Resident Commissioner
Santiago Iglesias
and His Times
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Santiago Iglesias lived between 1872 and 1939. His life is divided into four periods: the formative years, 1872-1896; the seedling period of the labor movement, 1896-1917; his career as Socialist senator, 1917-1932; and the years he was resident commissioner from Puerto Rico, 1932-1939. As the second and third periods are of such great importance, I have deemed it necessary to write four introductory chapters. These four chapters form Part One of this book and serve as a long, but vital, introduction to the main six chapters that make up Part two.

In order to set the stage, it is crucial to understand the socio-economic conditions of Puerto Rico at the end of the nineteenth century. Chapter I begins with an analysis of the economy and the society that had been formed at the end of the Spanish colonial domination. The rest of the chapter consists of the political evolution of the Island until 1896. It is of paramount importance to clearly understand the social, economic, and political situation of the period in order to comprehend the emancipatory struggle Santiago Iglesias faced. To overlook the politics of the Spanish colonial period and start with the parties founded after the United States took over the Island in 1898 would be most unwise as the principal ideologies of the twentieth century had their political formation in the nineteenth century.

The formative years of Iglesias in La Coruña and Havana are explained at the beginning of Chapter II. The first guilds, cooperatives, and other associations which had been formed before Iglesias made Puerto Rico his home are discussed together with the beginnings of a truly active and modern labor movement. The connection between the early years of the labor movement and the political parties is explained here. The Spanish American War and its results conclude the chapter.
The close friendship between Santiago Iglesias and Samuel Gompers and the relation between the Free Federation and the American Federation of Labor are important topics in Chapter III. The labor movement began to grow and became a strong force that had a great impact in the socio-economic and political life in Puerto Rico. Iglesias' relationship with Insular and Washington political leaders receives special attention. His contribution toward the granting of American citizenship to Puerto Ricans is carefully explained.

The development of the Socialist Party is the main subject of Chapter IV. The granting of the Jones Act and Iglesias' political participation between 1915 and 1928 are explained. Throughout Part One the evolution of the political parties and their principal leaders shows the continuity of Puerto Rican history.

Part Two begins with Chapter V. This chapter deals mainly with the socio-economic conditions of Puerto Rico after three decades of American colonial domination. It is parallel to Chapter I and serves to focus on the problems Iglesias faced in the last decade of his career. The Depression in Puerto Rico was more acute as a result of the hurricanes of 1929 and 1932. The political realignments between 1929-1931 conclude this chapter.

"On to Capitol Hill" is the title of Chapter VI. It starts in September, 1931, with Iglesias' trip to the fifty-first convention of the American Federation of Labor and continues with his activities until he was sworn-in as a member of Congress in March, 1933. Most of the chapter is dedicated to the electoral situation of 1932.

With Chapter VII Iglesias' congressional work begins. His task was a difficult one: he wanted Puerto Rico to receive equal treatment in New Deal legislation, not to be side-stepped and given merely token charitable allocations. The unrealistic separatist policies of the Liberal Party and the support it received from the Roosevelt Administration greatly limited Iglesias' congressional work and helped to create political unrest in Puerto Rico.

Chapter VIII continues with Iglesias' brief return to Puerto Rico in 1934 for a few weeks to strengthen the Coalition (of the Socialist and Republican Union parties). The conflicts between the Coalition and the New Deal agencies, and the political imbroglio they created consumes most of this long chapter. Iglesias continued working in Congress to get Federal grants to fight unemployment, attain social justice, and raise living standards for the working classes.
Introduction

In Chapter IX the electoral campaign of 1936 is explained. The Nationalist attempt on Iglesias’ life was the event that made most of the headlines during the campaign. By the end of November, Iglesias returned to Washington to resume his congressional duties. Work on the Hill was time-consuming, as he now belonged to four committees instead of the usual two. His staff consisted of an aide and a secretary, as opposed to present-day resident commissioners who have large staffs (more than twelve members, plus offices in San Juan and Ponce).

Chapter X also deals with Iglesias’ congressional activities. The political changes that were occurring in Puerto Rico are discussed. His participation in the internal fights of the Socialist Party received careful consideration. This chapter completes the book with the unexpected death of the Resident Commissioner.

I have received invaluable cooperation from numerous friends and colleagues who in different ways and to varying degrees have helped me with this book. They include: Luis Agrait, María de los Angeles Castro, Elizabeth J. Davy, Gervasio L. García, Alberto García Menéndez, Harold Lidin, Carmen Lidin, Kenneth Lugo, Wigberto Lugo, Enrique Lugo Silva, María Dolores Luque, Norma Maurosa, Fernando Picó, Joan Piurek, Virginia Pump, Carmen Raffucci, Andrés Ramos Mattei, Luis Rechani Agrait, Néstor Rigual, Nilsa Rivera Colón, Carmelo Rosario Natal, Arturo Santana, Ana Sagardía, Sandra Sawicki, Blanca Silvestrini, Dulce María Tirado, J. Benjamín Torres, and Charles Toth. To the Biblioteca José M. Lázaro of the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras, I am also indebted. Special thanks are given to the staff of the Colección Puertorriqueña and the Photographic Laboratory for having assisted me in the eight long years I spent in seemingly endless research. To my late great-aunt Margarita Santini I am deeply appreciative for having made the contact for me with Doña Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán and her indispensable archive.

This work was originally written as a doctoral thesis for Georgetown University in 1982. Dr. Luis E. Aguilar was the director of the dissertation. He was the person who originally suggested the subject of Santiago Iglesias when I was looking for a topic to do my research. I never thought I would enjoy research so much and that the suggested topic would definitely turn me into a historian. For his support throughout my Graduate School years I am most thankful. Dr. Thomas J. Dodd and Dr. Dorothy M. Brown have been the readers, I am most appreciative for their wise counsel.
Last, and certainly not least, my special thanks to the persons who most contributed to this work: Doña Pilar Barbosa de Rosario and Doña Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. Their advice and cooperation were enormous and vital. To them I dedicate this book.
Puerto Rico in the 1890’s

Puerto Rico covers approximately 3,435 square miles, an area which equals 2,198,400 acres. The Island is very mountainous, with its highest peak standing at 4,389 feet. Of the total land area, 40 per cent is covered by mountains, 35 per cent hills, and only 25 per cent prairies. As a result, 55 per cent of the land is 1,000 feet above sea level.¹ Of the total area, only 39 per cent is considered arable land, 58.4 per cent is suitable for pastures and forests, and 2.6 is uncultivated land.² Throughout the last hundred years the distribution has remained substantially the same. Agriculture was the principal source of wealth for Puerto Rico until contemporary times.

According to the census of 1899, Puerto Rico had 953,243 inhabitants. Other early census figures are: 1765, 44,883 inhabitants; 1800, 155,426 inhabitants; 1846, 447,914 inhabitants; and 1877, 731,648 inhabitants. The Island was two thirds as populous as Cuba and almost as populous as the state of West Virginia in an area one-third smaller than Connecticut or about the same size as the Cuban province of Matanzas. The urban proportion of the population was 21.4 per cent (203,792) and the rural, 78.6 per cent (749,451). The largest cities were San Juan (32,048) and Ponce (27,952). There were also 67 additional municipalities.³

The racial mixture in Puerto Rico has always been high. This is probably the main reason for the smaller degree of racial prejudice and discrimination. Of the 953,243 inhabitants, 589,426 (61.8 per cent) were classified as white, 304,352 (31.9 per cent) as mulatto, and 59,465 (6.3 per cent) as black. The blacks and mulattoes were generally found in the coastal areas (San Juan was only 47.6 per cent white), while the mountainous regions were mostly white.⁴ None of the original Taíno Indians
were left in 1899. Some observers, however, reported a small number of Puerto Ricans with what seemed to be Indian features. The Island also possessed 68 Chinese. Foreigners in Puerto Rico numbered 13,872 (1.5 per cent). Of this figure, 55 per cent were Spaniards, with the rest divided mostly among French (principally Corsicans), Italians, British (some were Caribbean blacks), Germans, Latin Americans, and 1,069 Americans.

To have a clear image of Puerto Rico at the end of the nineteenth century, one must consult Henry K. Carroll’s excellent work, *Report on the Island of Puerto Rico*, for information not found in the census of 1899. This book was commissioned in 1899 by the United States government in order to inform of all aspects of its recently acquired Caribbean colony. Carroll was a highly principled man, with a liberal spirit and a progressive mind. His large volume is an indispensable classic and an inexhaustible source of information.

The most common diseases which afflicted the Island were anemia, consumption, hookworm, malarial fevers, and various stomach ailments. Very few clinics and hospitals, both private and public, had been established. The few that existed were insufficiently equipped and badly operated. Ponce had the only hospital that could be considered worthy of that name. It was a natural thing to see people die for lack of medical assistance. The poor had an aversion toward hospitals because they believed the sick who were admitted there came out dead. Such public charities as orphanages and asylums were scarce, poorly supported and organized. One of the principal causes of disease was poor sanitation. Seventy-six per cent of the houses did not have sanitary facilities, not even a crude latrine. The average death rate between 1889 and 1898 stood at 30.2 per cent, considered then a moderate rate, while the birth rate was 28.2 per cent.

Puerto Rico’s public school system was antiquated with most of the schools located in the urban areas. Until the end of the nineteenth century few girls were sent to get an elementary education. The first rural school for girls appears to have been established as late as 1880. Only six school buildings were owned by the government. Most schools were located in rented rooms or buildings. In general, the physical facilities of schools were inadequate, the surroundings unsuitable, and bathroom facilities unsanitary. In 1899 there were 322,393 children of school age (ages 5 to 17) but only 25,798 (8 per cent) of them attended classes. There was no university on the Island. In June 1898, there had been 380 public schools
for boys, 148 for girls, 1 for adults, and 26 private schools with a total enrollment figure of 44,861 students. The Spanish government spent a total of $185,886.45 on educational expenses. The literacy rate was 15 per cent, while 1.6 per cent were able to read but not to write, and 83.2 per cent were totally illiterate. Illiteracy was extremely high and found principally in the rural areas.

In the 1890’s agriculture was the principal source of wealth for the country even though it was not in a prosperous period. The proportion of land under cultivation was difficult to determine. It was estimated that 294,973 acres were planted with coffee, sugar, tobacco and other crops. Pasture land amounted to 1,116,262 acres, and forest and wasteland totaled 657,631 acres. The acreage covered by urban areas was 391,534. Some 21 per cent of the total acreage of the Island was generally under cultivation. In 45 municipalities, 81 of 289 sugar plantations were uncultivated. The acreage planted with different crops varied yearly, especially those of sugar and tobacco. Acreage according to agricultural product was: coffee, 121,176 acres; sugar, 60,884 acres; tobacco, 4,222 acres; minor products (vegetables, bananas, etc.), 92,576 acres; and oranges, coconuts, and fruits in general, 16,115 acres. There were 50,753 owners of 60,953 farms. Latifundia was not yet a problem; it appeared later with the coming of the American corporations.

Puerto Rico’s excellent coffee was the main cash crop and brought extremely good prices in European markets. In the United States, however, the Puerto Rican coffee bean could not compete with the much cheaper Brazilian variety. The development of the coffee industry was due to a certain extent to the French emigrants that came from Haiti after its famous revolution in the 1790’s. It was not until 1876, however, that coffee production became important for the Island. Forty-one per cent of the Island’s total area was planted with coffee trees which, unlike those in Brazil, had to be raised under shade and grown with different types of banana and orange trees. There were 21,693 coffee farms covering 187,240 acres of which 91 per cent of the owners were white. The average size of a coffee farm was about 100 acres; they were located in the mountainous regions. The San Ciriaco hurricane of August 8, 1899, was disastrous for the planters who lost some $25,000,000. In 1897 the Island produced 51,710,997 pounds of coffee worth $12,222,599.

Sugar cane had been planted in Puerto Rico soon after its conquest by Juan Ponce de León in 1508. It never became, as in Cuba and other Caribbean Islands, an important crop until the twentieth century. Most
canefields were located on the coast and in some interior valleys. Because a large amount of acreage was necessary in order to be productive, very few small farmers cultivated sugar. The plantations varied in size, but the average was about 700 to 1000 acres. In the few years preceding 1898, a tendency had been started to increase the size of plantations by reducing their number in order to pull the industry out of a depression resulting from the abolition of slavery in 1873. This trend brought better prices and cheaper production. Puerto Rican sugar planters suffered heavily from exhausted soil, lack of fertilizers, archaic methods of cultivation, decrepit mills, plant diseases, high taxation, poor marketing, miserable communications, and lack of capital. So deplorable was the state of the sugar industry that it was difficult to see how producers could make a profit.14 There were 70,938 acres planted with sugar cane on 2,336 farms of which 96 per cent were owned by whites. The sugar mills totaled 345, but the majority possessed obsolete machinery. Cuba, with the best sugar mills, had only 207 and a gigantic production (then somewhat disorganized as a result of the 1895-1898 war). The crop in Puerto Rico for 1897 amounted to 126,827,472 pounds valued at $4,007,992.08.15

One contribution of the Arawak culture to European civilization was the enjoyment of tobacco smoking, and in Puerto Rico the cultivation of tobacco had been a paying business. The tobacco industry suffered from a combination of the problems faced by the coffee and sugar growers — foreign competition and poor methods of production. The quality of the insular tobacco leaf was not high and was usually exported to Cuba. Tobacco was raised on 4,222 acres by small farmers in the mountainous regions. In 1897 the production totaled 6,225,953 pounds sold for $1,194,318.30.16

Minor crops consisted of sweet potatoes, yams, pumpkins, rice, corn, tomatoes, different varieties of bananas, and other garden vegetables. They were raised on 143,175 acres and were consumed on the domestic market. Quality was terribly inferior; tomatoes were only slightly larger than marbles; cabbages and pumpkins were about the size of goose eggs. Production of fruits (16,115 acres) was mostly for local consumption.17

Puerto Rico's only lucrative agricultural industry was cattle raising. There were 1,093,273 acres of pasture with good and abundant grass. Costs were very low since few workers were needed in this type of industry. The cattle breeds were well suited for the climate, but the milk cows were of inferior quality. Some beef cattle was exported to Cuba and other Caribbean islands. The total value of cattle, plus horses, donkeys, mules, sheep, goats, and pigs, amounted to $8,360,736.18
In 1899, commerce in Puerto Rico was in the hands of Spanish and European houses; very few Puerto Ricans, were engaged in trading or banking. The principal merchants were Spanish and only employed Spanish clerks. The few Puerto Ricans that worked with them were engaged in the lowest kinds of jobs. On the other hand, the majority of planters and the few industrialists were Puerto Rican. An economic policy always followed in the Island has been to produce such commodities as coffee, sugar, tobacco, and cattle, and to import most of the food supply. The reasoning behind this policy has been that it is less expensive to import basic food products than to produce them. In 1897 imports amounted to $17,850,063. Spain sold the Island 40 per cent of the imports; the United States, 20 per cent; and England and its possessions, around 10 per cent. The remaining 30 per cent came mostly from Germany, Cuba, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Argentina. The leading products imported were rice ($2,481,631), codfish ($1,461,752), meat and lard ($1,394,935), wheat flour ($969,642), manufactured tobacco ($648,044), common wine ($388,303), canned goods ($238,929), soap ($220,403), iron plates ($211,094), cheese ($202,789), garden produce ($201,043), and other products. Food imports totaled more than 45 per cent with the rest being building materials, furniture, and machinery. The value of exports was $12,222,599, most of which was consumed by Spain, France, Cuba, Germany, and Italy. The value of exported sugar was $4,007,999, over half of which went to the United States. Cuba bought $990,808 of the $1,194,318 tobacco export.19

A sound banking system is indispensable in order for agriculture, trade, and industry to flourish. This was not the case in Puerto Rico in the 1890's. The idea of founding a bank in the Island goes back to 1812. It was not, however, until 1850 that the first bank, the London Colonial Bank, opened its doors in San Juan. It only lasted three years.20 The Bank 's short life was attributed to money-lending merchants' opposition to its establishment; they had so much power that they were able to drive the Bank into economic ruin. There were later attempts to found banks and savings associations, but each met with bad fortune.21 The first successful banking institution was the Sociedad Anónima de Crédito Mercantil which was founded in 1877. In 1881, the Caja de Economía y Préstamos was founded in San Germán. The Banco Español de Puerto Rico opened its doors in 1888; it soon became the most important bank because it functioned as a central bank with the power to issue paper money. This money, however, was not used as legal tender.22 In 1893, a cooperative
association called the Caja de Ahorro Colectivo opened operations, but soon went into bankruptcy. From its ruins arose the small Banco Popular de Economías y Préstamos which was much later (after the 1930's) destined to become the Island most powerful financial institution. Also partially developing from the Caja de Ahorro Colectivo was the Banco de Crédito y Ahorro Ponceño (1895). The Banco Territorial y Agrícola de Puerto Rico had been founded in 1894. Nevertheless, with all these credit institutions, the banking resources had only a capital (in dollars) of $1,115,957 and deposits of $1,838,783. The fragile banking system operated only in four cities. Most people depended on merchant money-lenders and usurers.

Very little can be written about the small and poor Puerto Rican industry in this period. Lack of capital, initiative, and technical knowledge compounded with the Spanish policy of protecting Peninsular industries accounted for the absence of a native industry. The few industries produced: bricks, furniture, ice, hats, oxcarts, salt, shoes, fruit preserves (1 factory), matches (1), castor oil (3), chocolate (3), cigarettes (27), cigars (108), bay rum (28 with a production of 15,143 gallons) and distilleries (198 making mostly rum with a total production of 1,615,075 gallons). There were also two foundries. Fifty years were to elapse before industrialization came to Puerto Rico.

Good communications are fundamental to the well-being and progress of any country. Without them, social, educational, cultural, industrial, commercial, and political interests cannot be fully developed. There was one excellent road cutting across the central mountains from San Juan to Ponce measuring 133 kilometers. Part of the road went also from Cayey to Guayama. Other roads of importance ran from Aguadilla to San Sebastián and from Ponce to Adjuntas. The other roads, some of which were called caminos reales (royal roads), were mostly rough trails which turned into mud ditches when it rained.

There were four railroad companies. The San Juan Railroad consisted of seven and a half miles of track from the Capital to Río Piedras. This company had 5 engines, 15 passenger cars, 1 baggage car, and 16 freight cars. The Western Railroad consisted of 6.21 miles of track between San Juan harbor and Bayamón. The company operated 2 locomotives, 5 passenger cars, and 17 freight cars. French interests owned the Porto Rico Railroad, 130 miles of unconnected track in different parts of the Island, which later extended from San Juan to Ponce via Mayagüez. This was a much larger company with 18 locomotives, 3
mail coaches, 4 baggage cars, 26 passenger cars, and 330 freight cars. A fourth railroad company was building a line from Añasco to Lares and had completed eleven miles. They had 2 engines, 4 passenger cars, 2 baggage cars, and 8 freight cars.28

A telephone system operated in San Juan (292 subscribers), Ponce (200 subscribers), and Mayagüez (100 subscribers). The telegraph system was a fine one with 400 miles of line serving 31 important towns. There were also 4 overseas cables. The Insular port facilities were primitive, even in San Juan.29

Of the total population of 953,243, 31 per cent was under 10 years old. The wage earners of the Island, a large number of them children, stood at 657,738. Only 11.8 per cent of the population was 45 years old, that is 112,934 people, 55,608 of whom were males and 57,326 females.30 In the wage earning group only half were full time laborers, which means only one third of Puerto Ricans were employed.31 As in other Latin American countries of that time, the laborers in Puerto Rico were not held in high esteem.

Until slavery was abolished by the First Spanish Republic in 1873 and to a lesser extent, until the American invasion, working conditions on the Island were more or less benevolent and responsibly despotic. The powerful landowners of Puerto Rico counted, while the great masses of field workers did not.32 The majority of the people depended upon daily wages for support, but the amount of employment was limited. The sugar cane industry required more laborers than either coffee or tobacco, but the work was not continuous. Many people worked during the harvest, but few were kept during the entire year. Daily wages for a normal field laborer on the sugar plantations ranged generally from 35 to 50 cents (provincial currency). A few skilled workers received 60 to 75 cents a day. The young boys and the few women who worked in this industry earned from 25 to 30 cents daily.33 The workers in the tobacco fields received a daily wage of 40 cents, but the pickers and sorters were, and continue to be, paid by the amount collected. Generally the workers in the coffee region made about 25 cents a day, working normally from morning to dusk. Wages varied from one plantation to another and from year to year. To a great extent wages were paid by tradition rather than by direct bargaining.34

Plantation owners paid their laborers once a week. Many of them paid in money, but a considerable number paid in the notorious vales (promissory notes) which were payable only at the store of the plantation owner.
It was common knowledge that in most of these stores the goods were sold at higher prices. Planters used the *vale* system of payment because they did not have enough cash for the season, and because there was a terrible shortage of legal tender on the Island. This unfair system of payment plagued the field working classes until the 1930’s when the Puerto Rican banking system became better organized.

The field workers were mostly illiterate because schools were by and large inaccessible. Their clothing was of the cheapest quality, and very few had two changes of clothes. The children, for the most part, went entirely naked, one reason for not sending them to school. The barefooted class amounted to nearly 700,000 people out of almost one million inhabitants. Only 150,000 persons were regular shoe wearers; 50,000 wore shoes from time to time.\(^{35}\)

The houses of the rural workers were small and poor. In the coastal areas these houses were straw huts made of palm leaves and, in the interior of certain types of grass. The huts were generally built one to three feet above the ground. Floors were constructed from pieces of royal palms, were uneven, and far from tight. They contained two or three rooms, ranging in size from six by seven feet to eight by ten feet; there were several windows and doors. The kitchen was generally next to the house. Furniture consisted of several hammocks: few families could afford the simplest of beds. When they could not afford hammocks they slept in corners of the room, sometimes on palm leaves. Perhaps there were benches or chairs: sometimes wooden boxes were used as substitutes. Tables were luxuries. Families of five or more members lived in these houses.\(^{36}\)

The urban workers’ houses appeared to be slightly better. Instead of straw or palm leaves, these houses were constructed from old wooden boxes used for other purposes. The interiors were the same as those in the rural worker’s houses. Though furniture might be considered slightly better, extreme poverty and squalor were evident there too. Dirt and filth were pervasive. Sanitary systems were nonexistent. Some city workers rented rooms in old buildings where rents were exorbitant and living conditions intolerable. Some families were better off, but since working opportunities were few, they could not improve their economic situation much. Household utensils were as scarce as furniture.\(^{37}\) Even with all this misery, Puerto Ricans were considered lovers of peace, courteous, and orderly; graver types of crime were not excessive and burglaries were insignificant. A high degree of illegitimacy (48 per cent of the children) was the result of poverty, illiteracy, and lack of efficiency on the part of the Catholic Church. Gambling was the principal vice.\(^{38}\)
Very few members of the working classes were robust. Most were small, thin, and stricken with anemia. There was need for a more plentiful and diversified diet. Plantains, bananas, rice, coffee, and codfish were the staples for the Puerto Rican worker year in and year out. Meat was a rare luxury; milk was of poor quality and scarce; the laborer had to be satisfied with whatever fruits he could obtain.\(^{39}\)

The skilled urban workers were better educated than their rural brothers, and they had better food and clothes. Yet because Insular industry was very small and working opportunities limited, their economic environment could not improve significantly. A member of the proletariat normally earned from $1.00 to $1.50 for a ten or eleven hour day.\(^{40}\)

In order to get a clearer view of the conditions of the laboring classes in Puerto Rico of yesteryear, a comparison with the sister island of Cuba and the stepmother country, the United States, is most revealing. A century report stating the percentage of persons in gainful occupations in the above mentioned countries by class occupations follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of occupation</th>
<th>Numbers in Puerto Rico</th>
<th>Puerto Rico</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, fisheries, and mining</td>
<td>198,761</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>38.0(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and personal service</td>
<td>64,819</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and mechanical industries</td>
<td>26,515</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and transportation</td>
<td>24,076</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal service</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>316,365</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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\(^{a}\) Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900.
In the United States the percentage of employed males in agriculture, fisheries, and mining was 42.3, while the proportion of males in Puerto Rico for the same group stood at a high of 73.3 per cent. Puerto Rican agriculture occupied three-quarters of the male population. The percentage of Puerto Rican women employed in this sector was 9.9, more than in Cuba (8.8) but less than that in the United States (14.3 per cent).\(^{41}\)

From the beginning of the sixteenth century Puerto Rico had been part of the Spanish Empire. For the Spanish crown the Island had a great military importance for the first three centuries. Puerto Rico was a key bastion of the empire in withstanding the attacks of the French, the English, and the Dutch. The Island was ruled by the military for the benefit of the defense of the Spanish kingdoms of the Indies.\(^{42}\) Puerto Rico was probably the part of the Spanish Empire that suffered more attacks by the European powers. These attacks, plus the negative influence of the Haitian Revolution, the immigration of royalists from the rest of Latin America, and the lack of a numerous creole intelligentsia with a strong economy, would help prevent the separatist ideal from having a strong following in the country.

The origins of the Puerto Rican political movements trace themselves back to the invasion of Spain by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808. By dethroning the Spanish Bourbons and replacing them with his brother Joseph, Napoleon created a colossal political upheaval that culminated with his own downfall and the Latin American wars of independence that liquidated most of the Spanish empire. The majority of the people, both in Spain and in the Indies, rejected Joseph I and favored the imprisoned Ferdinand VII. In Spain juntas provisionales were created, and, soon afterwards, a Junta Suprema y Gubernativa de España e Indias was formed to defend the country and to uphold the national sovereignty. The Junta Suprema decided that the overseas Spanish possessions were not colonies but integral provinces of the Spanish kingdom. As a result, there were to elect their corresponding representation. Puerto Rico had the right to one representative, and, as a result, the Junta Electoral elected Ramón Power in 1809.\(^{43}\) Power was a naval officer and member of an important San Juan creole family. He had recently distinguished himself by helping Juan Sánchez Ramírez in the reconquest of Santo Domingo from the French.\(^{44}\)

The Junta Suprema was replaced by the Consejo de Regencia. This council decided to call together the Spanish Cortes in which the overseas provinces were to be represented. Power was elected again.\(^{45}\)
By 1810 the Latin American wars of independence were gathering momentum. In order to strengthen the power of the crown in the Island, the Consejo de Regencia granted absolute (*.omnímodos*) powers to the governor and captain general of Puerto Rico. There were rumors of separatist conspiracies in the Island. Power, who now had been elected to the Spanish Cortes, rejected these rumors and vigorously attacked the absolute powers just granted to the governor.46

The celebrated Cortes of Cádiz reaffirmed that the overseas Spanish provinces were totally equal to those of the Península.47 The Spanish liberals had opted to follow a policy of political assimilation, equality, identity, and similitude, words that were used interchangeably for the rest of the century. This concept was not really new in Spanish law as it went back as far back as the Middle Ages. Even such centralistic monarchs as the Catholic Kings, the Hapsburgs, and the Bourbons had accepted this principle that had now been made a reality.48 Except for a small group of separatists, Puerto Rican liberals throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century were firm believers in this political principle.

Power was an active participant in the debates that created the famous Cádiz Constitution of 1812. Once the principle of political assimilation with Spain was established in this liberal constitution, Power took the second step in the development of Puerto Rican liberalism: political and administrative decentralization. In other words, he tried to obtain for the Island the greatest amount of internal autonomy possible without breaking from the unity with Spain. He succeeded in obtaining for Puerto Rico a liberal Provincial Diputation, more freedom for the municipalities, and several important economic and educational reforms which were to be greatly beneficial throughout the rest of the century. In 1813 Power was replaced by the liberal José María Quiñones, member of an influential family of San Germán, the second oldest city of the Island and at the time the second in importance.49

During this period the insular politics divided itself into two principal camps: the liberals wanting reform and the conservatives preferring the status quo. There was also a handful of cryptoseparatists. More than half a century would pass before these groups would form their corresponding political parties.50

In 1814 Ferdinand VII returned to Madrid and began to suppress the Constitution of 1812 and to reestablish absolutism. Puerto Rico regressed to the colonial status that existed in 1808.51

Colonel Rafael de Riego revolted in 1820 and succeeded in forcing
Ferdinand VII to reestablish the 1812 Constitution. Liberal Marshall Demetrio O‘Daly, a native of San Juan, was elected Puerto Rico’s deputy to the Cortes and in 1822 was replaced by José María Quiñones. The following year Father Félix Varela, a Cuban deputy, presented to the Cortes a bill which would have granted an autonomous form of government to Cuba and Puerto Rico. This bill was backed by Quiñones. As the bill was favorably discussed, the Holy Alliance intervened in Spain, and Ferdinand VII gladly returned to absolutism. Puerto Rico returned to its former colonial status, and in 1825 the governor was given absolute powers which were generally used throughout the rest of the century except during the short periods of true liberalism.

In 1836 the Queen of Spain was forced to accept the 1812 Constitution. As a result, Puerto Rico elected the moderate Juan B. Becerra, of San Juan, deputy to the Cortes. Unfortunately, the Cortes refused to let the Puerto Rican and Cuban deputies take their corresponding parliamentary seats. The Cortes decided that the constitution would not be applied to Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, and that henceforth they would be governed by special laws.

Several reasons can be attributed to these reactionary decisions, but the most important ones dealt with Cuba. First, political equality for whites and free blacks could lead to a disastrous slave revolution as had occurred in Haiti during the 1790’s (Cuba had then more blacks than whites). Second, if the insular colonies were given equal political rights with Spain, they would demand more rights which would lead to independence and the total liquidation of what remained of the empire. How these special laws were to be defined and applied remained unanswered and opened the way for numerous interpretations in the decades to follow.

Among the thinkers who had a marked influence in the Puerto Rican liberal movement was Francisco Pi y Margall. In 1854 this upcoming Catalanian radical activist published his first work of political significance. In *La reacción y la revolución* he presented the basic principles of his federal doctrine: unity inside diversity, universal suffrage, absolute freedom of thought, the sovereignty of the individual, and the rejection of the monarchy to be replaced by a republic. Pi y Margall broadened the principles of political and administrative decentralization. He defended the idea that the Spanish provinces should have the sovereignty that would lead toward a concluding federal pact. He envisaged this process in two steps. First, the provinces should have true democratic government with universal suffrage. Second, the provincial governments
and the local administrations (e.g., the municipalities) should receive from the national federal government their corresponding rights.\textsuperscript{58}

In the ensuing years, Pi y Margall expanded his ideals and was responsible for making “nineteenth-century Spanish republicanism synonymous with federalism.”\textsuperscript{59} His theories “gave coherence to the popular desire for greater independence from centralized government” and “doctrinal form to a tendency which had been a marked feature of Spanish life since the collapse of the centralized State during the War of Independence.”\textsuperscript{60} Pi y Margall’s movement was an urban one, and he was the only republican leader “who recognized the need for basing the Republic on the support of the workers.”\textsuperscript{61} His republican federalism was pro-labor and almost socialistic, but not communist.\textsuperscript{62} As will be seen later, this radical republican ideologue included in these ambitious plans, Puerto Rico and Cuba, since they were also Spanish provinces.

Because of the Cuban slave problem, the disastrous intervention in the Dominican Republic, and the difficult political relations with Great Britain and the United States, the Spanish government began to study the political, administrative, and economic problems of Cuba and Puerto Rico in order to decide what should be done with the special laws.\textsuperscript{63}

Spain’s Minister of the Colonies (Ultramar) was the young, intelligent, and ambitious Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. In a decree published on November 25, 1865, Cánovas called together a Junta Informativa of distinguished Cubans and Puerto Ricans to study and resolve their insular problems and the question of how to apply the special laws. Cánovas’ decree of reforms reaffirmed the Spanish legal traditions of political assimilation and degrees of decentralization.\textsuperscript{64} Traditionally, Puerto Rican historiography has studied the economic reforms proposed by the Puerto Rican members of the Junta Informativa because they deal with the abolition of slavery. Incredible as it may seem, the political reforms have been almost totally overlooked. This book will emphasize the significant political reform.

Elections were held to select the Puerto Rican members of the Junta Informativa; three conservatives and three liberals were chosen. Participating in the report on political reforms together with some Cuban members of the Junta were the three liberals: Segundo Ruiz Belvis, José Julián Acosta, and Francisco Mariano Quiñones.\textsuperscript{65} During the Junta days these men shared similar reformist liberal views for Puerto Rico. Soon, however, they would evolve from reformist liberals into three different political postures dividing Puerto Rico’s liberal camp from 1867 on. Ruiz
Belvis became a separatist with federalist tendencies and died in Chile in 1867. José Julián Acosta later became a monarchist assimilist and died in San Juan in 1891. Francisco Mariano Quiñones, a nephew of José María Quiñones, became a republican during the First Spanish Republic, continued as such inside the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party in 1887, remained an ortodoxo in 1897-1898, was a founding member of the Puerto Rican Republican Party in 1899, and died in San Germán in 1908 without changing his political credo.

In the long political report the reformist liberals declared that the political reforms they desired were based on the good principles of Spanish constitutional law and traditions. They categorically rejected the British system which denied colonial parliamentary representation in London, a privilege they have enjoyed in the Cortes, and the French colonial system of government. The reforms that they favored were acceptable in any platform of any Spanish political party. They wanted a representative form of government similar to that of the Peninsula. The first step to be taken would be the one of political assimilation as a peninsular Spanish province. They totally discarded and condemned any desire for political independence from Spain. Political assimilation with the Peninsula was the first step in the great Spanish tradition. The second step was the achievement of some degree of political and administrative decentralization, also an old Spanish political tradition that responded to the logical necessities of regional differences. The reformist liberals demanded equal rights and no more than any other Peninsular province. They explained that in representative forms of government there would be either a centralized system or a decentralized one. This decentralized system was the one of provincial autonomy which Spain had for centuries in the Basque provinces, Catalonia, and Valencia. Under the Spanish monarchy both the centralized and the decentralized (e. g., the autonomous) forms of government coexisted. The Antillean reformist liberal representatives favored for Cuba and Puerto Rico the autonomous form of government since it was most logical. That logic was founded in the traditional laws of the Spanish crown which gave political equality (assimilation) in everything that was possible and granted degrees of decentralization (autonomy) wherever adversities of interests made it a necessity. The reformist liberals wholly condemned the reactionary theory that the autonomous reforms would lead to independence. They believed that these reforms would bring more unity with Spain since there would be more political participation and sharing of responsibilities.
They concluded their report praising the work of the liberals of the Generation of 1812, the work of Power and Varela, and pledging their continuance with that tradition. This historic document inspired the liberal Puerto Rican political tradition from that time on.66

The work of the Junta Informativa was fully discussed. But by the time their work was concluded in 1867, the Spanish government had grown conservative, and the reform plans were ignored.67 This Spanish reaction would lead to the revolutions of 1868 and the downfall of Isabel II.

Curiously, an army mutiny with no political overtones whatsoever caused Governor José M. Marchesi to unleash a wave of repression against Puerto Rican liberals including the members of the Junta Informativa. Ruiz Belvis fled to New York together with the celebrated mulatto and radical abolitionist, Dr. Ramón E. Betances. There these two men joined other Cuban and Puerto Rican separatists of the Sociedad Republicana de Cuba y Puerto Rico that had been founded in 1865. The separatist party was gathering momentum as they founded the Comité Revolucionario de Puerto Rico.68 Betances directed this committee which soon began to organize secret societies in the Island in preparation for a revolt against Spain.69 Betances and Ruiz Belvis issued a manifesto on July 16, 1867 urging the Puerto Ricans and Cubans to make a revolution, overthrow the oppressive Spaniards, and achieve independence for the two Antilles in order to form a confederation between Cuba and Puerto Rico.70 From their origins, Puerto Rican separatists had a federative inclination, and a few even wanted annexation to the United States. Some only dreamed of confederating, or federating, the Spanish speaking Antilles, while other went so far as to include Haiti, Jamaica, and other Caribbean regions.71

Betances' secret organizations resulted in the legendary Grito de Lares of September 23, 1868. This Puerto Rican uprising was lead by Manuel Rojas, a Venezuelan, and Louisiana-born Matías Brugman, who lived in the interior of the Island. The government of the recently declared Republic of Puerto Rico was established with two Puerto Ricans, Francisco Ramírez Medina and Aurelio Méndez Martínez, as president and prime minister of the country. The Spanish government acted swiftly and efficiently, and the rebellion lasted only forty-eight hours. Repression followed, and scores of separatists suspects and liberals, including Acosta, were arrested. Betances had acted too hastily and with very little popular support from either the masses or the elite.72 Among the arrested
persons was a youth by the name of José Julio Henna. When a general amnesty was later declared, he left for New York swearing not to return to Puerto Rico until the Spanish flag had been replaced.  

Lares was followed by the Cuban Grito de Yara of October 10, 1868, and, unknown to all Puerto Ricans, had been proceeded by the so-called Glorious Revolution in Spain that commenced on September, 18, 1868 and ended the disastrous reign of Isabel II.  

With the Revolution of 1868 the liberal spirit of 1812 returned to Spain. The provincial government considered Puerto Rico a province which would have representation in the new Cortes. Spain was returning to the liberal policy of assimilation of 1810 and 1820. A new electoral code ruled that the deputies elected to the Cortes did not have to be residents of their representative districts. This rule created the system of cunерismo which, in the hands of conservative governments, would be used to make a mockery out of the political equality Puerto Rico supposedly enjoyed.  

The governor of Puerto Rico was the treacherous General José L. Sanz, who strove to limit the political participation of the Island. The political camp was divided between the conservatives who defended the status quo and opposed most reforms and the reformist liberals. The conservatives were mostly peninsular Spaniards comprised of government employees and business men. Also evident in this group were Puerto Ricans who were called austriaсantes because they wanted to be more Spanish than the Spaniards. The majority of the country was liberal, and there were some Spaniards with them. Nevertheless, the conservatives had most of the influence in the government and controlled the economic life of the Island.  

After a long political ordeal, the reformist liberals succeeded in February 1870 in electing four deputies: Román Baldorioty de Castro, José de Escoriaza, Juan Hernández Arbizu, and Luis Padial Vizcarrondo.  

The first group to organize a political party in Puerto Rico were the conservatives when they founded the Liberal Conservative Party in February 21, 1869. They were monarchists and generally enjoyed the backing of Madrid for the next three decades.  

The reformist liberals founded the Reformist Liberal Party on November 20, 1870, under the presidency of Pedro G. Goyco. Their program was based on political assimilation with Spain as the first step, to be followed by autonomy for the Island. This platform followed the tradition of Power, Varela, and the Junta Informativa which was about to
find defenders in the Cortes with the four Reformist Liberal deputies. Most members of the Party were republicans.

Minister of Colonies Manuel Becerra favored the assimilative plans of the Puerto Rican Reformist Liberals and went as far as to favor an autonomy with federal characteristics. In December 1869 he already had presented a bill to grant Puerto Rico a constitution. Escoriza wanted an autonomy identical to the one enjoyed by the Basque provinces. The constitutional project defended by Becerra was favored by the Insular Reformist Liberals, but the bill died when Becerra left the ministry in March 1870. Fortunately, the new Minister of Colonies, Segismundo Moret, presented a similar constitutional bill for Puerto Rico which was also defended by the Reformist Liberals, but it never became a reality. The reasons for not giving autonomy to Puerto Rico were the fierce war of independence being fought in Cuba and the feeling that such liberties would inevitably drive the country to independence. These excuses were similar to those employed in 1837. Eventually the people that favored these reactionary ideas formed the National League Against the Reforms whose object was to oppose the colonial reforms for Puerto Rico and Cuba. Some prominent members of the League were Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, later leader of the Conservative Party, and Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, future leader of the Liberal Fusionist Party.

The parliamentary system in the Cortes was extremely complex, and the Puerto Rican Reformist Liberals had very little influence inside the unstable Spanish political parties. In order to achieve more political influence and reforms for Puerto Rico Baldorioty promoted a pact, not a fusion, with the Progressive Democratic Party of Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla. Under this coalition the Puerto Rican Reformist Liberals would vote with Ruiz Zorrilla’s party and that party would then support reforms for Puerto Rico.

In April 1872 new elections took place in Puerto Rico for the Cortes. Governor Ramón Gómez Pulido, under the orders from Sagasta, rigged the elections in favor of the Conservatives, giving them most of the seats in the Cortes. Baldorioty lost his seat. In a later August election, the Reformist Liberals came out much better, though Baldorioty did not get elected.

The Liberal Conservative Party realized changes were in order. Sagasta convinced them to accept the principle of political assimilation and some reforms, such as the abolition of slavery. They also changed their name from Liberal Conservative Party to the Spanish Unconditional Party.
Inside the Reformist Liberal Party some internal changes were also occurring between the monarchists (Acosta, Goyco, Escoriaza, and de Celis Aguilera) and the republicans (Baldorioty, Blanco Sosa, Fernández Juncos, Labra, and Francisco Mariano Quiñones). The monarchists were assimilists and favored some degrees of political and administrative decentralization. The republicans were also assimilists, but they demanded a greater degree of political and administrative decentralization. What they called ample political administrative decentralization was really autonomy. There were some Reformist Liberals that would oscillate from one group to the other.\textsuperscript{91}

On February 11, 1873 the First Spanish Republic was proclaimed and Francisco Pi y Margall's federal ideals began to materialize. Pi y Margall favored a federal constitution for Spain whose provinces would be divided into autonomous states (i.e., federal states). One of these federal states would be Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{92} The Reformist Liberals were jubilant. Baldorioty declared that he shared Pi y Margall's ideals because "federal assimilation is the autonomy of the province" (e.g., Puerto Rico). He added, with some justified exaggeration, that everyone in the Island was a federalist.\textsuperscript{93}

The work of the Puerto Rican deputies in the Cortes was so efficient that the leader of the Bourbonist deputies complained that they "dominated" and were the "arbiters of the fortunes of Spain."\textsuperscript{94} Another prominent Peninsular politician declared that before Spain had ruled Puerto Rico but that now Puerto Rico ruled Spain. One newspaper went so far as to call the Puerto Rican deputies the "authors of the Spanish Republic."\textsuperscript{95}

Unfortunately, the Spanish Republic faced colossal obstacles. Only the United States and Switzerland, two decentralized republics, recognized the new regime. France threatened to intervene if Spain approved a federal constitution. Great Britain was also unfavorable.\textsuperscript{96} Under the presidencies of Nicolás Salmerón, and Emilio Castelar, a conservative republican, the federal constitutional project stagnated.\textsuperscript{97} Nevertheless, during the brief Republic, Puerto Rico achieved full political rights and responsibilities with the peninsular provinces. Madrid had finally adopted a policy of assimilation for Puerto Rico. The Island would continue sending deputies to the Cortes until 1898.\textsuperscript{98}

A milestone of the Republic was the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico on March 22, 1873. This had been one of the principal goals of the Reformist Liberals, and Puerto Ricans celebrated the freedom of 29,335 slaves.\textsuperscript{99}
The Reformist Liberal Party changed its name to Reformist Federal Party and swept the fifteen seats for the Cortes in May 1873. There they identified themselves completely with the republican leadership of the government. Manuel Corchado Juarbe, a hardworking and eloquent deputy under attack by some Peninsular deputy, affirmed that he had studied federalism well and was therefore a federalist republican. He further declared that in Puerto Rico he had defused federalism making it possible to elect so many federal republican deputies. Cánovas del Castillo went so far as to state that the Puerto Rican republican deputies "had in their hands the fate of all Spain." But the Republic had powerful enemies. Such important politicians as Cánovas del Castillo and Sagasta hated it. The army had similar inclinations, especially General Manuel Pavía. Pavía was a friend of Sagasta who seems to have given him the idea to overthrow the Republic. President Castelar’s position toward the activities of Pavía was greatly disliked by the federal republicans. When Pavía overthrew the Republic on January 3, 1874, these forces accused Castelar both of treason (for knowledge of the conspiracy) and imbecility (for not taking the necessary precautions to prevent the coup). After the coup, the conservative Castelar continued as a republican but in thepossibilist mold (i. e., and opportunist) because he collaborated with the monarchy, to the eternal dislike of the staunch republicans. In the provisional government Sagasta, as Minister of State, sent the reactionary Governor Sanz to Puerto Rico to demolish most of the reforms achieved under the Republic. With the restoration of Alfonso XII and the establishment of a parliamentary system with ministerial responsibility, Cánovas del Castillo and Sagasta alternated in the prime minister position. From 1876 until 1898 the Conservatives of Cánovas and the Liberal Fusionists of Sagasta ruled Spain by means of corrupt elections and with the collaboration of the possibilist Castelar and other minor groups. The Spanish Constitution of 1876 accepted the principle of assimilation for Puerto Rico and promised special laws as in 1837. But through fraudulent electoral means, the national system of cunerismo, and local caciquismo (bossism), the Unconditional Party controlled the Island with the authoritarian governors. Sagasta called autonomy “dangerous and prejudicial for the security of the bonds of unity between the Antilles and Spain.” Because of this reactionary policy, the Reformist Liberals, and later the Autonomists, refused to participate in the corrupt elections most of the
time. Other times they were merely able to elect few candidates for the
Insular positions or to the Cortes.

It was not until 1880 when the Reformist Liberals became active
again after the Sanz repression following the fall of the Republic. But they
were badly divided between assimilists (i.e., monarchists) and autono-
mists (i.e., republicans). The assimilists won and took control of the
reactivated Reformist Liberal Party, which sometimes was officially
called the Assimilist Party. They advocated a close collaboration with the
Spanish crown. José de Celis Aguilera was elected president in 1883.107
The republican autonomists gained in strength, and a year later de Celis
gave up the presidency. Julián Blanco Sosa was elected president.108 The
principal monarchical assimilists (de Celis, Goyco, and Acosta) began to
retire from active politics.109 They represented "temperate, aristocratic,
and conservative ideas" inside the Party as opposed to the "ardent,
democratic, and radical ideas" of Baldorioty and his followers.110

With the resignation of de Celis Aguilera, the evolution of the
autonomic program was inevitable. The assimilists had been defeated by
the campaigns of Rafael M. de Labra and Baldorioty. Labra, a Cuban by
birth and a resident of Spain, was a fervent republican autonomist with a
seat in the Cortes where he defended Puerto Rico.111 In his plan to
reorganize the Party in the Ponce convention of 1887, Baldorioty wanted
the Reformist Liberals to emerge from the meeting without discussion
and as autonomists and republicans, as he had always been.112

The famous Ponce convention of March 1887 united the Reformist
Liberals as a regional party and made autonomy a common ideal. The first
step in the development of Puerto Rican liberalism had been political
assimilation with the Peninsula (i.e., representation in the Cortes) and that
had been a fact, although one somewhat corrupted by the system of
cunerismo, since 1869. Now the second step was about to be taken. This
was autonomism, a high degree of local political and administrative
decentralization inside the Spanish nationality. The republican or monar-
chical affiliations of the members of the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party
toward the peninsular Spanish parties were protected under Article 7 of
the platform. That article permitted any member of the Party to sympa-
thize or affiliate himself with any metropolitan party which would define
autonomy for Puerto Rico.113 In this convention, the Generation of 1868,
the one of Baldorioty, Betances, and others, was slowly being replaced by
the Generation of 1887, composed of such men as José Celso Barbosa,
José de Diego, Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, Luis Muñoz Rivera, Manuel
F. Rossy, and others. These men were to be the principal political figures of the next four decades. The leading monarchical assimilists (Acosta, de Celis, Goyco, etc.) never became autonomists because this would have been too radical for them.114

Soon after the creation of the Autonomist Party, Sagasta named General Romualdo Palacio as governor of Puerto Rico on March 23, 1887. The new executive found the Island in full political effervescence. The Unconditionals lost no time affirming that the Autonomists were pernicious separatists. The Autonomists rejected these accusations and came out victorious in many municipalities in the local June elections, a blow for the Unconditionals and Palacio. As a result, the governor sent by Sagasta to Puerto Rico unleashed a four month campaign of terror known in history as the componte, the terrible year of 1887, which was another unfortunate chapter in the annals of Spanish atrocities. Scores were tortured; the jails filled. Baldorioty and fifteen other prominent Autonomists were thrown into the dungeons of the Morro Castle. There were rumors of executions. Some fled from the Island. A secret message was sent to the autonomists in Madrid who informed the Spanish government of Palacio's terror. Labra and Federico Degetau, who was like a son to Baldorioty, were able to have Palacio removed. On Christmas Day, 1887 the componte nightmare ended as Baldorioty and other patriots were freed. All Puerto Rican liberals rejoiced and never forgot the terrible year.115

In Cuba the reformists of 1867 had by 1878 founded the Liberal Party which became a defender of autonomy in 1882.116 The leading Cuban separatists were mostly in exile after the Ten Year War, 1868 to 1878. The conservative Spaniards along with some Cubans had created the Constitutional Union Party. These conservatives ran the country as the Unconditionals did in Puerto Rico,117 working with either Cánovas or Sagasta.118 However, it seemed sometimes that the Party divided itself into the Constitutional Union Party and the Reformist Party. The first group followed Cánovas, and the Reformists collaborated with Sagasta. Regardless of these divisions, the Autonomists did not make much progress and "were distrusted by everyone in Madrid because they seemed to be Republican as well as Autonomist."119 They had no influence in the Spanish establishment except with Pi y Margall's Federalist Republicans who had no power.120 By allying themselves with the Peninsular republicans, the Cuban Autonomists lost all possibilities of being heard by the Conservatives or the Liberal Fusionists; but they
had no alternative. The Cuban and Puerto Rican autonomists shared similar political programs, and Labra represented both Antilles, as well as an Asturian district, during different periods of his long career in the Cortes. Labra was an ardent autonomist although he was a prominent member of the Spanish Centralist Republican Party that opposed Pi y Margall’s Federalists. As years passed and Spain did not make the desired autonomist reforms, more and more Cubans began to favor the separatists that were being reorganized by José Martí.

Some months after the terror of the componte, the Autonomists renewed their activities. But there were bitter divisions among them regarding their relationship with the different peninsular parties. Their dilemma centered on the question of whether or not the party should make a pact, a fusion, an alliance, or an understanding with the Liberal Fusionists or with which republican peninsular party (there were Radicals, Federalists, Centralists, and Possibilists). The relationship with the Cuban autonomists was also a source of controversy. Baldorioty did his best to keep the Party together; doing a great deal to reorganize it. Baldorioty informed the local Autonomist committees that the first part of the platform, identity of rights (i.e., political assimilation with the Peninsula) was being fulfilled and would be implemented entirely. The second part was provincial autonomy (i.e., local political and administrative decentralization) which would necessarily come by addition. These ideals were based on Spanish traditions and laws, the contributions of Power, José María Quiñones, Varela, the Junta Informativa, Labra, and the work of the Reformist Liberals and the republican deputies in the Cortes. The monarchical assimilation of de Celis and his followers had been overcome. Baldorioty, however, was becoming old and in poor health. He finally resigned in February 1889 and died six months later.

In July 1890 Luis Muñoz Rivera founded La Democracia, a political newspaper whose aim was to “defend the absolute integrity of the autonomist creed.” Soon Muñoz Rivera set out a campaign to nationalize the Autonomist Party. His attitude was pragmatic, not dogmatic. In articles published in March 1891, Muñoz Rivera wrote that the autonomist creed had very little autonomism. That identification in Madrid with the Cuban Autonomist had had negative effects for Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican liberals faced four different options: annexation to the United States, rejected by all Puerto Ricans; a separatist rebellion, considered by everyone an unrealizable utopia; a net autonomy (as Canada), unacceptable because insular representation in the Cortes
prevented its suitability in the Spanish colonial system and because Madrid would never grant it; and decentralization (political and admin-
istrative) which was desired by all. In order to achieve the desired decentralization, the Autonomist Party needed to be influential in Madrid and accepted by a powerful party which would make the changes to replace the Unconditionals who controlled insular politics. Muñoz Rivera also rejected Pi y Margall’s republican federalism saying it was an “impossible fantasy.” It was with the monarchist Liberal Fusionist Party of Sagasta that he desired to affiliate the Autonomist Party. With this strategy Muñoz wanted to force the Unconditionals into a union with Cánovas’ Conservative Party.129 If the monarchy were to be replaced by a republic, Muñoz planned to side with the rightwingers because Sagasta would most likely be their leader. In case Sagasta would not accept the republic, then Muñoz planned to follow the leader who would make the best political deal.130

Basically these political plans of Muñoz Rivera were not new. Previously de Celis had been the foremost exponent of them. But former exponents generally had wanted pacts and alliances, not fusions.131 What Muñoz Rivera introduced to these schemes was crass opportunism and political cynicism. Nevertheless, these pragmatic plans were to be successful and used by his followers throughout the twentieth century.

The republican autonomists vigorously attacked Muñoz Rivera’s pragmatism because it was a retrocession to the assimilism of de Celis in the early 1880’s.132 There was, however, one who was delighted by Muñoz Rivera, the retired monarchical assimilist, José Julián Acosta. Shortly before his death Acosta, who never became an Autonomist, believed Muñoz Rivera’s sophistic political plans were very good.133 Muñoz Rivera, who always claimed to follow the ideals of Baldorioty and the Ponce convention of 1887, received praise from a man who had never espoused those ideals. He was indeed rapidly becoming a most successful and crafty politician.

At the 1891 convention of the Autonomist Party in Mayagüez, Muñoz Rivera proposed a pact with Sagasta. José de Diego eloquently attacked it calling it vile. He favored a pact with the Possibilist Castelar because this republican headed the most conservative wing of the republicans. Both motions were rejected. Article 7 of the platform of the Ponce convention of 1887 was replaced by one that permitted the formation of a commission that would have the powers to make intelligences, not fusions or alliances, between the Autonomist Party and the
Peninsular democrats who would accept or defend the ideal of Autonomy for the Antilles. The article kept the Party united.\textsuperscript{134}

Mariano Abril, Muñoz Rivera’s alter ego and a famous journalist, wrote critically later against the idea of annexing Puerto Rico to the United States. He stated that the Island would continue to be an exploited colony with the only difference being that the new metropolitan power would have a totally different culture. There would be, of course, economic progress but for the sole benefit of the new masters. The American culture would absorb and destroy the Puerto Ricans as the Taño Indians had been extinguished before. The “beautiful and rich” Spanish tongue would be replaced by the “cold and poor” English language.\textsuperscript{135}

The relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States had its origins in the middle of the eighteenth century when ships from the thirteen colonies initiated a limited trade with the Island. With the War of Independence, in which Spain participated, the trade, mostly flour and provisions, intensified, and Puerto Rico became a semidependency of the United States as a source of all kinds of supplies.\textsuperscript{136} By 1833 the Island was so dependent economically upon the United States that it was considered a fixed branch of its commerce. Even Spain began to worry about the influence American republican principles were having in the minds of the few Puerto Ricans that went to be educated in the United States.\textsuperscript{137} Francisco Mariano Quiñones was one of these.\textsuperscript{138} But there was not much Spain could do to lessen these influences. There was, however, no strong political annexionist movement in Puerto Rico per se as in Cuba. The individuals that harbored annexionist sentiments were mostly found among the separatists activists working in New York City with the Cuban revolutionaries.

After the Autonomist Party convention of 1891 in Mayagüez, Muñoz Rivera renewed his fusionist campaign from his newspaper. This was answered in several Insular newspapers by different leading republican Autonomists.\textsuperscript{139} Muñoz became so annoyed at not being able to succeed in his plans, that he retired temporarily from the Party in August 1892.\textsuperscript{140}

By 1894 the Autonomist Party was facing a terrible internal crisis brought on by the dilemma of pacts and fusions. In February the Party was reorganized and the new Directory formed included some of the principal young leaders of the Generation of 1887: Dr. José Gómez Brioso, Political Director; Manuel F. Rossy, Esq., Juridical Director; Dr. José Celso Barbosa, Economic Director, and Luis Sánchez Morales, Secre-
tary. All were republicans who defended the regionalism of the Party and the platform of the Ponce convention of 1887. They would lead the Party until 1897. Barbosa was the principal ideologue. Muñoz Rivera thought these men to be very intelligent and patriotic.\textsuperscript{141}

The internal fights inside the Autonomist Party resulted from the erratic reforms promised by Madrid from time to time. In 1888 Manuel Becerra was Minister of Colonies again and offered some minor reforms which had no results. Under Prime Minister Sagasta, Minister of Colonies Antonio Maura tried to make some reforms in 1892. He urged the members of the Constitutional Union in Cuba to accept the Autonomists as their loyal opponents inside the electoral system. His decentralizing reforms were also to be applied to Puerto Rico. As the reforms neared realization, they were accidentally undermined by Basque autonomist riots and anarquist terrorism. Many Spaniards thought that the granting of autonomy to the Antilles would lead to the disintegration of Spain; this conservative pressure influenced Sagasta to drop the Maura reforms and Maura resigned in March 1894.\textsuperscript{142} Buenaventura Arbaiza, the new Minister of Colonies, was Cuban born and a former follower of Possibilist Castelar. He proposed autonomic reforms more limited than the previous ones. But as they were being discussed, the second Cuban War of Independence of 1895 exploded, and the planned reforms were stopped. These reforms could have satisfied many of the Cuban separatists.\textsuperscript{143}

Just before the reorganization of the Autonomist Party in February 1894, Antonio Cortón, former Puerto Rican deputy to the Cortes and resident of Madrid, came to the Island with a political plan. Before leaving Madrid, he had talked with Maura and Moret with regard to the Antillean reforms being considered. Cortón's plan consisted in modifying the platform of the Autonomist Party by dropping its regionalist character, while still remaining autonomic, thus enabling the Party to join the Maura faction of the Liberal Fusionist Party of Sagasta. This was a new variation in the already complex situation surrounding the Autonomist Party regarding the dilemma of pacts and fusions. Cortón was not successful; he returned to Madrid and started a journalistic campaign against the Directory and Labra, who was then the leader of the Autonomist Party in the Cortes.\textsuperscript{144}

As a result of these new developments, Gómez Brioso called the delegates of the Party to a meeting in Yauco on January 1, 1895. There Muñoz Rivera proposed again a pact with Sagasta's Fusionists. The proposal was defeated by a majority vote. Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón
vigorously opposed the pact, as he had done before. After this rejection, Muñoz Rivera began a campaign from his journal, *La Democracia*, against the Autonomist Directory and Labra. He now also wanted a reorganization of the Party.\(^{145}\) Between 1891 and 1894 Muñoz had advocated an understanding with Sagasta which he indistinctly called a pact or fusion,\(^{146}\) words which have never been synonymous but which many in the Island began to consider so, and still do. Sometimes politicians can accomplish what etymologists cannot do.

The fourth Autonomist convention was held in Aguadilla on March 2, 1895. Muñoz Rivera again proposed the pact with Sagasta, which he wanted but without letting the Party lose its name and abandon its principles and regional character. By this time Muñoz Rivera had more followers, and there were fears of an open division in the Party. To prevent a possible defeat and keep the Party harmonious, Muñoz Rivera decided to retire his proposal until a more opportune occasion. Manuel Fernández Juncos proposed a pact with the Republican Centralists of Salmerón, of which Labra was a leading member. This proposal was also withdrawn, and the unity of the Autonomists was saved.\(^{147}\)

Commenting on the activities of the Aguadilla convention, *La Democracia* of Muñoz Rivera stated that there were three tendencies among the Autonomists which had been made self-evident: the republican, which desired an alliance with Salmerón; the Cuban, which wanted a pact with the friends of the sister island; and the opportunist, “which is based on the urgent necessity of an understanding” with the Liberal Fusionists “in order to reach the heights of power and take part in the administration” of Puerto Rico.\(^{148}\) But which individuals were identified with the three tendencies? The republican tendency, which was also centralist, was formed by Fernández Juncos, Matienzo Cintrón, and others. The Cuban tendency, which was also republican but federalist, was led by the Autonomist Directory: Barbosa, Gómez Brioso, Rossy, Sánchez Morales, and others. They wanted a close relationship with the Cuban Autonomists but also the maintenance of the regionalistic character of the Party and the upholding of the program of the Ponce convention of 1887. Later they were called interchangeably Historical, *ortodoxo*, *puro* or Radical. Muñoz Rivera was the ideologue and leader of the third tendency.\(^{149}\)

After the Aguadilla convention, a group of Autonomists decided to publish a newspaper in San Juan to defend their ideals. The paper, *El País*, was not to be an official organ of the Party but was called “a republican
journal affiliated to the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party." El País, was a
defender of the autonomist orthodox policies and was in opposition to the
pactist policies of La Democracia. The principal political theorist of
the new journal was Barbosa. The political debates between La
Democracia, then being published in Ponce, and El País would gradually
cause the inevitable division of the Autonomist Party and the creation of
the political leadership of Luis Muñoz Rivera and José Celso Barbosa.
Their respective political ideologies would have a profound influence on
the political orientation of the Island, up to the present. It would be wise
at this point to discuss these two men who for many years fought side by
side against the repressive Spanish colonial system and would later
bitterly fight each other. Their successors would continue their conflict
throughout the twentieth century.

Luis Muñoz Rivera was born on July 17, 1859 in the mountainous
central town of Barranquitas. His paternal grandfather, Luis Muñoz
Iglesias, had been a Spanish military officer who had fought against
Simón Bolívar in Carabobo and then settled in Puerto Rico. Muñoz
Iglesias was twice mayor of Cidra where he died in that position in
1852. Luis Muñoz Barrios was the father of Muñoz Rivera, and a well-
to-do merchant and slaveowner. While a distinguished member of the
Unconditional Party, he desired to be a liberal. Muñoz Barrios was mayor
of Barranquitas between 1855-1865. Muñoz Rivera's mother came
from a creole Puerto Rican family which was related to the influential
Unconditional Clotilde Santiago of Coamo, the town next to
Barranquitas. Clotilde Santiago was probably the wealthiest man on the
Island, owning over 12,000 acres, a powerful general store, as well as
being the regional banker. Muñoz Rivera was a self-made man
educationally with politics in his blood. He never studied at a university,
nor did he receive a high school education equivalent to that which was
offered in San Juan. Muñoz Rivera was, nevertheless, a man of extraor-
dinary talent who read extensively; he gained his first recognition as a
poet and journalist. Ramón Marín, a well known Reformist Liberal and
newspaper owner, became Muñoz Rivera's journalistic mentor and later
his father-in-law. In the field of politics Muñoz Rivera had a great
admiration for the conservative republican Emilio Castellar; this had a
marked influence in his political possibilism and pragmatism.

José Celso Barbosa Alcalá was born in Bayamón on July 27, 1857.
The Barbosas were mulattoes who came from Santo Domingo as a result
of the Haitian Revolution. Some Portuguese ancestry seems evident
because Barbosa is spelled with an s and not a z as in Spanish. The Alcaláś were mestizoes from the Venezuelan Andes who came to Puerto Rico because of the wars of independence.\textsuperscript{157} In the veins of José Celso Barbosa ran the blood of the African, European, and Indian, the three races which had formed Puerto Rico and the rest of the hemisphere. Barbosa’s father was a bricklayer who had a reputation as an excellent chimney builder. Since young José Celso possessed a brilliant mind, the family made great sacrifices to send him to study in the Jesuit school in San Juan in 1870. In those days Puerto Rico was enjoying a period of great liberalism, and he was greatly influenced by Francisco Pi y Margall and the First Spanish Republic.\textsuperscript{158} This federal Republic, as Barbosa later wrote, gave Puerto Rico the best government during its Spanish sovereignty.\textsuperscript{159} After graduating from the Jesuit school, he was sent to study in a preparatory school in Fort Edwards, New York. There he decided to study medicine and was the first Puerto Rican to be accepted at the University of Michigan where he graduated with the highest honors in the class of 1880.\textsuperscript{160} There he came to love the American institutions, and the true democratic principles of liberty and justice, to be a Puerto Rican because of the love of his country and an American by heart.\textsuperscript{161}

Barbosa returned to Puerto Rico and began to practice in San Juan. Gradually he became involved in politics by joining the Reformist Liberal Party. His first public political act occurred in 1886 when, at a meeting of the Party, he opposed the designation of the Centralist Republican Labra, who had been a federalist during the Republic, as the chief of the Party in Madrid. Barbosa was a federalist republican and that was the principal reason for leading the fight which prevented Labra from becoming chief again of the Party in the Cortes.\textsuperscript{162}

In May, 1895 Muñoz Rivera made his first trip outside the Island travelling to Spain. In Madrid he went to the Cortes and also visited such important politicians as Castelar, Maura, Moret, Pi y Margall, and Sagasta.\textsuperscript{163} The only glaring omission was Labra. This was due to Muñoz Rivera’s profound dislike for him because republican Labra opposed any pact with monarchist Sagasta.\textsuperscript{164}

By 1896 the political situation was getting very tense between Autonomists and Unconditionals. The leading Unconditional journalist, the Puerto Rican Vicente Balbás, challenged Muñoz Rivera to a duel when Muñoz Rivera was still in Spain. Muñoz Rivera selected Barbosa to be his second. This was no mere romantic duel. It represented the confrontation between the Unconditionals and the Autonomists, and was
considered as such by everyone. Because Balbás was a virtuoso swordsman, Muñoz Rivera took a crash course in order to defend himself. To the surprise and relief of all, Balbás behaved in the best spirit of Spanish chivalry when he ended the duel after slightly wounding Muñoz Rivera.165

This duel gave proof to the closeness of Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa. Unfortunately, it was soon to end. From Madrid, Muñoz Rivera became even more convinced of making a pact with Sagasta and went so far as to start a campaign to dissolve the Autonomist Party. The Party was a "sterile" one and had "no other road than to dissolve itself."166 He was absolutely sure that with Sagasta, who was then out of power, some form of autonomic reforms would be granted as soon as he would replace Cánovas.167

The situation was so critical that Gómez Brioso called a Party convention in San Juan on April 19. Muñoz Rivera, with others, presented a motion to dissolve the Autonomist Party. This was challenged by Manuel F. Rossy and other staunch republicans. Muñoz Rivera's motion was defeated. He left the convention and declared that there was no room in the Party for himself and his followers and that La Democracia would cease siding with the Party although it would continue to defend the autonomist ideal.168 Muñoz Rivera then continued to attack the directory and Labra because, according to him, there were no leaders, no Directory, no party committees, no power, no energies and not even a party. A new party had to be created.169

Muñoz Rivera's retirement from the Party was very brief and he soon returned.170 During this brief period he even considered the pact with Sagasta inopportune.171 But by June, Sagasta declared that he planned reforms, the projects of Maura and Aranzazuca, for the Antilles and that his Liberal Fusionist Party was now incompatible with the Unconditionals. Muñoz Rivera instantly renewed his pactist campaign.172 But why was Sagasta, who for so many years had opposed autonomic reforms, now thinking of dropping the Unconditionals to favor the Autonomists? The war in Cuba was the answer.

At the outset of the war in Cuba, Sagasta had been replaced by Cánovas. The new Prime Minister sent the able Marshall Arsenio Martínez Campos to resolve the Cuban problem as he had done in 1878. But times had changed. The Cuban separatist were more heroic than before and escalated the war throughout the Island, not just in Oriente where it had been previously limited. Martínez Campos decided to resign
and was replaced by the aggressive military technician Marshall Valeriano Wyler, soon to be known in the American press as “the butcher” for his repressive, but successful, tactics. When Martínez Campos returned to Spain in March 1896, he declared that the only way Cánovas could succeed in ending the devastating war was to grant autonomic reforms. This gave great hope to Muñoz Rivera. Cánovas feared that complications with the United States would lead that nation to intervene directly, something President Grover Cleveland did not wish. Secretary of State Richard Olney offered his “good offices” to help Cánovas solve the Cuban war. Olney desired some kind of autonomic reforms, but Cánovas had no intention of negotiating until peace had been restored in Cuba. With peace at hand, Cánovas planned to grant some form of autonomy. This Cuban crisis would be the principal factor which would bring about for Puerto Rico the much sought after autonomy.

The Puerto Rican separatists, who were mostly in exile, were very actively working with the Cubans in the Puerto Rican section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. Dr. José Julio Henna and Roberto H. Todd were the principal leaders in New York. The venerable Dr. Ramón E. Betances was active in Paris. The separatists were also operating in the Dominican Republic where Aurelio Méndez Martínez, former Prime Minister of the Lares republic of 1868, was then living. General Juan Rius Rivera, a Puerto Rican veteran of the Ten-Year War, was preparing an invasion of Puerto Rico with the backing of his brother-in-law Tomás Estrada Palma.

Todd wrote to Barbosa hoping he would collaborate. Barbosa answered that the people of Puerto Rico did not want independence, and that there were very few separatists.

All these political complications caused that republican Matienzo Cintrón, who had always opposed the pact proposed by Muñoz Rivera with Sagasta, to change his mind and reach an understanding with him. Matienzo now believed Sagasta to be sincere in his offerings of autonomy and feared a war of independence in Puerto Rico. Since there was no hope that Spain would become a republic, it seemed better to make a pact with the Liberal monarchists, get the autonomy, and save the Island from a disastrous separatist revolution. Matienzo now began to campaign with Muñoz Rivera for the españolización of Puerto Rico politics. El País warned Matienzo that uniting the Party with the Spanish government was a grave error because the Autonomousists would be forced to act against their political principles and traditions. The Autonomousists would be forced to defend the policies of Madrid even if they did not agree with them.
Barbosa wrote in *El País* that the autonomic reforms were inevitable, that the pact with Sagasta was unnecessary, and that the Autonomist Party should not then come to the aid of either Cánovas and Sagasta; they had created the present crisis, he commented, by having opposed the reforms for over thirty years. Cánovas and Sagasta just wanted to use the Autonomist Party to save Spain from further colonial disasters, not for the true benefit of Cuba and Puerto Rico. But with Matienzo’s change of mind, the pactism of Muñoz Rivera began to gather momentum.

The invasion of Puerto Rico led by Rius Rivera was to take place in the spring of 1896, but the plans failed and it was suspended. Gerardo Forrest, a leading Puerto Rican separatist working in New York, came secretly to the Island in July 1896 to sound-out different Autonomist leaders hoping to win them over to make them revolt. Barbosa repeated to him what he had previously written to Todd. Muñoz Rivera told Forrest that he favored independence just as an ideal, an ideal that was impossible for Puerto Rico. It was his belief that Spain would soon grant autonomy, and that that was better for Puerto Rico. But if Spain refused to grant autonomy, he would make the revolution with the New York separatists.

As Forrest was secretly visiting different political leaders around the Island, the delegates of the Autonomist Party met in Caguas on July 27, 1896. After discussing routine matters, the members of the Directory informed the delegates that Matienzo and Muñoz Rivera had come to the meeting with the purpose of fulfilling the article in the 1891 convention of Mayagüez which created a commission to seek pacts or alliances with metropolitan parties. After some speeches, the commission was elected. The voted members were José Gómez Brioso, representing the Directory of which he was Political Director, Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, as representative of the Delegation of the Party, Federico Degetau, as a journalist, Luis Muñoz Rivera, also as a journalist, and Rafael M. de Labra, as leader of the Party in the Cortes. Labra was designated president of the Autonomist Commission, as it came to be known. The commissioners were given the following instructions: to visit Prime Minister Cánovas and inform him of this mission; to discuss their plans with all Peninsular democratic parties from Sagasta to Pi y Margall, not excluding Cánovas, of course; to make an alliance with the party which would officially promise to put into practice the whole program of the Autonomist Party; and to preferably make an intelligence with the metropolitan party which had the best chance of gaining office. The Commission was authorized to make an alliance or intelligence, not a fusion. The word pact was not even used.
The Commission left San Juan on September 16, and arrived in Madrid on October 6, after visiting Labra in Asturias. After five long difficult months they returned. The political situation in Spain was more confusing than ever due to the Cuban imbroglio. Labra explained the situation to them. All the metropolitan parties were divided and fighting within themselves and against the others. Labra believed in a possible understanding with Sagasta, but never a fusion. Subsequently, the Commission visited the various politicians. Cánovas told them that as soon as the Cuban situation was brought under control, he would "grant ample reforms." Centralist Republican Salmerón believed the second republic, which was just around the corner, would solve the colonial problems. Federalist Republican Pi y Margall reaffirmed his belief that Puerto Rico should be an autonomous Spanish region (i.e., politically and administratively decentralized) with absolute identity (i.e., politically assimilated) with the Peninsula. To him the second republic was inevitable.

Union among the members of the Commission never really existed. Degetau was a staunch federalist republican; Muñoz Rivera was a passionate fusionist; Gómez Brioso was a federalist republican who, like a weathercock, turned alternately toward Muñoz Rivera or Degetau; and Matienzo was an undecided element siding with Muñoz Rivera at times but at other times keeping silent. The position of Labra never changed.

Talks with the Spanish leaders continued. Sagasta, Moret, Maura, and others were visited several times, but no solution seemed possible. Cánovas even began to use the English term "self-government" as one vague form of political reform that he would grant the Antilles very soon. No formula could be worked out between Sagasta and the Commissioners. Matienzo began to side definitely with Muñoz Rivera. Degetau and Labra kept their principles. By the end of November, Gómez Brioso swung toward Muñoz Rivera and Matienzo. This change was principally due to the developments of the war in Cuba and relations between the United States and Spain. However, Gómez Brioso's deeper reason was that he firmly believed Muñoz Rivera when he stated that he would return, together with Matienzo, to Puerto Rico via Paris and New York, where Betances and the separatists were based, and bring revolution to the Island. But had not Muñoz Rivera considered a separatist rebellion an unrealistic utopia? Was he sincere in what he said privately to Gerardo Forrest? Had not Matienzo changed his republican principles and regionalism in favor of the españolización of Puerto Rico because he was totally
opposed to a revolutionary war? Had both these men really changed their way of thinking so radically and so rapidly? Were they legitimately upholding the ideals of Baldoñioty, the autonomic platform of 1887, and following the instructions given in Caguas? Or was this action just a clever and opportune act of political bravado, for the benefit of Puerto Rico, of course, in order to win over the vacillating Gómez Brioso? In desperation, Gómez Brioso accepted entering into an agreement, in which he did not believe, with Muñoz Rivera and Sagasta. This agreement would require several weeks of negotiations.\textsuperscript{189}

As these political changes were taking place that December in Madrid, an unknown Spanish carpenter landed in San Juan who was to change the political evolution of Puerto Rico as well as the socioeconomic structures of the Island. Who was this figure who was fleeing from Cuba and the repressions of "butcher" Wyler?

Notes

5. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 30
11. Carroll, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 32-33, 615-651; Sanger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 72-73, 75-76.


60. *Ibid*.
74. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 139-140, 144-145.
75. Ibid., p. 150.
76. Ibid., pp. 151-153.
77. Ibid., pp. 155-156.
78. Ibid., pp. 158-159; see also Gonzalo F. Córdova, "Formación y desarrollo del Partido Liberal Reformista, 1864-1886," Cupey, 1990, pp. 139-164.
84. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 192.
85. Cruz Monclova, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 80, 89-93, 96-100.
87. Ibid., pp. 238, 266.
88. Ibid., p. 239.
89. Ibid., pp. 240-241, 243-244.
90. Ibid., pp. 245-246, 262.
92. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 249-251; "Dulce


94. Quoted in Antonio S. Pedreira, El periodismo en Puerto Rico (La Habana, Cuba: Imprenta Ucar, García y Cía., 1941), p. 95.

95. Ibid.


102. Ibid., pp. 251-253.


107 Ibid., pp. 298-308; Martínez de Carrerá, op. cit., p. 79.


110. Angel Acosta Quintero, José Julián Acosta y su tiempo (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1965), pp. 595-596.


112. Barbosa de Rosario, De Baldorioty a Barbosa, p. 112.


117. Thomas, op. cit., p. 294; Estévez y Romero, op. cit., pp. 41, 44-45, 47.
120. Ibid., pp. 297-298.
122. Lidio Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1959), pp. 107-108; Quiñones, op. cit., p. 221.
128. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 422.
130. Ibid., pp. 48-51.
131. Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera, pp. 71-75.
133. Acosta Quintero, op. cit., pp. 597-599.
137. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
139. Barbosa de Rosario, El ensayo de la autonomía, p. 21.
141. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 440-442.
144. Barbosa de Rosario, De Baldorioty a Barbosa, pp. 256-257, 269.
145. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 443-444.
146. Barbosa de Rosario, De Baldorioty a Barbosa, p. 314.
150. Barbosa de Rosario, *De Baldorioto a Barbosa*, pp. 277-278.
154. Interview with Margarita Santini, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 11 May 1977. My great-aunt was married to Rafael Rivera Zayas, Esq., who was a first cousin of the children of Clotilde Santiago, who were Santiago Rivera, and was a second cousin of Luis Muñoz Rivera. The sister of Rivera Zayas' father was married to Clotilde Santiago and was a first cousin of Muñoz Rivera's mother. Interview with Luis Muñoz Marín, Trujillo Alto, Puerto Rico, 24 August 1977.
160. Barbosa de Rosario, *De Baldorioto a Barbosa*, pp. 79-81; F. Clever Bald, Director of the Michigan Historical Collection of the University of Michigan, to Pilar Barbosa de Rosario, 23 March 1964, Archive of Pilar Barbosa de Rosario.
161. José Celso Barbosa to James B. Angell, President of the University of Michigan, 6 July 1903, Archive of Pilar Barbosa de Rosario.
182. Barbosa de Rosario, De Baldorioty a Barbosa, pp. 300-301.
186. Ibid., pp. 36-38.
187. Ibid., pp. 45-47.
188. Ibid., pp. 34, 48-69, 73-76, 88-90.
December 26, 1896 was just another ordinary working day for the Puerto Rican working classes. They did not know—and still very few people know—that on that day Santiago Iglesias Pantín landed in San Juan.¹ With Santiago Iglesias, unionism, labor federationism, and international socialism also disembarked in Puerto Rico.

Santiago Iglesias Pantín was born on February 22, 1872 in La Coruña, Spain.² His parents were Manuel Santiago Iglesias González and Josefa Pantín, two modest workers.³ Manuel S. Iglesias seems to have died before his son had been born. There was an elder son, Eduardo, who later emigrated to Argentina and was never heard of again.⁴ Young Santiago went to school, which he greatly disliked, until he was twelve years old. Iglesias started working as an apprentice in a wood-carving workshop, but later moved to a carpentry shop. The master carpenter was Antonio Vidal. He was the best informed political activist of the City with anarchist, socialist, and republican ideals. Vidal was also an editor of a labor newspaper and a delegate to the First International. While young Iglesias was earning a living and a trade, he was also acquiring republican and socialist ideals.

In September, 1882 Iglesias put his ideals into practice by actively participating in a strike that developed into a violent republican uprising. The revolt lasted ten days but it was finally smashed by the army. This revolutionary experience had a profound effect because it made him feel like a full grown man.⁵

It was during this period that Iglesias was exposed to those various determining influences which would direct his thinking toward radical socio-political ideas and contribute to his militancy in the struggle for the emancipation of the workers. He went to work at a different workshop
where Antonio Vidal was also employed. There he listened attentively to
the frequent lectures Vidal gave, explicating the new ideas of workers’
manumission. Becoming deeply interested in the ideas of Marx and
Bakunin that were then spreading throughout Spain and the rest of
Europe, Iglesias went to workers’ centers where he read pamphlets and
the revolutionary works of Pi y Margall, Reclus, and Bebel. Another
influence was the first labor journal he worked for, La Bandera Roja,
directed by Vidal and others. Besides the Catalonian federalist republican
leader Pi y Margall, the socialist Pablo Iglesias, no relation, was an
additional influence in shaping his thought. Soon Iglesias, espousing
federalist republican ideals, came to consider the United States a model
republic, a “grandiose example of liberty, democracy and justice.”

Spurred on by these politically progressive ideas, Iglesias decided to
emigrate to America. After two years in the carpentry shop, the young
Galician could not resist the desire to see the world. One bright October
morning in 1887, Iglesias was working on the roof of a house overlooking
the harbor when he noticed a transatlantic ship entering the bay. He did
not know its name or destination, but he did not care. Young Santiago just
wanted to do as his brother Eduardo had done. When the lunch break
came, Iglesias ran to the docks, jumped into a passager-carrying barge,
picked up a suitcase, and entered the steamboat. Some hours later the ship
left La Coruña. Not long afterwards he found out that it was going to
Havana via San Juan. That was fine with him. He left Spain without
telling Doña Josefa and without any identification, destination or plans.
Unlike most emigrants, Iglesias was not going to the New World to make
a fortune.

There were days of uncomfortable sea-sickness before the Morro
Castle of San Juan was spotted. San Juan was a twenty-four hour stop
before continuing to Cuba. Little did Iglesias know that ten years later he
would return to Puerto Rico and make it his home.

In Cuba he worked as a carpenter and was soon fully involved in the
labor movement. Iglesias worked for labor newspapers, on commissions,
and as a union secretary and organizer of meetings and conventions. He
also helped to organize several strikes which caused him to lose his job
several times, and therefore, he had to appeal to be admitted as a reader
in different tobacco factories in order to make a living. For several years
Iglesias served as secretary of the Círculo de Trabajadores until the Baire
insurrection. During this time he founded and edited such newspapers as
La Alarma and Archivo Social, which were later confiscated and
suppressed by the Spanish Government. José Martí commissioned Iglesias, together with Crecí and Bouza, to write and distribute a manifesto for the uprising of the Cuban working classes for the War of 1895. Máximo Gómez made him a lieutenant.

The last decades of the nineteenth century, as well as the first fourteen of this century, were the great years of socialism, unionism, and anarchism—Havana was an important center where these ideas propagated. As a result, Santiago Iglesias was able to acquire a deep understanding of labor struggles and social emancipation.

By 1896 Iglesias had become deeply involved in the Cuban revolutionary movement. Captain General Valeriano Wyler issued orders for his arrest and his life was at stake. As a result, he decided to leave Cuba and go to London, buying a ticket on a Spanish ship bound to Great Britain via Spain. Some of the ship’s passengers, officers of the Spanish army, became suspicious of Iglesias and informed him that upon arrival in Spain, he would be rigorously investigated. Iglesias decided not to go through that harassment and decided to stay in San Juan, where the ship was also to make a stop. That was the day after Christmas, 1896.

The Santiago Iglesias who landed in San Juan was a mature man with a definite concept about life. For Iglesias, life was “more intense and agreeable when the opportunity to fight for the ideals of justice and human rendition” were presented to him. He consecrated “the most fervent desire to give the best services to the human beings” whom society oppressed. This perception of inequity had been felt by him since his early days in Spain, “learning to stoically suffer and to fight for liberty and democracy.” He never could understand the life of the egotist. Life to him was “to love a woman, build a home, and fight without cowardice for the just things.” The greatest satisfaction Iglesias could experience laid in the “sound judgment of honest people and the love of human beings that” had to be maintained so that our efforts make them have hope of better days.

The labor movement in Puerto Rico, in the modern sense of the term, began shortly after Santiago Iglesias landed in San Juan in 1896. As soon as he entered the City through the San Justo Gate (San Juan was then walled), Iglesias questioned a carpenter, who was working on some windows, if there were industrial associations or workers’ unions, and received a negative answer. Iglesias questioned the carpenter again if there was at least one guild of organized workers that fought to improve their condition. Again a negative reply. After further questioning, Iglesias
found out that there were neither true labor leaders nor dynamic labor institutions.\(^\text{13}\)

Before the arrival of Santiago Iglesias there had been no actual militant labor movement on the Island. There had been, of course, labor associations and strikes. But how was it possible to have aggressive unions in a rural society, a repressive colonial government and with slavery until 1873?

The first institutions in which workers came together, not counting the *repartimientos, encomiendas*, and slavery, of course, were the guilds. The oldest on record were in existence by 1732. They were the following: cobbler, tailors, blacksmiths and silversmiths, masons and carpenters, and farm workers (*labradores*). A shopkeeper's guild was formed by 1747. These associations, functioning at the time, consisted of both trained artisans and traders as well as unskilled workers. Their regulations were approved by the Cabildo.\(^\text{14}\) It is not known if they had their own meeting places. Just how these guilds operated, what they accomplished, how many members they comprised, and what their total membership was, is not known. These guilds were formed principally by artisans, that is to say, by skilled laborers, not by the large masses of unskilled workers, who were the majority on the Island.

What is known is that in 1799 there existed guilds of clockmakers, silversmiths, tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, wigmakers, and cobbler. The members of the guilds were classified, following the medieval tradition, as masters, officials, and apprentices. These enjoyed certain privileges, but were still subject to government regulations.\(^\text{15}\) More documentation regarding the guilds has either been lost or waits to be rediscovered.

The other institutions that existed were the *cofradías* and *hermandades*. These were religious brotherhoods whose principal aim was to foster the spiritual, not the material, well-being of its members. Presided over by priests, their members had to possess excellent reputations. If high morality was not observed, the offender was promptly expelled.\(^\text{16}\) Later these religious brotherhoods began to add material benefits to the spiritual ones. The money deposited in the common fund was used to help members in distress, widows, and orphans. These practices of material benefits were later to evolve into mutualist societies free from clerical tutelage.\(^\text{17}\)

The guilds and the brotherhoods were not promoters of labor strikes. The oldest strike on record was in 1840 when some printers left work for a week.\(^\text{18}\) The Cooperative Society of Commerce Sales Clerks, established in San Juan in 1844, served as both a guild and a cooperative.\(^\text{19}\)
It was actually during the great liberal period of 1868-1874 when the working classes became more active in forming different types of associations and participating in politics. Early in 1872 the Society of Beneficence and Recreation, commonly called the Casino de Artesanos, was formed in San Juan. The *casino* idea soon spread around the Island; besides balls and gambling, lecture, plays, recitals, and evening classes were offered. Some even had a library. Generally they were trying to imitate the life style and manners of the high society *casinos*, including even their racial prejudices. Because the *casinos de artesanos* were mainly formed by skilled workers, a great number being blacks and mulattoes, they tended to look down upon the unskilled proletariat.

The reason for the proliferation of the *casinos de artesanos* was due to a liberal law of association that permitted their establishment, a law legislated by the republican Cortes of 1873. Another vital law made by the Federal Spanish Republic was that of freedom of the press. These laws were backed by the Puerto Rican federal republicans in the Cortes and were applied to the Island on May, 1873.

With the recently acquired republican liberties, a new type of association was formed. Santiago Andrade, a mulatto carpenter, established in 1873 the first mutualist society which was called Los Amigos del Bien Público. In this cooperative Andrade used to give lectures to educate the workers. The government was very suspicious of these lectures and later came close to suppressing them. This memorable cooperative operated until 1958, but its greatest period was in the nineteenth century.

The first labor newspaper in Puerto Rico was *El Artesano*. Wistremundo Muñoz edited the paper in Ponce. *El Artesano* was a "federal republican" weekly which was very well oriented socio-politically and read in at least eleven cities and towns. It began to be published on January 4, 1874 and lasted until February 1 when it was suppressed as a result of the fall of the Republic.

After the cooperative Los Amigos del Bien Público was organized, many others were formed in the following years, just as had occurred with the guilds, brotherhoods, and *casinos*. All these associations, whatever their limitations, did benefit a number of workers. They were not socialistic, as their charters specifically stated, and would not get involved in politics. Their aspirations and goals were social and cultural, but they also did their best to improve the economic conditions of their members. Due to their essentially democratic organization, these asso-
ciations helped to develop the political conscience of their members and were, therefore, to influence the masses.  

In 1893 an artisan by the name of Miguel Casado proposed the establishment of a cooperative. Barbosa immediately backed the idea. In *El Diario de Puerto Rico* Barbosa wrote seven articles on cooperative societies and urged the professionals to help the workers. What was established was the previously mentioned El Ahorro Colectivo. Besides being a cooperative, this association also fostered the education of its membership. What is important to note is that El Ahorro Colectivo was not an institution exclusively formed by artisans. Its membership and governing board was composed of artisans and professionals such as medical doctors, lawyers, educators, journalists, pharmacists. By 1896 the membership totaled 1,893 with a capital of $14,999.35 El Ahorro Colectivo also owned two general stores, a bakery, a warehouse, a savings bank, and a central office. Due to the financial mismanagement of the administrator, El Ahorro Colectivo closed down in 1898, but its members did not lose their investments.

With all the accomplishments of the guilds, brotherhoods, mutual societies, cooperatives, and *casinos de artesanos*, there was not a real and dynamic labor movement. The reason for this was that the authoritarian and militaristic Spanish government did not allow many liberties. The Code of 1870 strictly prohibited labor meetings and wage bargaining. Such legal rights as habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, impeachment, injunction, that guaranteed the liberties of the people had no effective value or were completely ignored. No one was free from being searched at the whim of the police. Any meeting or gathering, regardless of its location, was required to have government permission. In addition, a police inspector had to be present during the period of the meeting. To make things worse, the police inspector had the right to intervene whenever he saw fit. As a result, the speakers at the meetings had to change their language or rectify their concepts to fit the will of the police inspector. The arm of the law was a strong and inflexible one. Puerto Rico was a police state.

The Puerto Rican workers did not have a voice either in the political or socio-economic spheres. "Labor had no personality as a social and judicial entity." The general activities of the workers, a small number of urban artisans, were limited to the already mentioned institutions. But all these institutions were controlled by the government, the Church, and the ruling classes because they presided over the societies or controlled
the internal administration. These workers' institutions were urban societies and, therefore, the field workers, the immense majority of the Island, were not members. There is no doubt that the usual relation that existed was the one of master and serfs. They did not have any plans for the improvement of their social, economic, and human needs. Iglesias concluded that the "workers WERE NOT collectively considered NOR REPRESENTED any force in the civil, economic, and political life of Puerto Rico." They were "no more than the chorus" that had the only right to scream "¡Viva!" to their masters. In short, the working classes had no "civil nor labor personality, nor any influence."

Under these social conditions, Santiago Iglesias began his labor crusade. His main objective was to create a labor federation which through its efficacy and organizing influence would give the laborers of the Island "a weapon of social education and legal defense and the union FOR THEIR REDEMPTION." On his second day in San Juan, Iglesias began working as a carpenter in the military workshops on the various fortifications around the City. As soon as he had a chance, he started to divulge to his fellow workers civic ideals and the principles of labor unions.

The first concrete step in the development of the labor movement in Puerto Rico occurred on the evening of December 28, 1896. That night several workers met with the purpose of publishing a labor newspaper. Present were Eduardo Conde, José Ferrer y Ferrer, Ramón Romero Rosa, and others. During this gathering Iglesias gave his first lecture on the ideals of the international labor movement, the nature of labor newspapers, and the formation of a labor federation. The audience must have been quite impressed because from that moment on the labor movement started to gather strength. As for the newspaper no concrete plans were formed.

During his spare time, and whenever there were no officers around, Iglesias continued in his job to speak about trade unionism, socialism, and liberalism for which the workers of Europe and the Americas were fighting. The listeners heard him castigate those responsible for the social evils of colonialism and were frightened by his language which they considered strong and dangerous to themselves. The members of the government were accused of being responsible for the pitiful state of the defenseless working classes. Hearing such rhetoric made some members of the audience feel afraid of the possible consequences that could arise from police intervention if they involved themselves with such a "danger-
ous foreigner." It was not long before those in power began to hear about the subversive propaganda a newly arrived Spaniard was spreading. The fact of his having been born in Spain was still, a certain protection for Iglesias; and as a result, no police harassment arose. Thus, he continued introducing radical ideas and opening new vistas for the underprivileged classes.45

Labor gatherings became more frequent. In them, the general state of labor conditions was analyzed step by step, and the ideas began to crystalize. An educational program was begun in order to establish centers where labor ideals could be learned and where the workers could meet and discuss their problems. These workers could meet regardless of their religion, race or political ideals. Unions started to form according to the worker's craft. A central labor federation was to be formed to control and work towards the betterment of social, cultural, and economic standards for all the craft unions. The tactics, ideals, principles, and doctrines of social justice and economic liberties of international socialism began to be propagated among the working classes. In order to insure complete protection for the laboring classes, a labor-socialist party was planned. The party was to elect candidates to the Provincial Deputation and the municipalities for the purpose of promoting social legislation and protection for the underprivileged workers. After the labor movement had gathered enough momentum, solid relations were to be established with the labor centers of Europe and the Americas, but especially with the labor and socialist movements in Spain.46

Very soon the San Juan workers whom Iglesias was organizing began receiving newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets published by the socialist, anarchist, and labor press in Barcelona, Madrid, Havana, Buenos Aires, and New York. All these publications were considered subversive; therefore, they were immediately devoured by the readers and promptly destroyed because such material was pernicious evidence in case of a police raid or a judicial process. After some time this international labor literature was not burned and began to be circulated cautiously.47

The labor newspaper became a reality on May Day, 1897. The weekly was called *Ensayo Obrero* and was edited by Iglesias, Ferrer y Ferrer, and others who had planned it on December, 1896. In its pages the social injustices of the Island were vividly described. Reports of the activities of the international labor movement, anarchism, and socialism, as well as stories of past struggles, such as the famous Haymarket Square Massacre, were printed and read.48 There had been labor newspaper in
Puerto Rico before *Ensayo Obrero*. But this weekly marked the beginning of "a true labor press, directed by workers, aimed exclusively for organizing propaganda and social justice." As a result of this labor-socialist effervescence, the expected harassment from the governing classes, both Peninsular and Puerto Rican, began to slowly arise.

On the same May 1, 1897 the first worker’s May Day was commemorated in Puerto Rico. The celebration consisted of a lecture and the distribution of data on the Haymarket Square Massacre and of the resolutions adopted in the different international labor congresses. That first May Day was celebrated only in San Juan. The affair was a modest one, but nevertheless, a good sign, an indication that the labor movement was beginning to stand on solid ground.

One might wonder why the Spanish colonial regime had permitted so much subversive activity, why Iglesias and his followers had been allowed so much freedom of action if the law clearly stated that all labor-socialist propaganda was definitely forbidden. The answer lies in the fact that the foundations of the Spanish colonial regime were starting to erode. Madrid had finally begun to realize that if they intended to keep their islands in the Caribbean, governmental reforms were necessary. The Puerto Ricans were now hoping to obtain their much desired autonomy and that was why they had sent the Commission to Spain to work out a possible understanding.

The Commission, as has been previously explained, was headed by Gómez Brioso. He had decided to side with Muñoz Rivera and Matienzo in making an agreement with monarchist Sagasta. Degetau and Labra refused to surrender their republican principles. Gómez Brioso, under Muñoz Rivera’s influence, finally accepted a political fusion offered by Sagasta. In doing this, however, he felt that he had to suspend his republican beliefs for the love of Puerto Rico. Signing the fusion, he believed, would grant autonomy to Puerto Rico when the monarchist Liberal Fusionists reached power. Also, he planned to retire from politics. Gómez Brioso had tried to be a follower of Pi y Margall as well as Sagasta, and he knew that was totally incompatible. Thus the Sagastine fusion was made. It was neither an alliance nor an intelligence. It was not even a pact, as it has been generally, and erroneously called.

The Sagastine fusion had the immediate result of splitting the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party in two. The Party held a convention on February 12-13, 1897, in San Juan. Muñoz Rivera and Matienzo defended the fusion with Sagasta. Rossy, Barbosa and other republicans opposed it.
The majority of the delegates sided with Muñoz Rivera and ratified the Sagastine fusion.\textsuperscript{55} The Autonomists who followed Muñoz Rivera now became part of the monarchist Liberal Fusionist Party. The leading Autonomists who followed Barbosa, all republicans, founded the \textit{Partido Autonomista Ortodoxo}, which was also called Historical, \textit{Puro} or Radical. In the convention Muñoz Rivera had basically reverted his position to the assimilism of de Celis Aguilera.\textsuperscript{56} Besides the majority of the Autonomists, Muñoz Rivera attracted the followers of Sagasta who previously belonged to the Unconditional Party and many other persons who had been politically inactive.\textsuperscript{57}

In Iglesias' opinion, the followers of both Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa, but especially those of the former, wanted only the political power as sanctioned by Madrid. The working masses for them were unimportant. They were just a clique. Their principal desire was to replace the Peninsular political bosses with the Puerto Rican ones.\textsuperscript{58} With the Cuban crisis and the promise of autonomy by Sagasta, the Spanish colonial regime was granting more liberties, and the traditional oppressions were losing ground. Iglesias was thus fighting in an atmosphere which was revealing signs of change toward social and economic reforms. The decentralization and liberalization of the government was a matter of months. A political transformation was promising to bring a new social order. These were the reasons why Iglesias and his followers were not thrown into a dungeon.

With the promise of autonomy, the political liberties of the Island began to increase at a rapid pace. The labor movement campaign intensified. It did not take long, however, before Iglesias was fired from his job in the military installation because his social ideas were too radical for the conservative mentality of the Spanish army. From now on he had to work wherever he could.

At the beginning of July, Iglesias received a letter from Pablo Iglesias, leader of the Spanish Socialist Party. Pablo Iglesias suggested to Santiago Iglesias that a provincial chapter of the Spanish Socialist Party should be organized in Puerto Rico. Iglesias answered that such a thing was not yet possible because there were no constitutional guarantees to protect the rights of the workers who could form a political party.\textsuperscript{59}

In August, 1897 Premier Cánovas fell victim of the bullet fired by an Italian anarchist. It had been Betances who had given the anarchist the idea and the money for the trip.\textsuperscript{60} After some transitory cabinets, Sagasta came to power in October. The monarchist Liberal Fusionist Party was
now an ardent defender of autonomy due to the Cuban war and the pressure of the United States. Spanish public opinion now also shared similar ideas. Sagasta and Minister of Colonies Moret worked hastily, bypassed the Cortes, and got the Queen to sign a decree granting autonomy for Cuba and Puerto Rico on November 25, 1897. The Cuban Autonomists, unlike the Puerto Ricans, were receiving the same autonomy without any deal or fusion with Sagasta.\textsuperscript{61}

This autonomy came too late for Cuba, and the separatists could not accept it. Conservatives considered it as bad as independence. They organized demonstrations and riots which led the United States to send the Maine to Havana to protect American lives and property. This ship was later to explode, thus helping to precipitate the Spanish American War.\textsuperscript{62}

The Autonomic Charter gave the right to vote to all males over twenty-five years who could read or pay taxes. As a result, the literate workers and the illiterate taxpayers suddenly acquired a political importance that they had never enjoyed before. Muñoz Rivera, as head of the provincial committee of the monarchist Liberal Fusionist Party, was practically put in charge of implanting the new Autonomic Regime.\textsuperscript{63} During this period of government readjustment, the labor movement started to feel the results of the new liberties received by the Insular oligarchy, and the upper-middle classes. They feared that the radicalism of the labor movement Iglesias was directing would ruin their policies. The editor of the *Ensayo Obrero* was imprisoned for not presenting the required two copies of the paper to the government before publication.\textsuperscript{64}

The times were difficult ones. The internal fights in both the government and the political parties became so acute that they soon involved people all over the Island who were principally divided into *muñocistas* and *barbosistas*. Economic problems were given no consideration. Everything seemed to lie in the interest of gaining political power. The workers were inevitably dragged into the division of personalities and political interests. Because the workers had not yet created a collective labor conscience, they were easy prey of the leaders who influenced public opinion.\textsuperscript{65}

Iglesias and his supporters observed the recent developments, carefully studied the situation, and then decided to continue their campaign of labor education and organization. They concluded that the best thing to do was not to take part in the arguments of any political party and to try to direct the energies of the laboring classes toward the defense of their
rights. Thus, they endeavored to broaden and intensify the labor campaign.66

The political magnetism of Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa was extraordinary and it did not take long before it started to polarize the laboring classes. Suddenly *Ensayo Obrero* became a defender of Barbosa and the ortodoxos, San Juan being eminently republican. One of the journalists left the paper to publish *El Obrero Liberal* in defense of Muñoz Rivera and his monarchists Fusionists. The position got so critical that Iglesias and his followers were compelled to oppose all of them because their goal was the establishment of labor organizations.67

Iglesias and his adherents decided to organize the Economic and Social Studies Center. There, lectures about labor problems were given and international labor propaganda distributed. These activities were disliked by both muñocistas and barbosistas. The day came when Iglesias was accused of collaborating with the archreactionary Unconditionary Party. Because he was Spanish-born, Iglesias was thought to be working for the Unconditionals. Some accepted this illogical reasoning.68

Realizing the potential political power that Iglesias and his labor movement could have, Barbosa decided to have a meeting with him in order to get him on his side. This was actually not too difficult because Barbosa and Iglesias were both republicans, federalists, and came from similar humble backgrounds. Barbosa explained that the ideas of the *Partido Autonomista Ortodoxo* on economic and labor reform were the most radical and advanced, and that the Party would defend the underprivileged classes. Iglesias advocated voting abstention in the coming elections and, therefore, his potential votes could prove decisive. Barbosa’s proposition was tempting. Iglesias, knowing very well the difficulties of the times, decided that an understanding with Barbosa would be an advantageous one. By working together with an organized party, the workers could use its facilities, and therefore, spread their principles of labor emancipation. Now the doctrines defended by Iglesias were heard all over the Island. The results of these new developments provoked government hostility against the leaders of the labor movement, especially toward Iglesias.69

As 1897 came to a close, the foundations of the labor movement in Puerto Rico had been established: the *Ensayo Obrero*, the Economic and Social Studies Center, and some labor unions.70

On February 11, 1898 the Autonomic Regime was finally inaugu-
rated. In Cuba the autonomic chapter began to function in December. The reason for the late date for Puerto Rico was the fight between the monarchist Liberal Fusionists and the republican autonomistas ortodoxos. Muñoz Rivera wanted to have total control of the cabinet and government, as the fusion with Sagasta promised, but Sagasta and Moret wanted both parties to share power. After many weeks of negotiations, Sagasta's pressure finally forced Muñoz Rivera to accept the sharing of the Autonomic Government with the ortodoxos. Thus, Sagasta himself broke the so called pact he had made a year before with the Commission in Madrid. Matienzo, who by now had come to dislike Muñoz Rivera's authoritarian tendencies, began to favor the establishment of a single party as there had been before 1897. The mixed Autonomic Cabinet was as follows: Francisco M. Quiñones (ortodoxo), President; Julián E. Blanco (ortodoxo), Secretary; Luis Muñoz Rivera (Fusionist), Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación) and Justice; José de Diego (Fusionist), Subsecretary; Manuel Fernández Juncos (ortodoxo), Secretary of the Treasury (Hacienda); Luis Sánchez Morales (ortodoxo), Subsecretary; Manuel F. Rossy (ortodoxo), Secretary of Education; José C. Barbosa (ortodoxo), Subsecretary; Juan Hernández López (Fusionist), Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Tulio Larrínaga (Fusionist), Secretary; José S. Quiñones (Fusionist), Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce; and Cayetano Coll y Toste (Fusionist), Subsecretary. Thus the ortodoxos received the great honor of presiding over the new government (Francisco M. Quiñones was the venerable dean of politics). The Fusionists, however, had most of the power because the principal minister was Muñoz Rivera who controlled the powerful Civil Guard. They also had the two other most important ministries which were held by Hernández López and José S. Quiñones.71

That same February 11, a rally was held in which, for the first time, the red flag of the workers was displayed. After this mass meeting, and as a result of so much labor and socialistic agitation, Iglesias was arrested, but later released on bail. Ensayo Obrero was twice fined for trivial criticism of the Catholic Church. Not long after his latest arrest, Iglesias was again tried for injuries against the cabinet ministers. The situation grew quite unbearable, specially for Iglesias since he was the leader of the agitation. Every time the workers held a meeting or published anything that was not in accordance with the Autonomic Regime, they were immediately processed and imprisoned.72

The first concrete results of the labor campaign were seen in the large
meeting held in the Municipal Theater of San Juan on March 25, 1898. The purpose of the meeting was twofold: to reveal the workers as a powerful force and to protest against the high handed policies of Muñoz Rivera. During the meeting Iglesias urged the workers to vote against the Fusionists and favor the ortodoxos. Unfortunately, the great labor meeting did not end calmly. The crafty intentions of Muñoz Rivera were to dissolve the meeting as soon as the police inspector who was seated, according to law, at the presidential table saw fit. After several interruptions, the police inspector ordered the meeting to end. The protest against this arbitrary dismissal was energetic. A much greater indignation arose when it was discovered that a company of soldiers had been secretly stationed inside a nearby building and soon came over to help dissolve the meeting. That evening the Civil Guard patrolled the City on horseback to ensure public order which the workers had not altered. As a result of these outrages against public liberties, the labor leaders protested but were indicted. From now on the iron ring the Autonomic Government had forged around Iglesias and other leading labor figures began to get tighter and tighter. Almost immediately the leaders who worked in government controlled jobs were fired and not allowed to be rehired. They now had to work by covenant.73

Matienzo’s idea of forming a single autonomic party, as had existed before in 1897, had become a fragile reality on February 25. The Liberal Autonomic Union, as the new party formed by Fusionists and ortodoxos was called, lasted until March 24 because the division of 1897 had become too wide.74 The authoritarian policies of Muñoz Rivera caused the ortodoxos to leave the Union.75 The ortodoxos resigned from the cabinet and Francisco M. Quiñones was so disgusted that he stated that Puerto Rico could not be handed over “to those monsters who sacrifice everything in their desire for power and lucre.”76

On March 27, 1898 the general autonomic elections were held and 102,424 votes were counted out of 144,420 electors.77 This was an enormous number when compared with the numbers of the previous elections. They were as follows: 1869 -2,580; 1871 -15,940; 1872 (first election) -14,753; 1872 (second election) -11,210; 1873 -28,663; 1876 -12,600; 1879 -2,760; 1881 -2,094; 1884 -1,902; 1886 -1,823; 1891 -1,660; 1893 -4,900; 1896 -4,691.78 All the parties that participated now favored autonomy. The Unconditional Party received 2,144 votes. The Opportunist Autonomic Association, a group of Puerto Ricans former Unconditionals led by Vicente Balbás, Manuel Egozcue, Rafael López
Landrón, and Angel Rivero, received 1,585 votes. The ortodoxos and the Fusionists each obtained 16,068 and 82,627 respectively. To the Cortes the Fusionists elected ten deputies and one senator, the ortodoxos six deputies and one senator, and the Unconditionals just one senator. To the Chamber of Deputies, the Fusionists elected twenty-three representatives, the ortodoxos seven, and the Unconditionals one. Muñoz Rivera was now able to form a homogenous cabinet to his satisfaction.79 The elections had not been honest. Sagasta and Moret did not approve of the fraud, but accepted it as they had previously done for three decades.80 Pi y Margall lamented that Sagasta’s Fusionists continued the same old corrupt practices of caciquismo, cunrismo, and rigging the elections.81

The day of the elections, Muñoz Rivera issued an order of arrest against Iglesias and some of the activists too, but the former was able to flee to the other side of San Juan harbor. There he stayed for two weeks and continued writing for Ensayo Obrero.82

From there Iglesias wrote to Barbosa asking for help because the hatred of Muñoz Rivera, De Diego, and their followers was concentrated against him and it seemed that they wanted to destroy him by all means. He wanted Barbosa and his friends to use their influence so that at least his opponents would attack him by lawful means.83

While all this was taking place in Puerto Rico, the relations between the United States and Spain had become critical due to the problems in Cuba. Finally, by the middle of April, the two nations went to war on Cuban soil and Philippine waters. As war was about to be declared, Iglesias was informed that his hiding place was no longer secure. The safest measure would be to leave the Island for New York via Saint Thomas. Attempting to flee, Iglesias was soon recognized and captured by the Civil Guard. He was then sent back to San Juan and imprisoned.84

A week later Ensayo Obrero closed down. The workers now focused on the war, and the labor movement was deserted. Rafael López Landrón tried to free Iglesias, but to no avail. Iglesias’ term was to last for seven months. During the bombardment of San Juan by Admiral Sampson on May 12, a bomb perforated the twenty inch wall of Iglesias’ cell and fell on the cot where seconds before he had been resting.85

As the Spanish American War escalated, the fragile Autonomic Regime began to decline.86 Sixteen deputies and three senators had been elected to the Cortes in Madrid. That was political assimilism. The autonomy that had been given was not like that of Canada, as many erroneously think it to be. Muñoz Rivera himself affirmed this.87 The autonomy granted, following the old Spanish tradition, gave first identity
with the metropolis (i.e., political assimilation) and then a high degree of local political and administrative decentralization, as Muñoz Rivera had written in *La Democracia*. Canada has never elected members to the British Parliament. But the most important aspect was that the Autonomic Charter was never approved by the Cortes. Therefore, it was not constitutional and thus illegal. To make things worse, when the Charter was debated in the Cortes on May 1898, it was considered to be unconstitutional. Even with all the liberties the Autonomic Charter granted, the autonomy was labelled “colonial” as the first sentence of the document declared. Thus, Puerto Rico was still a colony of Spain.

When the war began at the end of April, the Autonomic Cabinet published a manifesto, written by Fusionist Hernández López, which declared that Puerto Rico would never renounce the Spanish flag and would fight for victory. The political struggles between Fusionists and ortodoxos grew stronger. Matienzo accused Muñoz Rivera of being a dictator like Porfirio Díaz and other typical Latin American despots. Muñoz Rivera went so far as to falsely denounce Barbosa as a traitor to Spain for having “direct relations” with the Americans. This repressive policy caused the division between Fusionists and ortodoxos to grow even wider for any possible reconciliation. Barbosa was not the only victim of Muñoz Rivera’s high handness.

As a result of the electoral victory in March, Muñoz Rivera reorganized the Cabinet exclusively with Fusionists (he became Premier) and under his absolute control. He was very anxious to be in full command of the Autonomic Regime before the United States would take control of the Island. The Autonomic Legislature opened its session under the threat of war on July 17. Herminio Díaz Navarro was chosen President of the Chamber of Deputies, and Francisco de Paula Acuña was elected President of the senate-like Council of Administration. Both were Fusionists. The Legislature had to adjourn a few days afterwards because the minority parties and a large number of Fusionists did not attend its sessions. On July 25, 1898 the American troops landed in Guánica, and a few hours later, the Legislature closed its doors.

On April 21, Captain General Manuel Macías had declared the suspension of the constitutional guarantees; the following day a state of war was declared. The Island was full of patriotic feelings toward Spain and against the United States. *La Democracia* of Muñoz Rivera stated that the Puerto Rican people were ready to sacrifice the last atom of their lives.
In New York the leading separatists, José Julio Henna and Roberto H. Todd, had begun to collaborate as early as January, 1898, with such leading imperialists as Under-Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. They also gave valuable information to other important figures such as General Nelson A. Miles, Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, Secretary of State William R. Day, and other persons in Washington. The United States would have invaded the Island regardless of the help the Puerto Rican separatists in New York gave, but the collaboration given was not of minor importance. From Paris, Betances hoped that the Puerto Ricans would rebel against Spain during these critical months, and he did not favor any annexionist move. He feared that if Puerto Rico did not act fast, the Island would become an American colony forever. Nevertheless, just before the war began, Betances wrote on April 16 to Henna that “it could be better to become a state of the Union than continue being Spaniards,” but he actually did not desire such a thing.

Eugenio M. de Hostos soon returned to New York from Chile to help Henna and Todd. He now considered it an error to have previously favored the independence of Puerto Rico and the creation of the Confederation of the Antilles by the road of the Cuban revolution. It was de Hostos who wrote, together with Henna, a manifesto condemning Spain, praising the United States, and calling for the creation in Puerto Rico of a “FREE STATE.”

In July, Betances wrote a most important letter than has remained almost forgotten, stating that in Spain some important political figures were planning to suppress the Autonomic Charter of Puerto Rico if Spain would retain the Island after the war. Regarding Henna, Betances wrote that he knew Henna was an annexionist but believed that he would not work for annexation. What was more tragic for Betances was that he realized that Puerto Rico would become American. And because that was going to occur, it was better to prevent unnecessary sufferings and bloodshed. The letter ended with the hope of returning to Puerto Rico.

After the United States was rapidly taking control of Cuba, and Spain was ready to ask for peace in the middle of July 1898, the Americans decided to invade Puerto Rico. This was considered an easy military campaign. The Puerto Rican separatists in New York offered to send forty men as civil commissioners to help out the American troops. General Miles politely declined because, naturally, he wanted to have total control of the invasion. Nevertheless, Miles wanted to bring Puerto Ricans
with him. He made an offer to Colonel Guillermo Fernández Mascaró, who was fighting with General Calixto García in Cuba, but because the United States had not promised to make Puerto Rico independent as they had Cuba, Fernández Mascaró refused to collaborate with the invading troops. Other separatists did not think along the same lines, men such as Mateo Fajardo, who organized with others the Porto Rican Scouts, the Porto Rican Commission, and the Porto Rican Guards, all closely cooperated with the American troops. The American army landed in Guánica on July 25, 1898 and swiftly began to take control of Puerto Rico after some small battles with the Spanish troops. The Puerto Ricans, from the upper to the lower classes, received the American invaders jubilantly. Ponce gave a most enthusiastic welcome to Miles. The daughters of Matienzo had even sewn a huge American flag to welcome the troops. Matienzo himself now became a fervent admirer and collaborator of the Unites States. In Ponce Miles issued a manifesto stating that the Americans had not come to make war in Puerto Rico, but to bring protection, freedom, and progress. In the middle of the war, it was rumored that Premier Muñoz Rivera had tried to cross the Spanish lines to join the incoming American troops.

The Puerto Rican separatists who had remained in New York met on August 2 and dissolve the Puerto Rican Section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. That same night de Hostos founded the League of Patriots. This was not a political party. Its purpose was to educate Puerto Rico so that a plebiscite could soon be made to decide if the Island preferred to be a state of the United States or an independent republic. However, the League was not to prove successful. But, how firmly did the separatists believe in the independence of Puerto Rico? Was this not the proper moment to start working to make the Island a republic as Cuba was to be? If they were sincere separatists, should they not have separated the Puerto Rican Section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party and established the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Party instead of dissolving it and forming the League of Patriots? The separatists turned out to be mostly ardent annexionists. No one paid much attention to those who wished to make Puerto Rico independent. Betances, the only real separatist leader of stature, was an old man and died broken-hearted in France on September 16.

The armistice between the United States and Spain was signed on August 12. By it Puerto Rico was ceded as war booty to the United States. Over two months were to be spent making the necessary adjustments in the local change of sovereignty.
While the American were replacing the Spaniards as the new colonial power, the political leaders began to adapt themselves to new political realities. The ortodoxos, writing a document accepting the change of sovereignty, desired that Puerto Rico become another state of the Union in order to affirm the identity of Puerto Rican people. Since most ortodoxos had always been federalists republicans, they were just continuing their long political traditions. Matienzo and Gómez Brioso, as well as Barbosa, Rossy, Sánchez Morales, Manuel Zeno Gandía, and others, signed this document which was secretly given to the American army on August 27 and later made public on October 28, 1898.\textsuperscript{115}

Premier Muñoz Rivera gave an interview on September 26 (published in the \textit{New York Tribune} on October 10) in which he declared himself an ardent believer of statehood for Puerto Rico and even called the United States the "new fatherland."\textsuperscript{116} Muñoz Rivera and his cabinet held meetings with the Americans in which Spain was degraded and the invaders were flattered, to the great disgust of Governor Macías.\textsuperscript{117} This attitude was a typical one all over the Island. Many Spaniards were victims of attacks by Puerto Ricans who had not forgotten their exploitive colonial policies and the atrocities of 1887.\textsuperscript{118}

In Spain, Pi y Margall disapproved of the American military occupation of Puerto Rico. He had agreed that if the United States would make the Island a state of the Union, Puerto Rico would then be truly autonomous. For Pi y Margall, only federated states could have that ideal type of autonomy for which he fought unsuccessfully in Spain.\textsuperscript{119}

On October 11 the \textit{Partido Autonomista Ortodoxo} held a meeting in which it was decided to dissolve the Party because, due to the annexation of the Island by the United States, new organizations had to be established in order to work with the new realities. The last official act of the ortodoxos was to say farewell to Governor Macías on the following day.\textsuperscript{120}

General Miles held control of the recently annexed Puerto Rico until August 14, 1898. He was succeeded by General John R. Brooke who proceeded to receive all the controls over Puerto Rico from the Spaniards. Finally on October 18, the flag of the United States was raised over La Fortaleza, the governor's residence. A few days later, October 26, the name of Puerto Rico was arbitrarily changed to Porto Rico and remained so until 1933. Muñoz Rivera and his cabinet were confirmed in their posts. All laws that were not incompatible with the Military Government were to remain the same. The public employees who swore loyalty to the
United States continued in their posts. The non-military violence that had erupted during late June and continued until early November consisted of attacks on a number of Spaniards and their property. The memories of the componte of 1887 were still fresh in Puerto Rico minds, resulting in the formation of seditious bands that terrorized the Spaniards until the American army methodically pacified the Island. On December 10, 1898 the Treaty of Paris was signed by which Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States and the civil rights and political condition of the Puerto Ricans would be determined by the Congress of the United States. By the Treaty Puerto Ricans were left without their Spanish citizenship. The Spanish diplomats protested unsuccessfully at this injustice. The American diplomats accepted that only those born in Spain had the right to become American citizens.

In the early part of October, Washington petitioned Madrid to free all political prisoners on the Island. Madrid accepted and on the morning of October 5 Iglesias was set free without being told the reason. He then went to see his friends and immediately made a plan to organize a labor federation and a newspaper to defend it. As this meeting was taking place, Premier Muñoz Rivera was preparing an order for his arrest. Soon the Inspector of Police was after Iglesias. Again, Iglesias played the same trick as before and fled to Río Piedras, the town next to San Juan where General Brooke had camped prior to entering the Capital. Iglesias hoped to find the liberty he was struggling for under the stars and stripes. Fleeing at night, he mistakenly reached Carolina instead of Río Piedras; there he met a friend who was serving as an interpreter for the American army. The friend introduced Iglesias to the commanding officer, Major Scott, who was very pleased to meet him and told Iglesias he had nothing to fear, for the American flag would protect him.

Later, during the change of sovereignty in the town, Iglesias was invited to give a speech which he gladly accepted. His speech was moderate but it provoked serious reactions. A couple of days later the laborers of a nearby plantation went on strike demanding better food and treatment and higher wages. In the meantime, he went making similar speeches in the neighboring towns. Needless to say, the landlords were not pleased. They protested to the government in San Juan. Meanwhile, the press also related their version of the events. Arrest orders were soon issued against Iglesias and sent to the American army to be acted upon. Mayor Scott refused to arrest Iglesias, informing General Brooke of the situation. Brooke sided with Iglesias and would not have him arrested.
Some days later, Iglesias accompanied the American army when it entered San Juan, enjoying its protection from bigotry and reaction. Even before the American government had completely replaced the Spanish crown, Iglesias was already elaborating plans. On October 23 the *Porvenir Social* was founded to fill the gap left by *Ensayo Obrero*. The same day a much larger labor meeting than that of March 25 was held in the Municipal Theater of San Juan. There the Regional Federation of the Workers of Puerto Rico was formed as well as a Círculo de Trabajadores. The Regional Federation began to organize workers, both male and female. Women were soon to start their long uphill struggle for greater freedom and benefits. These new organizations were taking the place of similar institutions that had existed less than a year before. The labor movement was reawakening with greater vigor and strength. Because Puerto Rico was now governed from Washington, labor contacts with the new metropolis began to be formed. Samuel Gompers, founder of the American Federation of Labor, and soon to be a close friend of Iglesias, had already stated that the Puerto Rican workers had to be protected from exploitation. Since the workers of the Federation had been denounced to General Brooke as being a group of conspirators, they bought an American flag, took it to the military Governor, and swore allegiance to it. Brooke said that it was unnecessary because he was satisfied with the fidelity and patriotism of the Puerto Rican workers. Henceforth, there would always be an American flag in the offices and activities of the unions Iglesias directed.

The political groups directed by Barbosa and Muñoz Rivera began to get reorganized. On October 13, the former ortodoxos had met at Barbosa's house, under Rossy's chairmanship, to start organizing a new party whose purpose was to make Puerto Rico a federal state of the Union. A convention was held on October 30 in which a manifesto was issued declaring that statehood was in agreement with the liberal tradition of the Puerto Rican people. The first to sign was the only remaining leader of the Generation of 1868 and a member of the Junta Informativa: Francisco M. Quiñones. Others who signed, besides the principal ortodoxos, were ex-Fusionist Matienzo, Manuel Egozcue and Rafael López Landrón, two former Unconditionals, ex-separatist Mateo Fajardo, Juan Hernández López, a member of Muñoz Rivera's cabinet who was now oscillating between one party and another, and others. One glaring exception was Manuel Fernández Juncos. Because he had been born in Spain, Fernández Juncos did not want to participate in politics under the new flag. His son
Manuel Fernández Nater, however, signed too and became an active stateholder. Nevertheless, several months would be spent organizing the party before it was founded in July, 1899.126

As has been previously mentioned, General Brooke retained the cabinet headed by Muñoz Rivera. This cabinet issued a proclamation in which its members aspired to fraternize with their compatriots in the continental United States. But the honeymoon between Muñoz Rivera and the Military Government would not last long. Neither did the disagreements between muñocistas and barbosistas end.127

The new liberties the United States of America had brought gave the labor movement much more freedom of action. Strikes of field workers occurred in several towns and districts of the Island. A labor paper was established in Ponce. Labor Unions that began to be formed in towns and cities across Puerto Rico became affiliated with the Regional Federation. Some strikes succeeded in raising the salaries of the workers. The government began to be more conscious of the federated workers. At the same time, the landowners and businessmen became more aggressive.128

The governing classes became more hostile to the Regional Federations as a result of these strikes, and the anger fell on Iglesias. Premier Muñoz Rivera called him to his office and told Iglesias that he should leave Puerto Rico. Muñoz Rivera added that Iglesias was a foreigner and that he could not get involved in public matters. Iglesias emphatically rejected all these admonitions. An order of arrest followed and the next day Iglesias was behind bars. Muñoz Rivera was being as arbitrary under the American flag as he had been under the Spanish one. Other workers suffered similar arrests in different parts of the Island.129

General Brooke was succeeded by General Guy V. Henry on December 9, 1898. General Henry did not agree with Muñoz Rivera's imprisonment of Iglesias and, therefore, freed him. During the weeks that followed, Henry began to show an increasing dislike for the proceedings of Premier Muñoz Rivera and his cabinet. After a while, Muñoz Rivera found the situation incompatible with the Military Government and on February 6, 1899 resigned en masse with the whole cabinet. A new bipartisan cabinet was soon named under the direct control of General Henry.130 Thus crumbled the last remains of the unconstitutional autonomy Spain had decreed in 1897. Full military government returned to Puerto Rico but in the American style. Under Henry many reforms continued to be made which helped improve the Island.131

During the winter months of 1898-1899 Iglesias wrote articles for the
labor papers, organized unions, and spoke at meetings day and night. Overworked and poorly nourished, plus harried by the police and imprisoned several times, Iglesias fell seriously ill for six long weeks. Labor propaganda and workers' strikes continued. During his illness the followers of Barbosa, who in San Juan were a majority, became more active inside the Regional Federation with the purpose of controlling it, or at least, diminishing its power. Since the barbosistas ran City Hall, public jobs were offered to members of the Federation. Iglesias disliked this more because he wanted no political control over the labor unions.\footnote{132}

In April, 1899 the Socialist Party of the United States addressed a letter to Iglesias inviting all the workers of Puerto Rico to organize a party and affiliate it with the national one. Its constitution was soon published locally in Spanish, but no concrete action was immediately taken.\footnote{133}

The Social Studies Group was revived by Iglesias and used as a form where the ideas, principles, and doctrines of socialism were studied and discussed by all those interested in the liberty and economic independence of the workers. This group was the vanguard of the Federation.\footnote{134}

May Day, 1899 was quite different from the small gathering of 1897. It was now celebrated in San Juan and nine other cities and towns across Puerto Rico. Great parades, gatherings, and meetings were held along with speeches. For the first time women actively participated in these meetings. A written manifesto which asked, among other things, for an eight-hour working day, was delivered to General Henry. The Military Governor was so impressed that he decreed the much desired eight-hour working day for the Island on May 2. The workers were jubilant, but the upper classes were greatly upset. The powerful economic interests soon succeeded in convincing General Davis, Henry's successor, in nullifying this important law.\footnote{135}

The former ortodoxos were the first to organize a party after the change of sovereignty. As soon as the Treaty of Paris was approved in February, 1899 in the American Senate, Barbosa began to incite his followers. On March 28, a platform was issued. A convention was held in San Juan on July 2-4 wherein the Puerto Rican Republican Party was formed. The goal of the Party was to make Puerto Rico first an organized territory of the Union and then a federal state. Most of its members were principally ortodoxos, direct followers of Baldorioty and admirers of federalist republican Pi y Margall, such as Francisco M. Quiñones, Barbosa, Rossy, Degetau, Sánchez Morales and Arístides Díaz y Díaz, son-in-law of Baldorioty. Besides them, there were such men as ex-
Unconditional Manuel Egozcue, ex-separatists Roberto H. Todd and Mateo Fajardo, and ex-Fusionist Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón. Other members of importance were the Cuban Dr. Salvador G. Ros, longtime resident of San Juan and active Autonomist and ortodoxo, and the recently arrived American lawyer, J. M. Keedy, who helped draft the Party’s platform. The Puerto Rican Republican Party was principally formed by professional men, the middle classes, and blacks, who had a profound admiration for Barbosa. The reason for the name of the Party was that they had been mostly federalist republicans all their lives and had a great admiration for the party of Abraham Lincoln, with which they later became affiliated. Rossy was elected president, but it was Barbosa who was the ideologue and the leader, although he never accepted the presidency. The Party symbol was an eagle. Barbosa and the Republican Party defended the ideal of political assimilation with the United States. They believed in the Americanization of Puerto Rico. But, political assimilation and Americanization did not signify for Barbosa cultural assimilation and the eradication of the Puerto Rican culture as his opponents have always insisted since 1899. Barbosa believed in adapting to Puerto Rico the positive accomplishments of the United States, especially its political institutions and its socio-economic developments. What he called a positive Americanization. He never wanted Spanish to be replaced by English. Calderón de la Barca and Shakespeare could coexist. Americanization was for Barbosa “not incompatible with Puerto Rican patriotism.” For him, political unity did not lead to ethnic unity. He was never a defender of a colonialist status, some form of home-rule, self-government or ambiguous autonomy, as Muñoz Rivera and his followers would most of the time advocate throughout the twentieth century. Barbosa was a staunch regionalist and soberanista who rejected independence because it would not give Puerto Rico the freedom, progress, stability, and happiness the union with the United States gave. The autonomy he wanted now was one of federal union, not that of a colonial possession.

For this political credo, Muñoz Rivera and his followers would accuse Barbosa and the Republicans of being the new unconditionals, a rightist party, a belief still shared by followers of Muñoz Rivera and the separatists. The muñocistas always portrayed themselves as moderates, centrist, true liberals, and sometimes, even as leftists. But if Barbosa and the statehooders never defended a colonial status, were not the defenders of some form of home-rule, self-government, and colonial autonomy
were they veritable rightists? It is one thing to have a preference for a specific status (e.g., independence, statehood or some form of colonialism) and it is another thing to possess social and economic ideals (e.g., conservatism, liberalism, marxism or socialism). The Puerto Rican political parties of the twentieth century would be principally held together first by the status issue and then by their social and economic ideals. Thus, the parties that would defend independence, statehood, and some form of colonialism, would generally have their ever changing number of conservatives, liberals, socialists, and, sometimes, a few Marxists.

Muñoz Rivera and his followers were not second to Barbosa and the Republicans in their enthusiasm for the United States. Mariano Abril, then editor of La Democracia, and who a few years before had absolutely condemned the annexation of Puerto Rico to the United States, was now a profound admirer of the new metropolitan power. He wanted the "wise" American system of education to be implemented on the Island as soon as possible so that Puerto Rico would be rapidly transformed. He hoped that Puerto Ricans would be sent in large numbers to the States to be educated so that in a few years Puerto Rico "would be American." Then the Puerto Ricans educated in the American style would bring the customs, language, culture, progress, and spirit of "that great nation" so that these things would infiltrate "the dead body of the Spanish decadence" that existed in the Island."141

Early in February, Muñoz Rivera had resigned from the cabinet because he did not accept General Henry's policies. He stated that his Party represented "a conservative tendency within the fullness of democracy" and that it would be faithful "in lending" its aid "to the metropolis in the development" of its plans for Puerto Rico. The Party wanted Puerto Rico to "maintain its autonomy" and that it "should be sustained until our laws and institutions are assimilated with the laws and institutions of the United States." In order to help the Island, Muñoz Rivera planned to go to Washington to inform the McKinley Administration of its problems and desires.142 According to The New York Times, the reasons for General Henry's dislike for Muñoz Rivera was that Muñoz Rivera "and the Government were synonymous terms while he was in the Cabinet" and that the Military Government had become its "police force." After his resignation Muñoz Rivera began waging a press campaign against the "alleged despotism" of the Military Government.143 Nevertheless, his statehood sentiments were not diminished at all.144

Muñoz Rivera left, with Mariano Abril, on March 10 for Washington
via Havana, where he met the principal Cuban leaders who considered Puerto Rico to have been definitely annexed to the United States. He undertook the trip representing the Insular agricultural interests and not as a leader of a political party. In Washington, Muñoz Rivera saw many influential people and visited McKinley twice at the White House (May 9 and June 13) where he informed the President of the cultural, economic, and political situation of Puerto Rico. Muñoz Rivera declared that “all Puerto Ricans, without any exception,” were “addicted to the American Union”; that there existed no “minor probability of passive resistances nor any armed rebellions.” He wanted Congress to make Puerto Rico a territory as the first step toward statehood. Muñoz Rivera affirmed that other territories with socio-economic and cultural conditions worse than Puerto Rico had been made states. In case Congress would refuse territorial status, he then wanted a Canadian form of autonomy. Muñoz Rivera rejected any legislation similar to the one granted to the territories of New Mexico and Alaska because those were “countries inferior” to Puerto Rico.

On September 4, Muñoz Rivera returned to San Juan dazzled by the greatness of the United States. He soon issued a manifesto urging his followers to transform Puerto Rico into “a specimen of California or of Nebraska.” Muñoz Rivera wanted the identity (i.e., assimilation, equality, similitude) of the Island with the United States. Furthermore, he believed that “for us to be good loyal Puerto Ricans, we could not be, we should not be, we do not want to be, absolutely, and without reserves, any other thing than good and loyal Americans.” The United States was for Muñoz Rivera the new ancient Rome.

Commenting on these declarations, the Republican Party simply called Muñoz Rivera “one more Republican” because he wanted the “identity” with the United States which was the “application of all the American laws to Puerto Rico” as the Republicans also wanted.

On October 1, Muñoz Rivera founded the American Federal Party. The Party wanted statehood because for them that was the true autonomous ideal. The Federals accepted and applauded the American annexation of Puerto Rico. They called themselves Federal because they wanted statehood and American because they did not want their federal ideal to be confused with the old Antillean Federation of Betances and de Hostos. The Party was essentially the same monarchist Liberal Fusionist Party with such men as Díaz Navarro, de Diego, Hernández López, and Antonio R. Barceló. The Federal Party represented the large landowners and the rest of the Insular plutocracy. Its symbol was a star.

No political organization was formed during this period that favored
independence for Puerto Rico. The separatists seemed to have either vanished or now followed Barbosa or Muñoz Rivera. The immense majority of Puerto Rican were now firm believers in statehood. However, they were bitterly divided into two parties which had essentially the same platforms. What divided the Island were the personalities and political procedures of Barbosa and Muñoz Rivera. Both maintained the same political styles as under the previous sovereignty: one always strict and inflexible about his principles, the other pragmatic and inconsistent about his ideals. Under these two magnetic political personalities, around whom Puerto Rico would continue to be divided throughout the twentieth century, Santiago Iglesias had to forge an independent labor movement and create a third political force of importance.

General Henry ended his governorship at his own request and was succeeded by General George W. Davis on May 9, 1899. The new Governor continued making reforms. Significant among these was the removal of the courts from the direct control of the secretary. The post of secretary of Justice was also replaced by a board of five lawyers.  

The city of San Juan was politically a Republican bastion. Iglesias had collaborated with Barbosa and many Republicans had joined and actively participated in the Regional Federation. The Republicans thought that the labor movement should join them officially. They needed their votes for the coming municipal elections and did everything possible to gain them. Iglesias rejected this plan because he wanted the labor movement to be free from partisan politics. The Republicans, however, insisted, and the Federation started to split. Governor Davis favored the Republican Party. A crisis occurred on July 18, 1899, when the assembly of the Regional Federation, the non-Republican wing, split and established the Free Federation of Laborers of Puerto Rico and the Socialist Workers Party in order to uphold the rights of the working classes. The members of the Free Federation could belong to any political party because it was non-partisan. The members of the Socialist Workers Party, however, had to be members of the Free Federation. Iglesias was fighting back swiftly.

Like most societies, the Free Federation had its own constitution, drafted by Iglesias, which stated the principles and goals which were to be followed in the ensuing struggles. The leading objectives were to obtain the best wages and working conditions from the employers, an eight-hour working day, and the establishing of fraternal centers in different towns for the exchange of ideas and feelings. In order to raise the
moral and intellectual level of the workers, the constitution of the Free Federation sought the establishment of more elementary schools. Provisions were also made for the creation of workshops owned by the Free Federation to improve the economic condition of the federated workers as well as to establish more cooperation, solidarity, and mutual help among one another. All workers were welcome to join, regardless of creed, political affiliation, race, or type of work performed. There was a central committee of delegates which served as the administrative body and was divided into sections. All the federated unions were autonomous. The Free Federation was divided into seven districts which corresponded to the seven governmental ones. The organization was divided into three classes: the local unions composed of the specific trades in a certain locality; the central unions made up of all local unions of the specific trades; and, finally, the Free Federation itself which was composed of the central unions of all the specific trades of the entire Island.\footnote{153}

The Republican Regional Federation now began to receive subsidies from San Juan City Hall, but the latter's influence was not important because the great majority of the workers followed Iglesias.\footnote{154}

The Socialist Workers Party was to function totally separated from the Free Federation but still directed by Iglesias. This Party was the first one in Puerto Rico to become affiliated with a national party in the United States when it joined the Continental Socialist Workers Party. The Insular Socialist Workers Party was officially recognized by the Continental one as the socialist organization of the “State of Porto Rico.” Many documents and information were translated and published. The socialist philosophy of the Party was not orthodox marxism, which they had not studied deeply, but social democracy. For the Puerto Rican workers, socialism was something like the “emancipating doctrine preached by Christ.” This was later to be called “yellow socialism,” but for the ruling classes, it was too radical, very dangerous, and a threat to the social order. The symbol of the Party was an arm holding a hammer.\footnote{155}

With labor propaganda and the organization of the unions under the Free Federation, strikes began to occur more often. Some of them lasted days, other weeks, and some months. Arrests of labor leaders were made, but as soon as they got out of jail, they went back to fight oppression. Iglesias carried high the torch of socialism under these adverse conditions. The labor movement in Puerto Rico had to endure countless strikes, arrests, imprisonments, beatings, etc., before it could elevate the workers to a dignified position in society. It had to fight Spanish autocracy, the
middle and upper classes, *muñocistas* and *barbosistas*, and American generals and civilians. When an obstacle was overcome a more difficult one was found. The endless strength of Santiago Iglesias was the fuel that kept the emancipating movement going.

As the reaction of the upper classes became more intense, so did liberties under the American flag and thus a balance was reached. The Republicans were now the favorites of the government and, therefore, the Federals began to seek more votes by looking at the labor movement with a different perspective. These changes did not alter the plans of the Free Federation which began to spread out from San Juan. *El Amigo del Pueblo* commenced weekly publications on October 23, 1899 in Mayagüez for the purpose of stimulating the growth of unionism and socialism.157

Under General Davis’ governorship, municipal elections were decreed. In order to prevent riots and strife, the elections were to last a hundred and sixty days, so that each municipality could be controlled individually. The suffrage was more restricted than that under the Autonomic Charter, and only the elite could be elected to office. The workers were erased from the political map. Too weak to enter the fight, the Socialist Workers Party did not take part in the elections. The Federals won with 28,880 votes, against 22,769 for the Republicans. The first party received forty-four municipalities and the other only twenty-two. Conservative elements, one being General Davis, were influencing the American government to be less liberal electorally than the Spanish monarchy in its last period.158

Seeing the injustice that was being done to the majority of Puerto Ricans and the good name of the democratic institutions of the United States, the Free Federation and the Socialist Workers Party began an energetic protest campaign by way of public speeches and newspaper articles both in Puerto Rico and the United States. As this campaign was taking place, the Free Federation accepted an invitation of the Socialist Workers Party of the United States to attend their national convention in Rochester, New York, on January 22, 1900. A meeting was held and Santiago Iglesias and Eduardo Conde were elected to represent Puerto Rico. For the first time the Puerto Rican workers were sending representation to a national convention.

When Iglesias and Conde reached New York, the convention was almost finished. However, the trip was going to be a most rewarding one. The New York Socialist Committee assigned Julius Gerber, the organizer for the State, as the guide for the labor delegates from Puerto Rico. Gerber helped them to protest the capitalist exploitation of the Puerto Rican
laboring classes. The termination of the Military Government was also urged. The New York Socialists and trade-unions gave a red carpet welcome to the Latin guests. There were meetings, assemblies, banquets, etc. Everyone was for the labor cause in Puerto Rico and speeches were delivered to defend that point of view. Iglesias, with an interpreter's help, also spoke. The national press, especially that of New York, called the attention of Washington to the terrible situation Puerto Rico was facing. It, thus, arose the sympathy of the American labor classes towards the workers of Puerto Rico. Late in the spring, Iglesias and Conde returned to San Juan.  

By the spring of 1900 the days of the Military Government were numbered. General Davis' administration had helped the Island to begin reconstructing after the devastating San Ciriaco hurricane of August 8, 1899 which killed nearly 3,000 people, destroyed millions worth of property, and caused a precarious socio-economic situation. Despite the mistakes committed by the military governors, they had nevertheless "made a serious and honest effort to better the condition" of Puerto Rico. "Their greatest failings were in the lack of understanding of a people with different traditions and in a rather blunt expression of chauvinism."  

Throughout the nineteenth century Puerto Rico had struggled to obtain political assimilation (i.e., representation in the Cortes) with the metropolis. This had been achieved from 1869 on, although many times corrupted by the system of "cumerismo" and fraudulent elections. Local political and administrative decentralization (i.e., autonomy) had finally been decreed in 1897 by Spain due to the Cuban crisis, but that ended as a result of the Spanish American War. The Cortes never did approve the Autonomic Charter which was also considered unconstitutional. With the change of sovereignty, Puerto Rico renewed the struggle that had begun in 1808. But the political evolution under the United States would be the reverse of what had been with Spain. First would come the lengthy development of local and administrative decentralization with the Foraker Act of 1900, then the Jones Act of 1917, and later the Commonwealth (Estado Libre Asociado) of 1952. Political assimilation had been limited to one resident commissioner in the United States House of Representatives (1902) with limited powers and American citizenship (1917). Ironically, all these laws seem to be an American version of the special laws Spain used in the nineteenth century.

Everyone was full of hope for the new liberties that the great American Republic was to establish. Such hopes would quickly vanish
when it was realized that the American Congress was not too prone to grant many liberties to its new colony.

At the end of 1899, Muñoz Rivera had written to Rossy, then president of the Republican Party, asking for the formation of one commission of Federals and Republicans to go to Washington to defend the cause of Puerto Rico. Rossy answered this request for political unity by stating that there were other groups on the Island, such as workers, business interests, farmers, that should be also represented. Furthermore, he reminded Muñoz Rivera of the bitter experiences the Republicans had undergone and could not forget when they formed with Muñoz Rivera the brief Liberal Autonomist Union Party of 1898, and the unnecessary violence committed by the Fusionists during the elections of March 1898.\textsuperscript{162} The gap between Republicans and Federals was too wide to close; although then similar ideas were shared.

The first recommendations made by Carroll in his Report were to extend to Puerto Rico the Constitution and laws of the United States, declare the Islanders American citizens, and grant a territorial form of government similar to that of Oklahoma.\textsuperscript{163} This liberal advice, unfortunately, would not be taken by Congress, for it would prefer the recommendations of the War Department, not particularly recognized for its liberalism.

The conservative mentality of the War Department was strengthened, among other things, by the reports sent by men such as General Davis who did not consider Puerto Ricans ready for self-government.\textsuperscript{164} Later, Davis affirmed that 99 percent of the Islanders were capable of administrating a government.\textsuperscript{165} Secretary of War Elihu Root, not noted for his liberalism, believed that Puerto Rico should be a colony.\textsuperscript{166} For him, Puerto Ricans could not establish an honest government because they were not capable of self-government.\textsuperscript{167}

In the original legislation presented by Ohio Senator Joseph B. Foraker the Constitution, laws, and citizenship of the United States were to be granted to Puerto Rico. However, this was later to be dropped from the bill.\textsuperscript{168}

At the hearings held for the Foraker Bill in the winter of 1900, the following groups sent delegates to Washington: the Republican Party, the Federal Party, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Banco Territorial y Agrícola. All these groups advocated some form of territorial government, the extension of the American constitution, laws, and citizenship to the Island as well as free trade. A bicameral legislature and universal suffrage were also sought.\textsuperscript{169}
During one of the hearings, José Julio Henna, who represented both the Chamber of Commerce and the Republican Party, demanded the fulfillment of General Miles famous proclamation of July 28, 1898. He wanted a territorial form of government that would prepare the way for Puerto Rico’s statehood. The former leader of the Puerto Rican separatists now confessed that he had “always tried to fight the Spanish and bring about annexation of the Island to the United States” ever since he had left Puerto Rico in 1868. Henna admitted that he had offered to collaborate with the War Department in 1898 “with the understanding that the Puerto Rican people should enjoy all the immunities, privileges, and liberties,” that he had enjoyed in the United States. Unfortunately those promises that were made to him, and which he transmitted to his countrymen, had not been fulfilled. Henna was so disgusted with the unfair treatment Puerto Rico was receiving from the United States that he would not return to the Island because the Puerto Ricans would ask him: “Where are those promises?”

But the American mentality of the period and the different political and economic interests of the nation prevented the granting of a liberal organic act as Carroll suggested, the original intentions proposed by Senator Foraker, and the just and fair demands the Puerto Ricans asked for. If Puerto Rico received what it wanted, would not the Philippines demand the same? In previous decades Puerto Rico had not been able to obtain the reforms it needed because of Cuba. Now Cuba would be replaced by the Philippines. The acquisition of this Pacific archipelago, with its cheap raw materials and labor, was a threat to many American economic and labor interests. Racially, Puerto Ricans were not quite acceptable as future American citizens, but the Philippines were absolutely unacceptable. If Puerto Rico received what it wanted (i.e., full territorial rights) this might lead to statehood, and most members of Congress rejected that idea. Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico were not yet states of the Union after decades of being territories. Thus, the final Foraker Act would give Puerto Rico a very limited form of government, much less than what monarchical Spain had decreed in 1897.

The Foraker Act was approved by Congress and signed by President McKinley on April 12, 1900. Speaker of the House Thomas B. Reed humorously stated that the intention of the Act was to make the Puerto Ricans three-quarters American citizens! The Organic Act granted the Island a governor appointed by the president of the United States. The legislative power was made up of an Executive Council of eleven
members, five of whom had to be Puerto Ricans, designated also by the president, and a House of Delegates, thirty-five members elected by limited suffrage. The judges of the Supreme Court were also presidential appointees. The Island was granted fiscal autonomy by which it kept the revenues collected by the Federal Customs and would not have to pay Federal taxes. Corporations were prohibited from owning more than five-hundred acres. Puerto Rico would be represented in Washington by a commissioner elected every two years. The worst part of all was that Puerto Ricans were not American citizens, but were made "citizens of Porto Rico." This was a judicial absurdity because Puerto Rico did not have the sovereignty that would give its inhabitants legal citizenship and no nation in the World recognized it. The civil government established was a centralized one, completely dominated by Washington. The rights and influence of labor were nowhere to be found because all the government posts were to be filled by the members of the upper class or their friends.

Commenting on the Foraker Act, Muñoz Rivera wrote that Puerto Rico "should have been considered as integral part of the United States" as with the annexation of Louisiana, Texas, California, and New Mexico to the Union.

One of the most bitter criticisms of the new Organic Act came from Henna. He declared that the United States flag had become a symbol of oppression and colonialism and urged Puerto Ricans to reject the Act. But no one took his advice. Henna never did return to Puerto Rico and died in New York, leaving his documents and a portrait to his beloved Ponce, city in which he had been born and left in 1868, never to return.

The constitutionality of the Foraker Act came later in the 1901 case Downes vs. Bidwell. The United States Supreme Court ruled that Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory and not an incorporated one, like New Mexico and Arizona. Since Congress had not expressly incorporated Puerto Rico, it did not have to deal with the Island in the same constitutional manner as with the states and incorporated territories. Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed the colonial status of Puerto Rico.

From the moment that the United States acquired Puerto Rico, the American sugar and tobacco trusts began to come to the Island. Puerto Rico offered unrivaled opportunities to the Wall Street business man: cheap land, cheaper salaries, and other advantages all under Uncle Sam's flag. Because of the naiveté of Puerto Rican patriots and the craftiness of local lawyers, all the property these businessmen desired would be in the
bottomless pockets of the trusts. The Foraker Act prohibited corporations from owning more than five hundred acres, but that was soon ignored because many prominent local landlords were politicians or financial backbones of the Federal and Republican parties. It was not long before American trusts owned the largest sugar and tobacco corporations. Needless to say, the transportation business from Puerto Rico to the mainland was also owned by American interests. Iglesias was aware of all this and realized that his enemies were now two: the local reactionaries and the mighty American corporations, but he was not afraid of this double-barrelled enemy.

The first American civil governor was Massachusetts-born Charles H. Allen, former Undersecretary of the Navy. A doctor of law from Amherst University, he had served terms in his state legislature and in Congress. Allen's term lasted from May 1, 1900 until his resignation on September 14, 1901.¹⁸⁰

May Day, 1900 was a greater success than the previous ones. Labor and Socialist congresses were held together for the first time. The congresses were held only in San Juan, but the May Day celebration was commemorated by the Free Federation in many towns and cities across the Island. Early in the morning, Iglesias opened the Economic Labor Congress with the attendance of sixty delegates representing fourteen towns and cities and thirty-six craft unions. Four-thousand had come from all over for the occasion. There were speeches and debates and a petition was written to be delivered to Governor Allen. After the first session of the Economic Labor Congress was over, a parade was organized. It finally reached La Fortaleza, the governor's residence, where the petition was delivered. The following demands were made: prohibition of salary payments in objects which were not legal tender; an eight-hour working day; prohibition of the rise in food prices when the provincial currency was to be changed for the American one; higher salaries; establishment of a public library, a labor office, an industrial and technical school, and the granting of a lot to build a worker's house; and complete suffrage to any male over twenty-one years of age. Governor Allen stated that he would do his best to fulfill these demands. Manuel Egozcue, Mayor of San Juan, also received a written petition which asked for better opportunities for the workers. One of the demands was the creation of a workers' housing development.

On May 2, the Economic and Labor Congress met again to finish the agenda. When it was completed, the Socialist Congress began. From both
congresses many resolutions were approved, which later became the
guide for succeeding labor assemblies.\textsuperscript{181}

The Foraker Act stated that on May 1, 1900 the provincial Spanish
currency was to be exchanged for that of the United States. The law
specified that for every provincial \textit{peso} sixty American cents were to be
received. That meant that the \textit{peso} was 40 percent less than the American
dollar. Therefore, all values went down 40 percent in the exchange.
Workers were to get the same percent cut in their salaries. The entire
Island exchanged 5,129,141.68 \textit{pesos} for the equivalent of
$3,077,485.08 dollars.

The problem that resulted from the exchange was that the cost of
living did not undergo any corresponding change. If the price of a pound
of rice was five provincial cents, it was now five American cents. The
Puerto Rican masses were being robbed of 40 percent of their already
minimal income. Foreseeing this, the Free Federation had asked Gover-
nor Allen not to allow it.

The insular property classes and the American economic interests
were responsible for this brutal act. Their purpose was to keep salaries
low in order to earn even greater profits. The laws of the government were
still few and not too efficient. In addition, the trusts, and the local property
classes had an enormous influence over the government.

The crisis that soon developed was an acute one for anyone who
depended on daily wages. Iglesias made a plan and presented it to the Free
Federation. The plan demanded immediate increase in salaries and an
eight-hour working day. Everyone was informed of the plan, but the
situation continued unchanged. A threat of a general strike was also
announced. The government and the property classes rejected all de-
mands. Therefore, the Free Federation declared the announced strike
which was to start on August 1, 1900. Soon everything was paralyzed.
The commotion produced was immense all over the Island. There were
protests, riots of workers, and arrests of labor leaders. The police were
ruthless with any workers they could lay hands on.

The success of this general strike led by Iglesias and the Free
Federation was considered a great danger by the reactionary classes and
the political parties they influenced. The reason was that the success of
the strike would prove to the Puerto Rican workers that if they were
strongly united, they would achieve those economic and social liberties
which they did not possess. As a result, the powerful opponents of the
strike started to look for scabs, who then were armed to fight the strikers.
The federated workers had to arm themselves with anything in order to defend their rights, and in many cases, their lives. Strikers were attacked in the streets by armed scabs who were protected by the police. Public guarantees were disregarded even in the lower courts of justice where strikers and labor leaders were taken before being imprisoned. Not even behind bars were they safe, because brutal jailers would not lose such a good chance to club these defenseless human beings who happened to be fighting for their subsistence. Iglesias was imprisoned several times during those days of intense struggle.

By September, peace was returning to the Island as the scale of justice tipped a little, enough to satisfy the basic demands for which the strikers of the Free Federation, were asking. If it was not a complete triumph, it was at least a moral one; the Free Federation had proven itself a force strong enough not to be ignored by the property owning classes. The power of the opponents of the labor movement was still formidable, but not invincible.  

The general strike was a turning point in the life of Santiago Iglesias and the development of the labor movement in Puerto Rico. He was physically very tired after so many weeks of strife during which he had been imprisoned and his life endangered several times. During this period Iglesias wrote articles for the socialist and labor papers of New York describing the pathetic local situation. Besides informing the powerful New York press, he was also asking for moral and financial help because the Free Federation had meager funds for its members. The articles had their impact and response came in the form of economic aid which soon arrived. All these recent developments convinced Iglesias that if he expected to succeed in making the Free Federation a powerful and efficient labor organization, he had to obtain solid backing of the labor organizations in the United States. Thus could he end the ill treatment of the workers. Therefore, Iglesias left on September 26, 1900 without telling hardly anyone.

Notes

3. Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, *El obrerismo en Puerto Rico (Época de*

4. Interview with Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, Carolina, P. R., 15 November 1973.


8. Ibid., pp. 15-16.


10. Iglesias de Pagán, El obrerismo en Puerto Rico, p. 22.


17. Ibid., pp. 46.47.


22. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
24. Barbosa, El Ahorro Colectivo ... 1895, pp. 4-7.
27. El Artesano, 11, January 1874; Ibid., 25 January 1874; Ibid., 1 February 1874.
28. Barbosa, El Ahorro Colectivo ... 1895, pp. 5-8; Campos Orta, op. cit., pp. 10-11; Andrés Rodríguez Vera, El triunfo de la apostasía (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía La Democracia, Inc., 1930), p. 50.
29. Fe, esperanza y caridad (Humacao, P. R.: Tipografía de El Criterio, 1893), p. 4; Campos Orta, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
30. Barbosa, El Ahorro Colectivo ... 1895, p. 8.
32. José C. Barbosa, “Sociedades cooperativas,” El Diario de Puerto Rico, 27 September 1893, p. 2; Ibid., 29 September 1893, p. 2; Ibid., 1 October 1893, p. 2; Ibid., 5 October 1893, p. 2; Ibid., 9 October 1893, p. 2; Ibid., 18 October 1893, p. 2; Ibid., 29 October 1893, p. 2; Barbosa de Rosario, ed., José Celso Barbosa, pionero del cooperativismo puertorriqueño, siglo XIX, pp. 8-28.
34. Barbosa, El Ahorro Colectivo ... 1895, pp. 12, 15, 16.
35. José C. Barbosa, El Ahorro Colectivo, sociedad cooperativa, memoria leída en la Junta General de accionistas, celebrada el 28 de enero de 1896 por su presidente el Doctor D. José C. Barbosa y Alcald (San Juan, P. R.: Imprenta del Boletín Mercantil, 1896), pp. 24, 29, 30.
38. Rafael Alonso Torres, Cuarenta años de lucha proletaria (San Juan, P. R.: Imprenta Baldrich, 1939), pp. 86-87.
39. Ibid., pp. 87-89.
40. Ibid., p. 91.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
49. Pedreira, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
54. Cruz Monclova, *Luis Muñoz Rivera*, p. 4-81.
68. *Ibid*.
75. Díaz Soler, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-151.
83. Santiago Iglesias to José C. Barbosa, March, 1898. Archive of Pilar Barbosa de Rosario. There is no precise date to the letter, but it had to be written after March 27 and before April 1.


99. Ramón E. Betances, *Las Antillas para los antillanos*, cd. Carlos M. Rama (San Juan, P. R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1975), pp. 239-240; in 1867 Betances had renounced his Spanish citizenship and in 1869 had placed himself under the protection of the United States government, see Bonafoux, *op. cit.*, p. 98.


118. Ibid., pp. 249-256.


120. Barbosa de Rosario, El ensayo de la autonomía, p. 184.


124. Ibid., pp. 75-80.

125. Ibid., pp. 80-81, 84-87; Iglesias de Pagán, El obrerismo en Puerto Rico, pp. 47-49.


129. Ibid., pp. 91-92; Iglesias de Pagán, El obrerismo en Puerto Rico, pp. 60-62.


133. Iglesias Pantún, Luchas emancipadoras, vol. I, p. 105; Principios, programa y constitución del Partido Socialista de los Estados Unidos de América (San Juan, P. R.: Prensa del Partido, 1899).


136. Roberto H. Todd, “La fundación del Partido Republicano Puertorriqueño,” El Mundo, 17 October 1937, p. 10; José Celso Barbosa,


145. Ibid., pp. 177, 181.


173. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico, *Hearings to provide a government for the Island of Puerto Rico and for other purposes on Senate Bill 2264*, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, pp. 36, 119.
La Coruña, a drawing by Antonio de Caula published in La Ilustración Española y Americana, September 22, 1891.
Iglesias' mother, Josefa Pantín.
The bearded Iglesias in 1898 with Eduardo Conde (seated) and Ramón Romero Rosa (standing).
Iglesias accompanies Samuel Gompers on his first visit to Puerto Rico, 1904.
Puerto Rican delegation for the Olmsted Bill, 1910. Seated from left to right: Pedro Perea Fajardo (R), José Gómez Brioso (R), Roberto H. Todd (R), Santiago Iglesias and Cayetano Coll y Cuchí (U). Standing, left to right: Eduardo Giorgetti (U), José de Diego (U), José Celso Barbosa (R) and Luis Muñoz Rivera (U).
Gompers, accompanied by Iglesias, giving a speech in Ponce during his second trip to Puerto Rico, 1914.
The Iglesias family, 1922. Front row from left to right: Luz, Angel, Eduardo, Santiago, Manuel, Justa, Josefa and Laura. Second row, left to right: Igualdad, Justicia, América, Fraternidad and Libertad.
President Alvaro Obregón receiving the leaders of the Pan-American Federation of Labor, Mexico City, November 1924. Seated from left to right: Luis Morones, Chester Wright, Samuel Gompers, Alvaro Obregón, Santiago Iglesias, James Lord and Conuto Vargas.
Iglesias and Gompers talking to President Plutarco E. Calles, December 1924.
Legislative commission, The White House, May 19, 1927. Front row from left to right: Santiago Iglesias, Félix Córdova Díaz, Assistant Secretary of War Hanford MacNider, Antonio Barceló, Calvin Coolidge, José Tous Soto and Rafael Alonso Torres. Second row, left to right: Rafael Pérez Marchand, Walter Mck. Jones, Juan B. García Méndez, Roberto H. Todd, Miguel Guerra Mondragón and General Frank McIntyre.
The Iglesias family at Coney Island, N.Y., July 1928. From left to right: Eduardo, Manuel, Igualdad, Frank and Elizabeth Bocanegra and Justa and Santiago.
Iglesias casting his ballot, November 8, 1932.
Santiago Iglesias, Washington, 1933.
The unveiling of the Samuel Gompers monument, Washington, October 7, 1933. From left to right: Chester Wright, Robert Haberman, William Green, Prudencio Rivera Martínez, Frank Morrison and Santiago and Justa Iglesias.
Coalition commission, The White House, November 3, 1933. From left to right: Vicente Hita, Miguel A. García Méndez, Santiago Iglesias, Bolívar Págán, Alfonso Valdés and Louis Obergh.
Iglesias addressing his well-wishers at the Municipal Theater on his arrival from Washington, July 24, 1934. Seated in center from left to right: Rafael Martínez Natal (holding hat) and Leopoldo Figueroa.
Iglesias and Justa wearing flowers given by Puerto Ricans living in Honolulu. December 8, 1935.
The Socialist convention, Caguas, August 14, 1936. Seated from left to right: Lino Padrón Rivera, Jorge Gauthier, Bolívar Pagán, Santiago Iglesias, Vicente Hita and Alfonso Torres. Standing, left to right: Moisés Echevarría, Sixto Pacheco, José H. Cora, Bernardino Villanueva, José Padró Quiles, Cristóbal del Campo, unidentified person, Epifanio Fiz Jiménez, Bolívar Ochart and Rafael Rivera Zayas.
Iglesias addressing the 1936 Socialist convention.
Iglesias the day after the Nationalist assassination attempt, October 26, 1936. To the left daughter Laura.
Family picture at Porter Street, Washington, December 5, 1938. From left to right: Junta, Santiago, granddaughters Josefa and Blanca Laborde and Joselina.
Coalitionists meeting Governor William D. Leahy, June 14, 1939. Seated from left to right: Rafael Martínez Nadal, Santiago Iglesias, William D. Leahy. Standing, left to right: Fernando Géigel, Alfonso Valdés, Bolívar Pagán and Louis Obergh.
Iglesia's last picture, Mexico City, November 1939.
Iglesias body arriving at the Capitol, December 11, 1939.
Mourners pay their last respects to the deceased labor leader.
Funeral services in the Senate Chamber, December 12, 1939. Seated in the back from left to right: Enrique González Mena, Leopoldo Figueroa, unidentified person, Emilio del Toro Cuevas, Mary T. Norton, William D. Leahy, Bolívar Pogán, Miguel A. García Méndez, Alfonso Valdés and Celestino Iriarte.
The funeral cortege leaving the Capitol.
Iglesias' body laid to rest in the Old San Juan Cemetery.
In New York, Iglesias immediately got a job as a carpenter and started to master his English. There he lost no time studying everything that had to do with socialism, anarchism, labor unions, and American democracy. He also wrote articles for the New York press about the problems Puerto Rico faced. At the same time, Iglesias kept informing and directing his followers in San Juan. The Socialists and labor leaders of the great metropolis agreed with his plan to find help in the United States and to lose no time in affiliating the Free Federation with Samuel Gompers’ powerful American Federation of Labor. They also told him that a socialist party would be powerless without a strongly organized labor movement. This Iglesias knew quite well.¹

The opportunity to make his plan a new reality came with the convention of the American Federation of Labor in Louisville, Kentucky. Santiago Iglesias wrote a letter in which he stated the demands of the Puerto Rican workers and their desire to become affiliated. On December 11, 1900 the Free Federation came under the protection and patronage of the American Federation of Labor. Samuel Gompers wrote some days later inviting Iglesias to come to his headquarters in Washington.²

Back in San Juan, Governor Allen carefully began the delicate mission of putting the Foraker Act into practice. He would have preferred to stay in Washington, but McKinley persuaded him that he was necessary in the establishment of the civil government. The fights between Federals and Republicans were as heated as ever. The Federals promptly showed their hostility to Allen who greatly disliked all this political feuding.³

The Puerto Rican members of the Executive Council were José C. Barbosa, Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón (representing the Republican
Party), José de Diego, Manuel Camuñas (representing the Federal Party), and Andrés Crosas (named as an independent). William H. Hunt was the President of the Council as well as Secretary of Puerto Rico. The Council first met on June 21, 1900. There Matienzo spoke, in the name of his Party and fellow citizens, thanking the United States for the granting of the civil government. De Diego then spoke for the Federals expressing similar thoughts and hoping that the civil government would lead to the formation of a free people under a free sovereignty.\textsuperscript{4}

This harmonious spirit did not last long. It came to an end as a result of the conflicts arising from the electoral division of the Island. The Federals accused the Republicans of gerrymanderism, and in protest de Diego and Camuñas resigned from the Council. There were then replaced by Republicans José Gómez Brioso and José de Guzmán Benítez.\textsuperscript{5}

Muñoz Rivera reacted to this by accusing the Executive Council of being anti-Federal and “favoring” the Republicans “in every way”; that if the Republican Party was considered American, the Federals claimed “to be more American than” the Republicans. He cabled his protest to McKinley and the American press.\textsuperscript{6}

Puerto Rican politics was going through a most unfortunate period. Muñoz Rivera and the Federals escalated their anti-American propaganda and the attacks on the Republicans by way of public meetings and in the pages of Muñoz Rivera’s two newspapers, \textit{El Diario de Puerto Rico} and \textit{La Democracia}. Both Federals and Republicans had staunch followers who organized mobs that terrorized their political opponents. One principal target of the Federals was Manuel Egozcue, Republican Mayor of San Juan. \textit{El Diario de Puerto Rico} unleashed a vicious campaign against him, and Republicans believed Muñoz Rivera to be the author of the articles. The Republican mob of San Juan lost its patience and proceeded to attack and destroy \textit{El Diario de Puerto Rico}. Muñoz Rivera’s residence was also attacked by the Republican mob. He then wisely decided to move his other paper, \textit{La Democracia}, to Caguas. Muñoz Rivera was safe there because in that town the political mob was Federal.\textsuperscript{7}

Under this tense political atmosphere, Iglesias had led the general strike before leaving for New York. He also had then been politically active. The name of the Party was changed to the Democratic Socialist Party, and a torch became the new symbol. Because suffrage was limited, the Party was not sure whether or not it would participate in the elections. In September, a convention was held but it was soon suspended due to the
intervention of the police. After Iglesias left for New York, the Party continued to be active. It filled an electoral list of candidates with the Executive Council. The Council refused to place them on the official ballot because they were filled too late and some candidates were not legally qualified to vote. Thus, they were unable to participate in the November elections.8

The Federal Party held its convention in October in Caguas. There a unanimous resolution was voted backing William Jennings Bryan for the presidency and affiliating the Party with the National Democratic Party. The Federals approved another resolution to change their name to Democratic Party as the National one. The Democratic affiliation and change of name, however, did not materialize.9

The elections were to be held on November 6, 1900. Suffrage was limited to males who were either literate or paid taxes. Most workers, as in the previous municipal elections, were thus unable to vote. The registered voters totalled 123,140. Alleging government partiality to the Republicans and a lack of electoral guarantees, the Federal Party decided to withdraw from the elections two days before they were to take place. Thus, the Republicans won with 58,367 votes against the 148 Federals who opted to vote. Thus, the thirty-five members of the House of Delegates were all Republicans. Federico Degetau was elected commissioner.10

The Republican Party now had the responsibility of using the limited powers granted by Foraker Act to govern the Island with Governor Allen. They had the difficult and uncomfortable task of adapting the American political system to the Puerto Rican colonial reality. The Federal electoral withdrawal left the Republicans with no opposition in the House of Delegates, and thus there were no major obstacles in passing the necessary legislation.11

The House of Delegates met for the first time on December 3, 1900. Some of the elected members were Francisco Mariano Quiñones, Manuel F. Rossy, Luis Sánchez Morales, Manuel Egozcue, Francisco Parra Capó, Pedro María Descartes, José Tous Soto, Cayetano Coll y Toste, Aurelio Méndez Martínez, Roberto H. Todd, and Frederick Cornwell. It is important to note that most of these men were former republican autonomists, but some had been Fusionists (Coll y Toste, Parra Capó, Tous Soto), Egozcue an Unconditional, Todd and Méndez Martínez (the former Prime Minister of the brief Republic of Puerto Rico of 1868) separatists, and Cornwell was a recently arrived American who did not
speak Spanish. Francisco Mariano Quiñones, dean of politics, was elected "temporary chairman" of the House in order to make the selection of the Speaker. The unanimous vote of the House was for Quiñones, but due to his age (he was then seventy), he declined. Rossy was then elected Speaker.\(^\text{12}\)

The laws passed under Rossy's term as Speaker of the House 1900-1904 (he was reelected in 1903) were numerous and of great significance. The following are some of the most important ones: trial by jury; Spanish and English made the official languages; scholarships to study in the United States; industrial schools; some labor legislation; the Insular Police; the establishment of the University of Puerto Rico; a new electoral law; a public library; freedom of religion, speech and press; the Political, Civil, Penal, and Criminal Procedure codes; and the post of Historian of Puerto Rico. This position was given to Francisco Mariano Quiñones.\(^\text{13}\)

A significant bill submitted during this period was the granting the vote to women. Pedro María Descartes, one of the componte Morro Castle prisoners of 1887, presented the bill during the first session. This was a most advanced piece of legislation because only four states of the Union then had female suffrage. Unfortunately Descartes' bill was "not taken seriously by the House" and did not get approved.\(^\text{14}\)

Federico Degetau was the first to represent the Island in Washington. A brilliant intellectual, son of a wealthy German-born father and a distinguished Creole mother, he had been very close to Román Baldorioty de Castro from his childhood. Degetau was educated in Spain where he obtained a law degree. During those years, he came to be known as a man of letters and a humanist. In politics Degetau became a follower and a friend of Francisco Pi y Margall and was elected president of the Spanish National Republican Youth. In the autonomic elections of 1898 he had been elected deputy to the Cortes by the ortodoxos. He was the only Puerto Rican that participated, albeit in a very limited manner, in the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish American War. His last act in the Cortes was to seek the release of General Juan Rius Rivera from prison. Degetau then returned to Puerto Rico to rejoin Barbosa and the Republican Party.\(^\text{15}\)

Degetau was elected in 1900 to the position of commissioner and not as resident commissioner, as it later became and continues to be. This change was partly due to his four years (he was reelected in 1902) of hard work in Washington. The origins of the position of commissioner in United States history goes back to the colonial period. The colonies used
to send agents to London to defend their interests before the Board of Trade and Plantations, the Committee of the Privy Council for Plantation Affairs, and other places in the English Court. Virginia was the first in 1670, to have this type of public and diplomatic representation starting in 1670.16 When Congress approved the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, the territories to be organized for future admittance to the Union were given the right of electing a delegate to the Federal House of Representatives. These delegates served as links between the Federal Government and the territorial governments. The position was a temporary one because the territories were expected to become states and thus be able to send representatives and senators to Congress.17 When Foraker began working on his bill, he originally proposed that Puerto Rico be granted a delegate with the same rights as all other territorial delegates. This was not approved. Instead Puerto Rico got a commissioner because the position of delegate carried the implication that the Island “would eventually become a state of the Union.”18 Congress was therefore making a distinction between Puerto Rico and the other territories (e.g., one unincorporated and the others incorporated). The Foraker Act did not define the functions of the commissioner. The commissioner was to be the representative of the Island in Washington and be accredited in the State Department; he was not a member of Congress.19

In Washington, Degetau labored to convince Congress and the Federal Administration that the American Constitution should be extended to Puerto Rico first as a territory and then as a state. Puerto Ricans were culturally prepared for self-government and to be American citizens. He believed that the economic and social problems of Puerto Rico derived from its political status.20 Degetau argued that during the last three decades of the Spanish regime, the Island had been sending deputies and senators to the Cortes. He wanted his position of commissioner to be changed to that of a delegate. In 1902 he was given the title of resident commissioner and given access to the floor of the House of Representatives.21 In this same year, the Philippines were given two resident commissioners.22 The House of Representatives also passed a bill in 1902 granting Puerto Rico a delegate, but the Senate rejected it because it implied a change of status making the Island an incorporate territory. The resident commissioner was given in 1904 the right to have a voice (but not to vote), participate in debates, and be a member of several committees.23 In the ensuing seven decades, the office of the resident commissioner would evolve in such a way that "for all practical purposes" it had become the same thing as a delegate with the rights, prerogatives, and limitations very similar to the ones of other congressmen.24
As the Foraker Act began to be implemented, Santiago Iglesias arrived on February 4, 1901 at Washington’s Union Station, where Gompers and other important leaders of the American Federation of Labor personally welcomed him. During his stay in the City, Gompers informed Iglesias how the American Federation of Labor was organized and what its ideals and goals were. He also advised Iglesias to learn just how the democratic republic of the United States operated. Iglesias’ formation and beliefs had been mostly European and not American. He was advised to keep the labor movement completely out of politics. Instead of following the tactics of the radical revolutionary European tradeunions, he was to follow the constructive progressivism of the American labor unions. Labor reforms had to be made through the local legislature and not through violent strikes. These transformed labor ideals had to be established within the complex socio-economic and political realities of Puerto Rico.  

While Iglesias was in Washington, the Free Federation organized a series of meetings protesting the misery and tyranny that existed throughout the Island. A written protest was made and signed by 8,000 workers. This document was sent to Iglesias so that he could personally deliver it to President McKinley. On April 15, 1901, Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, accompanied Iglesias to the White House to hand the documents to the Executive of the Republic. McKinley told Iglesias that he would try to find means to help improve the situation of the Puerto Rican workers. The New York and Washington press were also made aware of the situation and published many articles making known the intolerable conditions of the recently acquired American possession.  

On May 28, Iglesias sent the first official documents of organization for the Free Federation from the American Federation of Labor. During the month of September the Free Federation was officially recognized as a state organization by the federation presided over by Gompers. As this was taking place, Iglesias represented Puerto Rico in the Socialist convention in Indianapolis. Finally, on October 14, 1901, Gompers appointed Santiago Iglesias General Organizer of the American Federation of Labor for Puerto Rico and Cuba. The next day, Gompers took him to meet President Theodore Roosevelt and suggested to the former Rough Rider that Iglesias’ mission required guarantees of security and legal protection. Roosevelt immediately dictated a letter addressed to Governor Hunt, Allen’s successor, guaranteeing protection for Iglesias. The Associated Press informed its readers of this new development and three weeks later Santiago Iglesias left for San Juan.
After more than a year's absence from Puerto Rico, Iglesias returned full of hopes and plans for the socio-economic liberation of the laboring masses. In his pocket he had Roosevelt letter addressed to Hunt which supposedly guaranteed his security and gave him legal protection against his reactionary enemies. A large number of workers were on the dock to give him the deserved welcome. However, several persons who were in the group were not well-wishers. As soon as Iglesias set foot on the platform, he was arrested and, without any explanation, taken to the Municipal Jail in the mist of an uproar. The reason for the arrest was that during his absence he had been called to court and had not attended. As a result, a $2,000 bail was imposed. Because Iglesias did not have any bondsmen, he was imprisoned. He immediately wrote a letter of protest to Governor Hunt and sent a cable to Gompers. The Associate Press gave coverage to the arrest. Some days later, the bail was lowered to $500 which Gompers rapidly paid.28

Out on bail, Iglesias began to organize unions under the regulations of the American Federation of Labor. The anti-labor atmosphere that existed the year he had left for New York had not changed at all. Reactionary elements were desperately trying to stop all the labor agitation. On December 14, 1901, the Municipal Court of San Juan reached a verdict by which Iglesias was condemned to three years, four months, and eight days of imprisonment. Other labor leaders, also on trial, were given four-month jail terms. The dissolution of the Free Federation was also ordered. The Court had based its case on the Spanish laws that were still being applied, prohibiting labor unions, strikes, demands to raise salaries, etc.29

The uproar caused by this sentence was greater in the United States than in Puerto Rico. On the Island the people were not surprised at such a verdict, but the national press could not believe that such reactionary laws could exist under the American flag. Iglesias stated that he was sorry for the judges but not for himself because all he had done in the name of the unions he had established, was completely legal under the American Constitution. He also said that his lawyer, Herminio Díaz Navarro, was going to prove that the Spanish laws upon which the case was based were null and void since the Island had come under the American flag. Díaz Navarro made an appeal to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.30

In January of 1902, the crusade to organize unions under the aegis of the American Federation of Labor was renewed and intensified all over the Island. The atmosphere of prejudice and hostility against labor
emancipation was still there, but that made no difference to Santiago Iglesias and his followers. In fact, such opposition was possibly an incentive to fight harder. There were meetings for printers, bakers, tobacco factory workers, who were soon becoming union men. Strikes of sugar cane workers demanding better treatment and wages were promptly crushed by the police force which was dominated by reactionary landlords and political chiefs. By the spring of 1902, the Free Federation was more strongly established than ever.31

The appeal made by Díaz Navarro to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was set for April 9, 1902. The judges, after hearing Díaz Navarro’s defense of Iglesias, the other labor leaders, and the Free Federation, revoked the sentence given by the Municipal Court five months before. The judicial consequences of decision were of supreme importance. The labor organizations were now recognized as completely legal and all Spanish laws which were in conflict with those of the United States were declared null and void. The joy of the unionized workers could be easily imagined.32

Iglesias continued giving conferences and calling meetings in different towns of the Island. Even though the Free Federation had been declared completely legal, the reactionary opposition continued as determined as ever. Bullies who threw rocks, intimidated the workers, or even fired guns, were always around where there were labor activities. The police, as always, did not care or even did its best to make the atmosphere unpleasant for Iglesias and other labor leaders. In Mayagüez things got so bad that Iglesias was almost killed when an unknown man shot at him as he was returning to the hotel one night.33

The abuses committed against the members of the Free Federation were such that Gompers protested in Washington. To President Roosevelt he condemned the injustices inflicted against a legal labor federation. Gompers also wrote a letter of complaint to Governor Hunt telling him of the brutal attacks against the members of his national union in Puerto Rico. The worst part, Gomper’s wrote, was that the persons responsible for the attacks were never arrested, but that the attacked ones were always the ones imprisoned. Iglesias and the Central Committee of the Free Federation also protested. This protest resulted in a Government investigation which somewhat helped to soften the general repression.34

The private life of Santiago Iglesias changed significantly on September 29, 1902, for on that day he was married by a judge in Aguadilla to Justa Bocanegra. They were to have eleven children: Santiago,
Josefina Victoria, Libertad, América, Fraternidad, Igualdad, Justicia, Laura Paz, Luz Estrella, Manuel, and Eduardo. Eight of them were named after ideals and qualities Iglesias loved most during his life. As a father he was lovable and just, as a husband exemplary.35

As Iglesias continued his uphill struggle to organize labor unions and bring social justice to the working classes, the Insular political atmosphere was as turbulent as ever. Both Republican and Federal parties had very similar programs. But the electorate was divided by the personalities and the political procedures of Barbosa and Muñoz Rivera. The Federals and Muñoz Rivera did not waste any good opportunity to attack the Republicans, the Allen administration, and Washington. Muñoz Rivera would later lament that he himself was carried away by a passion of false anti-Americanism.36 A good number of Federals pointed out that the reason that the American government was unfriendly to their Party was due to Muñoz Rivera’s hostile campaign. As a result, Muñoz Rivera decided to leave the Island on March 1901. He settled in New York where he founded The Porto Rico Herald and continued defending his ideals. With Muñoz Rivera out of the local political arena, Díaz Navarro began to direct the Federals to be friendlier to the Allen Administration and Washington. Governor Hunt succeeded Allen on August 1901, and he began to name more Federals to important governmental posts. Hunt even began to talk about a way in which the Federals and Republicans could unite.37

Inside the Republican Party, Matienzo became restless. He was a very dynamic and brilliant person, but his problem was that he was politically not patient. Matienzo now began to grow somewhat disenchanted with the American colonial policies toward Puerto Rico and with the fights between Federals and Republicans. Hunt’s idea of Insular political unity soon began to germinate in Matienzo’s fertile mind. He now would begin a two-year political crusade which would culminate in the formation of the Puerto Rico Union Party in 1904. The San Juan News considered this political development as having separatist inclinations. Matienzo rejected this accusation by stating that it was untrue.38 He affirmed that Puerto Rico should accept Americanization because to do that was to accept civilization, and American civilization was liberty. Puerto Ricans should even learn to play baseball and football!39 Matienzo now also began to give lectures to members of the Free Federation and even called himself a socialist like Iglesias.40

The Federals continued their policy of improving their relationship with the Hunt administration. De Diego even went as far as to call himself an American by heart.41 At an April 6, 1902 meeting of the Federal
Directive Council, de Diego presented a motion favoring a collaborationist strategy which was approved. He gave a splendid speech where he declared that he hoped to see the “Federal star” shining “in the great American constellation.” De Diego, remembered as an eloquent separatist, was then an ardent statehooder. This is actually not surprising, because in his youth, he had been a follower of Pi y Margall.

On May 12, the Republicans had a meeting where Barbosa rejected Matienzo’s plans of union with the Federals. Barbosa reminded Matienzo and the Party that it was the Federals who had always obstructed unity in the Insular politics as Fusionists, during the brief Liberal Autonomous Union Party, and after the Spanish American War. Matienzo’s motion to make a political union was roundly defeated. But some Republicans began to gradually leave the Party and become Federals.

From New York, Muñoz Rivera completely opposed the union plans of Matienzo. He even called Matienzo a traitor to both Barbosa and himself. Muñoz Rivera now also defended statehood more than ever and rejected both independence and even the Canadian dominion status he had asked of McKinley in 1899. For him a dominion status was an accursed form of colonialism.

In this complex and fluctuating political atmosphere, Santiago Iglesias and the Free Federation continued their struggles against all odds. The suffrage for the 1902 elections was a limited one, and Governor Hunt had no sympathy for the Socialist Workers Party. By law the Party was not permitted to put up candidates. Therefore, it was decided to vote for the Federal Party which would run two labor candidates on their ticket. There was no pact or fusion between the two parties. It was only an experimental agreement. The Free Federation had nothing to do with it. One of the two candidates was Iglesias, who ran in the district of Guayama.

The elections were held on November 4, 1902. The Republicans won with 73,823 votes and elected twenty-five delegates. The Federals obtained only 34,605 votes and elected ten delegates. The elections were marred by illegalities, as were those of 1898. The Republicans were, unfortunately, getting even with the Federals. Iglesias, who ran in a district that was a Federal bastion, lost as did the other labor candidate.

As the months passed by, the struggles of Iglesias for the Free Federation continued as strong as ever. In the fall of 1902, Iglesias headed the Insular delegation to the American Federation of Labor convention held that year in New Orleans. The delegates of that convention approved
a resolution asking Congress to grant Puerto Ricans American citizenship. Iglesias himself had already become an American citizen on April, 1900.50

During 1903, the abuses against the organized workers continued although not as strong as previously. The Second Labor Congress was held from October 23 to November 3, 1903 in Ponce. There were eighty-nine registered delegates representing, 8,600 unionized workers from forty-two towns and cities. Some of the resolutions approved were later to be made law in the coming legislative sessions. A Bureau of Labor was demanded but was rejected by the Executive Council.51

By the end of that year, the end of the Hunt administration seemed to be getting closer.52 The Federal complaints against Hunt were personally delivered by Henry W. Dooley, a local American businessman, to President Roosevelt. Dooley informed the President of the Insular political situation and Hunt's favoritism toward the Republicans.53 Roosevelt, who did not know Hunt well, began to exert pressure on him to resign hoping that this would put an end to the complains of the Federals.54

As these changes were crystalizing in Washington, the Republican Party sent José Gómez Brioso and Roberto H. Todd to the same city to incorporate their Party with the G.O.P. This idea was Barbosa's. Degetau opposed this decision because he believed that since Puerto Ricans were not yet American citizens, they should not get involved in national politics. Barbosa thought that by incorporating the Party the granting of the citizenship would be hastened. Gómez Brioso and Todd visited Roosevelt and explained their plan. Later they saw the Ohio senators, Joseph Foraker and Mark Hanna. Since these three key persons all favored the incorporating idea, the National Republican Committee voted to accept the affiliation with the Puerto Rican Republicans. This was ratified in the 1904 Chicago convention of the G.O.P.55

This new development in the Republican Party further weakened its unity. Since Matienzo had begun his campaign of political union, some Republicans, like Manuel Zeno Gandía, began to leave the Party. A number of wealthy Republicans abandoned the Party also because they disliked the new taxing system approved by the House of Delegates.56

Matienzo's plan of political unity would not have been successful had not its most important opponent changed his mind. On January 9, 1904, Muñoz Rivera suddenly declared himself an ardent unionist and returned to Puerto Rico to work for the new ideal.57 Santiago R. Palmer, President of the Federal Directory, wrote to Rossy, his Republican
counterpart, asking him to convince his followers of the unionist ideal. Rossy rejected this political proposal because the Republicans believed in a two party system.58

The Federal American Party opened its last convention on February 18, 1904 in San Juan. There the delegates voted to dissolve the Party. A motion was approved to invite for the next session the Republicans that were coming over to form with them the new party. These men were Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, Manuel Zeno Gandía, Rafael del Valle, and other lesser known persons. The convention was renewed on the 19th for the discussion of the platform of the new political organization, the Puerto Rico Union Party. The article that caused the greatest difficulty was the fifth.59

This article, the celebrated base quinta, dealt with status the Unionist Party would advocate for Puerto Rico. It was Matienzo who had proposed the idea, but Zeno Gandía wrote it out. The article stated that Puerto Rico should be either a state of the Union or an independent republic under the protection of the United States; and that as a transitory measure, the Island should have the necessary self-government until the final status was decided upon. Many former Federals, especially Díaz Navarro, were in opposition to this article because they rejected the idea of independence. Matienzo, at this period, was not favorable to independence, but he believed that if statehood was not granted, then he would accept independence as a final solution to Insular status. The article was voted upon and the clause dealing with independence was rejected. Later in the day de Diego, who had been absent during the debates, returned and led a brilliant fight which succeeded in restoring the independence clause of the article. He was not really defending independence, but thinking along the lines of Matienzo. Muñoz Rivera kept himself neutral during all the heated debates.60

Before the convention was adjourned, Muñoz Rivera proposed that a commission should be appointed to visit Samuel Gompers who had recently arrived in San Juan. This was approved and lead toward a period of cooperation between the Free Federation and the Unionists. Gompers drafted the labor clauses which were later included in the Unionist program. The new symbol of the Party was the same two united hands of the American Federation of Labor.61

Muñoz Rivera, the real Unionist leader, wrote that the "supreme aspiration, the fundamental creed" of the Party was "COLONIAL AUTONOMY" and that the Puerto Rican people "unanimously aspired"
towards "SELF-GOVERNMENT." He was, however, rejecting neither statehood nor independence as the final status. But his pro-Americanism lost some of its vigor. The colonial autonomy he advocated was of a transitory form, not a permanent status. Furthermore, Muñoz Rivera had already rejected in 1902 dominion status. As for American citizenship, he was all in favor of obtaining it. Even with all his political pragmatism, Muñoz Rivera never advocated an inferior colonial form of government as the permanent solution to the status of Puerto Rico.

February 15, 1904, is a milestone in the history of the labor movement in Puerto Rico. On that date Samuel Gompers arrived for a two-week trip. His purpose was to investigate the labor conditions and carefully study the working classes because they could not "live isolated from the American movements." During his stay, Gompers traveled widely interviewing businessmen, farmers, landlords, workers, professionals, and politicians. The result was that he became extremely well-informed on the condition of Puerto Rico.

The Gompers visit evoked a great enthusiasm among the working classes. This, in turn, renewed the energy and gave new vigor to the Free Federation. His comments and reports confirmed the study made by Carrol in 1899 and the complaints constantly made by Iglesias on the exploitation that the workers suffered.

One important development resulted from the Gompers trip. The local unions of the Free Federation increased from seven to eighty. The Free Federation was now a real force to be respected and felt. One must not forget that it was very difficult to organize workers who were mostly illiterate. Labor propaganda had to be done mostly person-to-person, by way of meetings or through the social study groups created by the Free Federation. Hence, the majority of the workers could not be reached by means of printed materials of any kind.

Even though most workers were illiterate, this did not discourage the labor leaders from developing a labor press. Many labor papers did not last long; however, as soon as one ceased publication, another one always emerged to fill the gap. San Juan, Ponce, Mayagüez, and Arecibo were the cities where most of these newspapers and magazines were printed. The principal labor paper was Unión Obrera, established in Ponce in 1902 by Iglesias. A few years later it became the official newspaper of the Free Federation. Later the newspaper moved to Mayagüez with Julio Aybar its editor: it lasted until 1935. The labor press contributed incalculably to the development of the labor unions in Puerto Rico.

The workers in the tobacco factories, the tabaqueros, were the most
educated in the labor movement and produced some of the best labor leaders. Living in urban centers, they found it much easier to become better educated. In the factories where they worked there was always a reader who did more than entertain them as they performed their tasks. This educational entertainment exposed the workers to the daily press, to the great authors, to history, and even to labor oriented publications.69 Thus, there were several ways in which the working classes began to learn both their rights and the means to achieve them.

After the foundation of the Unionist Party, Governor Hunt felt more uncomfortable until President Roosevelt finally replaced him on July 4, 1904.70 Massachusetts-born Beekman Winthrop was the new Insular executive. He was a man of wealth, knew Spanish, had been a judge in the Philippines, and had been recommended by William H. Taft, former governor of the Philippines and then Secretary of War.71 Winthrop and Regis H. Post, the Secretary of Puerto Rico and a close friend of President Roosevelt, seemed to have been instructed in Washington to temper the Insular political turbulence. They began to do this by favoring the Unionists as Hunt had done with the Republicans.72

When Barbosa, Rossy, Gómez Brioso, and Todd went to the 1904 G.O.P. convention in Chicago to conclude the process of incorporating the Insular Republicans with the Continental Republicans, the Associated press—with information provided by the Governor’s Office—stated that the commission was headed by a black who was the Puerto Rican equivalent to “Boss” Crocker of Tammany Hall, and that their Party had no affinity with the National Republican Party. Winthrop and Post were trying to block the incorporation and prevent the Puerto Rican delegates from sitting and voting in the convention.73 The Unionists also did their best to obstruct the incorporation.74

As a result of this affiliation between the Insular Republicans and the G.O.P., more persons began to join the Unionists.75 This incorporation, however, was not identical with that effected by Muñoz Rivera and Sagasta in 1897. The Spanish Liberal Fusionists Party was a highly centralized organization as opposed to the decentralized national parties in the United States. But for a number of regionalist Puerto Ricans this incorporation was unacceptable. Degetau never accepted it and would run for resident commissioner as an independent under the ticket of the Regional Republican Party, thus further dividing his former Party.76

A new electoral law passed in 1902 by the Republicans was amended in 1904 to grant the vote to all male illiterates.77 Since the
Republicans were mostly a party of professionals and urban groups, the new electoral law favored the peasants who were under the influence of the Unionists. Most Unionists were the same Federals who were men of property and wealth. Barbosa was criticized for having favored this electoral law. But he defended his action at the Party convention by stating that it was preferable to lose the elections than to have the Americans say that Puerto Ricans did not know how to use universal suffrage. Mateo Fajardo was selected to run for resident commissioner.

For that same position in the Unionist Party some favored Zeno Gandía, a co-founder of the Party. But Muñoz Rivera coveted the same office. He went to see Winthrop, and the Governor told him that his former anti-American attacks made him unacceptable to Washington. Muñoz Rivera then backed Tulio Larránaga, and the candidacy of Zeno Gandía fizzled. Nevertheless, Muñoz Rivera ran for the same position under the ticket of the Democratic Party, formed by a local group of Unionists.

With the new electoral law, the workers now had great political influence. The Free Federation and the Unionist Party had now drawn closer. Six members of the Free Federation were placed on the Unionist ballot for the House of Delegates. Nevertheless, it was also decided to run some candidates on the ticket of the Socialist Workers Party. The Party even ran Muñoz Rivera as their candidate for resident commissioner.

During this electoral campaign there were more rallies than ever before due to the larger electorate. Winthrop and Post would be seen in public wearing white suits and red ties, the colors of the Unionist flag.

The elections took place on November 8, 1904 and were the most honest and quietest there had ever been. The Unionists won a smashing victory with 89,713 votes against 54,092 for the Republicans. They elected twenty-five delegates, including the six labor leaders, while the Republicans elected only ten. The Republicans won in eighteen municipalities—including San Juan and several other important urban centers—but the Unionists got twenty-six. Degetau only received 190 votes. Muñoz Rivera obtained 111 votes for resident commissioner in the Democratic Party ticket and 40 more in the Socialist Workers Party.

In the 1904 San Francisco convention of the American Federation of Labor, Iglesias and the other delegates from Puerto Rico presented several proposals explaining the aspirations and needs of the Insular working classes. They also asked the American Federation of Labor to get
Washington to give more self-government to Puerto Rico. This system of government should be similar to that of Australia and New Zealand. One demand of importance was for the granting of American citizenship which Degetau was fighting for in Congress.87

The House of Delegates opened its new session on January 9, 1905 and Matienzo was elected speaker.88 This was the first time workers were beginning to be legislators. Previously this field had been a prerrogative of professionals and men of letters. Times were changing. The six delegates were two typographers, one journalist, a painter, one carpenter, and a treasurer of a labor union. In the House they began to push for more labor legislation that would improve the working classes.89

In the spring of 1905, the cane workers of the southern districts of Ponce and Guayama and the northern district of Arecibo went on strike demanding higher wages and shorter working hours. Some towns of the southwestern district of Mayagüez, the northwestern district of Aguadilla, and the northern district of San Juan also went on strike. There were over twenty municipalities on strike, out of a total of forty-six. The workers on strike in the southern municipalities numbered some 20,000 with some 15,000 more in the northern ones. Thirty-eight sugar cane plantations and 140 smaller farms were paralyzed in the southern coast alone.90

The Free Federation was the organizer and Santiago Iglesias the director of these strikes which affected both the entire Island and overseas investors. The strikes were more than justified. The sugar cane workers were inhumanly exploited and deprived of the essentials of life. The sugar industry flourished under a prosperity that enriched the owners while thousands of workers labored under sun and rain for fourteen hours a day for a miserable wage which was not enough to sustain a decent life. The strike strategy put into practice had already been used by American and world labor unions when they fought to obtain better compensation for the workers. However, this did not make any difference to the reactionary capitalists and the police force. Hundreds of strikers were beaten, arrested or even shot. The American, foreign, and local corporations and landlords believed it necessary that these field workers be kept obedient at any cost. Puerto Rico was to be utilized for its riches because labor was very cheap. To the sugar barons the strikers were just rebellious serfs which had to be crushed. Many acts of violence were committed in the name of law and liberty.91

The wave of strikes started in the spring of 1905 and lasted until the summer of 1906. They were, however, not continuous for months nor
were they constant in every sugar plantation; sometimes many were on
strike and other times only a few. Nevertheless, the strikes were effective
for the workers who achieved better benefits. Moreover, they were very
harmful for the sugar industry because production and corresponding
profits diminished.

In order to make strikes more effective, Iglesias organized commit-
tees which also had another important function: to act as committees of
conciliation and arbitration. It was not unusual that when one of these
committees was having a meeting, the police, many times using the
facilities provided by the sugar cane landlords, would dissolve the
gathering by arbitrary and, in not a few cases, brutal ways. The police,
using wooden sticks, sabers or guns, would descend upon workers, both
male and female, young and old.

These strikes of 1905-1906 caused such confusion that for the first
time injunctions were used in the Federal Court against the directors of the
strikes and members of the Free Federation. Another injunction was
presented in the District Court of Arecibo with the same end in mind. The
objective of these injunctions was to prevent public gatherings of the labor
leaders. It was expected that these would eliminate the strikes because by
using the powers of the courts, the labor representatives would be legally
prosecuted for disobeying the law. Fortunately, the judges did not impose
any sentence in any of the cases which were presented to them. In order
to defend the Free Federation and everything that was related to it,
Santiago Iglesias had to personally prepare a plea which was presented
to the Federal Court. Because sometimes the workers did not have any
lawyers, they had to defend themselves.92

After more than a year of almost constant strikes, the sugar landlords
and corporations realized that the workers were deadly serious in their
demands, and if a settlement was not reached the sugar would be lost. As
a result, the sugar producers reached an agreement with the Free Federa-
tion to pay wages of seventy-five cents in legal tender for eight hours of
work. This was a 15 percent increase in the workers’ salary. Wages that
were not paid in legal tender —the notorious vale— were prohibited.
Workers were not allowed to make purchases outside the company store
of the plantation. Payments were to be made at midday on Saturday.
Minors and women would receive fifty cents for eight hours of labor. The
obligatory lunches which were sold by plantation agents were abolished.
Salary discounts due to rain would not be made. Overtime was to be paid.
Finally, all strikers would be allowed to return to their jobs.93 This
agreement was a great triumph for the working classes.
The Third Labor Congress was held in Mayagüez with the attendance of fifty-five delegates on July 18, 1905. Up until then, the Free Federation had not been completely welded to the American Federation of Labor. But now, after Gompers' visit, the bond between the Puerto Rican federated workers and those in the States was solidified. The Congress was without doubt one of the most constructive in perfecting the local labor organization. Eighty resolutions were considered and discussed by the representatives of seventy-five local unions.\textsuperscript{94} The Free Federation had reached maturity. The Fourth and Fifth Congresses of Guayama, July 14, 1906, and Arecibo, March 8, 1908, simply followed the pattern set in Mayagüez.\textsuperscript{95}

The uphill campaign to obtain American citizenship for Puerto Ricans was a long one. The first bill that Degetau presented in the House of Representatives in 1904 was asking for American citizenship.\textsuperscript{96} A year later, Governor Winthrop asked Washington to favor this same idea. In his message to Congress on December 11, 1905, President Roosevelt urged the approval of a citizenship bill for Puerto Rico. As a result of all this, a few weeks later Speaker Matienzo presented a joint resolution asking Congress to grant the "noble and just recommendation" of Roosevelt. This was approved by the House of Delegates.\textsuperscript{97} Resident Commissioner Larrínaga presented legislation asking for American citizenship. In July, 1906 de Diego got the House to vote a memorial to Secretary of State Elihu Root also demanding the same thing.\textsuperscript{98}

Muñoz Rivera spent most of 1906 traveling around the Island getting the Unionists well organized for the coming elections. By doing this, he further increased his control over the Party.\textsuperscript{99}

After the 1904 elections the Socialist Workers Party gradually disappeared due to its lack of organization. All the energies of Iglesias and the other labor leaders were used in solidifying the power and influence of the Free Federation during the great strikes of 1905-1906. Those strikes in turn made the Unionists become afraid at the radicalism of the workers and the political arrangement between the Party and the Free Federation. De Diego strongly objected to this labor radicalism. He went so far as to declare that four bills voted by the House (and presented by labor leader Ramón Romero Rosa) branded the Unionist Party as a socialist organization in the eyes of Washington. This was for him prejudicial to both Puerto Rico and the Unionists. The Unionist Party refused to run any candidates who did not appear registered on their lists. Thus the six labor delegates would not be placed on the Unionist ballot,
and the political arrangement ceased. This action would lead the workers to later call Muñoz Rivera the "Czar of Barranquitas," his hometown.\textsuperscript{100} During this time a change occurred in the political policies of the American Federation of Labor because it was dissatisfied with the lack of Congressional labor legislation. The American Federation of Labor decided that they would back any candidates who would defend their policies and oppose those hostile to the labor movement. This strategy was to be applied locally. However, since the influence of labor was so weak in the two Insular parties, it was decided that the Free Federation would run their own candidates with the sole purpose of counting votes. Iglesias was placed on the ballot of the Free Federation as candidate for resident commissioner.\textsuperscript{101}

The elections of November 6, 1906 were a smashing victory for the Unionists. They won with 98,406 votes against 53,932 obtained by the Republicans. The Free Federation Party received just a total of 1,345 votes. In the House of Delegates the Unionists won all the thirty-five members. They also won forty-three municipalities while the Republicans were reduced to twelve.\textsuperscript{102} 

\textit{Union Obrera} accused the Unionist Party of being now "the enemies of the working classes." The paper declared that the workers wanted to have their "political independence" and be respected by both Unionists and Republicans. The labor paper also totally condemned the corrupt practice of vote buying, which would plague the Island for three more decades.\textsuperscript{103} Santiago Iglesias was the first political leader to fight against this practice of buying votes.\textsuperscript{104} The Unionist Party had a solid majority, but they —with Winthrop’s consent— committed unnecessary electoral frauds which "corrupted public conscience" and democratic institutions. Unionist leaders, nevertheless, claimed they were defenders of the "most pure democratic principles," "representative institutions," and "freedom of expression" of the people.\textsuperscript{105} After the electoral victory, the Unionist Party began to acquire an almost absolute control of the political patronage. All government job vacancies were to be filled with faithful Unionists.\textsuperscript{106}

Arriving from a trip to Panama, where the canal was under construction, President Theodore Roosevelt spent two days in Puerto Rico. He was impressed by its scenic beauty and called it a "tropic Switzerland". In several speeches that Roosevelt made he reaffirmed his desire to give American citizenship to Puerto Ricans. This he also did in his messages to Congress in 1906, and later in 1907 and 1908. Since 1906, both the
G.O.P. and the Democratic Party platforms favored United States citizenship for the Island. But all Congressional legislation to grant the citizenship failed to get approved.107

Although Roosevelt was favorable to the granting of citizenship, he was not inclined to make any changes in the Foraker Act. This caused Matienzo to become disenchanted with the United States. Again changing his opinion, he began to criticize Washington's colonial policies. Since he was Speaker of the House of Delegates, this created a serious problem for Muñoz Rivera who wanted a close collaboration with Washington. Matienzo's following in the Unionist Party was very small. Thus, when the new House of Representatives reconvened in 1907, Matienzo was not reelected Speaker. The post went to Francisco de Paula Acuña. Matienzo was gradually becoming a man without a party, even though many considered him the creator of the Unionist Party. It was Muñoz Rivera who was the indisputable leader of the Party; anyone else was secondary.108

Speaker Acuña was appointed to the Executive Council on March 1907 and de Diego was then voted to replace him.109 It was de Diego who had the distinction of going to Virginia in June, 1907 together with all the other speakers of the states and territories, to represent Puerto Rico in the celebrations of the founding of Jamestown. There he gave an eloquent speech in which he asked for American citizenship. De Diego stated that he wanted American citizenship because he had no citizenship. Nevertheless, he added that he wanted either American or Puerto Rican citizenship, but with all the rights of national sovereignty. Later de Diego visited President Roosevelt and asked for reforms in the Foraker Act, such as an elective senate.110

Governor Regis H. Post (1907-1909) was not pro labor, and this created obstacles in the organization process of the Free Federation. In 1908, 38 new local unions were organized and 27 reorganized making a total of 112. But regardless of their limited membership, they were a force that was respected.111

The elections of 1908 were another landslide for the Unionists, for they again won all the seats in the House of Delegates with 101,033 votes. The republicans only got 54,962 votes, while the Free Federation Party received only 1,327 votes.112 Commenting on this Unionist victory of 1908, Pedro M. Descartes wrote that it was sad to see so many Republicans—especially a good number intellectuals—leave the Party and join the forces of Muñoz Rivera. But the worst thing was that many
Unconditionals had become fervent Unionists and that a number of the victims of the componte of 1887 were now praising their former persecutors for having defeated the Republican Party in the elections. The Unionists celebrated their 1908 electoral triumph with some Spanish military music which Descartes had not heard since he had been a prisoner in Morro Castle with Baldorioty because of the repression of Governor Palacio.\footnote{113}

The new House of Delegates opened its session early in January, 1909. There were many new members — such as Luis Lloréns Torres — who had a great desire to reform sections of the Foraker Act towards more self-government. Matienzo was one of the activists of this group. It did not take long before the delegates and Governor Post were bitterly at odds. The House refused to pass the new budget and appointed a commission to go to Washington to explain the angry controversy. Its members were Luis Muñoz Rivera, Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, and Eugenio Benítez Castaño.\footnote{114}

The three commissioners went to Washington and saw the Secretary of Interior, President William H. Taft, and several members of Congress. But no one there was much impressed by the protesting Puerto Ricans, and they returned to San Juan empty-handed. Taft considered that the House of Delegates had too much power and did not know how to use it. He therefore instructed Congress to legislate to trim its powers.\footnote{115}

The powers of the Foraker Act were reduced by the Olmsted Amendment. By it, the previous budget would apply for the following year whenever the House of Delegates refused to approve a new one. Puerto Rico was now placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department. This would serve as the new colonial ministry until 1934. All this controversy led Post to resign. George R. Colton was now appointed governor on November 6, 1909.\footnote{116}

Colton was from Nebraska and had been a colonel during the Spanish American War in the Philippines. He later became head of the Federal Customs in the Philippines. Before coming to Puerto Rico, Colton had directed the custom services in the Dominican Republic which was then undergoing American intervention. He was the first governor who took an interest in the problems and conditions of the workers.\footnote{117}

President Taft had ordered Secretary of War, Jacob Dickinson and General Clarence Edwards, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, to brief him on the problems of Puerto Rico so that he could recommend some changes to Congress. This presidential initiative was to crystalize in the Olmsted Bill which would try to reform the Foraker Act.\footnote{118}
Representative Marlin E. Olmsted, after long meetings with Dickinson and Edwards, drafted a bill to grant voluntary—not collective—United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans as well as liberalizing the legislative system and other governmental reforms. As a result, much political interest in the Island arose. The Free Federation had a special interest in the Olmsted Bill because it provided for the creation of a Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. This interest increased as the Bill suffered changes. In the beginning the Department was to be created by Congress, but this was later vested in the Insular Legislature. This change was immediately opposed by the Free Federation. The reason for this was that the House of Delegates was not pro-labor. As a result, by allowing the Legislature to establish the Department, that would be tantamount to suppressing it. The Free Federation also opposed certain clauses of the Bill which restricted the working class from voting and the right of election to public office. Gompers vigorously attacked all clauses which were detrimental to the workers.

In order to inform Congress of the aspirations of Puerto Rico, Governor Colton organized a commission of prominent Unionists, Republicans, and the Free Federation, with Iglesias as the Labor representative. The commission went to Washington and participated in the hearings. The Olmsted Bill passed the House but was defeated in the Senate.

While all these political developments had occurred, the Sixth Labor Congress took place in Juncos, March 18-20. Among the resolutions adopted were the following: improvement of the administrative system of all labor unions; labor views on the Olmsted Bill; housing projects for workers; organizing more women in labor unions, etc. During one of the speeches Iglesias delivered, he pointed out that 60 percent of the earnings made were being taken away from Puerto Rico by absentee capitalists. It was at this Congress that the use of the name Free Federation as a party name was prohibited because many workers disapproved.

The May Day celebrations in 1910 gave way to the first local commemoration of Labor Day. Governor Colton donated $50.00 of his personal income as a prize for the labor groups that sent the best delegation to the parade.

By this time the parties were moving ahead for the coming November elections. Muñoz Rivera had had enough of Matienzo and the young activists in the House. As a result, none of them were allowed to run on the Unionist ticket. Muñoz Rivera would now leave his House seat and
run for resident commissioner. Matienzo and Llorénis Torrés initiated a plan to form a new party whose political platform would be statehood and independence because they rejected any form of colonial autonomy. Llorénis Torrés, however, favored only the independence ideal. Separatism was beginning to germinate again.\textsuperscript{124}

The 1910 elections were another landslide for the Unionists who received 100,634 votes, won fifty-one municipalities, the resident commissioner, and all the House seats. The Republicans lost with 42,062 votes and won sixteen municipalities. In San Juan, the Socialist Party got 67 votes and in Arecibo the Workers’ Party obtained 872. In the district of Guayama, the Free Federation had campaigned to get the workers to vote against Díaz Navarro because of his anti-labor record in the House (he was the leading corporation lawyer). Díaz Navarro won his seat, but since 1,479 Unionist workers had voted against him, the Republicans won the city of Guayama.\textsuperscript{125} The Free Federation was a force not to be ignored by the political leadership.

Muñoz Rivera left for his new political position in Congress absolutely certain that the Unionist Party was entirely under his control and that the House of Delegates would not become rebellious as in 1909. De Diego was his close follower and would not cause too many problems. Furthermore, de Diego was a close collaborator of Governor Colton, and his pro-American sentiments (i.e., imposed collective American citizenships) were beyond any doubt. Since he was a prominent corporation lawyer (among his clients were the Banco de Puerto Rico, Fritze, Lundt and Co. and the Bianchi family (sugar), de Diego had the good will of the powerful business interests.\textsuperscript{126}

In Washington, Muñoz Rivera worked hard to improve the economic and political conditions of Puerto Rico. At a conference he gave in October, 1911 at Mohonk Lake, New York, he stated that there were three political solutions for the Island: statehood, home-rule, and independence. Of these three, Muñoz Rivera declared that he preferred statehood, proposed home-rule as a temporary solution, and would favor independence as a last resort for Puerto Ricans to maintain their rights and honors if Congress would reject the federative solution.\textsuperscript{127}

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, was in favor of granting collective United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans, but opposed any statehood solution for the Island. The status he favored was one of local autonomy, similar to that which some of Great Britain’s overseas possessions had. Elihu Root also shared similar political ideas. The granting of
American citizenship and the negation of statehood in favor of an autonomous colonial status, would now begin to make some Puerto Ricans lose their faith in the institutions of the United States. As a result, the separatist ideal would gradually begin to grow. Matienzo was one of these disenchanted people.  

The position of Iglesias and the Free Federation in regard to citizenship was still the same. The workers wanted Congress to grant Puerto Rico American citizenship collectively, not individually as some proposed, because it guaranteed the freedom and progress they wanted. Whether or not Puerto Rico would become a state, that was to be decided in the future. Independence was considered as a sentimental political solution which Iglesias and the Free Federation rejected. Governor Colton backed this position. Speaker de Diego was also still demanding collective American citizenship.

The December, 1911 issue of the American Federationist gives an excellent overall view of the development of the labor movement, the problem it faced, and actions taken to resolve them. Twenty-two new unions had been established for a total of 132 and a membership of more than 8,000 workers. The economic and social conditions of the workers had “improved to a marked degree.” During the year, considered a “peaceful” one, only eighteen strikes had occurred. The principal cause of most of these strikes was the workers’ refusal to accept salary cuts, then something very common. All strikes ended favorably for the unionized workers.

In that same year, Mariano Abril published a book on socialism based on the articles he had written for La Democracia. The book condemned the revolutionary socialism that was being preached locally. Puerto Rico did not have traditional institutions that had to be overthrown by a revolution. The working class was not intellectually prepared for certain types of “disuniting propaganda.” There was no aristocracy, bourgeoisie, nor racial conflicts, and therefore, destructive socialist propaganda was unnecessary. Puerto Rico lived under a political system that was fully democratic. As far as Abril was concerned, the only social problems that existed lay in the minds of the disruptive socialists; for him there were no class divisions on the Island. Abril also stated that a strong socialist party would never be organized in Puerto Rico if intellectuals and professionals did not join it as it had happened in Europe.

The new separatist group that gradually began to form under Matienzo’s direction came principally from the Unionist Party — includ-
ing some ex-Republicans — and would be joined by some former Unconditionals such as Rafael López Landrán and Vicente Balbás. The group, thus, included both conservatives and liberals. To further complicate matters, the separatists were divided as to when independence should take place: one faction desired it immediately; another faction would ask for it after a majority vote in a plebiscite; a third faction aspired independence after a preparatory period which could last up to fifty years. None of these three groups wanted independence by way of a revolution. Matienzo went so far as to desire an independence in which Puerto Rico would become united to a Latin American federation that would be created by the middle of the 20th century. He was truly a dreamer, whose dream, unfortunately, kept changing.

On February 8, 1912, Matienzo, together with Zeno Gandía, Lloréns Torres, Eugenio Benítez Castaño, and others issued a manifesto founding the Party of Independence of Puerto Rico. The manifesto declared that since any form of autonomy was of a temporary nature, only statehood and independence were permanent status. Their aspiration was to make Puerto Rico a sovereign republic.

La Democracia, Muñoz Rivera’s paper, rejected Matienzo and his followers. The Republican El Tiempo declared that Matienzo should not be taken seriously because he would change his political affiliation again as he had done three times before.

Since Matienzo and his followers were not successful in increasing their Party membership from the Unionist and Republican camps, they then looked to the workers. López Landrán, a former Unconditional, who had now become quite socialistic, wrote a platform for the separatist Party which was similar to the political and economic plans of the Free Federation. But Iglesias and the workers were not impressed at all. Matienzo was, thus, leading a party of separatists that had no followers.

The interest of Governor Colton in the welfare of all continued to manifest itself as his policies were put into practice. The demands of the Free Federation started to gain recognition by those in power. Under Colton’s influence and under the pressure of General Edwards, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the House of Delegates passed a bill on March 14, 1912, establishing the Bureau of Labor. The Legislature that passed the law was composed mostly of persons hostile to the Free Federation. However, pressure from Washington had convinced them of the need of the Bureau. The principal functions of the Bureau were to investigate the general conditions of labor, insured labor legislation was
put into practice, improve relations between management and workers, and to suggest more social legislation. Its power was limited, but it was a step forward. The Legislature also passed other labor laws of the regulatory type (working hours, labor conditions of women and minors, safety working regulations, etc.).

After solving a series of complex strikes, in which Governor Colton had to intervene to protect the workers from police abuse, Iglesias went to Washington at the end of March where he spent six months defending the rights of the workers.

Congressman William A. Jones, Chairman of the Insular Affairs Committee, introduced a bill—which took five years to be finally approved—to grant collective American citizenship to Puerto Ricans, an elective senate, the establishment of a Department of Agriculture and Labor, the transferring of the administration of the Island from the Department of War to the Department of Interior, and other reforms. One negative aspect of the Jones Bill was that the suffrage would be restricted to property owners and literate men.

During the hearings, Muñoz Rivera defended the granting of collective citizenship. Horace M. Towner, Republican minority member of the Insular Affairs Committee, told the Resident Commissioner that the granting of American citizenship would not make independence impossible for Puerto Rico. The United States could make the Island an independent republic even if its inhabitants were Americans. Muñoz Rivera agreed with this theory. Chairman Jones favored collective citizenship, but was not inclined towards eventual statehood.

Iglesias lobbied hard for the granting of American citizenship. General Edwards was favorably inclined too. Iglesias visited President Taft in order to convince him to take a more energetic attitude toward the citizenship which had been approved in the House and was being studied in the Senate. Soon afterwards, Taft wrote to Iglesias defending the conferring of the citizenship. This document was very important because it was the first time the President had given his opinion on such a vital matter. The letter was included in a pamphlet Iglesias wrote entitled A People Without a Country, Appeal for United States Citizenship for the People of Porto Rico in which he published all the important declarations made by prominent persons on the citizenship subject. The pamphlet was given broad publicity. The bill was not passed, but Iglesias would continue fighting for American citizenship because it would, claimed he, give security to the institutions which gave Puerto Rico its liberties.
Besides dealing with several aspects of the Jones Bill, Iglesias was at the same time defending the workers in the Finance Committee of the Senate. There a sugar bill was being considered in which Puerto Rican sugar would be declared tariff free. This was damaging because the sugar corporations would earn less and the workers would get lower salaries. Both politicians and businessmen were against the bill and several commissions had been sent up to testify. Iglesias opposed the bill because it would destroy the commercial protection of the United States, a protection that had improved the social conditions of the masses by 50 percent. The wages paid to sugar cane workers had gone up from 20 cents to 60 and 70 cents per day, with some earning more. Working hours had been reduced. Fortunately, the sugar bill was rejected. This had been the first time that capital and labor had worked together to prevent the destruction of an industry.\textsuperscript{142}

Roberto H. Todd, National Committeeman of the G.O.P. in Puerto Rico and Republican mayor of San Juan, passed through Washington in June before going to the Chicago convention of his Party. He visited Secretary Stimpson to hear his opinion on the passing chances the Jones Bill had in the Senate. The Secretary of War told him to see New York Senator Elihu Root. For the Insular Republicans the granting of the American citizenship was the most important element in the Jones Bill, and Root's backing was vital. Root was not favorably inclined to citizenship because he felt that it would be interpreted by Insular Republicans as the first step in demanding statehood. The status Root wanted for Puerto Rico was that of an American protectorate.\textsuperscript{143}

Resident Commissioner Muñoz Rivera knew what Taft, Stimpson, Root, and other policy makers in Washington thought about the political status of Puerto Rico. Independence was for Muñoz Rivera his \textit{desideratum}, but his \textit{modus operandi} was autonomy. Yet, he considered independence a "purely abstract ideal" that would never become a reality.\textsuperscript{144} Nevertheless, at the convention the Unionists held in Mayagüez prior to the 1912 elections, the Party rejected statehood in favor of independence.\textsuperscript{145} During the electoral campaign, however, the Unionists gave emphasis to home-rule. They stated that if the Democrats should win in the United States and refused to grant home-rule to Puerto Rico, the Unionists Party would then ask for independence.\textsuperscript{146} The Unionists had a cordial relationship with the Democratic Party. William Jennings Bryan had visited the Island as their guest in April, 1910.\textsuperscript{147}

In this unclear political environment the electoral campaign took
place. The separatist Party directed by Matienzo was not able to place any candidates on the ballot because it lacked enough signatures (a mere 103). The Party was only able to place on the ballot the names of three elective officials for the Municipal Court in the small town of Yabucoa.\textsuperscript{148}

In these 1912 elections, Iglesias and the unionized workers began to realize even more the importance of having some political power. The National Democratic Party had written to Iglesias in 1911 proposing the formation of a local party of Democrats and Socialists which would enable the workers a greater degree of influence in Washington. There was also a possibility of involving Muñoz Rivera in the political arrangement. Iglesias asked Gompers for his opinion on the Democrat proposal. Gompers rejected it and the political deal fell through. The workers then decided to nominate some candidates under the banner of the Insular Labor Party.\textsuperscript{149}

The November elections were another solid victory for the Unionists when they received 91,420 votes. They won all the electoral districts as well as fifty-four municipalities, twenty-eight delegates, and the resident commissioner. The Republicans lost with 58,225 votes winning in nineteen municipalities and seven delegates (due to a new minority representation law; however, they never took their seats because the Party boycotted the Legislature). The Insular Labor Party obtained 67 votes in Manatí and Barceloneta, and 2,359 in the Unionist district of Arecibo. The workers were principally getting their votes out of the Unionist camp, not the Republican. Matienzo's Party of Independence received only 70 votes.\textsuperscript{150}

Those who began to favor independence would have to work mainly inside the Unionist Party because their political following was minuscule. Matienzo's experiment had failed and his health was broken. With this election, Matienzo ended his active but erratic political career. He died a year later on December 27, 1913.\textsuperscript{151}

Resident Commissioner Muñoz Rivera returned to Congress full of great hopes due to both the Unionist victory and that of Woodrow Wilson and the Democrats. He had with him a home-rule bill approved by the Unionist Party which he hoped the Washington authorities would back. In the national capital Muñoz Rivera was informed that President-elect Wilson would discuss with him all the Insular appointments—including that for governor. His candidate for governor was Jorge Bird Arias. Bird was the Manager and Vice-President of the Fajardo Sugar Company (one of the largest American mills on the Island). Muñoz Rivera favored him because Bird represented the American sugar corporations as the conservative caudillo Mario G. Menocal was doing in Cuba. Bird would have
the backing of both the United States interests as well as the Unionist masses. All these expectations of Muñoz Rivera soon began to vanish because Wilson gave more attention to the Washington bureaucracy. The Unionist home-rule bill was shelved, and Muñoz Rivera had to follow the dictates of the Bureau of Insular Affairs and the Insular Affairs Committee.\textsuperscript{152}

For years the petitions sent by the Free Federation to the House of Delegates would receive little consideration, and most of them were shelved. The time came when the workers were compelled to take a more active attitude both locally and in Washington. At the end of January 1913, the Legislature was discussing a message sent by the Free Federation. Speaker de Diego delivered a hostile speech against the Free Federation and, especially, against Iglesias. The statements made by de Diego and other delegates were immediately analyzed and answered by the Central Labor Union of San Juan. Soon after, an extraordinary labor convention was held in order to vehemently protest the declarations of de Diego. The attitude of the Speaker and the House of Delegates was considered so serious by the labor unions that an exposition was sent to Congress defending the labor movement against the venomous attack of Speaker de Diego and making serious accusations against the Unionist Administration. The exposition was entitled \textit{The Tyranny of the House of Delegates of Porto Rico}.\textsuperscript{153}

In that document, the Free Federation stated that the Unionist Party was dominated by an oligarchy which did its best to prevent the progress and happiness of the people,\textsuperscript{154} and that the reforms asked by the workers were considered by the House of Delegates as “socialistic and disruptive of public peace.”\textsuperscript{155} Among others, the reforms wanted were: the establishment of schools of art, trade, and industry; more elementary schools; free school lunches; laws of accidents and compensation; orphanages; more authority to the Bureau of Labor; the creation of workers housing projects; enforcement of the eight-hour law; and the levying taxes on capital taken out of the Island by absentee owners. The Free Federation wrote that these delegates considered themselves as “supermen,” possessors of “divine rights,” and as “aristocrats” who were actually advocating decadent “backward ideas.”\textsuperscript{156} This energetic protest had some good effects since the Legislature then passed some laws that improved the social conditions of the working class; however, no radical changes occurred.\textsuperscript{157}

The members of the unionist Party were divided as to what they really wanted. Some talked about self-government, others about home-rule;
some wanted statehood; there were others who wished for some form of autonomy, while a small active group began to push for independence. This growth of separatism was a direct result of the lack of reforms made to the Foraker Act by Congress. If Congress had then granted American citizenship and would have promised statehood in the near future, there would have been no problems with most of the Unionists. But since the offer of American citizenship was generally proposed in such a way as to imply a negation of both independence and statehood, a number of Unionists did not want Puerto Rico to become a permanent colony under some form of autonomy. This was the reason for the growth of separatism in the Unionist camp. Speaker de Diego became its leading exponent.\textsuperscript{158} De Diego, who previously had eloquently defended statehood and American citizenship so many times, now became a defender of Puerto Rican citizenship—which he used to claim did not exist—and a believer of independence with a protectorate similar to that of Cuba.\textsuperscript{159} At the Lake Mohonk conference of 1913, de Diego stated that some form of autonomous government (like that of Canada or Australia) was impossible under the Constitution of the United States. Puerto Rico had only two options: statehood or independence. He favored independence for geographic, ethnic, and cultural reasons. The republic he wished to see, however, was under a protectorate of the United States. This protectorate was much more restrictive than that imposed on Cuba in 1902.\textsuperscript{160}

Due to de Diego's anti-labor record (which went back as far as 1898), the Free Federation was in opposition to his separatist plan. They believed that the independence he wanted was only to dominate the workers and "to strangle" the democratic institutions the United States was developing in Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{161}

Barbosa and the Republicans rejected any Congressional plan to perpetuate forever the colonial status of the Island. They kept demanding American citizenship as a first step toward statehood disregarding all opposition to both. But if bad came to worst and statehood would be impossible, then Barbosa would consider a demand for independence.\textsuperscript{162}

Kentucky-born Arthur Yager was appointed governor to replace Colton on November 6, 1913. Yager was a Princeton University classmate of President Wilson, this helped him to secure the post. He would remain as governor for the two terms that Wilson served in the White House.\textsuperscript{163}

Muñoz Rivera had to return to San Juan in the fall of 1913 to prevent a split in the Unionist Party. De Diego's separatism was growing, and he was afraid that the pro-American wing of the Unionists would join the
Republicans. A compromise was reached at an assembly held on November 22, 1913. The Party reconfirmed the rejection of statehood from the platform and would now favor an autonomous form of government as a transition for future independence.\textsuperscript{164}

By the end of 1913, the membership of the Free Federation was 10,000, which was 2,000 more than in 1911. The total number of unions, however, had decreased from 132 in 1911 to 130.\textsuperscript{165}

The Bureau of Labor was able to produce some benefits for the workers even though its authority was very limited. After a while, unfortunately, its personnel came to be formed by persons completely ignorant of the labor problems. Persons knowledgeable about labor problems were rejected whenever they applied for a position. The only governmental office which the Free Federation had fought fourteen years to establish to help the workers had now closed its doors to the persons they were supposed to help.\textsuperscript{166}

As 1913 came to an end, the Free Federation wrote to Governor Yager. The letter asked him to include several labor measures in the address he was going to deliver to the Legislature. These measures were basically the same as those written up by the Free Federation and sent to Congress earlier in the year. Yager promptly ignored them. The general attitude of his administration was "reactionary." The workers seemed more hostile to it and their protests were ignored. Yager favored the Unionists all the time. But this repressive policies caused the Free Federation to become more militant and lead to the definite establishment of the Socialist Party.\textsuperscript{167}

In the winter months of 1914, the Jones Bill began to be discussed again in Congress. The two principal reasons why the granting of collective American citizenship and governmental reforms for Puerto Rico had strong Congressional opposition were racism and eventual statehood. A number of representatives and senators considered Puerto Ricans to be racially inferior and therefore unworthy of being made citizens of the United States. If Puerto Ricans became citizens, they felt, then they would demand statehood. Statehood was opposed by most Congressmen for the same racial prejudices, plus geographic, cultural, and economic considerations.\textsuperscript{168} Speaker Champ Clark went so far as to affirm that "It would be easier to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear than American citizens from a Porto Rican."\textsuperscript{169} It was this type of mentality Puerto Ricans had to deal with in Washington.

In the Unionist House of Delegates, Speaker de Diego received
unanimous support for a memorial opposing collective American citizenship because Puerto Rico already had its own citizenship which had been recognized by Congress in the Foraker Act. The Unionist were now defending a citizenship that did not exist juridically. De Diego believed that United States citizenship would make independence more difficult to obtain. The document was sent to President Wilson and Congress. Muñoz Rivera sympathized with the memorial, but thought it would not receive much attention in Washington. He began to believe that Congress would grant collective citizenship because it wanted to keep Puerto Rico “FOR EVER.” Congressman Jones considered the Unionist belief in independence as mere “IDLE DREAM,” but at the same time he favored independence for the Philippines. What was worse for Muñoz Rivera and the Unionists was that they had no influence in Washington. Puerto Rico would get the reforms Washington saw fit. It was also obvious that Congress and the Bureau of Insular Affairs were somewhat tired of Unionist pragmatism. Muñoz Rivera, who had demanded statehood, autonomy, and home-rule, now stated that he preferred independence. He, however, would not fight for it because most separatists were principally just some key leaders of the Unionist Party and not its rank and file.

Iglesias wrote to Gompers informing him about the Free Federation’s opposition to the House of Delegates memorial against the granting of collective American citizenship. Gompers was asked to intensify his lobbying for the much desired citizenship. But the Jones Bill did not make much progress during that session of Congress. The backing of President Wilson was considered a must, but he felt there were other matters of greater importance.

The second and last trip of Samuel Gompers to Puerto Rico took place from March 21 to April 3, 1914. He came accompanied by a personal friend and three important American labor leaders. Gompers traveled around the Island and was heard by more than 100,000 workers. There were labor assemblies and rallies everywhere. As on the previous trip, he interviewed every type of person who would give him valuable information on the problems the workers and the Island faced. Gompers stated that there had been some improvements, but the situation was still deplorable.

Beginning with 1914, the Insular labor movement began a seven-year period of great difficulties and challenges. Many of the problems were consequences of World War I; prices and standards of living went up but wages did not increase commensurately. Iglesias pointed out that
in Philadelphia unskilled workers received $2.00 per day when in Puerto Rico they got only around 80¢. To make matters worse, the cost of living in the Island was 30 percent higher than in Philadelphia. The strikes of 1914-1920 were full of violence as those of 1905-1906. The police and landlord repression reached new records. But with years of experience, Iglesias and his followers would be able to steer the ship of labor successfully during those stormy years.

The Unionist Party opened its 1914 convention on September 5 in San Juan. The Party was seriously divided between the autonomists led by Muñoz Rivera and the separatists of de Diego. Muñoz Rivera wanted to hold down the separatism de Diego was fomenting because it could torpedo the autonomic reforms being discussed in Congress. De Diego had the backing of Herminio Díaz Navarro, Mariano Abril, and other Unionist leaders. Muñoz Rivera wanted the Party to work now for autonomy and leave independence for the future. De Diego desired independence immediately and rejected autonomy. But no match for the power that Muñoz Rivera wielded over the Unionists, the dieguistas were out-voted. The convention reconfirmed the 1912 platform: autonomy for the present, independence in the future.

At this 1914 Unionist convention, a resolution proposing an alliance with the Republican Party was unanimously approved: The Republicans absolutely rejected the Unionist invitation. Barbosa believed that such alliance could only happen when the Unionists would end their erratic pragmatism and their dualism. The Republicans would go to the elections alone demanding reforms in the Foraker Act (e.g., collective American citizenship, territorial government, elected senate).

For the elections of November 3, 1914, the Free Federation was better prepared than ever before. In the district of Mayagüez Julio Aybar, editor of Unión Obrera, was nominated delegate on the Republican ticket. Other workers were running for municipal posts under the banner of the Insular Labor Party.

When the votes were counted after the balloting, the Unionists had won, but with a much smaller margin than previously. They received 107,519 votes, won only in four districts (for a total of nineteen delegates), and held thirty-six municipalities. Resident Commissioner Muñoz Rivera was reelected. The Republican votes increased to 82,574, winning three districts (sixteen delegates, one of whom was the socialist Julio Aybar) and twenty-four municipalities. The Insular Labor Party received 42 votes in the district of Ponce, 57 in the district of Mayagüez, 77 in the district of Aguadilla, 95 in the district of Humacao, 250 in the district of
San Juan, 794 in the district of Guayama and 3,083 in the district of Arecibo (a total of 4,398 votes). The city of Arecibo, which was a Unionist stronghold, was won by the Insular Labor Party with 2,871 votes (the Unionists lost with 2,525 votes and the Republicans received only 25 votes). The separatism of de Diego had been beneficial for his political opponents.179

Notes

12. Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. I, p. 76; Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 486; Néstor Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico (San Juan, P. R.: Instituto de Cultura


17. Ibid., pp. 39-41.

18. Ibid., pp. 36-38, 42.


24. Ríos, op. cit., pp. 44-45; Ramos de Santiago, ed., op. cit., p. 171; Interview with Jorge L. Córdova, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, 4 March 1978. Córdova, a stateholder like Degetau, served as resident commissioner between 1968-1972. He obtained the right to vote on committees and was permitted to join a caucus of a national party (the G.O.P.) in 1970. Successive resident commissioners, pro-Commonwealth Jaime Benítez (1972-1976) and pro-statehood Baltasar Corrada (1976), have been members of the Democratic Party Caucus although they represent different Insular parties (the first one belongs to the muñócrata Popular Democratic Party and the other to the barbosista New Progressive Party). The New Progressive Party, which had always dominated the local G. O. P., finally took control over the Democratic Party in 1978 from the Popular Democratic Party which had it since the 1930's. This has been the first time a local party has had control over the two national parties. But in 1984, the
Popular Democratic Party regained most of the control over the Democratic Party.


35. Interview with Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, 27 October, 1975.


42. *La Democracia*, 7 April, 1902, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 8 April 1903, p. 3.

43. Cayetano Coll y Toste, *Boletín histórico de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía Cantero Fernández y Co., 1926), vol. XIII, p. 81. The biography of de Diego was not included in the reprint edition.


69. Ibid., pp. 115-117; Guerra de Colón, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
71. Ibid.; Todd, Desfile de gobernadores de Puerto Rico 1898-1943, p. 59.
72. Todd, Desfile de gobernadores de Puerto Rico 1898-1943, pp. 59-63.
73. Ibid., pp. 63-64; Roberto H. Todd and José Gómez Brioso, Informe de los delegados del Partido Republicano de Puerto Rico ante la Convención Nacional Republicana celebrada en Chicago el 21 de junio de 1904 (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía El País, 1904), pp. 22-23.
74. Pilar Barbosa de Rosario, La política en dos tiempos (San Juan, P. R.: n. p., 1978), p. 32.
75. Díaz Soler, op. cit., pp. 296-299.
78. La Democracia., 17 April 1902, p. 3.
79. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 26 August 1904, p. 4.
82. Boletín Mercantil de Puerto Rico, 8 November, 1904, p. 1.
84. Todd, Desfile de gobernadores de Puerto Rico 1898-1943, p. 64.
85. Díaz Soler, op. cit., p. 301.
86. Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. I, p. 118; La Democracia, 10 November 1904, p. 1; Boletín Mercantil de Puerto Rico, 11 November 1904, p. 2.
89. Iglesias de Pagán, El obrerismo en Puerto Rico, pp. 252-255.
93. Ibid., p. 353.
94. Report [sic] de Procedimientos del Tercer Congreso de la Federación Libre de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, pp. 3-36.
103. Unión Obrera, 7 November 1906, p. 2.
104. La Democracia, 7 December 1939, p. 4.
109. Ibid., p. 372.
113. Pedro M. Descartes to José Celso Barbosa, 4 December 1908, Archive of Pilar Barbosa de Rosario.
115. Ibid., pp. 423-424, 428; Cabranes, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
116. Díaz Soler, op. cit., p. 430; Clark, op. cit., p. 12; Todd, Desfile de gobernadores de Puerto Rico, p. 91.
132. Mariano Abril, *El socialismo moderno* (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía La Primavera, 1911), pp. 3-4, 47.
137. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
138. Ibid., pp. 36-45.
139. Ibid., pp. 51-52; Díaz Soler, op. cit., pp. 545-546; Cabranes, op. cit., pp. 70-72.
142. Ibid., pp. 55-58.
147. Ateneo Puertorriqueño, Visita de Mr. William J. Bryan a la ciudad de San Juan, discursos (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía de Real Hermanos, 1910); Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. I, pp. 155-156.
155. Ibid., p. 5.


162. José C. Barbosa, “¿Por qué no ser amigos del Sr. de Diego?,” El Tiempo, 29 June 1914; reprinted in Barbosa de Rosario, Orientando al pueblo, pp. 104-105.


166. Ibid., pp. 95-96.


The new House of Delegates reelected de Diego as Speaker. The Republican minority had among its members Manuel F. Rossy and two men that would have great prominence in the coming two decades: José Tous Soto and Rafael Martínez Nadal. On February 9, 1915 the Republican delegates presented a bill to petition Congress to define the political status of Puerto Rico and reform the Foraker Act. The bill stated that Puerto Rican citizenship had no international validity because the Island was not even half-sovereign. The Unionists voted against it. A similar substitute resolution made by both parties was then approved by all except for Republican (Socialist) Julio Aybar. Labor leader Aybar voted against it because the resolution did not demand American citizenship as the Free Federation wished.¹ This resolution, however, did not produce any reaction in Washington as the Jones Bill stagnated during the Sixty-third Congress that ended in March 1915.² When Muñoz Rivera returned, he told the press that the reforms he wanted were an elective senate and optional citizenship. When asked by a reporter about the alleged Unionist anti-Americanism, Muñoz Rivera answered that the Party was “not anti-American” and that it was “strongly American,” as was the Republican Party. He added that if Puerto Ricans had the opportunity to have optional citizenship, the “majority” would choose to “become American citizens.” As far as Insular status, the Resident Commissioner declared: “We want first to be Americans with the privilege eventually of becoming an independent nation under the protection of the United States.”³

By this time labor agitation was very active all over the Island. The workers were tired of the false promises of the historical parties. The impact of World War I plus the reactionary administration of Governor Yager —Gomper’s considered him the worst of all— made the socio-
economic conditions very difficult. The principle of the American Federation of Labor of keeping politics out of the labor movement could not be followed in Puerto Rico because the traditional political parties kept ignoring the just demands of the working people who made up the immense majority of the inhabitants. The workers always elected to office the ruling classes and their associates who were the exploiters. Iglesias knew very well that this situation could not be tolerated any further. There was an urgent need for the workers to fight in the political arena with a class party. A socialist party was needed in order to change laws of oppression and privilege for the benefit of the proletariat masses.4

Under this atmosphere the Eighth Labor Congress of the Free Federation met in Cayey on March 18, 1915 lasting four days.5 After the Congress ended, a political convention was called which was attended by forty-two delegates from thirteen towns.6 The problem was that they lacked a place to hold the convention. The Unionist mayor refused to let the workers use City Hall. Fortunately, the pastor of the Baptist Church of Cayey invited them to use his church.7

There a workers’ party was born which was to be the political wing of the Free Federation. All its members had to be members of the Free Federation. Iglesias, who did not assume the presidency until 1920, was the architect of the new party which was named Socialist Party. The Party affiliated itself with the Socialist Party in the United States. This affiliation gradually would become academic and would cease by 1924. The Socialist platform asked for the following: extension of the American Constitution to Puerto Rico; granting of American citizenship to Puerto Ricans; and amendments to the electoral law. The economic reforms were not clearly defined in the platform.8

The press reaction to the founding of the Socialist Party was simply to ignore it. Only the old arch-reactionary Spanish Boletín Mercantil de Puerto Rico (the nineteenth-century paper of the Unconditional Party) had some comments on the activities the Free Federation held in Cayey. It stated that the Free Federation was an “enemy” and the “most disuniting institution” of Puerto Rico.9

Iglesias explained to Gompers that the Socialist Party demanded better economic and social conditions following the labor principles and the political policy of the American Federation of Labor. He also explained that if he (Gompers) lived in Puerto Rico, he would be called a Socialist. Gompers understood the situation and considered that this political move of the Free Federation would be beneficial to the labor movement.10
This aversion to the Free Federation and Santiago Iglesias was certainly not uncommon. Muñoz Rivera once physically attacked Iglesias with his walking-stick at the famous La Mallorquina restaurant because Iglesias had severely criticized his policies! Fortunately, friends intervened and the walking-stick hit a porcelain vase instead of Iglesias. Muñoz Rivera, embarrassed, later commented that the incident was one of the most unfortunate in his life.11 (The broken vase is still at La Mallorquina.)12

Gradually, Muñoz Rivera came to realize the great mistake he had made by ignoring the working classes. In a letter written on July 28, 1915 to Antonio R. Barceló, his hand-picked President of the Unionist Party, he wrote:

> It think a great deal about the problem of the workers. The danger is imminent. In the elections of 1916, it is possible that we will not bring a majority to the House and it is also possible that the resident Commissioner [sic] will be defeated. The blame will belong to the landlords who exploit their workers and the Unión which does not intervene in time, sincerely and with energy. The economic interests want everything and take everything away from the workers. We are their accomplices because of our inexcusable silence. We should take measures that would save the Unionist responsibility. If we do not take them, I will deplore it. On more than one occasion I have fruitlessly pointed this out.13

Muñoz Rivera very clearly stated that the Unionist Party—the Unión—was not helping the exploited working classes. To make things worse, the Unionist leaders were the accomplices of the capitalists. They should, Muñoz Rivera believed, help the underprivileged masses. Unfortunately, Barceló did not take the wise advice of his pragmatic leader.

On October 24, 1915 the Unionist Party held another convention in San Juan. Speaker de Diego was principally responsible for convoking it. He presented a proposal to ask Congress to grant independence to Puerto Rico. If this was refused, then Congress should make autonomic reforms liberalizing the Foraker Act. These reforms, however, should preserve Puerto Rican citizenship. Muñoz Rivera then made a counter proposal which upheld the Unionists platforms of 1913 and 1914. The two proposals were then voted upon and that of Muñoz Rivera received 106 votes against 36 for that sponsored by de Diego. The convention then decided to postpone any action in favor of independence. All efforts were
to be channeled in favor of obtaining autonomic reforms in the Foraker Act. Muñoz Rivera had postponed the separatist drive. He came to consider the granting of American citizenship as something inevitable since the White House, the War Department, and Congress wanted it. De Diego, nevertheless, continued to look for ways to advance his separatist ideals. He now was in opposition to collective American citizenship because it would make independence extremely difficult to obtain. Puerto Rican citizenship—which he had firmly claimed did not exist—was described now as the "divine eucharist" of the independence ideal. To ask for American citizenship was to abjure the ideal and to "commit the heresy of spiting... the sacrament of one's fatherland".

In November Muñoz Rivera wrote to President Wilson informing him of the resolution adopted in the Unionist convention and asked him to include reforms for Puerto Rico in his next address to Congress. Wilson complied. In his congressional speech of December 7, 1915, he asked that legislative body to grant a larger degree of self-government to the Island.

The leaders of the Insular Labor Party met in Arecibo, with the decision to disband their Party and join the Socialist Party. This action was utilized by Governor Yager to take away the municipal administration of Arecibo from the Insular Labor Party and arbitrarily hand it over to the Unionist Party in January, 1916.

The obstacles erected by the Yager administration and the Unionists against the workers were numerous. As the Socialist Party began the slow and tedious process of getting registered for the coming elections, the number of required signatures was capriciously augmented with the anti-democratic hope that the workers would not be able to have candidates to vote for. The necessary signatures were obtained and the Party was lawfully registered.

One of the principal reasons for strikes during these years was that the workers demanded higher salaries due to the inflation caused by the war and the great profits reaped by the sugar corporations. In 1916 a ton of sugar went up from $92.64 to $180. The total profits obtained during that year by the sugar and tobacco crops were an average of 49 percent. The workers had solid reason to strike in order to improve their economic situation.

On January 20, 1916 Congressman William Jones re-introduced his bill to grant Puerto Rico a new organic act. The leading aspects of the bill were: the complete separation of executive and legislative powers; an
elective senate, as well as the already elective lower house; and the collective granting of American citizenship. The bill also contained several provisions which were to be strongly objected to. One article stated that the suffrage was to be restricted to literate males or taxpayers. This same restriction was also to be applied to all candidates for the Legislature. Statistics showed that there were 250,000 registered electors and that 70 percent of them were illiterate. However, there were 10,000 illiterate taxpayers who therefore could vote. As a result, only 85,000 males were to be electors and 165,000 former electors would lose their right to vote.21

This aspect of the Jones Bill was one of the most controversial. Iglesias vehemently attacked it and mobilized Gompers and the American Federation of Labor to oppose it too. The reactionary elements, however, were quite pleased by this restrictive aspect of the Bill. Governor Yager was one of these reactionaries and declared in Congress that the illiterates never should have had the right to vote and that, if it were possible, it would be better to take the vote away from them.22 Both Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa opposed this voting restriction.23

In what was to be his last speech in Congress (May 5), Muñoz Rivera was ambivalent in regard to the granting of American citizenship. He preferred that a plebiscite be held to let the Insular electorate decide. Muñoz Rivera also wanted American citizenship if it would lead toward statehood. Nevertheless, the Resident Commissioner declared, too, that Puerto Rico should be given the opportunity to become an independent republic. What Muñoz Rivera roundly rejected for Puerto Rico was a permanent colony formed by citizens of the United States.24 But, a few weeks later, he dropped the plebiscite idea and said that he was “sure that Puerto Ricans would become American citizens.”25

During the Congressional hearings of May 5, 1916, one Congressman declared that the granting of American citizenship would eliminate the possibility of independence for Puerto Rico. But that did not signify—to another Congress—that Puerto Rico could be made into a state of the Union. Congressman Towner hoped that the Jones Bill would lead to a future Canadian form of autonomy.26 These lawmakers were not at all sure as to what really should be done with Puerto Rico.

Reaction won in the House of Representatives, and the Bill was passed with all the restrictive clauses on May 23, 1916. Since it was clear that the Bill would become law in the immediate future, a rider was passed postponing the 1916 elections until 1917.27
As the Jones Bill for Puerto Rico was being debated, Congress had approved another Jones Bill for the Philippines on February, 1916. By that bill the Philippines received more liberties (such as an elective Senate) and the promise of independence "as soon as a stable government" was established there. This would lead to the formation of the Commonwealth (which was very close to independence) in 1935 and the declaration of independence in 1946.28

Not feeling physically well, Muñoz Rivera returned in September to San Juan. At a meeting of the Unionist Central Junta, he proposed that statehood should be included again in the platform of the Party. With the coming American citizenship, Muñoz Rivera considered that statehood was possible in the future. He wanted the Unionist Party to have the same platform as from 1904 to 1912.29

Muñoz Rivera also met Barbosa and Rossy and told them that he wanted a political "understanding" with the Republican Party. Later, there were several meetings with Barbosa in the offices of El Tiempo. With the approaching American citizenship Muñoz Rivera wanted a closer relationship with the Republicans because now both favored statehood, but no fusion was expected to take place. Unfortunately, Muñoz Rivera became gravely ill, and the plans did not materialize because he died on November 15, 1916.30 At the funeral, Barbosa declared that at the moment when he and Muñoz Rivera were about to reach a political agreement (and that only meant statehood for Barbosa), death overtook the Resident Commissioner. The Central Junta of the Unionist Party met a day after Muñoz Rivera died and read his political will, a vague document which asked for a close relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States and did not discard independence.31 The reintroduction of statehood to the Unionist platform was ignored by the Party leadership.32

The final decision on the Jones Bill was to be made during the winter session of Congress. Therefore, Iglesias decided to go personally to Washington in order to fight the reactionary voting clauses of the Bill in the Senate. Samuel Gompers intensified his activities against the ignominious classes. Several progressive senators became fully convinced of the reasons the labor leaders had for opposing the Jones Bill. What good would American citizenship do for Puerto Ricans if the immense majority lost their right to vote? What kind of organic act would it be if it took away the democratic liberties of a country, yet at the same time, granted American citizenship, which was supposed to guarantee such democratic liberties?33
Antonio R. Barceló, President of the Unionist Party, and Manuel V. Dometech, Republican Commissioner of the Department of Interior, headed an Insular commission sent by their parties and other groups to Washington in December to urge the approval of the Jones Bill before the holiday recess. Barceló stated that the passing of the bill "would be the finest Christmas gift that could be made to the people of Porto Rico."34 But, for two more months the Senate postponed the approval of the bill from which the reactionary voting clauses were eliminated. The Jones Bill became law when it was signed by President Wilson on March 2, 1917.35 Iglesias was in Puerto Rico at this time and Gompers cabled him the good news. President Wilson gave one of the three pens with which he signed the new organic act to Gompers as a token of gratitude for his struggle for democracy.36 Santiago Iglesias must have been very satisfied with these news.

Iglesias was not the only one who was happy. From New York Henna congratulated the people of Puerto Rico. La Democracia wrote that there were "gritos of triumph, hurrahs of joy, exclamations of rejoicing" all over the Island due to the approval of the new organic act. Mariano Abril editorialized that the Bill was a "triumph" for the Unionist Party and Puerto Rico.37 The Republicans, of course, shared these same feelings.38

The most important part of the Jones Act was that Puerto Ricans were collectively made citizens of the United States. In economic and fiscal arrangements the Act was basically the same as the Foraker Act. The three governmental powers were separated. The executive branch was made up of a governor appointed by the president of the United States. The members of the governor's cabinet were designated by the president (the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Education) or the governor with the consent of the respective Federal or Insular Senates. The legislative power was now composed of a House of Representatives of thirty-five elected members and a Senate of nineteen elected legislators. The Insular Legislature had full power over local legislation. The United States had full control over defense, customs, post office, and other areas which dealt with the national sovereignty and were of a Federal nature. The governor had a suspensive veto power over bills passed by the Legislature. The judicial power remained the same. The Department of Agriculture and Labor was established (Iglesias and Gompers had urged its creation). The Board of Health was replaced by the new Department of Health. The post of resident commissioner continued as before, except that his expenses were now to be paid with Federal funds. Congress
continued with the same supreme legal power as before. The bureau of
Insular Affairs of the War Department kept its jurisdiction over Puerto
Rico by an executive order of President Wilson.39

Now that Puerto Ricans had become American citizens, was the
Island an incorporated territory? Originally some people considered it to
be so, but some United States Supreme Court cases (People of Porto Rico
vs. Carlos Tapia, People of Porto Rico vs. José Muratti, and Balzac vs.
People of Porto Rico) declared that Puerto Rico continued to be an
unincorporated territory as before the Jones Act and that the American
constitution did not fully apply.40 Puerto Ricans were thus declared
second-class American citizens by the Taft Supreme Court.

The Jones Act allowed those who did not want to accept American
citizenship to remain as “citizens of Porto Rico” or claim Spanish or other
foreign citizenships. Those who chose to remain Puerto Rican citizens
became aliens in their own land because that citizenship was not recog-
nized internationally. Only 287 Puerto Ricans chose to remain “citizens
of Porto Rico,” although later 240 of them went to the Federal Court to
claim the American citizenship that they had originally rejected. Separat-
ist Vicente Balbás was one of those who chose to remain a Puerto Rican
citizen.41 During World War I he energetically campaigned against
American military recruitment and was arrested. Balbás was then impris-
oned in the Atlanta Federal penitentiary and was later released and moved
to Spain where he died.42 Separatist Speaker de Diego accepted American
citizenship in order to fight the system from the inside so that he could
“reestablish” Puerto Rican citizenship and create an independent repub-
lic under American protection.43

Muñoz Rivera had left the control of the Unionist Party in the hands
of Antonio R. Barceló. Barceló was the person in the Party who would
best follow Muñoz Rivera’s pragmatic political philosophy. Muñoz
Rivera did not want the Party to fall into the hands of Speaker de Diego
and his group of separatists. To succeed him as resident commissioner,
Félix Córdova Dávila was selected by Muñoz Rivera for similar reasons
as Barceló.44

In order to harmonize their political ideology with the new Jones Act,
the Unionists called a convention on May 6, 1917. There they declared
that the new Act was a legitimate triumph of their work and that American
citizenship—which many of them had fought—was a high honor. Their
former separatist fever had now decreased markedly; they also upheld the
platform of 1915 with its emphasis on autonomy. Nevertheless, they
would still make the electoral campaign giving emphasis to the separatist ideal. De Diego, however, was now a sick man and had lost much of his former dynamism. He died later in New York on July 17, 1918.45

The Republicans also had their convention in May. They now wanted Congress to explicitly declare Puerto Rico an incorporated territory and rejected the possible establishment of a permanent colonial system based on American citizenship.46

The Socialist Party had its convention in San Juan, June 1-3, 1917. The program agreed upon demanded the following establishment of a banco del pueblo; land reform; improvements in education; housing for workers; old-age pensions; women's suffrage; abolition of the death penalty; better working laws; ...and other social democratic reforms. As for the status, the Party was to define its position when worker’s social democracy was established. However, it was essentially a pro-American organization which wanted permanent union with the United States, as had been amply demonstrated by the political activities of Iglesias and the Free Federation locally and in the States. For the Socialists the status of Puerto Rico was not an issue. It was of secondary importance; what had to be solved first were the socio-economic problems confronting the Island.47 The Party nominated forty-eight candidates. The electoral law was discriminatory toward the Socialists. During the campaign Iglesias was the target of the most defamatory propaganda ever seen in the Island.48

The elections took place on July 16, 1917 and the Unionists won with 90,155 votes, electing twenty-four representatives, thirteen senators, and winning in forty-two municipalities. The Republicans obtained 60,319 votes and won two of the five senatorial districts for a total of five senators, fourteen representatives, and eighteen municipalities. The Socialist Party received 24,468 votes and won six municipalities. The Socialist victory in these towns (Ceiba, Culebra, Fajardo, Luquillo, Naguabo, and Yabucoa) was significant because they were in the Unionist district of Humacao. These towns were mostly sugar-producing areas where the Republican electorate was very weak. The Unionist margin over the two opposition parties was 5,368 votes. These elections also served as a referendum on prohibition. The Unionists and Republicans did not take a stand on the matter, but the Socialists advocated it. There were 102,423 votes for prohibition and 64,427 against.49

When the official results of the elections were announced, none of the Socialist candidates had won a seat in the Legislature. There was an
immediate protest because the Socialists showed that their Party had pulled enough votes to elect Iglesias as senator-at-large. After a two-month struggle, the newly-elected Senate made an investigation in which the Socialist electoral complaints were proven correct and Iglesias was given his senatorial seat on September 13, 1917. Another Socialist candidate, José H. Aldrey, was also recognized as representative from the Las Piedras-Naguabo-Teiba district. The reason for the electoral complication had been that since the Socialist Party was new, it was not allowed by law to have representation in the polls in order to protect their electors.\textsuperscript{50}

A few days before Iglesias' Senate seat had been recognized, the Ninth Labor Congress meet in Bayamón on September 9. The number of Unionized workers had increased from the 5,900 of the Cayey Congress to 16,000. The number of unions had grown from 35 to 139. The socio-economic and political problems of the day were discussed and the labor strategy plans for 1918 formulated.\textsuperscript{51}

With the entrance of the United States in World War I, the people of Puerto Rico demonstrated great patriotic fervor toward the war cause. The Unionist Party cabled President Wilson pledging unqualified Insular support to fight Germany. The House of Representatives unanimously voted a similar resolution. Senate President Barceló asked President Wilson to apply the draft to Puerto Rico. A total of 236,853 men were drafted and 17,855 were inducted. The Island military quota ranked higher than many states and territories. $10,093,100 worth of Liberty Bonds were sold locally (sugar producers bought around 80 percent of them) while the Red Cross fund subscribed was $112,000. Senator Eduardo Giorgetti, principal sugar baron, Francophile, and intimate friend of the late Muñoz Rivera, was the highest bidder in the whole United States for the two pounds of White House wool that were auctioned at the price of $4,000. Senator Mariano Abril, one of the Germanophiles, considered it prudent to stop writing his articles in \textit{La Democracia} in favour of Germany.\textsuperscript{52} The Unionists were excellent political pragmatists and very well experienced dualists. They were pro-American and anti-American with equal facility. Since its foundation, after all, the Unionist Party had never been politically homogeneous.

After the legislative session had ended, Iglesias left in the middle of April 1918 for Washington as suggested by Gompers. The President of the American Federation of Labor wanted Iglesias' help in order to bring specific charges against Governor Yager. The Unionist Party lost no time in defending their protector and immediately mobilized their forces with
solid financial backing. However, because Governor Yager was a close friend of President Wilson since their university days at Princeton University, the accusations of the labor leaders came to nothing.

Iglesias stayed in the United States until late in the autumn taking part in various kinds of activities. One of the most important took place in Laredo, Texas, on November 13, 1918, when the Pan-American Federation of Labor was founded. Iglesias would participate as much as possible in the organization and was later elected secretary.

In the Senate Iglesias' defense of the workers got him into many heated debates, especially with the Unionist majority. On March 2, 1919 he opposed the nomination of two anti-labor Unionist judges for Fajardo and Vieques. Iglesias went so far as to accuse one judge of having the backing of the powerful Fajardo Sugar Company. Barceló, President of the Senate and a native of Fajardo, was perturbed at Iglesias' accusations and lashed out at the Socialist Party. He declared that the Party was not a stable one, that its votes came from a "strange combination" with the Republicans, that it had no reason to exist because it was actually the Free Federation who had to deal with the workers, that it was a "class party" whose banner was "hate for the other social classes," and that it was a "serious danger" to public peace. Iglesias defended the Socialists, but no pro-labor judge got appointed.

The labor atmosphere in the Fajardo area had been tense for a while. Finally a workers' strike for higher wages against the powerful Fajardo Sugar Company, whose manager and part-owner was Barceló's brother-in-law — Jorge Bird Arias —, occurred. The strike was more violent than usual, and the workers accused the police of provoking a bloody riot. This caused a sensational debate in the Insular Senate. Senate President Barceló got very angry and accused Senator Iglesias of being responsible for the disorders in the Island. He went so far as to state that if Puerto Rico were totally free and he had the power, Iglesias would be deported for being "pernicious" and a "corruptor of the public conscience." This was correctly interpreted by La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico that if Puerto Rico were a republic and Barceló the president, Bolshevik Iglesias would be expelled forever. No Socialist or member of the Free Federation would ever forget that if these separatist dreams of Barceló were ever realized, he (Barceló) would become an "ignorant and conceited petty-tyrant." Iglesias was again facing difficult times.

A Congressional Commission headed by Speaker Joseph Cannon and the Chairman of the Insular Affairs Committee, Horace M. Towner,
visited Puerto Rico in April, 1919 in order to familiarize themselves with the American possession in the Caribbean. There were meetings, tours, receptions, and public hearings in the Legislature.\textsuperscript{61}

In one of the public hearings Senator Iglesias delivered a speech and answered the questions the members of the Commission asked him. He claimed that 70 percent of the income produced in Puerto Rico was going to absentee capitalists; that local tobacco workers were getting wages which were 35 percent lower than those paid in the Continental United States; that when sugar was sold at $2.50, workers were earning from 45 to 55 cents per day, and when sugar went up to $7.20 workers got only 80 to 85 cents per day, but the cost of living had gone up 210 percent; that the 500 acre law was always being violated. However, one of the topics Iglesias gave more emphasis to was the establishment by Congress of a \textit{banco del pueblo} in order to free the workers from usury. This bank would grant the real economic freedom the workers wanted, ensuring a more rapid development of progress. Iglesias wanted Congress to establish the \textit{banco del pueblo} because the efforts of the Insular Legislature had proven futile. Governor Yager —under the influence of bankers and non-resident capitalists— had vetoed the workers’ bank law passed by the local legislators three times. The Socialist Senator also declared that the political problems of Puerto Rico were secondary because statehood and independence were too far away. Besides that, neither of those two status would guarantee economic freedom, and to him, such freedom was the most important valuable possession a country could have.\textsuperscript{62} Questioned on the opinion of workers on the independence of the Island, Iglesias affirmed that they did not favor it.\textsuperscript{63}

During these hearings the Unionists continued with their dualism (some favored a close association with the United States while others demanded independence). Barceló went so far —in an angry moment— as to declare that he wanted independence even if that meant that Puerto Rico would die of hunger!\textsuperscript{64} The Republicans reaffirmed their statehood stand.\textsuperscript{65}

May Day, 1919 coincided with a four-day convention of the Socialist Party in San Juan. Iglesias gave an opening speech in which he praised the Russian soviets. He denied that the bourgeoisie was prepared to govern. For him only the workers were prepared to overthrow the capitalist system. Iglesias blasted the reactionary separatist leaders whom he called nothing more than local \textit{menocalitos} (potential Puerto Rican dictators as was Mario G. Menocal in Cuba).\textsuperscript{66}
Among the Socialists, there were some leaders who favored independence on the Socialist platform. Alfonso Torres, who was later also Secretary General, shared a similar belief. Iglesias opposed any status definition because the important thing for him was to solve economic problems first and later decide on status. Furthermore, he believed that both independence and statehood were not yet possibilities. The delegates voted that Insular status would be "perfectly defined" when the workers social democracy was established in Puerto Rico. Other motions approved in the convention, besides the long list of social reforms, were the abolition of the death penalty (which was later made into law in 1929) and women's suffrage. The Socialists were the first to place these two important proposals on their Party platform. The idea of making a coalition with another party was rejected.67

Benigno Fernández García, Unionist representative from the Guayama district since 1912, wrote an article accusing the Legislature of being controlled by the powerful economic interests to the detriment of the working classes.68 For that denunciation he was threatened with impeachment by the Senate. But the ensuing uproar soon disappeared, and Fernández García finished his term in the House.69 Nevertheless, he grew disenchanted with the Unionists and a year later joined the Socialists because that was the only party, he felt, that could make the "juridical transformation" needed in the Island to achieve justice for the working classes. Fernández García envisioned a Socialist electoral victory for the 1924 elections. However, he would not stay long with the Socialists and would return to his former political associates.70

On a mid-summer newspaper interview, Iglesias declared that the happiness of Puerto Rico lay in neither statehood nor independence. The status he now favored was a broad autonomy like that of Australia and New Zealand where all citizens would be united in a social democracy. The autonomous government was to be free and sovereign and the American citizens of Puerto Rico would have the right to make commercial treaties with other countries.71 This was the closest Iglesias ever got to independence. It seems to have been a pragmatic move to harmonize the pro-American workers (they would still keep their American citizenship) with those who were espousing separatist ideals. After all, Iglesias knew status was not going to be decided in the immediate future, and he needed to broaden the political base of the Party.

The Free Federation held the first Women Workers' Congress in October. The purpose was to strengthen the influence of women and
make them more active in political, labor, and socio-economic fields. Scores of women's unions sent their delegations. A memorial recommending social reforms was written and delivered to Governor Yager.72

The Federal Department of Labor sent Joseph Marcus to make a report on Puerto Rico. Among the things he pointed out was that 14 percent of the wealth of the Island was in the hands of Puerto Ricans and of the remaining 86 percent, 67 was American-owned and the rest was in the hands of Spanish, French, and other nationalities. On the aspect of strikes, Marcus wrote that they were “numerous and disastrous to the interest of all concerned”. The strikes were due to the “desperate conditions” the workers faced, and they were the only method laborers had to improve working conditions. One reason for the low wages was that there was a high rate of unemployment and the landlords knew they could keep wages low because there were more hands than jobs. Marcus also stated that the workers were pro-American and looked toward the United States for aid.73 This was the year when the average monthly rate for strikes from June to December was ten per month.74

At the beginning of 1920 the American Federation of Labor sent two commissioners to Puerto Rico with the purpose of investigating the labor situation. They reported that the Island was a “living graveyard.” The sugar interests, especially the Guánica, Aguierre, and Fajardo companies and Eduardo Giorgetti, were so powerful and influential that they “assume the attitude that they are lords and masters” of the Island. The Unionists Party (Giorgetti was Vice-President of the Senate) was “entirely responsible” for the existing inhuman conditions. In order to undermine the work of the Free Federation, the Unionists had organized a “fake labor organization” (the Porto Rican Federation of Labor lead by Andrés Rodríguez Vera) making “every effort” to foment dissension and destroy the authentic unions. For the two continental labor commissioners the Unionist Party was controlled by “unscrupulous politicians and lawless corporations” who were worse than the “pirates” that “formerly sailed the Caribbean”. The Unionists had passed some labor legislation, but they had not been “sincere” in the enforcement of these laws. For their enforcement, the government in the Bureau of Labor had only seven persons, the office staff, and the field inspection force.75

The Tenth Labor Congress of the Free Federation took place in Caguas, March 21-23, 1920. The Federation was now composed of 206 local unions, four central labor unions, five local trade councils, two cooperative institutions, nine labor temples (meeting halls), one Joint
Advisory Board of the cigarmakers, one Carpenter's District Council, four Central Labor Unions, and one state federation. The total number of members represented was 12,000 more than in the previous Congress of 1917, which ought the total to 28,000 unionized workers.76

Iglesias began the electoral campaign of 1920 very early. One day in March, he was at the office of the Free Federation when Luis Muñoz Marín came over to join the Socialist Party. The son of Muñoz Rivera had broken his ties with the Unionist Party, converted to socialism, and wanted to join Iglesias actively. Muñoz Marín was now commencing his long pragmatic and dualistic political career.77 Iglesias told Muñoz Marín of the great challenges and difficulties that lay ahead if he joined the Party and unsuccessfully tried to dissuade the son of Muñoz Rivera from taking such a dramatic political step. But Muñoz Marín was fervently convinced in helping the working masses, so the arguments of Iglesias proved futile.78

During campaign speeches Iglesias thundered against the capitalist classes and the absentee corporations which were stealing the wealth produced by the unfortunate laborers all over the Island. Next to the Socialist Senator the twenty-two year old Muñoz Marín also delivered violent speeches defending the laboring classes and attacking the capitalists and their political allies. Muñoz Marín affirmed that socialism did not align itself with the Unionist Party or any other capitalist party. The only important area in which he did not make speeches was Barceloneta, the town where Giorgetti had one of his two sugar mills (Central Plazuela, Central Los Caños was in Arecibo).79

The Russian Revolution was a popular topic in those days and Iglesias gave a lecture on it in the Ateneo. There he praised Marx, Bakunin, and international socialism. Iglesias declared that the ideas that were dominating Russia were most "humane" and "just." He ended the conference affirming that there would soon be a revolution in Puerto Rico and that the only true democratic government that existed was the dictatorship of the proletariat, as was being developed by Lenin.80 This was probably one of the most radical speeches he ever gave, but Iglesias soon reconsidered and modified his brand of socialism.

Regardless of the campaign radicalism of the Socialists, the Party was pro-American. However, the Unionists and the Yager administration did not waste any chance they had to impede Socialist activities. Yager went so far as to prohibit the Socialists from using their red flag. Needless to say, the Republican Party had always been under Unionist fire. Gradually the political situation reached the point where Republicans and
Socialists began to talk about possible ways they could cooperate to defeat the Unionists in places where they had a potential voting majority. In their April convention, the Republicans liberalized their platform to make the Party more appealing to the Socialists. José Tous Soto was elected president. Although he was a well-known corporation lawyer, he was the lawyer of Aguirre Central and a consultant of Guánica Central and other corporations, Tous Soto had favored a political agreement with the Socialists since 1919. He discussed the idea with Barbosa who agreed to it (after all, there had been a collaboration back in 1898). At a second Republican convention in Ponce, the Party approved a resolution in favor of making local coalitions as long as they were not with the Unionists. Leopoldo Felíú presented another resolution which accepted local pacts with the Socialists. This was also approved.81

The Unionists began their convention on September 11 in San Juan. There were heated debates between Cayetano Coll y Cuchi (defending the separatist wing) and Juan B. Huyke (supporting the pro-American wing). The delegates finally voted a basically autonomic platform upholding the programs of 1913 and 1915. During the electoral campaign, however, most Unionists orators spoke favoring independence, this being a clever electioneering tactic which produced votes. The Unionists declared that it would be a betrayal to the people if the Socialists made a deal with the “reactionary” Republicans.82 Barceló strongly attacked the opposition. He called the Republicans “traitors” and “wretched” and said that the Socialist leaders were the exploiters of the workers’ misery.83

The Socialist held their convention in San Juan on October 6. Iglesias gave a thunderous speech blasting the recent actions of the Unionists. He was furious and went so far as to call the leading Unionist leaders “imbecils” and Barceló a “hypocrite.” But the principal issue at the convention was whether or not a pact should be made with the Republicans. The Republicans had sent a delegation to lobby for the pact. There were heated debates, and the majority of the Socialists delegates were in favor of the pact. Muñoz Marín gave a brilliant speech attacking the pact with the Republicans. When the issue was voted on, those favoring the pact won with 125 votes as opposed to 49 against. Muñoz Marín then walked out declaring he would never speak again at a Socialist meeting. He would now defend socialism with his writings. The convention finally decided to allow the Executive Council of the Party to decide upon the coalition proposition.84

As Muñoz Marín left the convention, he stated that capitalism was a
large raven —its right wing was the Unionist Party and its left was the Republican Party.85

During the volatile debates on the pact, Iglesias had kept a neutral position. The Socialist Executive Council finally decided to collaborate with the Republicans in Ponce and some other towns. There a local party of Socialists and Republicans was formed and named the Popular Party —commonly called El Ligao (slang Spanish for league or mixture)— in which the different elective positions were divided between the two groups.86

The elections of November 2, 1920 were held with a new electoral law approved by the Unionists. With this law an Insular Board of Elections was established. On this Board only the parties that had the category of “principal” (the two that had the highest number of votes in the 1917 elections) had representation. Therefore, only Unionists and Republicans were represented on the Insular Board of Elections as well as on the local electoral boards and the electoral polls. The Socialist Party was, then, not to have any representation in the electoral process by law! Since a new electoral list was to be made, all voters —only males over twenty-one years of age— had to register. Because the Socialist Party had a large number of illiterate voters, the process of registering them put the Party at a clear disadvantage. The electoral law prohibited the formation of coalitions (that was why the Socialists and Republicans had to form a local party in Ponce and not a coalition). In order to protect their votes, the Socialists had no choice but to rely on local agreements with the Republicans.

The Unionists won with 126,446 votes against 63,845 votes for the Republicans, and 59,104 votes for the Socialists (who doubled their votes). The voting majority of the Unionists over the other two parties was 3,497 votes. They won in six of the seven electoral districts, electing fifteen senators and twenty-seven representatives. The Unionists also were victorious in forty-nine municipalities. The Republicans got only the district of Ponce and elected three senators, nine representatives, and won sixteen municipalities. The Socialist Party elected one senator (Iglesias), three representatives, and won eight municipalities. These eight towns were Arroyo, Ceiba, Fajardo, Luquillo, Río Grande, Yabucoa, Carolina, and Guayama. All used to be Unionist strongholds where the Republican electorate was insignificant. Guayama was the district head of the electoral district where the Unionists had the largest following in the entire Island.87 In Ponce El Ligao was victorious. The
results of the elections showed that the Socialists had more votes than the Republicans in the Unionist districts of Arecibo, Guayama, and Humacao, and the Republicans had more than the Socialists in the districts of San Juan, Aguadilla, Mayagüez, and Ponce. If the Socialists and Republicans had been able to make a pact, they would have won in three districts (San Juan, Mayagüez, and Ponce, of course). The Socialists votes were coming principally from Unionists. In this election the Unionists won the city of San Juan from the Republicans for the first time. Ponce elected a Republican mayor and two representatives from each party which formed El Ligao.88

As a prominent member of the Pan-American Federation of Labor, Santiago Iglesias attended its convention celebrated on January, 1921 in Mexico City. There he was avidly questioned by other Latin American labor leaders on the advantages and disadvantages that Puerto Rico was experiencing as a result of the Spanish-American War. Iglesias answered very frankly the questions asked. After the convention was over, he left for Washington where he spent several weeks informing different policy-makers about the conditions in Puerto Rico.89

The labor year that ended on March 30, 1921 had been, as usual, an active one with many strikes. The main reason for the strikes was the workers’ refusal to accept wage cuts. The Machinists’ Union had been determined to challenge the railroad companies if their wages were reduced in the new contracts being negotiated. However, a satisfactory agreement was reached, and the strike was averted. Twenty-four local unions had been organized in the past twelve months bringing the total of affiliated unions in the Free Federation to 242.90

The cohesiveness of the Unionist Party began to weaken somewhat after the 1920 elections. The separatist wing of the Unionists was not large, but it was articulate and vociferous. The leader of this group was Speaker Cayetano Coll y Cuchí. Ex-Speaker Juan B. Huyke led the pro-American wing of the Party. Pragmatic Barceló, as President of the Senate and the Party, had the uncomfortable and difficult task of keeping his forces together. Thus, he would invariably make separatist, autonomist or pro-American statements to please the various groups under his direction.91 Even statehood was acceptable to Barceló.92

The separatist Unionists formed different associations to expound their ideal. José S. Alegría led one called Asociación Independentista together with the former personal secretary of de Diego, ex-Representative Leopoldo Figueroa. José Coll y Cuchí, a former Republican delegate (in 1904), formed the National Association.93
With the Republican victory in the National elections the days of Governor Yager were numbered. The Unionists began to pressure Washington to get a Puerto Rican, recommended by them, to be appointed governor. If that were not possible, Yager should be reappointed. Republicans and Socialists were in opposition to these plans. Congressman Towner, Republican chairman of the Insular Affairs Committee, informed Barceló that in Washington there was a desire to grant more autonomic reforms to the Island. However, the Unionists separatist propaganda was hurting the chances of these reforms because independence would not be granted. The National Republicans were against independence (President Harding personally favored statehood); the Democrats had statehood in their platform as the final status for Puerto Rico. Towner expected the Unionists to adapt to these realities. He was in opposition to both statehood and independence, and now briefly began to favor a special state status (something like half statehood) with some representation in the House and in the Senate. Requiring a constitution amendment, this measure did not make any progress at all. Barceló, nevertheless, began to gradually solidify the autonomist sector of the Party in order to drop independence from the platform.

Soon after President Warren G. Harding took office he named Emmett Montgomery Reily (he always signed as E. Mont. Reily) governor. The Reily Administration was a hectic one, since with his inaugural speech on July 30, 1921, he alienated the Unionists and some Socialists. He was undiplomatic (he went so far as to call the Puerto Rican flag, then only used by some Unionists and separatists, a “rag” and a “flag of destruction”), extremely pro-American, intolerant of the Unionist independence sentiments, and favorable to the Republican Party.

After some weeks, the relations between labor and Governor Reily improved to such a degree that on Labor Day he attended the celebrations and delivered a speech where he praised Iglesias’ leadership and expressed his sympathy for the workers and their aspirations. On November 12, 1921, Reily appointed the members of the Commission of Mediation and Conciliation. The purpose of this Commission was to prevent or help to settle strikes. It had been approved by the Legislature in 1919, but Yager had never made the corresponding appointments. The Commission started with a small budget of $15,000 and gradually expanded. By 1924, 50 percent of the strikes were favorably settled. The percentage of strikes settled or prevented augmented in the following years. Labor-management relationships were now becoming institutionalized.

The Republican Party suffered a great loss with the death of Barbosa
on September 21, 1921. No longer would the statehood ideology of the Party be the same. After the granting of American citizenship, there was a movement inside the Republican Party which wanted the Jones Act reformed so that the Insular governor would be elected; in this, they were in agreement with the Unionists. Barbosa, however, insisted that the granting of an elective governor should be given together with the extension of the American Constitution to Puerto Rico. His reasoning was that the extension of the Constitution assured statehood because then the Island would be an incorporated territory. Some Republicans objected to this because it could lead to Federal taxation—something to which Barbosa did not object. Furthermore, Barbosa argued that if the right to elect the governor was achieved without the extension of the Federal Constitution, the people of Puerto Rico would become accustomed to the colonial status and would not fight for political equality. After his death, the idea of an elective governor and more autonomic reforms continued. However, the interest in the principle of extending the United States Constitution to Puerto Rico became secondary. There laid the difference in procedure in the Republican Party before and after the death of José Celso Barbosa.100

At the beginning of 1922, Republican Congressman Philip Campbell presented a bill to grant Puerto Rico a new organic act. The bill proposed to make the Island an associated free state with the right to elect a governor and the appointment of an American commissioner to supervise the laws locally legislated. The Unionists were most enthusiastic toward the bill (as these were the days of the Irish Free State). The Republicans opposed it. Tous Soto considered it a “colonial formula.” Iglesias shared similar negative views. The Unionists called a convention on February 11, 1922 and made the associated free state the only status the Party would uphold. There were some Unionists that were unhappy with this new political development. Prominent Representative José de J. Tizol, Vice-President of the Treasury Committee of the House who shared separatist sentiments, declared that the associated free state status formula without any economic reforms was just an “abject form of permanent slavery.” The Unionist separatists gradually began to feel restless inside their Party.101

This dissatisfaction of the Unionist separatists due to the Campbell Bill led to the founding of the Nationalist Party by José Coll y Cuchí and José S. Alegría on September 17, 1922. This new party favored independence and wanted a sovereign republic without a protectorate. Socio-economically, however, the Nationalists were not radicals. They were
generally Hispanophiles—but not rabid anti-Americans,—professionals, and intellectuals who donned top hats, tails, and walking sticks on Columbus Day celebrations.\textsuperscript{102}

The administration of Governor Reily was bitterly attacked by the Unionists. Iglesias had been able to have a good working relationship with Reily and defended him. But as a result of the Governor's mistakes and the incessant Unionist fire, Iowa Republican Congressman Horace M. Towner was named to replace Reily on March 4, 1923.\textsuperscript{103}

At his inaugural speech on April 4, 1923, Towner, who previously had only advocated some form of autonomy, now favored statehood as the final status for Puerto Rico. He repeated the same belief later during his annual message to the Legislature.\textsuperscript{104} The pro-statehood rhetoric of Towner was similar to that of Reily. The difference was that the new Governor was very diplomatic. Towner's governmental appointments went to the Unionist Party; thus he was able to have a good working relationship with the legislative majority. Towner described the Unionists as a conservative party composed of the educated and property owners. As a result of this pro-Unionist policy, the Republicans and Socialists soon were at odds with the Iowa Republican. Barceló was also able to collaborate with Towner because his separatist sentiments were now dormant. He now favored either statehood or some form of broad autonomy. This was not surprising because he had been a Federal and in 1918 he—together with Barbosa—had presented a concurrent resolution in the Senate asking that the American Constitution, as well as Federal economic legislation, be extended to Puerto Rico. But the separatist Unionist senators were able to defeat it.\textsuperscript{105}

The relationship between Republicans and Socialists had become closer since 1920. Both parties were hoping that Congress would amend the local electoral law so that a coalition—and not an artificial fusion such as the Ligao Party—could be made. They lobbied in Washington (Iglesias went on the Commission) and a bill was introduced; but it was not to be approved. Tous Soto even contemplated that in the coming Republican-Socialist coalition the pro-American Unionists would come over and join it.\textsuperscript{106}

Iglesias gave an interview to Muñoz Marín (whose ardent socialism had now dramatically weakened). In this interview the Socialist Senator declared that the Unionists would be defeated if the Socialist and Republicans formed a coalition. If the Republicans would change their minds and form a coalition with the Unionists, then the Socialists would
obtain some 100,000 votes alone. Absenteeism was for Iglesias the principal economic problem the Island faced. Sugar production made 65 percent of the local exports and 70 percent was absentee-owned. The absentee proprietors in turn spent their profits elsewhere and thus prevented further Insular economic development which would raise the living standards of the workers. Iglesias lamented that Puerto Rican intellectuals, unlike other intellectuals in Europe and Latin America, were not interested in the Socialist Party. This indifference persisted even though Iglesias had tried to attract intellectuals to the Party with practically no success. Puerto Rican intellectuals generally preferred either the Unionists or the Nationalist parties and sneered at the Socialists as an ignorant lot.

The months of July and August were full of activity for Iglesias and his followers. On July 25, the Eleventh Labor Congress of the Free Federation met in Ponce. By this time 150 unions with a membership of 31,000 (an increase of 3,000 since 1920) were affiliated with the Free Federation. The Socialist Party also had a convention in Ponce on August 29, 1923. A motion favoring independence as the final status for Puerto Rico was introduced. The overwhelming majority of the delegates voted against it because they favored a permanent union with the United States. Towner was blasted for having appointed a militant Unionist as General Superintendent of Elections. The Executive Committee was given the right to make a coalition with any other party as long as the socio-economic principles of the Socialist Party would not be weakened.

On September Iglesias left for Portland, Oregon, to attend the October National convention of the American Federation of Labor. There, together with Muñoz Marín, he made his usual socio-economic demands which now included some political reforms. Afterwards, Iglesias went to Washington where he presented a memorandum to President Calvin Coolidge on November 17, 1923. Some of the salient points were that: absentee sugar interests owned the best acreage of the Island valued at more than $100,000,000; in 1910 there had been 59,000 small landowing farmers and by 1920 they had been reduced to 17,000; on top of taking 60 percent of the wealth produced out of Puerto Rico, the corporations had obtained from the Legislature a tax law by which they were paying 60 percent less in taxes on their income than similar corporations or individuals in the continental United States; the 500-acre law was flagrantly violated; the flight of capital should be controlled in
order to make it stay in the Island so that industries would develop and provide employment for the excess population.\textsuperscript{111} No results came from Iglesias' document, and he returned home.

During that year several meetings had been made by Tous Soto, Iglesias, and other leading members of their parties in order to work out a coalition. There were no major conflicts between the parties, and everything seemed favorable to the formation of a coalition for the coming elections of 1924. The Unionists began to worry, looking for ways to prevent the coalition.\textsuperscript{112} Barceló declared that such a coalition would be controlled by Iglesias who was a "Bolshevist."\textsuperscript{113} Another prominent Unionist, Jorge Bird Arias (vice-President and General Manager of the Fajardo Sugar Co.), shared the same beliefs of Barceló towards Iglesias who was publicly called Senator "Bolsheviqui."\textsuperscript{114}

There was one aspect in which the three principal Insular parties were in agreement: an elective governor. On January 8, 1924, Towner headed a legislative commission formed by Barceló, Tous Soto, Iglesias, and other prominent political figures. Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila had presented legislation trying to reform the Jones Act. The granting of an elective governor was the principal goal of the Puerto Rican legislators. But General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, John W. Weeks, Secretary of War, and President Coolidge were generally not very enthusiastic about any major reforms. There were speeches where the needs and problems of the Island were made known, and there were hearings and receptions. By the second half of February, Towner and all the leading Puerto Rican legislators, except Iglesias, had expressed their points of view.\textsuperscript{115}

Iglesias went to the Committee of Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives and then emphatically stated there that the Puerto Rican Socialist Party was a democratic one which upheld and defended the Constitution of the United States and American citizenship. Then he continued with the problem of Insular status which only the United States Congress could decide. In regards to the wish for an elected governor and other liberal reforms, Iglesias declared that they were also his desires. He then proceeded to describe the political reality of the Island in the past twenty-five years. After some more explanations about other liberal governmental reforms, Santiago Iglesias came to the main part of his speech—the 500-acre law. He now explicitly stated that the violation of that law was one of the problems which caused most anguish to the people of Puerto Rico; that although it was unlawful to own more than 500 acres,
the Insular Legislature had not taken any action to enforce that law; that one of his first obligations as a senator had been to present a resolution imposing penal sanctions on the violators of the law of 500 acres, and that year after year, he introduced the resolution all over again; that even before he had been a legislator, he had presented several memoranda to the former House of Delegates, the governors, etc., but, as usual, the memoranda had always died in a special committee. The latifundia issue, Iglesias emphasized, was a problem of life and death for the Puerto Rican people. Then he went on to state that the Legislature always had the power to legislate against latifundia but had never done so. Why? Because the legislative chambers had always been packed with local landlords and representatives of the corporations. Eminent attorneys who were either corporation lawyers, landowners, shareholders, political leaders or combinations of these, plus other capitalists, were the people’s representatives year after year. Latifundia — aggravated by absenteeism — was the terrible curse of the Island. The problem Puerto Rico had to solve first was the land problem; the liberal governmental reforms could follow.116

The immediate outcome of this speech was political panic, Barceló and Tous Soto returned immediately to Puerto Rico and during the voyage secretly made a deal to forge an alliance between their parties against the Socialists. When they landed in San Juan on March 6, they published a manifesto declaring that Unionists and Republicans would unite their forces in order to achieve "our own sovereignty inside the sovereignty of the United States."117 This clever phrase was interpreted as autonomy by the Unionists and as statehood by the Republicans.

As a result of the manifesto, there was a general political uproar. Tous Soto, who had favored a coalition with the Socialists since 1919, now declared that an agreement had not been reached with Iglesias because the Socialist Senator desired only a coalition and not a fusion! The Republican leader now wanted an alliance with the Unionists because the Socialists were considered communists in the United States.118 Tous Soto now rejected Iglesias and the Socialist Party because of their radicalism and "communist tendencies." If a coalition of Republicans and Socialists was formed for the 1924 elections, it would be defeated because Iglesias had become a politician and had abandoned the workers. Even if the coalition won — according to the Republican leader — it would control the Legislature, but the governor would not appoint a single coalitionist to the cabinet. Never would a Socialist be allowed to administer the Department of Agriculture and Labor. Furthermore, Washington would
refuse to make any reforms in the Jones Act because the Socialist Party was anti-nationalist (here Tous Soto meant that the Socialists were anti-American because all Socialists had to be internationalists), was affiliated with the American Socialist Party, and attacked private property.\textsuperscript{119} It must be remembered, after all, that back in 1898, Tous Soto sided with Muñoz Rivera’s Fusionists and not with Barbosa’s ortodoxos.\textsuperscript{120}

Barceló had less difficulties controlling the Unionists forces than Tous Soto had with his Party. Most of the senior Republican leaders close to the late Barbosa (i.e., Rossy, Gómez Brioso) as well as Todd, Martínez Nadal, and others rejected the manifesto of Barceló and Tous Soto because for them it betrayed the statehood ideal. The only close friend of Barbosa to favor it was Sánchez Morales, Santiago Veve Calzada then decided to retire from politics.\textsuperscript{121} Both were men of wealth.

On April 20, 1924, Unionist and Republican commissions met in Ponce to begin organizing their electoral alliance. For voting purposes, the two parties would be two separate entities before the 1924 election. After it, however, they would become one political party. Thus the alliance was to develop into a fusion and not a coalition.\textsuperscript{122}

Both Unionists and Republicans held their conventions simultaneously in the nearby cities of San Germán and Mayagüez respectively. There were some secondary Unionist leaders who opposed the alliance, but Barceló steam-rollered them. The situation in the Republican convention was difficult for Tous Soto. However, he had the backing of the Towne Administration and was successful in rigging it. When the alliance with the Unionists was voted on, there were 130 in favor, 55 against, and two abstentions. After the voting, Martínez Nadal left with the dissident staunch stateholders and formed the Partido Republicano Puro (for electoral purposes it was to be called the Historical Constitutional Party and used the elephant of the G.O.P. as its symbol).\textsuperscript{123}

Some secondary Unionist leaders were dissatisfied with the formation of the Puerto Rican Alliance of the Union Party of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican Republican Party (this was the long official name of the group) and, led by Manuel Benítez Flores, founded the Federal Party on August 31, 1924. This Party wanted a temporary autonomous government to be followed in the future with independence. They were separatists like the Nationalists, but less active and therefore did not want to join them.\textsuperscript{124}

The Socialist Party was now facing a formidable opponent with the formation of the Alliance—which was called the Turkish Alliance by
Iglesias. Barceló and Tous Soto went so far as to denounce Iglesias to Gompers as a "dynamiter." The Socialist Party was eager to make a coalition with the Republicans who rejected the Alliance. Muñoz Marín, who in 1920 had absolutely condemned a coalition with the Republicans, now changed his mind. He declared from New York (where he was then living and would campaign for Progressive Robert La Follette and Republican Fiorello La Guardia even though he was a separatist) that for the Socialists to go to the elections alone would be stupid. A coalition with dissident Republicans was the intelligent step Socialists had to take. For Muñoz Marín the Alliance was formed out of fear of a Socialist victory in the coming elections. After a series of meetings, Iglesias and Martínez Nadal worked out a "free electoral pact." Thus, the first coalition, as opposed to the alliance, was never a fusion.

In order to ensure the electoral victory of the Alliance, Governor Towner called a special session of the Legislature to change the electoral law. Coalitions — contrary to the 1920 elections — were now allowed (the Alliance was going to the elections as a two-party coalition, but afterwards it would become one single party). The puros — and the Nationalists and the Federals — were not allowed any representation in the electoral polls. The Socialists were permitted to have an observer (without a vote) at the polls because they were not electorally considered a "principal" party. The Alliance, however, had the right to have two voting representatives (one Unionist and one Republican) at the polls. The electoral polls were thus a virtual monopoly of the Alliance. One Alliance leader wittily remarked that they would win with the masses (masas) or with the electoral polls (mesas).

After a turbulent electoral campaign, the elections were held on November 4, 1924. The Alliance won with 163,041 votes (132,755 Unionists and 30,286 Republican), and the Coalition received 90,479 votes (56,103 Socialists and 34,576 puros). The Alliance won all seven senatorial districts and had a total of seventeen senators (nine were Unionists). It also elected thirty-six representatives (twenty-six were Unionists) and reelected Córdova Dávila to Congress. Iglesias and Martínez Nadal were elected senators at-large and two Socialists and one puro were elected to the House. The Coalition won a great victory in San Juan (the Unionists had controlled it only since 1920) and carried just four other municipalities (out of seventy-five). The Federal Party received only 432 votes while the Nationalists got a mere 399 votes. There were many accusations of fraud and illegalities. It was probably the most
corrupt election ever held in the history of Puerto Rico. Iglesias and Martínez Nadal formed the People's Protest Committee and denounced an infinite number of electoral frauds and illegalities in almost every town. They also made sure Washington was well informed. The result of these unfortunate elections was an atmosphere of suspicion in Congress about the political and civil maturity of Puerto Rico. This Congressional suspicion in turn gave reason or pretext not to approve the pending legislation giving the Island the right to elect its governor and other liberal reforms.131

Not long after the elections, Iglesias left for the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor at El Paso, Texas, but he arrived late.132 Nevertheless, he had mailed a resolution denouncing the past Insular elections.133 When Iglesias finally reached El Paso, he then accompanied Gompers to Mexico City where they attended the inauguration of President Plutarco Elías Calles and the Fourth Congress of the Pan-American Federation of Labor.134 The altitude of the Mexican Capital harmed the already frail health of Gompers and upon his return to the United States, he passed away in San Antonio, Texas, on December 13, 1924.135

Iglesias stayed several months in Washington after Gompers' funeral. There he lobbied for some bills involving Puerto Rico which were being debated in Congress. Iglesias also worked at the headquarters of the Pan-American Federation of Labor performing his corresponding duties.136 To Congress and President Coolidge, he handed a long memorandum of the Free Federation.137 In it the socio-economic causes of the misery and exploitation on the Island were stated as well as the reforms which Iglesias thought should be implemented.138 The causes stated were the following: monopolies and illegal land and natural resources control; violations of the Jones Act and other laws; refusal of economic interests to pay taxes in proportion to their profits; and receiving by absentee owners 60 percent of the wealth produced which prevented further economic development. The proposed reforms were: regulation of latifundia; equitable reassessment of the actual market value of all property and the prosecution of any violators of Insular laws; obliging corporations and individuals to pay the corresponding taxes; curtailment of capital flight on all property or persons who did not prove that they reinvested locally two-thirds of their profits; and the granting to Puerto Rico by Congress an interest free loan of $50,000,000 for economic reforms. These reforms consisted of: development of agriculture and
industry; infrastructural improvement; land reform; a government development banking system; and consolidation and cancelling of the Insular debt.\textsuperscript{139}

Some members of Congress were agreeable to these reforms, but, unfortunately they were not powerful enough to get any legislation through which would have made Iglesias' plans a reality.\textsuperscript{140} Coolidge, the Department of War, and Governor Towner were not enthusiastic about the reforms desired by Iglesias. Towner even went so far as to consider him the leading trouble-maker in Puerto Rico. The opposition of the economic interests (i.e., the Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Sugar Producers, and the Asociación de Agricultores) were also formidable in their newly-created group headed by Eduardo Giorgetti and called \textit{Fuerzas Vivas}.\textsuperscript{141}

The Alliance-dominated Legislature convened and elected Barceló to the presidency of the Senate and Tous Soto as Speaker on February 9, 1925.\textsuperscript{142} But this political group had a great amount of internal friction. The Unionist wing was disenchanted because Tous Soto had brought over less than half of the Republican electorate. The Republicans wanted the Unionists to share governmental positions on a fifty-fifty basis as they had tentatively agreed previous to the 1924 elections. Thus many Unionists were unhappy when they lost their long controlled political jobs. The \textit{puros} had difficulties too because Todd wanted to have control of the Party which was presided over by Martínez Nadal. Todd, the powerful Mayor of San Juan, would finally leave the \textit{puros} to join the Alliance, taking with him City Hall.\textsuperscript{143}

During 1925-1927 the Alliance tried to get Congress to make reforms in the Jones Act and allow the election of the governor. Barceló had a great desire to be governor. There were bills and hearings, but none were successful because the Coolidge Administration and Congress were unsympathetic.\textsuperscript{144}

The Free Federation held an extraordinary labor congress in San Juan on May 30-31, 1926. Eighty-four unions were represented. The Congress concentrated on strengthening workers' solidarity and reaffirmation of the social, economic, and political reforms they had been fighting for. Iglesias delivered a lengthy speech where he related their past struggles and what were now their goals and objectives. He stated that the Socialist Party was neither marxist nor communist.\textsuperscript{145}

For the next two years, Santiago Iglesias and the Free Federation continued attempts to propose reforms in Washington approved by the
Insular Legislature. The powerful reactionary *Fuerzas Vivas* were as strongly opposed as ever, and not much was achieved.

Speaker Tous Soto began to restudy the autonomic concept of the associated free state status formula he had previously categorized as colonial. Besides this title of associated free state, the other names used for this variable form of autonomy were free state, associated state, and special state. Tous Soto, who was gradually losing his faith in the statehood ideal, was seeking to decrease the colonial control Washington exerted over Puerto Rico. The Speaker was pushing for an autonomous form of government with such broad powers that he deemed it necessary to make an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Needless to say, constitutional amendments are no simple procedure. Even with this amendment, this broad autonomic formula was seen by Tous Soto as transitory, for he personally preferred statehood as a final status for the Island.

Early in 1928, Senator Juan B. Soto (Republican member of the Alliance) presented a bill to make the people of Puerto Rico—according to him—free, independent, and sovereign. Senator Soto, who was also international law professor at the University of Puerto Rico School of Law, favored a political formula which was not total independence, but a kind of associated republic status. He was expanding the concept of Tous Soto a step further. The Island, nevertheless, could still become a state of the Union or totally independent in the future if it so desired. In the Coalition, Martínez Nadal absolutely rejected Senator Soto's bill. Iglesias was then in the States, so his reaction—which would have been similar to that of Martínez Nadal—was not published in the press. An editorial in *El Tiempo* condemned the bill. In the Alliance camp, the reaction was not enthusiastic. Barceló did not publicly say a word. Brother-in-law Jorge Bird Arias stated that Soto's bill was “contrary” to the platform of the Alliance and had not been “authorized” by Party leadership. Prominent Alliance representative (from the Unionist wing) Alfonso Lastra Chárriez declared that Soto's bill did “not deserve to be commented on,” that it was “completely banal” to give any importance to something that had no value. The concept of associated free state would later become a reality, under the aegis of Luis Muñoz Marín, with the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1952. However, the Commonwealth had much more limited powers than the status designed by José Tous Soto and Juan B. Soto in the 1920's.

Barceló's opposition to Iglesias and the Socialist Party began to
somewhat mellow after the 1924 elections. He even attended important labor activities together with Iglesias. But the *Fuerzas Vivas* rapidly mobilized to hold back Barceló’s conciliatory moves toward the Socialists. The President of the Senate, Barceló, was not a powerful and charismatic leader like the late Muñoz Rivera and had less influence over the Unionists. His control over the Alliance was even weaker because he had to share it with Tous Soto who was a more astute politician.

But Barceló’s most conciliatory gesture toward the Socialists occurred early in 1928 in Fajardo. This town was an important sugar-producing region which the Socialists had recently won after a famous court case where it was demonstrated that the Alliance had committed fraud in the 1924 elections. It was also Barceló’s home town. Barceló was to deliver a speech as a guest of the Socialists, and the subject was supposed to be on the women’s suffrage bill (for the literate only) he had introduced. The Senate’s President began by affirming he had come to explain the law and not to defend any particular party or ideal. The time had come to tell the people the truth because Puerto Rico was politically disoriented. Barceló then stated that the Unionists had been accused of vote-buying, but he now swore that the coming elections were going to be honest. Restrictive suffrage for illiterates was considered by him as a “stimulus” to get the people interested in reading and writing. On the subject of workers, Barceló declared that they were in a better socio-economic situation in 1899 than at the present and blasted the rich for trying to control everything. As for his passionate political anger, the Alliance leader confessed he had buried it. To prove the point, Barceló added that the platform from where he was speaking belonged to the Socialists and when asked if he wanted the red Party colors to be taken down, he had refused. Barceló would join the red flag of Socialism, for him denoting Puerto Rican dignity and courage, with the white flag of peace in order to defend the Island. He then pledged to ensure in the coming electoral campaign the principle that only good men—regardless of party affiliation—should be elected to office. Barceló then admitted that up to then the opposite had occurred. In Puerto Rico there were many municipalities whose administrators had governed badly and these towns should be handed over to the opposing party. The Fajardo Socialist (and *puro*) administration, however, was the most honest one of the Island. Barceló wished that there would be more municipal administrations like Fajardo. He then admitted that the basic Insular problem was economic and not political (something Iglesias had always said and been ridiculed
for). The culprit for this poor economic situation, he continued, had been the late Executive Council and not the Unionist legislators. Barceló concluded the speech asking the people to vote consciously, to elect the good candidates regardless of party affiliations, even if the voter had to vote against the Alliance. This was Barceló’s rarest moment of self-criticism, but the political atmosphere did not change substantially. The Senate President’s conciliatory overtures to the Socialists never got anywhere because he bowed to the pressure of the conservative members of his party, the Fuerzas Vivas, and the powerful influences of the great Continental economic interests.

During the election year of 1928, Senator Iglesias was extremely active from platform to platform and from town to town. For the elections the Alliance approved amendments to the electoral law which prohibited coalitions or alliances of two or more parties (the opposite of the 1924 electoral law). Since the Alliance was now a single party, that Party wanted to force a fusion of Socialists and pueros (this was something that was totally rejected by numerous Socialists and pueros) or to prevent a new coalition in order to improve their electoral success. Faced with this antidemocratic electoral law, the Socialists and pueros worked out a fifty-fifty deal for the elective posts (the candidates for resident commissioner belonged this time to the Socialists). The two parties would keep their own separate organizations and platforms under a single party name in order to be able to take part in the electoral process. The artificial party was named the Socialist Constitutional Party, but it continued to be known as the Coalition. Iglesias and Martínez Nadal worked out a common bond between Socialists and pueros based on seeking reforms in the Jones Act and advocating permanent union with the United States with eventual statehood. The platform of the Alliance now proposed to make Puerto Rico a special state of the United States. This special state status required a constitutional amendment and had been originated by Governor Towner.

The elections took place on November 6, 1928. The Alliance was victorious receiving 132,826 votes and the Coalition obtained 123,415 votes, of which at least 67,990 were Socialist votes (this was the number of votes Iglesias pulled as senator at-large). The numerical difference between the two groups was now 9,411 instead of 72,652 as in 1924. The Alliance won in four senatorial districts and elected eleven senators (five from the Unionists wing and —surprisingly— six from the Republican wing). It also elected twenty-one representatives (fourteen from the
Unionist wing and seven from the Republican one). Córdova Dávila was reelected. The Coalition won in three senatorial districts and elected a total of eight senators (four for each party). Eighteen representatives (nine for each party) were also elected by the Coalition. The Alliance won in forty-seven municipalities. Todd was reelected in San Juan under the Alliance ticket and ceased believing in statehood, becoming later an autonomist until his death in 1955. The Coalition was victorious in the remaining thirty municipalities. In many towns and in two senatorial districts the majorities were won by a very small margin. The Nationalist Party received only 329 votes. It is curious to note that eloquent Nationalist leader José Coll y Cuchi was named by the National Committee of the Democratic Party to campaign in the Spanish speaking areas for Al Smith. This was the first time that political propaganda was made nationally in Spanish. Coll y Cuchi’s separatism was indeed a peculiar one, but after all, he had once been a state-hooder and a G. O. P. affiliate.

Notes

8. Socialist Party, _Actuaciones de la primera convención territorial celebrada los días 21 y 22 marzo de 1915, en la ciudad de Cayey, P. R., en cuya fecha se fundó la rama de estado en Puerto Rico_ (Bayamón, P. R.: Tipografía El Progreso, [1915], pp. 3-64; Pagán, _Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956)_ , vol. I, pp. 169-171; Rivera Colón, _op. cit._, pp. 33-35.
9. _Boletín Mercantil de Puerto Rico_, 25 March 1915, p. 1. The _Unión Obrera_ of these weeks are missing.
10. Samuel Gompers to Santiago Iglesias, 19 May 1916; Santiago Iglesias to Samuel Gompers, 26 May 1916; Samuel Gompers to Santiago Iglesias, 19 June 1916, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
11. Carmelo Martínez Acosta, _Luis Muñoz Rivera_ (San Juan, P. R.: Imprenta Venezuela, 1948), pp. 16-17.


20. Ibid., p. 214.


32. Huyke, op. cit., p. 10; Barbosa de Rosario, La política en dos tiempos, pp. 24-25.


37. La Democracia, 3 March 1917, pp. 1, 4.


43. Sebastián Dalmau Canet, José de Diego (San Juan, P. R.: Cantero, Fernández y Co., Inc., 1928), pp. 43-44.

44. Muñoz Rivera, op. cit., vol. III, p. 219; Barbosa de Rosario, La política en dos tiempos, p. 25. Félix Córdova came from a family of autonomist republicans and two first cousins had been founders of the Republican Party. His brother, Dr. Ulpiano Segundo Córdova, was such a staunch stateholder that he used to humorously boast that his name was U. S. Córdova.


46. El Tiempo, 9 June 1917, p. 1

47. Socialist Party, Programa y constitución territorial del Partido Socialista (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía Boletín Mercantil, 1917).


49. Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriquenos (1898-1956), vol. I, pp. 184-187; Bayrán Toro, op. cit., p. 150; Candidatos elegidos y proclamados en las elecciones celebradas el 16 de julio de 1917 ([Junta Insular de Elecciones], n. d.), p. 3; Rivera Colón, op. cit., pp. 33, 38.


55. *La Democracia*, 3 March 1919, p. 4.


62. "Discurso del senador socialista en la vista pública ante la Delegación del Congreso americano," April 1919. Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, The *banco del pueblo* became a reality in 1960 with the founding of Banco Obrero. In 1979 it went bankrupt and was replaced by a new Workers Mutual Savings Bank.


67. *Programa, constitución territorial y actuaciones del Partido Socialista*,


76. _Constitución de la Federación Libre de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico_ (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía Compañía Editora de Justicia, 1921), p. 1: Report of Santiago Iglesias Pantín to the American Federation of Labor, 1920, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Alonso Torres, _op. cit._ , p. 263.

77. Interview with Luis Muñoz Marín, Trujillo Alto, Puerto Rico, 24 August 1977; Carreras, _op. cit._ , pp. 218-219; Carmelo Rosario Natal, _La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín_ (San Juan, P. R.: Master Typesetting of P. R., Inc. 1976), pp. 46-50, 65-68, 79-80, 86-112. It is interesting to note that in a questionnaire Muñoz Marín answered for _El Mundo_ and published on February 12, 1978, he considered Iglesias a "conservative" socialist while he was a "radical." However, it was the "conservative" Iglesias who was persecuted, imprisoned, and shot at for his socialists activism while "radical" Muñoz Marín encountered nothing comparable to the hostility and repressive measures Iglesias constantly faced; Luis Muñoz Marín, _Memorias, autobiografía pública (1890-1940)_ (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, 1982); pp. 38-40.

78. Carreras, _op. cit._ , p. 219; Rosario Natal, _La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín_ , p. 80; Muñoz Marín, _op. cit._ , pp. 40-41.

79. Carreras, _op. cit._ , pp. 219-220; Rosario Natal, _La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín_ , pp. 81-86, 112-124. Muñoz Marín, _op. cit._ , pp. 41-43. As previously mentioned there had been a close friendship between Muñoz Rivera
and Giorgetti. Muñoz Rivera died at Giorgetti’s residence, and the sugar baron had always been very generous with the family of the Unionist leader.

80. La Democracia, 18 May 1920, p. 1. La Democracia did not publish the complete text of Iglesias’ lecture, but only excerpts and their interpretation. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico (18 May 1920, p. 1) carries just a brief summary that eliminates any radical tone to the speech. El Mundo did not cover the conference. The Unión Obrera issue is missing, so until more documentation is discovered, one must use what was printed in La Democracia. In the May 22 issue of Unión Obrera, there are some commentaries on the Ateneo lecture. It stated that the Russian regime was neither communist nor parliamentarian, but was both. In fact, it was more revolutionary than parliamentary. Unión Obrera then stated that the socialism that they wanted for Puerto Rico was “parlamentarista.” They were thus toning down the radicalism of Iglesias’ lecture. The Socialist paper also declared that they did not oppose independence. What they were against was independence as sustained by the Unionist leaders who ruled the Island because they were just defenders of capitalism. It is important to note that the Republican El Tiempo did not give any importance to the lecture of Iglesias. On page 2 of the May 21 issue they stated that the revolution prophesied by Iglesias was just part of a worldwide movement.


83. La Democracia, 27 September 1920, p. 4; Rosario Natal, La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín, p. 120.

84. El Mundo, 6 October 1920, p. 1; Rosario Natal, La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín, pp. 124-125; Rivera Colón, op. cit., pp. 57-58, 244-251.

85. El Mundo, 8 October 1920, p. 1; Rosario Natal, La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín, p. 125.


88. It is curious to note that the Socialist from Ponce, Francisco Grevi Bellagamba, was a carpenter who had been employed by the Continental sugar baron Walter Mck. Jones (owner of Central Herminia) and was also then elected to the House on the Unionist ticket.
89. Report of Santiago Iglesias Pantín to the American Federation of Labor, 20 March 1921, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

90. Ibid.


103. Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-


110. Rosario Natal, La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín, pp. 163-164.

111. “Memorando del Senador Santiago Iglesias entregado al Presidente de los Estados Unidos Hon. Calvin Coolidge traducido por el Sr. E. Paz Granela, Vice Presidente de la Federación Libre,” Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


120. Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 486. Tous Soto had been a law student of Republican Centralist Nicolás Salmerón.


126. Later, Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila would denounce Iglesias to William Green (Gompers’ sucesor) and Congress as a communist, claiming he could prove “beyond a reasonable doubt the affiliation of the Socialist Party of Porto Rico with the Socialist Party of America and with the Third International of Moscow” which was “organized and dominated by Lenin, Tortsik [sic] and the Communist Party of Russia.” U. S., Congress, House, Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila speaking on Conditions in Porto Rico 68th Cong., 2nd Sess., 4 March 1925, Congressional Record, p. 5597. Antonio R. Barceló and José Tous Soto had similar beliefs as Córdova Dávila regarding Iglesias’ relations with Moscow. See El Mundo, 14 March 1925, p. 1.

132. "Resolution No. 78 by Delegate Santiago Iglesias to the American Federation of Labor in Convention assembles in the City of El Paso, Texas, on the 17th day of November 1924," Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
133. Santiago Iglesias to Samuel Gompers, telegram with no date, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
137. Santiago Iglesias to Calvin Coolidge, 25 November 1925, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
138. Santiago Iglesias to Luis Negrón, 27 April 1926, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
140. Santiago Iglesias to Luis Negrón, 22 April 1926, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
142. Tous Rodríguez, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
146. Santiago Iglesias to the members of the Free Federation, 25 September 1927, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
147. Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias Pantín, 14 February 1927, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Rivera Colón, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-231.


150. *El Mundo*, 16 February 1928, p. 3.

151. *Ibid*.


154. *El Tiempo*, 17 February 1928, p. 2


156. *La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico*, 20 March 1928, p. 1; *El Tiempo*, 20 March 1928, p. 2; *El Mundo*, 21 March 1928, p. 3; *Unión Obrera*, 24 March 1928, p. 1; *La Democracia*, 19 March 1928, p. 1; Rivera Colón, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-264. The most complete coverage of the speech appears in *La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico* (a Unionist Alliance paper), *El Tiempo* (puro) and *El Mundo* (independent). *La Democracia* (the leading Unionist Alliance paper) almost totally ignored the speech and printed only a brief notice.


160. Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956)*, vol. I, pp. 311-313; Alonso Torres, *op. cit.*, p. 375; Bayrón Toro, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-171. Bayrón Toro makes several errors identifying the Unionist and Republican legislators of the Alliance both in 1924 and 1928. I have tried to correct the mistakes by consulting with several persons who knew the políticos of that period.

After thirty years of American domination, there had been numerous changes in the cultural, economic, political, and social life of Puerto Rico. The population had increased from 953,243 in 1899 to 1,543,913 in 1930 (1,869,255 in 1940). The urban proportion of the population had augmented from 2.14 percent to 27.7 percent (427,221), and the rural, had decreased from 78.6 percent to 72.3 percent (1,116,692); by 1940 it was 30.3 and 69.7 percent respectively.¹ From the total population, 74.3 percent (1,146,179) were classified as white and 25.7 percent (397,156) as colored (both mulatto and black). There were also 38 persons of Chinese or Japanese origin. Foreigners numbered 26,320, from which 18,596 were Spaniards and 2,406 French. The Continental Americans living in Puerto Rico had just increased from 1,069 in 1899 to 2,160 in 1930.²

The population density of the Island was 450 persons per square mile, making it higher than Japan.³ In the United States the density figure was 41.2 per square mile.⁴ South Carolina, then the most populated rural state, had a density of 55 persons per square mile.⁵ This high population growth was a result of a very high birth rate and a decreasing death rate.⁶ The annual population growth rate had increased from 1.54 percent (1899-1910) to 1.69 (1920-1930) when the percentage for the industrialized nations was under 1.5 percent.⁷

From the seventy-seven municipalities, fifty-seven had aqueducts, twenty-six possessed a sewage system, and all but the island towns of Vieques and Culebra had electricity. San Juan had grown from 32,048 in 1899 to 114,715 and Ponce from 27,952 to 53,340. Mayagüez was then the third largest city with 37,060.⁸ The Insular communication system had greatly improved since 1898.
Then there were only 275 km. of paved roads, and by 1929 these had increased to 1,786 km. Fernando Ortiz, the noted Cuban scholar, categorized the roads as "excellent" and stated that they were the most used in the Caribbean. There were also 1,800 km. of graded dirt roads and 5,000 km. of trails. Puerto Rico had one mile of paved roads for every 3.4 square miles, which meant that it had a greater proportion of better roads than any state except for Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The quality of the roads and bridges were the best that could be used in tropical countries. The motor vehicles registered in 1929 numbered 16,057 and would increase to 26,847 by 1940.

Railroad mileage had augmented from 155 miles to about 1,010 miles. The Porto Rico Railroad had become the American Railroad of Porto Rico and its tracks increased from 130 to 222.4 miles going from San Juan to Ponce via Mayagüez. This company was practically the only one that was not exclusively used to carry sugar cane inside the sugar mills. There were twelve other railroad companies that had some 500 miles of tracks just employed to transport sugar cane to their respective mills.

The telephone system was not a mere list of 592 subscribers in San Juan, Ponce, and Mayagüez. Most towns now had the service principally provided by the Porto Rico Telephone Company (founded in 1914 by the Behn brothers who later left San Juan and organized ITT) and the Insular Department of the Interior. The Porto Rico Telephone Company operated 12,500 telephones in 1926 and 18,993 by 1941. The Department of the Interior controlled only twelve towns in the central part of the Island and served a mere 610 subscribers in 1938 and 650 by 1941.

The telegraph system had doubled its services. In 1898 it served only in thirty-one towns and had forty-one stations; by 1928 it operated in seventy-one towns and ran seventy-two stations. The Bureau of Insular Telegraph of the Department of the Interior administered the telegraph. There were also three overseas cable companies (American, English, and French).

The Insular port facilities, which in 1898 were primitive even in San Juan, had vastly improved. The Capital was still the main port, but there were fourteen more. A good number of them principally served some sugar mills, Guánica being the most important.

As Carroll's Report on the Island of Porto Rico is indispensable in having a clear understanding of the Puerto Rico at the turn of the century, Porto Rico and its Problems by Victor S. Clark, ed. is equally essential
for the 1930's. This work was prepared by the Brookings Institution. Dr. Clark was familiar with the Island since 1899, having served as President of the Board of Education (he was the architect of the new educational system) under the military governors. He assembled a group of seven continental scholars—Frank Tannenbaum was one of them—who began the study in the autumn of 1928 and concluded it in February, 1930. As a result, the work was made after the devastating hurricane of 1928 and the Wall Street crash of 1929 which had, naturally, tremendous negative effects on Puerto Rico.

During the Spanish domination, even though there was a Board of Health, no vigorous and methodical public health campaign had been taken to decrease the diseases that affected the population. In 1898 only around 6 percent of the Insular budget was spent on health and sanitation. The Superior Board of Health was established by General Davis on June 29, 1899 to supervise the sanitation of the Island. This was a nonpolitical bureau whose director reported directly to the governor until 1917. The Jones Act created the Department of Health, whose commissioner was appointed by the governor. By 1928 this Department received 11.34 percent of the Insular budget. The period of few and poorly operated clinics and hospitals had ended. Now most municipalities had public hospitals and dispensaries which served 80 percent of the population. The Department of Health operated 132 hospitals, and there were an additional 368 in private practice. The United States Public Health Service and the Rockefeller Institution cooperated with the government to improve health standards. By 1924 the legislative established the School of Tropical Medicine, it was operated in association with Columbia University, becoming a center of worldwide reputation. This school worked closely with the Department of Health. After education and public works, the Department of Health received the largest appropriations which then amounted to $1,250,000 (out of a $11,000,000 budget).

One of the first tasks undertaken by the Military Government back in 1899 had been to vaccinate most of the population, thus virtually eradicating smallpox. Yellow fever was also soon brought under control and by 1928 there were no deaths reported from it or from smallpox. But the four principal diseases of 1898, —stomach ailments, tuberculosis, malaria, and hookworm— were still dreaded. Puerto Rico had the highest mortality rate in the civilized world, being nearly three times higher than New York. Most Puerto Ricans were still suffering from hookworm (90 percent of the rural population and 50 percent of the urban). In spite of the
fact that it was generally not a fatal disease, it reduced the working
capacity of the victim from 50 to 75 percent. Due to the scientific
discoveries of Dr. Bailey K. Ashford and the work of the government,
Deaths were reduced from 7,369 in 1899 to 483 in 1928. One of the
principal reasons for the cause of these diseases was poor sanitation.
Although in 1899 seventy-five percent of all the houses did not have even
a crude latrine, in 1929 about two thirds of the rural houses and one fourth
of the urban ones still did not have this type of sanitary facility. Even
though a good number of aqueducts and sewers had been constructed,
they were not well managed. The death rate, whose average between
1888-1898 stood at 30.2 percent, was 20.4 percent in 1928 and 18.6
percent in 1930, the lowest figure than in any previous recorded year (in
1940 it was 18.4 percent). By comparison, Chile’s was 30.4, Egypt 25.4,
India 24.9, Romania 22.2, Canada 10.2, United States 11.3, Australia 9.4,
and New Zealand 8.7. The birth rate went from 28.3 percent in 1898 to
32.2 percent in 1930 and would further increase to 36.8 percent by the end
of the decade. The health problem, however, was considered essentially
economic and not sanitary. An improved economic situation would raise
the living standards. Higher incomes would improve the nourishment and
diet of the people who then could also afford private medical treatments.
Such improvements, unfortunately, were not easy to achieve because the
Island was overpopulated.  

The development of public instruction during the last thirty years had
been, according to Fernando Ortiz, “extraordinary.” In 1899 there had
been 525 public schools with 25,798 (8 percent) students. By 1930 the
enrollment had increased to 214,328 (32.9 percent) of 651,395 people
from the ages between 5 and 20. Illiteracy had decreased from 83.2
percent to 41.4 percent (in 1920 it stood at 55 percent) and 80.6 percent
could not speak English (90.1 percent in 1920). Previously, schools
were located in rented rooms and buildings and — in many cases — the
residence of the teacher. The physical facilities of these schools were very
inadequate. Only six school buildings were government property. Three
decades later, there were 1,992 school buildings (1,078 were government
owned) with 4,462 classrooms. The public instruction budget had risen
from $185,886.45 to $5,834,468 (from both Insular and municipal funds)
in 1928. While in the United States $27.85 was spent on each student who
attended public schools, in Puerto Rico it was only $12.57. In Great
Britain and Switzerland it was $18.32 and $20.83 respectively. The per
capita expenditure for school purposes in Puerto Rico was $2.95 when it
was $4.47 in the United States, while it was $3.09 in Great Britain, $3.43 in Canada, and $4.47 in Switzerland. There were 23 junior high-schools and 23 high-schools with a total enrollment of 6,950. Private schools now numbered 37 (with 6,994 students) which were supervised by the government and 45 (with 2,933 students) that were not. The Department of Public Instruction had 4,523 teachers. The University of Puerto Rico (1903) had two campuses: Río Piedras and Mayagüez. The enrollment was 3,500. The Polytechnic Institute of San Germán (1913), operated by the Presbyterian Church, had 396 college students in 1928, 109 in 1933, and 378 in 1940. Sacred Heart College was established in 1936 and had some 40 female students by 1940. With all these accomplishments, there were still serious educational problems. Approximately some 97 percent of the urban children of ages between 5 and 14 went to school while in the rural areas the percentage went down to 40. Two-thirds of the rural schools operated on the double enrollment system. About 74 percent of the rural children only stayed in school up to the third grade. It was not easy to teach these children because in addition to various illnesses (hookworms, etc.), many were also hungry. Some did not attend school for lack of clothing. Nevertheless, the country people wanted their children to attend school in order to better themselves intellectually and economically. Many in the upper classes, however, were opposed to educating the rural children because that meant higher taxes for them; fewer peasants would then like to remain farm laborers, and because they (the masses) could ultimately gain control of the government due to the universal suffrage that existed.19

One controversial aspect of the educational system in Puerto Rico was the so-called process of Americanization. According to those who believed in independence, or a loose form of political association with the United States, the public school system established by the Americans in 1899 began a methodical process to Americanize the Puerto Ricans by trying to assimilate them culturally. This was to be done by enforcing the teaching of English language and American patriotism; thus, Puerto Rican culture would be obliterated and replaced with an American cultural model. This was supposed to have been accomplished under the aegis of the Commissioner of Education, who was a presidential appointee until 1948. Up to 1921 the commissioners of Education were Continental Americans until former Speaker Juan B. Huyke was appointed. Huyke was a very pro-American Unionist, so he was severely criticized by many fellow party members and separatists. Republicans and Social-
ists (Barbosa, Martínez Nadal, Iglesias, et al) have always been accused of helping in this process of obliterating Puerto Rican culture. It must be pointed out, however, that the Americanization generally favored by Republicans and Socialists was quite different from the one this political opponents claimed they believed in. Because they were political assimilists, they were not necessarily cultural assimilists. After all such men as Rossy and Gómez Brioso never became fluent in English and Martínez Nadal spoke it with difficulty. Probably the best definition of what the statehooders understood by Americanization or Americanism (a word they also used) was penned by Supreme Court Justice Emilio del Toro (1922-1943). Del Toro wanted Puerto Rico to adopt American political institutions and a democratic educational system, to conserve both the contributions of Spanish civilization and Puerto Rican culture as well as the benefits of American civilization. For the Brookings' scholars to remove the teaching of English from the elementary grades and leave it to the upper courses, which only a minority attended, "would add one more exclusive privilege to the many already enjoyed by the well-to-do." Fernando Ortiz—the Cuban nationalist and radical liberal whose sympathies were for Puerto Rican independence—believed that the American influence had caused some problems, but it also had given the Island "prodigious progress." For example, American civilization had given women more freedom and dominion over themselves. Ortiz categorically wrote that it was "utopic" to think that Puerto Rico would lose the "personality of its spirit" and be absorbed in the "Anglo-Saxon ocean." The Island had a government based on a "vigorous democracy" which has "developed in the Puerto Rican people a sense of itself as a people and an awareness of what active citizenship means, which augers a growing concern with Puerto Rico's problems and the will to face them effectively." The debate on Americanization has still not ended.

A small number of Puerto Ricans had been involved in commercial activities at the end of the nineteenth century. Most merchants were then Spaniards. By 1930 the amount of Puerto Ricans in the trading business had greatly increased, and more Spaniards hired fewer employees from Spain. A small number of Continental Americans owned some stores of quality products, while some Lebanese had established shops that sold inexpensive merchandise. Commercial businesses were practicing modern methods of management, marketing, and advertising. There were some 30,000 persons employed in commercial related business. In 1897 imports amounted to $17,850,063 and gradually increased to a record
—due to excellent sugar prices—$105,479,703 in 1921. By 1927 the figure stood at $98,814,393 and went down to $61,281,101 in 1932 due to the Depression. From there on imports gradually increased again to $107,030,482 in 1940.\textsuperscript{25} Imports from the United States went up from 20 percent in 1897 to 86.3 percent in 1928 for a value of $79,000,000; Spanish imports decreased from 40 percent to 0.8 percent ($783,000).\textsuperscript{26} In the fiscal year 1935-1936 Puerto Rico was the sixth most important market of American exports after the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, and Hawaii. The Island was the ninth market of United States food products in 1923 and by 1935 it became the third. One-third of the food bought consisted of meat, lard, fish, and eggs. Puerto Rico consumed 4,600,000 pounds of rice from the States which was 44.5 percent of the quantity exported. Shoes, textiles, grains, cereals, and cigarettes were also leading American imports. The other prominent imports were household goods, building materials, machinery, medicines, and fertilizers. Puerto Rico also annually imported around $1,292,000 worth of illegal lottery tickets from the Dominican Republic and Spain. Gambling had been prohibited since 1898 (except horse racing), but the Puerto Rican tradition of cock-fights and playing the lottery continued thriving underground. The Dominican Republic sold 40 percent (about $1,192,000) of its tickets in Puerto Rico and $100,000 were spent in the Spanish lottery. The return prize money amounted to $285,000. The Insular economy was being drained of $1 million a year by a myopic law until the government lottery was re-established in 1934.\textsuperscript{27}

The exports in 1897 were valued at $12,222,599. That figure had increased to $150,811,449 in 1920—due to the sugar boom—, declined to $106,716,587 in 1928, decreased to $75,472,289 in 1933, went up to $114,953,827 in 1937, and stood at $92,347,242 by 1940.\textsuperscript{28} The exports in 1928 were: raw sugar, 52.7 percent; leaf and scrap tobacco, 16.6 percent; coffee, 2.5 percent (in 1914 it had been 19.0 percent while the percentages for 1920, 1924 and 1929 were 6.0, 5.02 and 0.6 respectively); grapefruits, 2.6 percent; cigars, 3.5 percent; and textiles, 9.3 percent. Agricultural products consisted of 78.1 percent and manufactures of 15.2 percent.\textsuperscript{29} Between 1899-1903, 66.7 percent of Insular exports had gone to the United States, but by 1920 the percentage had increased to 90.6 and rose further to 95.3 percent in 1936. Throughout the Depression years the exterior trade of Puerto Rico held up better than in other areas. The purchases of consumers' goods did show an increase during that difficult period.\textsuperscript{30}
The banking system in 1898 had been quite fragile. Its capital amounted to $1,115,959 and deposits to $1,838,783. By 1929 deposits had increased to $59,150,075 and resources were $87,424,216. The number of banks had expanded from six to eighteen (four of which were considered "foreign" institutions) in 1929 with thirty-five branches. The Banco Español de Puerto Rico was reorganized in 1900 and changed its name by dropping the Español. In 1913 it merged with the Sociedad Anónima de Crédito Mercantil and assumed the new name of Banco Comercial de Puerto Rico. In 1932 this important bank was acquired by the small Banco Popular de Economías y Préstamos which then became the Banco Popular de Puerto Rico. The prominent Banco Territorial y Agrícola de Puerto Rico continued operations until it went bankrupt in 1932. The Crédito y Ahorro Ponceño continued functioning as well as the recently founded Banco de Ponce (1917). The other local minor banks were the following: Banco de San Germán, Banco Masónico de Puerto Rico, Banco Agrícola de Aguadilla, Banco de Yabucoa, Crédito y Ahorro Popular de Yauco, Banco de Cabo Rojo, Banco de San Juan, and two with the identical names of Caja de Economías y Préstamos. From this group, only the Banco de San Juan and the Caja de Economías y Préstamos founded in 1881 survived the Depression.\(^{31}\)

The so-called "foreign" banks (two American and two Canadian) were the American Colonial Bank (1899; considered a local institution but 85 percent of it was owned by Fred M. Schall of New York), the Royal Bank of Canada (1907), the Bank of Nova Scotia (1910) and the First National City Bank (1918). The "foreign" banks had ten branches of the thirty-five that all the eighteen banks operated. Absentee business interests controlled about 60 percent of all the banking capital. The resources of the "foreign" banks amounted to 50.2 percent of the total banking capital in Puerto Rico. Ninety-five percent of the capital of these four banks was owned outside the Island. Absentee interests also controlled 26.1 percent of the stocks of the fourteen local banks. In summary, some 60 percent of the banking capital was absentee owned. The First National City Bank took over the American Colonial Bank in 1930, and the Chase Manhattan Bank was established in 1933.\(^{32}\)

The Federal Land Bank of Baltimore opened a branch in San Juan in 1923, and the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank began local operations in 1924. Loans on lower rates now became available. By 1929, $8,134,019.65 had been loaned.\(^{33}\)

Besides the regular banks, there were also several private loan
companies. Some export companies and traders had credit services, and also a number of money lenders were active. A postal savings system had fifty-four offices in different post offices. In 1928 there were 1,563 depositors with savings totaling a mere $154,795.34

There were also in Puerto Rico three Canadian and four American life insurance companies. At the end of 1928, the value of the policies stood at $29,591,958 with gross annual premiums totaling $1,497,150. According to Brookings, Puerto Rico had "nearly all the types of financial institutions and agencies required."35

Industrial development during the first three decades of the twentieth century had been meager. Many considered the need to industrialize in order to reduce the unemployment problem and the economic deprivation of the working classes. Not much had been accomplished since Puerto Rico had very few raw materials it could manufacture into finished products.36 The most important industries were the following: pottery (3 factories), lime ovens (3), saw mills (4), cotton mills (1), buttons (1), shirts (3), undershirts (1), men's clothing (30), embroidery on lace (155), beds and mattresses (16), light mattresses and pillows (7), slippers (23), men's caps (8), hats (4), coffins (34), trunks (7), brooms (2), chocolate (3), candy (5), crackers (8), pasta (7), ice (36), electric batteries (1), cardboard boxes (3), cauldrons (2), fertilizers (7), gas manufacturers (2), electric plants (40 plus), bay rum (9), medicine (9), diamond cutting (2), foundries (5), bay rum (9), distilleries (2), tobacco workshops (3,427), tobacco stripping (103), cigarettes (1), cigars (399), coffee torrefactions (23), coffee mills (13), carbonated beverages (32), and sugar refineries (1). These industries gave employment to some 55,000 workers.37

With the repealing of Prohibition, the rum industry became very important. In 1934, 22 rum distilleries were established but were reduced to 10 by 1937. The rum production rapidly increased from 93,739 gallons in 1934-1935 to 2,062,812 gallons in 1935-1936.38 Two breweries also began operating.39

The foundries and machine shops were important industries. They supplied the forty-one sugar mills of the Island with most of its necessary equipment. Recently, one complete sugar mill with the most modern machinery had been built and sold to Venezuela. Marine engine work was also done in these establishments.40

After World War I some Puerto Ricans had learned the delicate art of diamond cutting. They were rated as equal to the skilled Dutch cutters, and their level of honesty was higher. This industry, unfortunately, only gave employment to a handful of persons.41
There were over 40 electric plants some of which were private (for both public service or sugar mill use), while others were owned by the municipal or Insular governments. The three most important private ones were located in San Juan, Ponce, and Mayagüez. Canadians owned the Porto Rican Power Company which operated in San Juan and other municipalities in the eastern part with 32,300 customers, serving some 300,000 of the total population. The Company also ran the trolley in San Juan and its suburbs. Its assets were estimated at $8,938,966. The Ponce Electric Company was a New Jersey corporation. It served about 51,000 people, and its assets were valued at $1,441,471. The Valdez family operated the light company at Mayagüez which was worth $900,000. During the last fifteen years the Insular government had begun operating electric plants which generated half of the electricity. Washington authorities had not been favorable to this policy of public ownership of utilities. Nevertheless, the Insular government had been successful in this venture which sold its power at lower rates and led the private companies to reduce their prices. The increase in current consumption was growing as rapidly as in the United States. The Continental-owned Porto Rico Gas Company was the other utility corporation. It was incorporated in Delaware, had assets valued at $1,724,954 in 1929, and operated exclusively in San Juan.

An industry of recent growth was the needlework products (embroidery, lace, and the various types of garments). It had its beginning with some immigrants coming from Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. In 1899 it was known for its fine quality, but the quality was commercially insignificant. However, when World War I began to reduce the European supply of fine needlework products, the Continental merchants started to pay attention to Puerto Rico. Thus the somnolent garment industry entered its most important era. After the War, due to Congressional immigration laws which reduced the supply of cheap labor which was the source of the needle industry, the Insular garment manufacturing continued to develop because of the local cheap labor market that existed. Mayagüez soon became the sweatshop capital. Other important centers were Aguadilla, Añasco, Lajas, Maricao, Cabo Rojo, San Germán, Sabana Grande, Lares, San Sebastián, Moca, Rincón, San Juan, Coamo, and Ponce. Over 50,000 women and girls labored in factories (155) and at home where an enormous quantity of the garments were produced. The needlework manufacturing was controlled from the mainland by merchants who sent their agents to Puerto Rico to deal with local middlemen.
who, in turn, contracted—sometimes by way of another sub-middleman—the women that did the work. The needlework industry produced: embroidery, lace, women dresses, shirts, blouses, and underwear, men's suits and underwear, handkerchiefs, plus some linen and silk goods. Some of this needlework was categorized as equal to the best produced in France. The garment industry export value in 1920 was a mere $107,000, but by June, 1929 it had risen to $15,133,000. Most of these manufactured products went to the States. Some men's clothing, however, was being exported to the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Venezuela, Colombia, and the Canal Zone ($30,000 in 1924 and $338,000 in 1928).46

As previously mentioned, the need to industrialize Puerto Rico was considered vital by many. But to change an agricultural society into an industrial one was not a simple endeavor. It required time, technology, and investments. The obstacles against industrialization were multiple. There was a lack of raw materials on which the factories could depend and manufacture finished goods. Power resources were limited. The labor force was largely unskilled and hard to train. Once the workers were trained, there was a high degree of absenteeism because of the living standards. The new skilled workers were not easily convinced to increase their productivity in order to multiply their incomes. The reason for this was that the new salaries gave them a false feeling of affluence, and they lacked the desire to accrue savings. Credit, transportation, and rents were not cheap. Some manufacturing costs were even higher than in the States even although the Island had an enormous amount of cheap labor. Because Puerto Rico had a low living standard the local market was very limited to a number of industries that could be established. The mainland market was the only potential one that existed, but this was not important as an incentive to attract investors. There were also certain economic interests that were hostile to the development of local industries which could compete with their mainland operations. There was also some dislike toward corporations that were not locally based.47 Last, but not least, was the "alleged restlessness of labor" which held serious strikes to the economic detriment of the large industrial enterprises.48 The advertisement of the industrial advantages Puerto Rico had to offer—such as tax exemption—to the Continental investors had already been used, but with very little success. The Depression years would not hasten any local industrial development. That had to wait until the late 1940's.49

Another factor involved in the limited industrial growth was due to
the lack of mineral resources in Puerto Rico (principally manganese and copper); but they had no economic potentiality.50

The Puerto Rican economy continued depending on agriculture. The soil was moderately fertile, but production was subject to strong competition from other Caribbean countries. In spite of the fact that there was overpopulation, wages were higher in Puerto Rico than in the neighboring countries. Cuban sugar and tobacco, Brazilian, Colombian, and Central American coffee, and United Fruit Company and Florida plantations of tropical and semi-tropical fruits gave stiff competition to similar Insular agricultural products. Since the turn of the century, the Federal Department of Agriculture began to help improving the local agricultural conditions. In 1911 the Legislature had established the Board of Commissioners of Agriculture to further develop farming. The Department of Agriculture and Labor (1917) was of vital importance in scientific research, conserving natural resources, increasing the money-making export crops, and encouraging food production of local products which helped the small farmers. The land under cultivation increased from 21 percent in 1899 to 70 percent by the 1930's.51

There was the general belief that sugar latifundia was responsible for the limited production of food crops and the development of a prosperous class of small land farmers. Yet this was incorrect because the sugar cane lands were in the coastal areas where yeomanry had never been important. The farms had always been fairly large and had been used for cattle raising and not for minor crops. The most important factor in the small production of food crops was that it was not remunerative as was sugar cane growing. Even the small farms that the government had established in the fertile plains in order to encourage a yeomanry were planted with sugar cane instead of minor crops, vegetables or fruits.52 In 1898 there had been 60,933 farms with 50,753 owners. Out of approximately 2,198,400 acres Puerto Rico had, 1,979,474 were farm lands which had dwindled by 1929 into 52,985 farms and were owned by 43,101 persons and corporations.53 In 1917 there had been 477 persons, partnerships, and corporations that owned land over 500 acres which consisted of 26 percent of the cultivated land (some 537,193 acres). They also leased an additional 123,000 acres for a grand total of 37 percent of the lands under taxation. The average acre price was $143, as opposed to $53 per acre which was the local average price. These 477 holders controlled over 50 percent of the assessed capital land value in the Island. In 1930, these figures had not changed substantially. The rural farms were mostly small property.54
The low productivity of the Puerto Rican farmer and farm laborers was not due to its proverbial laziness. The laziness had mostly been caused by such diseases as uncinariasis which by 1930 decreased. The farmers and rural workers had shown that they worked as hard as any person in the States. The problem was that they were "ignorant and backward and difficult to educate in modern methods of cultivation." Since many were still illiterate, they could not be educated by printed materials. Everything had to be done by word of mouth. For this purpose the Department of Agriculture and Labor had established seven model farms which were visited annually by 3,000 farmers. There were also rural lectures and demonstrations by members of the Department; 20 to 30 tours of the model farms were organized yearly, and other related programs were in operation (seminal service for breeding, cattle tick extermination tanks). Still, much had to be done in the fields of rural credit, marketing, cooperatives, better farming organization, and management.56

Sugar cane had replaced coffee as the most important product. The acreage had increased from some 72,000 in 1899 (15 percent of the cultivated area) to 251,000 in 1929 (11.41 percent of the total area of Puerto Rico and 44 percent of the cultivated acreage). By 1938, it had increased to 318,000 acres. The 345 generally obsolete sugar mills had been reduced to 42 modern ones; ten of them were in the interior and the rest on the coast. The sugar industry now enjoyed the best of what contemporary technology had to offer. The sucrose content had increased from 1 ton to 3 1/2 tons per acre.57 The production figures (in tons) were the following: 1897, 63,546; 1917, 503,081 (Cuba's production: 3,386,566; World's production: 12,691,838); 1925, 660,003 (Cuba's production: 5,741,086; World's production: 17,802,776); 1929, 586,760 (Cuba's production: 5,775,073; World's production: 20,307,523); 1934, 1,103,822 (Cuba's production: 2,593,314; World's production: 18,324,996), and 1939, 851,969 (Cuba's production: 3,024,000; World's production 20,708,641). The crop for 1928 was valued at $54,579,020, that of 1929 at $35,224,038, that of 1937 $71,390,088, and the 1940 production was worth $57,328,790.58

The sugar industry was the most important force in the Insular economy. Most of it was located in the coastal regions making a green ring which dominated the life of most Puerto Ricans. The production cost of sugar was 2.54 cents per pound while in Cuba it was 1.33, in the Philippines 1.93, in Hawaii 2.54, and in Louisiana 3.77 cents.59 The
socio-economic results of this sugar economy had many similarities with the Cuban case so well described by Ramiro Guerra in Azúcar y población en las Antillas. Absentee ownership (50 percent American) controlled 58 percent of the sugar production. It is very important to note, however, that the absentee ownership of the sugar economy was less in Puerto Rico —a full fledged American colony— than in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The American owned sugar interests were concentrated in four corporations: South Porto Rico Sugar Company (1900), Central Aguirre Associates (1899), United Porto Rico Sugar Company (1926; became Eastern Sugar Associates in 1937), and Fajardo Sugar Company (1905). These large corporations also controlled the economic life of the towns where they were located. Puerto Ricans, however, did have some investments in these corporations.

South Porto Rico Sugar Company was established in the southwestern part of the Island where they operated the largest mill, Central Guánica. This mill imported sugar cane to be ground from the Dominican Republic (the average between 1927-1934 was 23 percent of the total output), where the same company had a large holding in La Romana. South Porto Rico owned 17,635 acres and leased or controlled 32,000 more acres. The Company assets were valued at $18,943,261 and produced 128,621.75 tons of sugar in 1932. Central Aguirre Associates operated three mills in the southern towns of Santa Isabel (Central Cortada), Salinas (Central Aguirre), and Guayama (Central Machete). Aguirre owned 22,269 acres and leased or controlled 17,000 additional acres. Its assets were estimated at $14,438,157 and produced 122,890.60 tons of sugar in 1932. United Porto Rico Sugar Company ran five mills in the districts of Humacao and Guayama. They were: Central Santa Juana and Central Defensa located in Caguas; Central Cayey, in Cayey; Central Pasto Viejo in Humacao; and Central Juncos in Juncos. These five mills possessed 28,843 acres and leased or controlled 15,187 extra acres. Their assets were valued at $16,635,713, and their sugar output was 110,388.23 tons in 1932. Fajardo Sugar Company had two mills: Central Fajardo and Central Canóvanas in Loíza. The acreage owned by Fajardo Sugar summed 25,741, and it leased or controlled 12,000 more acres. The assets were set at $13,621,279 with a sugar production in 1932 of 110,490.70. These four corporations produced 50 percent of the sugar cane production and owned 10 percent of the total wealth in Puerto Rico. Around 30 percent of the sugar produced by these mills was raised by colonos.
The remaining eight percent of the absentee sugar production was owned principally by Spaniards. These persons, however, resided on the Island, and most were married to Puerto Ricans. Rafael Martínez and associates owned Central Coloso (in Aguada) which in 1932 produced 35,970.00 tons. Central San José (in Río Piedras) and Central Constancia (in Toa Baja) were owned by José M. del Valle, Rafael Fabián and associates, and had a production in 1932 of 15,298.48 and 24,416.00 tons respectively. Manuel González (who had replaced Giorgetti as the richest man on the Island) and associates, was the owner of Central Carmen (in Vega Alta) and Central San Vicente (in Vega Baja) with a total production of 50,385.63 tons. There were also other mills such as Central Victoria in Carolina, Central Lafayette (French owned) in Arroyo, and Central Plata in San Sebastián. Some of these mills had also some Puerto Rican shareholders.63

There were 23 sugar mills owned by Puerto Ricans which had 42 percent of the production. The largest was Central Cambalache (in Arecibo) with a 40,809.50 ton production. The Roig family had two mills (Central El Ejemplo in Humacao and Central Roig in Yabucoa) with a total production of 46,712.78 tons. The Serrallés family produced 56,084.88 tons in their mills in Ponce (Central Mercedita) and in Juana Díaz (Central Boca Chica). Eduardo Giorgetti processed a total of 43,361.63 tons in his two mills (Central Los Caños in Arecibo and Central Plazuela in Barceloneta). Mario Mercado Montalvo's sugar production was of 24,251.14 in his Central Rufina at Guayanilla. All the above mentioned sugar tonnage constituted the production for 1932.64

Puerto Rican sugar production depended for survival on the Congressional tariff because production costs ranged (between 1913-1923) from one third higher to almost double those of Cuba. In regards to the application of the 500-acre law, the Brookings' report did not favor its enforcement because it would ruin the industry. Cooperative sugar mills owned by small growers were considered uneconomic. Brookings advocated regulation.65

There was only one sugar refinery. The Porto Rican-American Sugar Refining Company produced nearly a million bags of refined sugar a year and was owned by the South Porto Rico Sugar Company.66

Tobacco had become the second most important crop after sugar. It was planted on the mountainous regions, the most important centers being the towns of Comerío, San Lorenzo, and Cayey.67 In 1897 there had been 4,222 acres planted with a production of 6,255,953 pounds, but by
1921 the figures stood at 40,000 acres and 25,000,000 pounds. The Insular tobacco record production was in 1927 when 50,000,000 pounds (valued at $24,860,072) were raised in 81,900 acres. With the Depression, it went down to 6,000,000 pounds cultivated on 10,079 acres. By 1937 it had increased to 34,983,117 pounds planted on 50,000 acres; but it was reduced in 1940 to 32,262 acres with a production of 18,399,848 pounds. This increase in production was due greatly to government and modern technological methods. The American tobacco companies provided the necessary market for the increasing production. The tobacco farmers depended on the American companies or individual intermediaries in order to finance their crops. About 20 percent of the tobacco farmers were wealthy enough to finance themselves and deal directly with the tobacco companies. The remaining 80 percent were small farmers that depended upon middlemen or the companies.

Tobacco exportation consisted of: leaf tobacco (stemmed and unstemmed) locally grown; tobacco manufacturers; stemmed tobacco of Cuban origin; tobacco manufactures consisting in part of imported tobacco; and scrap, stems, etc. In 1899 some 100,000,000 cigars were produced, but only 100,000 were exported. The peak cigar year was 1920 when 321,000,000 were manufactured; but by 1929, the figure decreased to 64,000,000. As cigar smoking declined, the popularity of cigarettes augmented. The record figure was reached in 1920 with a production of 347,722,000 cigarettes. By 1926, cigarette manufacturing had dropped to 300,000,000 and would continue decreasing.

Tobacco planting did not suffer from the ills of latifundia. The agricultural production was in Insular hands, but this was not so with the industrial and commercial phases. These two were under absentee control. The Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company (established in 1899) was a powerful institution which yielded a similar influence in the tobacco business as the four large sugar absentee corporations did in the sugar cane trade. The company had eight factories in Puerto Rico (two in San Juan and six located in Bayamón, San Lorenzo, Manatí, Ceyey, Cidra, and Ponce), a box factory, a warehouse (both in San Juan), and two additional factories in the States (Tampa and Newark). The total value of the Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company (and subsidiaries) was close to $30,000,000 and dominated 80 to 85 percent of the tobacco business in Puerto Rico. The rest was controlled mostly by jobbers who opened temporary factories or gave small contracts to individual workers to manufacture cigars. Most cigars (75 percent), however, were machine made. In 1931 there were 103 tobacco stripping shops, 399 cigar making shops, and 3,427 tobacco workshops.
Coffee, the crop that had made Puerto Rico world famous by the end of the nineteenth century, had been demoted to third place in agricultural importance by 1930. The Puerto Rican coffee bean had been sold in Europe at prices that were double that of Colombia and more than duplicated the Brazilian bean. The valuable bean had never been popular in the United States where the cheapest varieties remained entrenched. The coffee export for 1897 had been 51,710,997 pounds. In 1899 there were 191,356 acres planted with coffee trees. By 1919 the acreage had increased to 193,561 acres which equalled 29 percent of the area under cultivation; but from there on, it began to decline and by 1929 it amounted to 169,491 acres. Coffee was characterized by its erratic production. These are the most important figures (in pounds): 1901, 12,157,240; 1915, 51,125,620 (all figures before 1920 are the amount of the coffee exported, total figures began to be kept in 1921); 1920-1921, 44,194,219 (26,731,648 exported); 1922-1923, 25,271,306 (16,821,939 exported); 1928-1929, 18,446,602 (1,278,666 exported); 1929-1930, 5,351,599 (433,901 exported); 1930-1931, 6,000,000 (1,978-359 exported); 1932-1933, 11,381,096 (549,839 exported); 1934-1935, 8,000,000 (799,950 exported); and 1939-1940, 23,498,000 (3,644,385 exported). Because coffee production decreased, it began to be imported (1927-1928, 1,205,823; 1928-1929, 4,864,974; 1929-1930, 9,832,458; 1930-1931, 6,338,230 pounds). Adjuntas, Lares, and Yauco were the leading coffee growing areas. There the coffee acreage was decreasing and being replaced by tobacco, sugar, and minor crops. Agricultural technology was poor. For example, the average yield per acre in Puerto Rico was 200 pounds while in Colombia it was 810 pounds. Besides that, the small coffee planters—the majority—had depended for credit on the Spanish merchants and money lenders to their detriment. With the establishment of the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank in 1924, the coffee growers began to get cheaper and larger loans which improved their precarious economic conditions. Coffee was the only crop not consumed in the United States. The buyers in 1926 for 18,961,009 pounds valued at $5,626,302 were the following: Germany, 25.35 percent; Cuba, 24.86 percent; Spain, 20.24 percent; Italy, 11.59 percent; the Low Countries, 7.44 percent; France, 3.54 percent; and Switzerland, 2.03 percent. Cuba used to consume close to 50 percent of the Puerto Rican coffee export, but imports decreased as the Orienté growers increased their production. The coffee processing in Puerto Rico was done in 13 mills and 23 torrefactions.
Fruit production in 1898 had been insignificant. Most of the fruit was for local consumption, and just some coconuts were exported. There were 5,290 acres planted with coconuts in 1899 and the 1901 export was valued at a mere $8,334. In 1928 the figure had increased to $713,992, and the acreage for 1929 was 12,052. The pineapple production had a similar growth. The fresh pineapple export was $1,654,188 and the canned one $1,159,175. The acreage in 1929 was 2,772. The grapefruit planting in 1929 covered 8,720 acres, and its exports were valued in 1928 at $2,704,310. Orange trees were grown in 1929 on 4,930 acres, and the 1928 export-crop amounted to $1,256,039. The development of the fruit industry was largely due to enterprising Continentals who had settled in Puerto Rico. Unlike most Puerto Rican farmers, they lived on their property. Therefore, the productivity was much higher. Most of these plantations were between 300 and 400 acres with the largest consisting of 674 acres and the smallest 51 acres. Corporations owned 10,183 acres of fruit plantations valued at $1,093,580. Absentee companies controlled 66 percent. Fruit was processed in nine canning factories and 78 fruit packers.\textsuperscript{73}

The acreage planted with minor crops decreased from 143,352 acres in 1899 to 118,661 acres in 1929. The principal crops were bananas (numerous varieties), sweet potatoes, corn, rice, beans, various tubers, and other garden vegetables. Most minor crops were planted in the mountainous regions. Sometimes some of these crops, like bananas, were planted together with the coffee trees. The production of minor crops was significantly less than what Puerto Rico consumed. The explanation given for this low productivity was that minor crops agriculture was not as remunerative as sugar cane, tobacco or coffee. It was claimed that there were about 400,000 acres of uncultivated land in the mountainous regions which could be developed agriculturally. During World War I, Governor Yager had appointed a food commission which increased the acreage of minor crops production from 137,000 in the autumn of 1917 to 335,000 by April 1918. The coffee and sugar cane acreage was not reduced significantly. Only some marginal tobacco lands were replanted with corn and vegetables.\textsuperscript{74}

The cattle industry had decreased. The figures for the pasture land are the most inaccurate. They apparently were reduced from 1,579,903 acres in 1899 to 1,517,329 acres in 1929. Fortunately, the livestock figures are more precise. They are the following: horses from 58,664 to 42,120; mules from 6,985 to 5,829; donkeys from 1,085 to 1,756; cattle from
260,225 to 296,235; sheep from 6,363 to 3,259; goats from 15,991 to 34,269; and pigs from 66,180 to 69,266. The number for domestic fowls went from 365,499 to 684,448. Dairying had progressed markedly especially in the areas close to San Juan.\textsuperscript{75}

The total wealth of Puerto Rico had increased from $100,000,000 in 1898 to $650,000,000 by 1928. Outsiders —mostly Continentals—controlled 20 percent of this wealth. Spanish property holders were mostly residents and were in the process of becoming bona fide Puerto Ricans through marriages and acculturation. Total absentee investment was valued at $176,000,000. Puerto Ricans had $30,000,000 invested abroad.\textsuperscript{76}

The 1930 census reported that 32.6 percent (503,805) persons of over 10 years old were gainfully employed. From that figure, 49.0 percent (378,003) were male and 16.3 percent (125,802) were female.\textsuperscript{77} But how do these employment figures compare with the situation in 1899? The information available is somewhat unclear, but must be used until more economic research is done. According to Gayer, Homan, and James, the "percentage of persons employed in Puerto Rico showed no tendency to decrease between the time of the American occupation and 1930... despite the rapid increase in population."\textsuperscript{78} The employment percentage they give for 1899 is 47.7 (314,695), and for 1930 is 46.1 (503,810); they give no consideration to the extent of cyclical unemployment or seasonal employment.\textsuperscript{79} Diffie gives the figure of 267,764 (83.0 percent) for the working force in 1899, and the unemployed numbered 54,803 (17.0 percent).\textsuperscript{80} But the Census of 1899 states that there were 316,365 (48.0 percent) employed persons over ten years old.\textsuperscript{81} For 1926 the employment figure given by Diffie is 338,876 (69.8 percent) and 146,461 (30.2 percent) unemployed.\textsuperscript{82} The Brookings report does not give an unemployment figure for 1929. The Commissioner of Agriculture estimated that not more than 37 percent of the working force was unemployed in 1929. Santiago Iglesias stated that in 1932 there were 400,000 unemployed.\textsuperscript{83}

Field workers numbered 209,902 (of which 7,921 were women); their wages varied according to the cultivated crop. The daily average for the sugar cane workers in 1926 was 75 cents and by 1934 it had increased to $1.00.\textsuperscript{84} Coffee plantation laborers earned in 1928 between 50 to 69 cents a day. The workers in the tobacco fields were paid between 50 to 79 cents per day while those on the fruit plantations made between 60 to 99 cents.\textsuperscript{85} Laborers —some of whom were children— generally worked 4
or 5 days a week. Annual earnings varied because many workers did not have year-round employment. The yearly average in the coffee and tobacco plantations was $135 while in the sugar and fruit fields it increased to $169. Laborers supplemented their monetary income with the wages earned by their wives and children from about $250 to $225. The family budget was also increased—variedly—by some vegetable gardening, share-cropping, and sharing with the landlord the products and profits of some livestock and fowl raising.86

Most of the laborers’ income was spent on food. They were being better fed than in 1899. The poverty that existed in 1929 was “not worse” than in 1899, notwithstanding the great increase in population.87

Skilled workers’ salaries were higher. They generally earned between $1 to $3 a day in 1928.88 With the depression salaries became erratic. Building trade wages ranged from $1.75 to $6.66 a day. Cigar factory salaries ranged from as low as 33 cents to $2.00 daily. But the common wages were $1.00, $1.50, and $1.75. The cigar and tobacco factories had a total of 15,508 workers (of whom 9,453 were women).89 The worst paid of the skilled workers were the women in the needle industry. In 1926 they numbered over 40,000 and many were girls. A large amount of these women and girls worked at home, and there was no legislation regulating their work until the 1930’s. Home workers received pitiful sweatshop salaries that went between 15 and 25 cents per day. In the factories the average wages ranged from 50 cents to $1.00.90

Rural laborers seldom owned the houses they lived in. They were generally tenants-at-will who paid no rent. Their occupancy right was the will of the landowner. Just over half of the rural population lived in houses with just one or two rooms. There were a few workers that owned their houses but not the lot where it was located. These laborers did not have to pay rent either, but they were still tenants-at-will. In 1899 most rural housing were improved Indian bohios. They were basically constructed of grass, palm leaves, and wood (or palm boards). The construction of these thatched huts had somewhat improved by the 1930’s. They varied in size from ten to twenty square feet, and the kitchen was still outside. Workers in the sugar plantations generally now had much better housing. The housing here was principally composed of board cabins with galvanized iron roofs or long tenements of frame construction. Temporary sugar workers were housed in large wooden barracks where 500 or more would sleep in one huge long room. This type of temporary housing was being improved by the 1930’s. A great number of the agricultural workers
houses virtually had no furniture. What they possessed were hammocks, wood boxes that served as chairs, and some benches. The kitchenware was mostly made from gourds, coconuts, and tin cans. Eight people were the average number of persons per house. There had been extreme cases of sixteen to twenty persons in some houses, but this was a temporary result of the housing shortage due to the 1928 hurricane.⁹¹

The houses of the urban workers were generally much better than those of the rural laborers. In 1898 houses had been just slightly better. The habits of the urban workers were still strongly rustic because 90 percent of them had been raised in the country. Old San Juan had its old colonial masonry tenements where apartments and rooms were rented out. Between 40 to 50 percent of the skilled workers owned houses. Some of these were three or four rooms modern suburban frame cottages. The irregular laborers and unskilled workers generally lived in hovels constructed with whatever materials were found. They were located in crowded and unsanitary areas which were rapidly becoming chaotic slums. The crime rate, however, was low. In San Juan, and some other cities and towns, special efforts had been made to increase housing developments so that working people could own homes. Rents were generally exorbitant in San Juan, but much lower in the rest of the Island. Teachers, salesmen, bureaucrats, and some professional men had houses, apartments, and standards of living comparable to similar persons in the States. The Insular per capita was $230.00, while that of Mississippi, the poorest state, was $1,242.⁹²

The general social attitudes and outlook on life of the workers — especially the rural majority — had changed since 1898. By 1930 the quasi-serf mentality was rapidly disappearing. This was due to several factors, among other things, the public school system, growing political consciousness, social and religious work of Catholic and Protestant missions, and labor unions.⁹³

Undoubtedly, one of the main contributing factors in the chronic unemployment conditions in the history of Puerto Rico has been its excessive population. But emigration had never been popular with Puerto Ricans. In 1900 several groups of emigrants were recruited to work in Hawaiian plantations. Some seven thousand left for Hawaii and stayed there; but emigration did not continue. Before World War I some small groups of field workers went to the Dominican Republic and Cuba and prospered there. In 1926 about fifteen hundred migrated to pick cotton in Arizona. But emigration had not been successful because Hawaii and
Cuba preferred cheaper and submissive emigrants from Asia or Jamaica and Haiti. St. Croix in the Virgin Islands had been a place where Puerto Ricans emigrated in considerable number (in proportion to the size of the Island) and stayed. Most of the Insular emigrants went to New York City. In 1927 there were some 23,543 living there with an additional 8,990 in the rest of the States. These figures do not include students and well-to-do Islanders. But by 1932, there were 115,000 Puerto Ricans in New York City. The migration boom would take place after World War II and during the 1950's.94

The Brookings report had some pertinent observations regarding the labor movement. During three decades it had become an important force, especially in politics. But the labor unions had "not been able to surmount the handicaps for an overcrowded labor market and the poverty of its members so as to win signal victories by direct action".95 Salaries had increased in unionized trades but not more than in non-organized jobs. The tobacco strikes of 1914 and 1926 had apparently caused the biggest tobacco corporation to transfer most of its factories to the States. Most strikes, nevertheless, represented an "impulsive resistance to some worsening of the conditions of the workers."96 The Socialist Party was growing and had enough power to influence public administration and the legislative process. This had produced the "enactment of a considerable body of laws for the protection of the workers and the promotion of their interests." The Bureau of Labor—which was "hampered by inadequate appropriations" legislated by the Unionists and the Alliance—and the Mediation and Conciliation Commission, plus other divisions, enforced the labor laws.97 Some of these statutes were "more progressive" than in several States.98 For Luis Araquistáin, then a well-known Spanish leftist, the Socialist Party was a "purely opportunist" organization, as was for him also the British Labor Party and the American Federation of Labor. Blacks, who formed a sizable part of the labor force and were prominent in the labor movement and the Socialist Party (and in Republican politics too), were in favor of the United States and did not want independence for Puerto Rico.99

With the establishment of the Department of Labor in 1930—to be discussed later—the labor conditions improved even further. The first seasonal labor contract (convenio) between the Free Federation and several sugar mills was made in 1932 with the United Porto Rican Sugar Company for 1932-1933. This contract served as a blue-print for future contracts that would cover the whole sugar industry by 1934 when a
convenio was signed by the Union of Agricultural Workers, an affiliate of the Free Federation, and the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico. These contracts were generally successful in eliminating serious strikes, improving working conditions, raising wages, etc.¹⁰⁰

Since 1898 a number of important professional associations had been established which played important roles in cultural, social, and economic development. The Ateneo, Bar Association, and Masons continued as before the American invasion. The Elks (1905), Y.M.C.A. (1910), Knights of Columbus (1911), and the Rotary Club (1918) began to function and grow. Lions International established their first club in Puerto Rico in 1936 and gradually spread over the Island. The Lions grew in prominence as the old casinos (both upper and artisan class) began a marked and irreversible decline. The Lions clubs became known for their civic activities and for the gradual democratization of Insular social life. The Medical Association of Porto Rico (1902), the Porto Rico Engineering Society (1904), and the Porto Rico Teacher's Association (1911) commenced their drive to improve their respective professions and raise the educational and scientific levels of Puerto Rico. In the economic field the three most important and influential organizations were the Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico (1899), the Association of Sugar Producers of Porto Rico (1909), and the Asociación de Agricultores de Puerto Rico (1924). The Chamber of Commerce was formed under the initiative of General Henry and came to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution in 1899 of the venerated Royal Economic Society of Friends of the Country (1813) and to consolidate other business associations there were then operating. Under the aegis of Eduardo Giorgetti, the Association of Sugar Producers had been formed. This was the powerful association which had great influence in the Insular economy and in politics. During World War I, as previously mentioned, its members had bought some 80 percent (8,000,000) of Liberty Bonds. The Asociación de Agricultores had the greatest membership and was thus very influential. They had been the backbone of the Fuerzas Vivas. The Asociación de Industriales de Puerto Rico began forming in 1928 but became formally organized in 1930. This group was made-up of the new entreprenurial class that began to replace the agricultural interests.¹⁰¹

Puerto Rico's annual income in 1928 was around $160,000,000. Insular and municipal taxes in 1898 had been $2,460,000 (almost half of it went for military and colonial ministry expenses) and had now increased to $17,920,000. The taxing system was considered high. The
public debt had risen from nothing to $44,349,000. Insular government expenses between 1928-1940 ranged as follows: 1928, $11,618,288.94; 1932, $12,305,597.09; 1933, $10,922,504.14; 1934, $13,861,362.81; 1938, $16,946,823.25; and 1940, $15,393,981.95. The expenses of the Federal Government in Puerto Rico for 1928 amounted to $2,712,000. This money was used for troop maintenance, veteran pensions and allowances, and the operation and maintenance of several departamental branches. Insular and municipal employees added to some 9,000. Almost half of them were teachers, one-quarter civil servants, 800 policemen, and the rest were mostly municipal employees. In 1928 this bureaucracy consumed 60 percent of the government expenditures. The civil service law was not a powerful one; therefore, most of the government employees belonged to the party in power (i.e., the Union of Puerto Rico and the Alliance). In 1932 there were 7,244 Insular government employees of whom 277 were Continentals. Of this total, only 198 belonged to the Socialist Party, 1,348 to the Republican Union Party, (the new name for the fusion of the Alliance and the puros) and the rest of the Liberal Party (the new name for the old Unionist Party). In the municipal governments most employees were removed whenever there was a political change. The civil service law to make appointments upon merit was not strong and was getting weaker by 1928.

Although Puerto Ricans in this period were facing severe problems, they were better-off than at the end of the nineteenth century. They ate and dressed better (shoe imports increased from 400,000 pairs in 1898 to 1,765,000 pairs in 1928), had improved housing, possessed a higher degree of education, received more government services, etc. By ordinary United States standards of living, Puerto Rico was quite poor; however, it was still higher than most Latin American countries and some areas in the Southern States.

The New York Stock Exchange crashed in October, 1929, plunging the United States into its deepest economic depression which soon became worldwide. This economic catastrophe soon engulfed Puerto Rico whose economic situation was already in shambles. Since September 19, 1928 the Island’s economy had been wrecked by a fateful hurricane that swept the country from one corner to the other. San Felipe hurricane was classified as the most violent, highest, and disastrous ever recorded. There had been previous storms which had caused higher death tolls, but due to modern communications (W.K.A.Q. Radio had began broadcasting in 1922), more people were informed and many safety precautions were taken in time.
Governor Towner sadly wrote in his yearly report that in all respects the history and record of the island had been seriously modified and changed by that occurrence. Socially, economically, politically, educationally, in their health and by its psychological influences its people have been greatly affected by that event.\textsuperscript{108}

San Felipe hurricane lasted 18 hours; its wind velocity was close to 200 miles per hour, and the rainfall was the heaviest on record (29.60 inches). The records are incomplete because the fury of the hurricane broke many of the corresponding measuring instruments. The effects of the storm were appalling. Parts of the Island looked like the World War I devastated areas of Belgium and France. Mountain sides looked as if a forest fire had swept-by, and the lowlands were flooded. Thousands of thatched huts were blown apart; 247,728 rooms were destroyed, and 192,444 suffered partial damage. Around half a million persons lost their homes, clothing, and stored food. Eighty to 90 percent of the coffee crop was lost (valued at $9,465,225); forty-nine percent of the coffee trees and fifty-nine percent of the shade trees were destroyed (amounting to $8,716,925). Over five years were needed to recuperate the coffee production (the coffee tree variety then planted took over five years to bear fruit). The loss of the sugar production was just $17,337,180 (thirty-two percent). Other losses were: tobacco, $1,974,114; citrus fruits, $2,713,866; coconuts, $1,650,829; and cotton, $43,000. There were also losses in minor crops, cattle, poultry, etc. The destruction of public works and property was high. Electric, telephone, and telegraph lines suffered great damages. Insular and municipal public work losses were valued at $1,940,257. Total material destruction was assessed at $85,312,120. The lost in human life was only 312, while there were 3,755 seriously wounded. This minimal loss of life was due to preventive measures taken before the storm and to the diligent work of the Department of Health. In contrast, the 1899 hurricane had had a death toll of 3,000.\textsuperscript{109}

The relief work done by the Red Cross was impressive. It distributed 1,500,000 food rations ($525,041.09), 505,500 garments ($186,000; some twenty percent was manufactured locally), 10,000 blankets, 5,000 cots, and truck loads of medical supplies ($70,000.36). The Red Cross also gave $1,383,122.42 in building materials. The agricultural program cost $693,878.33. In sum, the Red Cross spent $3,150,288.16.\textsuperscript{110}

As a result of this hurricane and the Wall Street crash, the Insular
economy plunged down as unemployment soared to sixty percent and wages were reduced. As if this socio-economic situation was not deplorable enough, on September 10, 1931 a small storm called San Nicolás passed by the north coast leaving two dead and only $200,000 worth of property damage. San Nicolás was simply a dress rehearsal for San Ciprián. This third hurricane struck the northern part of Puerto Rico on September 26, 1932. The wind velocity was over 120 miles per hour, but the rainfall was not excessive (16.60 inches). The number of houses and buildings destroyed totaled 56,810 while 51,501 suffered damages. Between 75,000 to 125,000 were left homeless. Sugar cane losses were valued at $11,553,000. Coffee plantations suffered because the young coffee trees and shade trees were too young to withstand the fury of the hurricane winds. The damage caused in these plantations was set at $3,742,000. The minor crops loss summed $1,666,000; tobacco, $751,000; coconuts, $704,000; cattle, $29,000; and bees, $7,000. Citrus fruits were hardest hit because they were located close to the cyclone’s path. The lost value (including pineapples) was $1,905,000. The number of animals killed were the following: horses, 777; cows, 3,402; goats, 5,054; pigs, 13,282; and poultry, 446,890. San Ciprián left 257 dead and 4,820 wounded. Total property lost was estimated at $40,000,000. But the worst damage to the economy was that it still had not recovered from San Felipe hurricane and the world depression had not ended. The important Banco Territorial y Agrícola closed a few days after San Ciprián, complicating still further the disastrous economic crisis.

After the damages caused by San Felipe were calculated, Iglesias wrote to William Green describing the local disastrous economic and social conditions. Green was requested to use his influence on Capitol Hill in order to persuade congressmen to cooperate with the Insular Legislature in solving the local economic problems. Governor Towner invited Senator Hiram Bingham and Representative Edgar R. Kiess, both of whom chaired the committees that dealt with Puerto Rico, to come to see for themselves the situation. The result was the creation of the Porto Rico Hurricane Relief Commission with $50,000 for administrative expenses and $6,000,000 to be spent in three years granting agricultural loans (not exceeding $25,000) to farmers. An additional $2,000,000 were appropriated to rebuild and repair schools and roads.

The Executive Council of the Free Federation submitted an exposition to Governor Towner and the Legislature—which now meet in a new marble capitol—on February 11, 1929. The document urged asking for
a congressional loan of $50,000,000 to be used for the following purposes: improvement of the educational system, especially with more trade, industrial, and agricultural schools; development of electric power and irrigation systems in order to increase food production and provide more jobs; industrial promotion to reduce unemployment and augment public revenues; full implementation of the Federal Homestead Act to provide small farmers with land grants and loans to raise their standard of living; to lower the loan interest rates; and reduce the Insular public debt. The Free Federation did not wish the "confiscation" of the land "exploiters." What was desired was regulation; only in cases of "absolute necessity" should property be expropriated, at reasonable prices and lawfully. The Free Federation further declared that they did not want a "war" against the interest groups which controlled the Insular economy. They just wanted changes and transformations in the "life of certain corporations" so that more remunerative jobs would be created. This document was later presented to Towner's successor in November.¹¹⁶

Based on this exposition, Iglesias and the Coalition senators presented a joint resolution in the Senate (Number 6 of February 14, 1929) in order to begin a socio-economic rehabilitation plan. Governor Towner strongly opposed this resolution and wrote to Secretary of War James W. Good attacking it because it was presented by "pure socialists" whose "success would mean the ruin of the Island."¹¹⁷ The bill was thus torpedoed.

President Herbert Hoover soon received a twelve page letter from Iglesias explaining the precarious local conditions and urging him to take some initiative in helping to remedy them.¹¹⁸

During the year Santiago Iglesias planned a trip to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Consul in San Juan informed Governor Towner that his government considered Iglesias persona non-grata due to his labor and socialist beliefs and because Iglesias was to be accompanied by the "most radical labor agitators" of Puerto Rico. The Consul added that Iglesias would be welcomed only if he came simply as an Insular senator and not as a labor leader. The trip did not materialize.¹¹⁹

A much weakened Alliance had re-elected (in February 1929) Barceló and Tous Soto to the Senate and the House of Representatives presidencies. The Alliance was somewhat similar to the Holy Trinity (one and three) because for electoral purposes it was one legal party (a fusion), but for everyday operations, it still functioned as two distinct parties (Unionist and Republicans). The Alliance never had a party president and
was supposed to function under an elected directory. But the Directory was impotent because the true leadership was in the hands of Barceló and Tous Soto. The problem was that this bicephalus leadership—as it generally happens when there are two commanding heads—did not function well after the pyrrhic victory of 1928, the internal fights began to brew and get out of control. The minority Republican wing wanted a real centralized party with a defined political program in order to deal better with the influences on the Fuerzas Vivas. The Fuerzas Vivas had Barceló under fire accusing him of leftist demagoguery which he wanted to use to control the masses and attract the Socialists.120

With the election of Herbert Hoover, the Towner administration was expected to end. Towner was old, ill, and the socio-economic situation in Puerto Rico demanded a new and a dynamic administrator. The Alliance leadership was apprehensive because the new resident of La Fortaleza might not give it the solid backing Towner had provided. The Alliance dominated Legislature passed a concurrent resolution asking President-elect Hoover to keep Towner as governor.121

The Alliance Directory met on July 20, 1929 to make plans for the internal and political reorganization that would take place on August 21. Barceló and Tous Soto had different plans and their rift began to grow wider. On August 17, Barceló called together a meeting of the Unionist members of the Directory. There the decision was taken to call together the old Central Junta of the Unionist Party and the Unionist members of the Directory. At this second meeting it was decided to convoke a general convention of the old Unionist Party for August 24. Leopoldo Figueroa, Jesús Benítez Castaño, Jenaro Cautiño, and two more voted against this measure. Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila also opposed Barceló’s plans and rapidly returned to Puerto Rico and presided over the scheduled Alliance Directory meeting of August 21. Three days later, the Unionists held their convention under Barceló. There it was voted to end the Alliance with the Republicans and re-organize the old Unionist Party. A platform similar to that of 1904 was adopted. The final status (independence, statehood or autonomy) for Puerto Rico would be decided in a plebiscite. Barceló was elected president. A new Central Junta was selected and, on August 29, it expelled Córdova Dávila, Cautiño, Benítez Castaño, and others from the Party. Now a number of separatists (both Nationalists and other assorted separatists who had rejected the Alliance for different reasons) began to return to the re-organized Unionist Party (such persons as Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, Miguel Benítez Flores, Alfonso
Lastra Charriz, Luis Lloréns Torres, José Coll Vidal, José S. Alegría, etc.). There were other Unionists who followed Córdova Dávila in the Alliance together with Tous Soto because they disliked Barceló's leadership. These men formed a varied group: some were separatists like Jesús Benítez Castaño; others were moderate separatists who would become stateholders like Rafael Cuevas Zequeira or would become autonomists like Epifanio Fernández Vanga and Francisco M. Zeno. Leopoldo Figueroa, Celestino Iriarte, and Victor Gutiérrez Ortiz were more active separatists who would become stateholders; and Córdova Dávila, and Cautiño had been pro-American Unionists. On August 31, Córdova Dávila presided over the Alliance convention in Mayagüez. Tous Soto and Córdova Dávila insisted in keeping the Alliance united and condemned Barceló's defection. As for the status, the convention also favored independence, statehood, or autonomy.\textsuperscript{122}

Some days later (September 5) the Insular Committee of the Alliance met and elected Rafael Cuevas Zequeira president of the Party and selected all other administrative officers. The Unionists declared that they would fight them. Barceló and Tous Soto now started a bitter and long journalistic polemic. Meanwhile, the members of the Coalition enjoyed the political brawl.\textsuperscript{123}

As these political controversies developed, Governor Towner resigned on September 26, 1929. The name of his successor had already been known for six months: Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Roosevelt was known in Puerto Rico since the days he served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Harding. As Assistant Secretary he had leased the small San Geronimo Castle to a local Continental for the incredible period of 999 years! (Three decades later the Government of Puerto Rico got the property back.) The son of the celebrated Rough Rider had presidential ambitions that had been badly bruised when he lost the 1928 New York gubernatorial race. With the election of Hoover, Roosevelt aspired to be Secretary of War, but was happy to accept the governorship of Puerto Rico. Córdova Dávila had backed this appointment.\textsuperscript{124}

Roosevelt threw himself with enormous enthusiasm into his new appointment. He read all he could on Puerto Rico and began learning Spanish in order to become bilingual and understand Puerto Rican culture. On October 2 the new governor landed in San Juan and delivered his inaugural speech in both languages. The speech avoided political problems and emphasized literature, art, Puerto Rican literature, and
socio-economic problems. He began to travel by car, horse, and airplane all over the Island—between October and January—in order to get a full understanding of the people and their problems. Roosevelt even ate and drank coffee in the bohíos with the jíbaros (hillbillies). He began to call himself the "jíbaro of La Fortaleza" to general public delight. The new governor soon became the most sympathetic American executive the Island had ever had.\textsuperscript{125}

1929 was also the year when Santiago Iglesias published the first volume of his \textit{Luchas emancipadoras}. He considered the work a chronicle, an autobiography or just narrations. Iglesias has been the first political personality who has published an autobiography in Puerto Rico. His purpose was to make known some important pages of history that had not been written and with which forthcoming generations should become familiarized.\textsuperscript{126} The original title was \textit{Crónicas de Puerto Rico}, but Bolívar Pagán convinced him that the title \textit{Luchas emancipadoras} would explain the content of the work much better.\textsuperscript{127} Volume one commenced with his childhood in Spain and goes up to 1910. The second volume was to have gone up to the 1930's. Unfortunately, Iglesias was only able to get as far as 1917. This other volume was published posthumously by his daughter Igualdad in 1962.\textsuperscript{128}

The work was received with mixed reactions. Reactionary elements paid Andrés Rodríguez Vera, a Unionist journalist and pseudo-labor leader who hated Iglesias, to answer Iglesias' book. On March 1930 Rodríguez Vera's \textit{El triunfo de la apostasia, comentando el libro de Santiago Iglesias Pantín} appeared. In 163 pages he tried to prove Iglesias wrong. Rodríguez Vera said that if \textit{Luchas emancipadoras} had a "literary flavor," it could be "elevated to the category of a novel," but that was not the case. Iglesias' book was merely a "SUSSAGE" carefully prepared to magnify his personality. "Passion" and "injustice" filled every chapter. The book was "unjust" because of its desire to "annul" the most important work accomplished in the development of the labor movement. The book almost "deified" Iglesias making himself an "apostle, a self-sacrificing martyr, a courageous pioneer, a great intellect, and a beating heart." Rodríguez Vera came to the conclusion that if the promised second volume was anything like the first, then it should be titled \textit{LUCHAS ESCLAVIZADORAS}.\textsuperscript{129}

The Free Federation held a convention on November 10-12, 1929. One hundred six unions were represented by fifty-six delegates. The main speaker was Governor Roosevelt who was warmly received. In his
speech he described the socio-economic problems the Island faced and how they could be solved by industrialization, something Iglesias and the Free Federation had always advocated.\textsuperscript{130}

As has been previously explained, the Alliance's pyrrhic victory in 1928 had terribly weakened it and lead Barceló to secede and begin reconstructing the old Unionist Party. The Alliance then reorganized itself under Cuevas Zequeira. As 1929 came to a close, no one knew how the legislative chambers would re-organize and what group would have the parliamentary majority. The political parties were in a unique state of flux; and the days of Barceló and Tous Soto as presidents of the respective chambers seemed to be drawing to an inevitable end. The Coalition was on its way up. According to the 1928 Socialist-\textit{puro} pact, a Coalitionist majority would give the Senate's presidency to the Socialist Party (the Socialists had more votes than the \textit{puros}). That was why Martínez Nadal had unsuccessfully nominated Iglesias to be the Senate's president in February, 1929. That had been unacceptable to the Alliance, when it was still united as well as when it had split between Barceló and Córdova Dávila. In order to prevent Iglesias from succeeding Barceló, Giorgetti, and Córdova Dávila tried to persuade Martínez Nadal to accept the upper chamber's presidency. Martínez Nadal roundly rejected the proposal and informed Giorgetti and Córdova Dávila to wait until Iglesias' return from Washington.\textsuperscript{131}

As soon as Iglesias arrived from his annual Washington trip as member of the American Federation of Labor and the Pan-American Federation of Labor, the Supreme United Council of the Coalition met (January 1, 1930) under Iglesias' chairmanship and agreed not to make any pacts with the Alliance or the Unionists. The political atmosphere began to grow tense as a result of the numerous informal meetings of the political leaders trying to form a new legislative majority. Cuevas Zequeira, Iglesias, and Martínez Nadal could not reach an agreement. On January 12, the Insular Committee of the Alliance called upon the Unionists to return to the fold in order to keep a legislative majority. The Unionist Central Junta rejected this offer (January 14). A few days later (January 20), the Unionists made an offer of possible legislative agreements with the Alliance on condition that Barceló would remain as the Senate's president. The Alliance rejected this proposal. By January 29, the Alliance and the Coalition were back at the conference table. Iglesias presented several legislative plans one of which would ask the Federal Government to lend Puerto Rico $100,000,000 to consolidate the Insular debt and make a program of public works, industrialization, and economic rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{132}
When the Legislature reconvened on February 10, 1930, no accord had been reached between the Alliance and the Coalition. In the House Tous Soto submitted his resignation, but no action was immediately taken. Barceló did the same in the Senate; it was accepted by fifteen senators (seven Coalitionists and eight from the Alliance—the six Republicans and ex-Unionists Francisco M. Zeno and Celestino Iriarte). Unionist senators Manuel A. Gandía Méndez, Juan Hernández López, and Coalitionist (puro) Senator Ramón G. Goyco voted against the resignation acceptance of Barceló, who abstained from voting. Senator Iriarte was the elected pro-tempore president. Martínez Nadal then proposed Iglesias for the presidency. Zeno followed by nominating Sánchez Morales. The ensuing balloting was a tie: eight Coalitionists for Iglesias, eight aliancistas in favor of Sánchez Morales, and three blank Unionist votes. This elective tie continued for seven subsequent ballotings as the political situation grew more critical. Martínez Nadal declared that he would not accept any agreement that would keep Tous Soto as Speaker. The political intrigue thickened. On February 16, a Unionist commission visited Iglesias to workout a compromise. This commission proposed to back Socialist Alonso Torres for Speaker if the Socialists voted Hernández López to head the Senate. Iglesias stated that he could not consider such a proposal without the participation of Martínez Nadal. The following day, the Unionist Central Junta decided to instruct their representatives to accept Tous Soto’s resignation. As a result (on February 18), twenty-seven representatives (the eighteen Coalitionists and nine of the fourteen Unionists) voted down Tous Soto. Ten Alliance representatives (five Republicans and five ex-Unionists) were the only backers the former Speaker had left. (Tous Soto abstained, and Representative Tizol had died the year before the totality of thirty-nine). The tie in the Senate continued. The Supreme United Council of the Coalition met the next day and instructed their legislators to vote freely in order to break the Senate’s tie and thus be able to reorganize the Legislature. A commission of the Alliance came to this meeting and invited the Coalition to form a legislative majority. The Coalition then formed a committee to work out a compromise with the Alliance. Finally, on February 19 the Coalition and the Alliance made an agreement by which they would cooperate until the 1932 elections. The new legislative majority would be known as the Good Government Group. On February 20, puro Manuel F. Rossy was voted Speaker with Rafael Alonso Torres as vice-president with nineteen votes (eighteen Coalitionists and one
from the Alliance; there were seventeen blank ballots from members of the Alliance and the Unionists plus two representatives were absent. The next day Luis Sánchez Morales was elected Senate president when he received eight votes. Iglesias got only seven votes and there were four blank ballots (belonging to Barceló, García Méndez, Hernández López and —rumor had it— Goyco). There was still strong opposition, or fear, to allow Socialist Iglesias to hold the highest Insular legislative post. But, after all, in the Good Government Group, the Alliance and the pueros had more votes together than the Socialists.

The Good Government Group majority, however, was still unsettled. On March 14 Unionist Representative Juan García Ducós asked that the presidency of the House be declared vacant. This was approved and Speaker Rossy was ousted. Then Tous Soto and Rossy were nominated for the presidency. Tous Soto received seventeen votes (Unionists, some aliancistas and two pueros) and Rossy obtained only fourteen votes. The Good Government Group leadership was furious over the defection of some of their men, especially the puro representatives. These two legislators had come under the strong influence of the followers of Tous Soto, and as a result, extreme pressure was to be applied in order to bring them back to the fold. Sánchez Morales declared that he would resign the Senate’s presidency if Rossy were not re-elected Speaker again. By March 19, the political crisis came to a close when Tous Soto resigned and Rossy returned to lead the House. From now on Tous Soto became a man without a party. The pueros never forgave him for all the political actions he had taken since 1924.

Governor Roosevelt was a most dynamic executive who did his best to improve the poor socio-economic Insular conditions by reporting them to Washington and to the National press. Since he was a Roosevelt, he was heard and given importance as no other previous governor or Puerto Rican political leader had been. The Cabinet appointments were favorably accepted by the Good Government Group except for the Public Instruction Commissioner (actually a presidential appointment, but he was recommended by Roosevelt). Juan B. Huyke was replaced by José Padín. The new commissioner de-emphasized the teaching of English in favor of Spanish. The pueros and the Socialists greatly disliked this change causing some political conflicts with the Governor. Roosevelt, was, nevertheless, able to get along well with most political leaders, especially with Iglesias and Córdova Dávila. He came to dislike Martínez Nadal and distrust Barceló and Todd. Regardless of the political controversies that
were always created, Governor Roosevelt's administration effected some socio-economic improvements. They were the following: federal funds were obtained to improve agricultural and trade education programs as well as health units in each town; establishment of a milk program for children; Federal laws beneficial to the economy were extended to Puerto Rico (like the Agricultural Marketing Act); a high sugar tariff was kept by Congress so that local sugar could compete better; tax laws were enforced on corporations and the rich; industrial promotion was stressed; and Puerto Rican cultural values were emphasized.\textsuperscript{135}

At the end of the 1920's, the separatist movement began to gain strength and have a strong influence on the political life in Puerto Rico as never before. The problem was that its strength would be divided between the Unionists and the Nationalists. The Nationalist Party had been founded in 1922 but had not been successful at the polls. With the re-activation of the Unionist Party in 1929, many prominent Nationalists, who had been Unionists, returned to the Party led by Barceló, which now included independence in the platform. Noticeable among these persons was José S. Alegría, founder and former president of the Nationalist Party. Antonio Ayuso Valdivieso, who had succeeded Alegría in the presidency in 1929, called a general Nationalist convention on May 11, 1930. At this convention, Barceló led a Unionist commission, Leopoldo Figueroa headed the Alliance, and Etienne Totti represented the pueros. The Socialist Party did not send anyone. Ayuso Valdivieso opened the meeting and then proceeded to resign because he was in disagreement with the procedures and tactics of the vice-president, Pedro Albizu Campos. Albizu Campos informed the convention of his two-year trip through Latin America propagandizing in favor of independence. His new political strategy was based on an aggressive and militant activism founded on a profound and bitter hostility toward the United States. Albizu Campos was a brilliant man with a dynamic personality. Since he was also a persuasive orator, Albizu Campos had begun to have a strong following among numerous youths and some intellectuals. His aggressive separatist rhetoric provoked a debate with José Coll y Cuchí, who rejected the new militant tactic. Coll y Cuchí argued that independence could be accomplished through legal and pacific methods. But the position of both men was irreconcilable; thus, Coll y Cuchí left the convention and the Party. The Nationalists then approved a new platform which demanded the immediate suppression of American colonialism and the establishment of a sovereign republic as soon as they could win an
electoral victory. They condemned the Free Federation and the Socialist Party because of their "Yankee origins." At the end of the convention, the Nationalist took an oath to defend their ideal by giving their lives if it were necessary in order to achieve independence for the fatherland. In spite of this militant activism, the Nationalists—at this time—were basing their independence strategy on democratic means and not by subversion or an armed struggle. But who was this new political personality who would be the most prominent defender of independence in the history of Puerto Rico after Ramón E. Betances?

Pedro Albizu Campos was born on June 29, 1893 in Ponce. He was the illegitimate son of merchant Alejandro Albizu Romero and a mulatta named Juliana Campos. Albizu Romero had lived in the United States several years during and after the Civil War; he was the one who had read General Miles' famous manifesto in Ponce. He later worked in the United States customs. There was a fine relationship between Albizu Romero and his son Pedro. Possessing a natural intelligence, Albizu Campos went to public schools and in 1912 graduated from Ponce High School. During his high school days his political ideals became known. They were then, however, "strongly pro-American" and not for independence. Albizu Campos, on the recommendation of school principal Charles H. Terry, was awarded a scholarship to study in the States over the class valedictorian because that student was a separatist. He went to the University of Vermont where he studied agricultural engineering for a year. Then Albizu Campos transferred to Harvard University where he became a chemistry major. During those years he was active in different intellectual activities and clubs. Albizu Campos became a well-known sympathizer and activist in the Irish nationalist movement. He received another scholarship from the Insular Legislature and entered Harvard Law School in 1916. World War I interrupted his legal studies, but he finally obtained his law degree from Harvard in 1923. On May 1917 Albizu Campos had begun a military course in Harvard which made him a Second Lieutenant of Infantry. He then personally went to Washington and voluntarily offered his services to General Mcintyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Albizu Campos was sent to Puerto Rico, did some more military training and was assigned to Infantry Regiment 375. This Regiment was formed of black and mulatto Puerto Ricans. The whites went to regiments 373 and 374. In March 1919 he was honorably discharged and made First Lieutenant of the Reserve Army. Some time during this period (1913-1923) he was discriminated against racially.
This discrimination is considered the cause of his future hate toward the United States.\textsuperscript{143} Albizu Campos began his official political career in January, 1923 when he joined the Unionist Party at a meeting in Ponce. There he condemned the Socialist Party because it advocated "class struggle" which divided the people. In regard to the Nationalist Party, he stated that it "pitifully divided the regional forces."\textsuperscript{144} At this period Albizu Campos believed that the Unionists should not make any deals with other parties. Puerto Rico should make its own constitution without breaking with the United States. He accepted the partial application that the Federal Constitution had on the Island. Albizu Campos also agreed that the Spanish American War, the American conquest of Puerto Rico, and all the acts of the government were constitutional. Statehood was for him a "suicide" for Puerto Rico and a "grave inconvenience" for the United States, but Congress could not reject this status because Puerto Ricans had the right to ask to join the Union. What he then favored for the Island was some form of autonomy, the associated free state status which was then advocated by the Unionist Party.\textsuperscript{145} When Barceló and Tous Soto published the famous Alliance manifesto on March, 1924, Albizu Campos favored it and considered that Tous Soto had made a "great sacrifice." He added, however, that the Alliance would lead to the formation of a Socialist and Republican coalition. In the United States, however, no tolerance for socialist parties or coalitions with them existed.\textsuperscript{146} By the time the Alliance was basically formed in April, Albizu Campos wrote to Barceló and offered him a plan which, among other things, wanted the Socialists to be invited to join the Alliance.\textsuperscript{147}

Soon after this letter, Albizu Campos grew absolutely disenchanted with the Alliance which would create —for him— a dictatorship of the plutocracy (the coalition was the "dictatorship of demogoguey"). He then joined the Nationalist Party.\textsuperscript{148} One explanation for this abrupt change was that Albizu Campos' desire to run for the Senate was rejected by the Alliance.\textsuperscript{149} Inside the Nationalist Party he soon grew in prominence and became vice-president. In 1927 Albizu Campos was sent to several Latin American countries to propagate the independence ideal. After visiting the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Peru (his wife was Peruvian), and Venezuela, he returned in January 1930 to Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{150} The Albizu Campos who returned was now a militant nationalist activist. Now he condemned the Spanish American War and declared that
the Treaty of Paris did not apply to Puerto Rico because the Island was then an autonomous entity, and its people had not been consulted when the sovereignty had been changed.\textsuperscript{151} It seems that his knowledge of history and international relations was somewhat deficient. But what was Albizu Campos’s political philosophy? Was he a leftist revolutionary as many think he was?

According to contemporary Marxist separatist José A. Lanuze Rolón, Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party were bourgeois who ignored class struggle and advocated the “impossible cooperation” between capital and labor. The Party was “romantic” and “sentimental” although it strongly attacked the United States. It was a traditionalist organization, Hispanophile, and Catholic.\textsuperscript{152} A similar evaluation is shared by a present-day man of letters, José Luis González. For González, a Marxist scholar, Albizu Campos was a conservative Hispanophile but not a fascist; but had he been a Spaniard, he would then have been a Carlist instead of a Falangist.\textsuperscript{153} For Gordon K. Lewis, a socialist political scientist and historian, Albizu Campos was sort of a crypto-fascist.\textsuperscript{154} But inside the Nationalist Party, there were some members with fascist sympathies.\textsuperscript{155} Nevertheless, the Nationalist leader is still highly esteemed by his followers. Thus, Rafael López Rosas states that Albizu Campos’ aim was to unite all Puerto Ricans to achieve independence. Once the republic was established, the people would decide what type of government they wanted for the Island.\textsuperscript{156}

Santiago Iglesias went to Washington in 1930 earlier to fulfill his duties with the Pan-American Federation of Labor, the American Federation of Labor, and lobby for Puerto Rico in Congress and in the Hoover Administration. The Island wanted “a square deal, not charity,” Iglesias stated in connection with Governor Roosevelt’s plea for $3,000,000 grant to be used fighting disease, poverty, and feeding hungry children. He believed that no governor or legislative majority could take the necessary steps to properly reconstruct the Island without generous congressional appropriations and strong presidential support.\textsuperscript{157} At the Boston convention (October 6-17) of the American Federation of Labor Iglesias and Prudencio Rivera Martínez received backing to get Congress to extend to Puerto Rico some Federal laws promoting vocational education and rehabilitation, the construction of rural roads, providing additional agricultural credit facilities, and other socio-economic legislation.\textsuperscript{158} During November and December Iglesias was active in Washington because Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila had presented some important
bills, one of them being the establishment of a Department of Labor.\(^{159}\) In the middle of December Iglesias declared at a senatorial hearing that all Insular political parties favored the creation of a separate Department of Labor because the Department of Agriculture and Labor could not handle so many problems. He also added that because eighty-five percent of the adult population was composed of workers, a Department of Labor would render invaluable public and social services to the large majority of the people as no other agency of the government could do. In order to prove his point further, he stated that for the fiscal year 1929-1930 the Department of Agriculture and Labor received a budget of $427,280.14. From this amount $373,861.44 was spent for the exclusive benefit of agriculture and landlords, and only $20,118.70 went to the Industrial Commission. The sum assigned for the workers’ benefit added to merely $33,300.00. The Department of Labor was a necessity.\(^{160}\) Governor Roosevelt also backed this new department which became a reality in 1931 and Prudencio Rivera Martínez was appointed its first commissioner.\(^{161}\) Before Iglesias returned to Puerto Rico, he wrote a memorandum to President Hoover mentioning the critical Insular situation. Puerto Ricans would “not be in need of national charity if economic and industrial fairness” had prevailed. Proper socio-economic reforms could not be carried out without solid presidential backing.\(^{162}\)

Governor Roosevelt came to have a very low esteem of Mayor Roberto H. Todd of San Juan. The members of the Coalition and a good number of the leadership of the Alliance were furious at Todd because he had joined forces with Barceló, reneged statehood, and became an autonomist (the pueros considered that highly reproachable). The city of San Juan was always considered a Republican bastion and the Good Government Group could not stand to see it in Unionist hands due to the political manoeuvres of Mayor Todd. As a result, in February 1931 a bill was introduced in the Legislature that the mayor of San Juan be called city manager and be selected by a nine member commission (five appointed by the governor and four popularly elected). After some legislative debates, the bill was approved, Todd ousted, and Jesús Benítez Castaño named city manager (this law would last four decades.)\(^{163}\)

Herbert Hoover was the second president who visited Puerto Rico. He landed in Ponce on March 23, 1931 for a three-day visit in order to familiarize himself better with the local problems with the future possibility of making political reforms. Hoover was somewhat preoccupied with the anti-American and separatist campaign that Barceló and Albizu
Campos were waging. The President traveled twice across the Island, visited San Juan, and delivered several speeches. Iglesias was part of the Reception Committee and presented President Hoover with a message from the Free Federation. Hoover asked Iglesias several political questions. One was how strong the idea of "secession" was in the "popular mind." Iglesias answered frankly that "only a small group composed of academicians—the so-called intellectuals, sentimentalists, and romantics—advocated the idea of secession, and that their influence was unimportant." On the question of who favored statehood, Iglesias affirmed that he was "glad to answer that the entire people of Porto Rico, without distinction of classes, would welcome the conversion of the Island" into a state of the Union "with immense joy and happiness." Iglesias added that Puerto Ricans "were aware of the difficulties at this time existing in the way of such a far-reaching national measure." Hoover asked Senate President Luis Sánchez Morales how strong the ideas of independence were. Sánchez Morales stated that the separatist ideas in actuality "were very minimal and in reality were nothing more than a sentimentalist expression that still hung over from the Spanish monarchical regime." Hoover in turn told Sánchez Morales that if there were not such separatist force in Puerto Rico, the push for independence would then come from the great economic interests of the West and the South who feared competition from Puerto Rican agricultural and manufacturing production. The visit helped Puerto Rico to be better known nationally, but no important changes took place. However, Hoover went so far as to ask Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila (when he was asking Hoover for his support for a bill giving full autonomy to the Island) if Puerto Rican people "would not be disposed to renounced United States citizenship." 

In April 1931 Iglesias was able to get the Legislature to approve a bill granting the right to vote to all women (only literate women were to be allowed to vote in the 1932 elections). Influencical conservative political leaders, approached Governor Roosevelt and convinced him not to sign the new law.

The Unionist Party was facing the difficult problem that because it had formed the Alliance in 1924, the name of the Party and its electoral symbol (the two united hands) now legally belonged to the Alliance and not to them. The Insular Department of Justice declared that the Unionist name and electoral symbol belonged to the Alliance Party and not to the Unionists. The Unionists went to the Insular Supreme Court to regain
their name and symbol. But on May 20, 1931, the Court ruled against them.168

Barceló then called for a general convention for June 6, 1931 in San Juan. There was now a great separatist enthusiasm among the Unionists, most especially among the principal leaders. After prolonged debates, the Unionists voted to eliminate autonomy and statehood from the Party platform. Independence was now the only status the Party would defend. Three days later, Barceló wrote to President Hoover explaining the recent changes. He told Hoover that lack of government reforms had destroyed their faith in the United States. Nevertheless, they did not harbor any enmity toward the United States and continued to admire the American democratic system.169

This new change in events caused great excitement among Puerto Rican separatists because both Unionists and Nationalists favored independence. Albizu Campos urged the Unionists to cease their collaboration with the United States, to renounce going to Fortaleza asking for government employment, and to demand immediate independence. But the separatist fervor among the Unionists was not as deep as that of the Nationalists, so not much did change. The autonomist Unionists were nevertheless confused; some retired from politics, others continued inside the Party trying to soft-pedal and decrease the separatism of the Unionist leadership. Among these autonomists were Eduardo Giorgetti, Jorge Bird Arias, Carmelo Martínez Acosta, and Mariano Abril. Abril condemned the intransigence of the Unionist separatists and claimed that 80 percent of the Party favored autonomy. Meanwhile, the Alliance leaders did their best to attract a small number of autonomist Unionists to their fold.170

Late in August (the 20th) Luis Muñoz Marín returned to San Juan. He had been living in New York intermittently since 1921 and now would stay to begin his active participation in the political arena. Muñoz Marín was still a convinced separatist with socialist ideas, but—as pragmatic as his father—he was not sure what party he would join. His relationship with Iglesias had never ceased completely. In 1926, when Muñoz Marín had been editor of La Democracia (an Alliance paper) he had given a speech at a Socialist rally attacking the Fuerzas Vivas.171 Thus Muñoz Marín’s dualism and pragmatism were well-known. In San Juan he promptly befriended Governor Roosevelt and visited the interior of the Island with him, even though Muñoz Marín considered himself a radical separatist.172 But having lived most of his life in Washington and New
York (he had been born in 1898 and moved to the States in 1910), Muñoz Marín was bilingual and bicultural. Furthermore, he was never an anti-American. The principal pen (a gold one) with which Woodrow Wilson had signed the Jones Act was personally delivered by Muñoz Marín to the White House. In a newspaper interview he called himself a nationalist, although he did not belong to the Nationalist Party nor any other party (i.e., the Unionist). Muñoz Marín rejected statehood and would continue being a nationalist even if Congress made Puerto Rico a state. In regards to the coming 1932 elections, Muñoz Marín declared that he would vote for the Unionist Party and for Albizu Campos. But what is more important—in the light of his future autonomic political beliefs from the mid-1940’s one—he absolutely condemned autonomy. Some years later, Muñoz Marín would become the first important Puerto Rican political leader of the 20th century, who would defend autonomy as a permanent and not as a transitory status. But having a possibilist political philosophy, this is all perfectly understandable.

Between September 1930 and September 1931, 23 local unions were organized and five were reorganized. The Twelfth Labor Congress was held in San Juan on September 2-4, 1931. The Congress represented some 25,000 workers—a loss of 6,000 since the Eleventh Congress in 1923—which were represented by 147 delegates from 133 unions (a drop of 26 since the previous congress). Governor Roosevelt led the group of distinguished guests who delivered speeches. The others were: Commissioner of Health Dr. Antonio Fernós Isern, Commissioner of Education Dr. José Padín, the President of the Industrial Commission Juan M. Marrero, Industrial Commissioner Francisco Paz Granela, the Chief of the Bureau of Commerce Rafael Ríos, and Santiago Iglesias. The Congress studied the Insular socio-economic problem and passed a resolution giving greater emphasis to labor education and organization.

The Mediation and Conciliation Commission had successfully continued solving labor conflicts since its establishment. In 1932 it intervened in forty-four cases that affected 4,306 men and 2,260 women. These workers were engaged in sugar cane planting, needlework, dock transportation, hat, and fertilizing manufacturing.

In the fall of 1931 the plans to effect a fusion between the Alliance and the pueros gradually began to gather strength. Commissions of both parties held separate caucuses to make their plans. These were endless consultations and conventions and no agreements were reached. In several towns Alliance and puro committees began to individually
proclaim the fusion of the two parties, while the leaders in San Juan could not reach an agreement by the end of December.\textsuperscript{179}

Theodore Roosevelt considered his tenure as governor as a political stepping stone. His national public exposure increased as a result of his many speeches and articles. Rumor had it that he could be Hoover's running-mate for 1932 or the Republican presidential candidate for 1936. By late 1931 the newspapers began to report that Roosevelt was being considered for governor of the Philippines. This was considered a higher stepping-stone for his political career. Besides, Roosevelt became pessimistic about Puerto Rico's economic problems and came to harbor "ugly American" sentiments about Puerto Ricans. It seems that young Roosevelt did not have the political stamina and brilliance of his father. In December 1931, he appointed Attorney General James R. Beverly as acting-governor and left for the States.\textsuperscript{180} He left claiming there was a $2,000,000 surplus in the Treasury, when actually there was a deficit of $5,000,000.\textsuperscript{181}

\section*{Notes}


3. Maximiliene Sorre and Fernando Ortiz; \textit{Geografia universal}, vol. XIX: \textit{Antillas} (Barcelona, Sp.: Montaner y Simón, S. A., 1936), p. 344. The section of Puerto Rico was the work of the eminent Cuban intellectual.


5. Diffie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 163.


8. Sorre and Ortiz, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 360-362.


19. Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 72-79. Sorre and Ortiz, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-353; Santiago Iglesias, “Politics and Elections,” 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. The enrollment of the Polytechnical Institute (now Inter American University) was provided by the President’s Office on a telephone interview on 22 April 1980. The one for Sacred Heart College (now Sacred Heart University) was provided by the Registrars Office on a telephone interview on 15 April 1980.


50. Sorre and Ortiz, *op. cit.*, p. 367; Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.
55. Ibid., pp. 500-501.
56. Ibid., pp. 501-514.
59. Gayer, Homan, and James, op. cit., pp. 60, 85.
60. Ramiro Guerra, Azúcar y población en las Antillas (Havana, Cuba: Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1970).
61. Sorre and Ortiz, op. cit., pp. 268, 199-205, 310. In Cuba 80 percent of the capital investment in sugar was American controlled by the early 1930’s. The Dominican Republic had 22 sugar mills in 1925. Of these, 12 were American, 2 were American and Dominican, 5 Italian, 1 Italian and Dominican, and 2 Dominican. The most important mills were also American owned.
64. Government of Puerto Rico, Fortieth Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico, p. 102. In 1992 there remained only four mills (Aguirre, Coloso, Mercedita, Plata, and Yabucoa). All four are managed by the Department of Agriculture since the mills were bought by the Government in 1969; most of the land, however, is privately owned and leased. The absentee corporations have ceased to exist.
67. Ibid., pp. 433, 675.


74. Clark, ed., op. cit., pp. 489-495; Diffie, op. cit., p. 78.

75. Diffie, op. cit., p. 79; Clark, ed., op. cit., pp. 494-495; Sanger, op. cit., p. 358; U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, p. 224. The acreage figures between 1899 and 1930 have certain discrepancies. The author has used those that appear most accurate. Personal experience, however, has shown that a farm that was supposed to have X amount of acres when it was bought in the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century had really Y amount of acres when it was accurate measured after the 1930’s. The acreage increased in some cases while it decreased in others.


78. Gayer, Homan, and James, op. cit., pp. 12,15.

79. Ibid.

80. Diffie, op. cit., p. 166.

81. Sanger, op. cit., p. 89.

82. Diffie, op. cit., p. 166.


87. Ibid., pp. 31-39; Diffie, op. cit., pp. 166-169.

88. Gayer, Homan, and James, op. cit., p. 4.


94. *Ibid.*, pp. 515-520; Sorre and Ortíz, *op. cit.*, p. 345; Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131; Santiago Iglesias to James R. Beverly, 27 January 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. The great migration was discreetly propelled by the Popular Democratic Party in order to improve local economic conditions. By 1980 there were over two million Islanders in the States. New York City had more than half of that. Since Puerto Rico had 3.2 million, it is frightening to think what would have happened to the famous Operation Bootstrap if all Puerto Ricans had remained on the Island, as was the case in the 1930's. After all, in the 1970's, 60 percent of all families were below the Continental American poverty level. That is why some 60 percent of the people qualify for Federal food stamps to the tune of $3 billions in an economy with a G.N.P. of over $7 billions.


99. Luis Araquistáin, *La agonía antillana* (Madrid, Sp.: Espasa Calpe, S. A., 1928), pp. 67, 70. Araquistáin visited the Caribbean Islands in 1926-1927 and wrote his famous book which Machado prohibited in Cuba. He dedicated the book to Cayetano Coll y Cuchi whose political affiliations changed many times. Coll y Cuchi was first a Republican and was later a Unionist, a Liberal, a Socialist, and a Popular.


103. See annual reports of the governors, 1928, p. 29; 1932, p. 64; 1933, p. 90; 1934, p. 43; 1938, p. 70; 1940, p. 75. The budget for 1979 was over $5 billions.

105. Ibid., pp. 328-329, 332, 340; Santiago Iglesias, "Politics and Elections," 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. The Insular bureaucracy in 1979 numbered approximately 40 percent of a working force of one million. From that 40 percent, about one-fourth are employed in the public corporations such as the two telephone companies, the electric company, the shipping company, etc.


109. Ibid., pp. 2-7; Saliva, op. cit., pp. 287-293; Cruz Roja Americana, El ciclón que azotó a Puerto Rico, septiembre 13 de 1928 (San Juan, P. R.: Negociado de Materiales, Imprenta y Transporte, 1929), p. 3; American National Red Cross, "West Indies Hurricane Relief Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands" (Mimeograph, 1929), pp. 3, 38.


113. Ibid., pp. 300-305; José Padín to James R. Beverly, 10 November 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Edmundo D. Colón to James R. Beverly, 14 October 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; James R. Beverly to Santiago Iglesias, 16 November 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

114. Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 30 November 1928, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


117. Horace M. Towner to James W. Good, April 4, 1929, National Archives, War Department Record Group No. 350, File 28465.

118. Santiago Iglesias to Herbert Hoover, 12 March 1929, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

119. Quoted in Clarence Senior, Santiago Iglesias, apóstol de los trabajadores (San Juan, P. R.: Editorial de la Universidad Interamericana, 1972), pp. 81-82.

121. Ibid; Clark, op. cit., p. 133.
123. Ibid., pp. 323-324.
129. Interview with Juan Carreras, 10 July 1967; Andrés Rodríguez Vera, El triunfo de la apostasía, comentando el libro de Santiago Iglesias Pantín (San Juan, P. R.: Tipografía La Democracia, 1930), pp. 4-5, 7, 163.
130. "Convención especial de la Federación Libre de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico," Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
134. Tous Rodríguez, op. cit., pp. 122-123; Rigual, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 394-395; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. I, p. 328. Further information on this parliamentary crisis was given to me on May 18, 1978 by a more knowledgeable person who is an authority on legislative matters and prefers to remain anonymous.
140. Interview with J. Benjamín Torres, San Juan, P. R., 28 May 1981.
141. *The San Juan Star*, 11 October 1976, p. 17. This is a letter written by Dr. Luis R. Soltero Harrington whose father Augusto R. Soltero, was a classmate and friend of Albizu Campos. Augusto Soltero was the valedictorian of the high school class and Albizu Campos was the second honor. Augusto Soltero was then an ardent separatist who later would become a statehooder.


145. Ibid., pp. 16-22.

146. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

147. Ibid., pp. 25-27.

148. Ibid., pp. 29-31.


159. Santiago Iglesias to Félix Córdova Dávila, 28 November 1930, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
160. “Vistas ante el Comité de Territorios y Asuntos Insulares del Senado,” 18 December 1930, Archive of Iguáldad Iglesias de Pagán.

161. Clark, op. cit., p. 139; Combas Guerra, op. cit., p. 62; Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 28 April 1931, Archive of Iguáldad Iglesias de Pagán.

162. Memorandum of Senator Santiago Iglesias for the President, Archive of Iguáldad Iglesias de Pagán.


164. Clark, op. cit., p. 143; Rígual, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 18-20; Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 28 April 1931, Archive of Iguáldad Iglesias de Pagán.


166. Ibid.


173. La Democracia, 3 March 1917, p. 1.


178. Ibid.


180. Clark, op. cit., pp. 143-149; Quiñones Rodríguez, op. cit., p. 185.

181. Todd, Desfile de gobernadores de Puerto Rico 1898-1943, pp. 163-164.
After the Labor Day activities, Santiago Iglesias began preparations and left for New York en route to attend the fifty-first convention of the American Federation of Labor to be held in Vancouver, British Columbia, from October 5 to 15, 1931. He informed the delegates, that a number of labor laws had been approved by Congress since the previous convention in spite of the opposition of some Insular and Continental reactionary elements. The most prominent accomplishment was the establishment of the Department of Labor. Other laws legislated and signed by President Hoover included: furthering vocational education and rehabilitation; opening of more agricultural experimental stations; extension work between the agricultural cooperatives and schools that taught agricultural courses; and economic relief legislation. The support of the American Federation of Labor had been indispensable. Iglesias declared that his $100,000,000 economic rehabilitation plan presented to Congress and President Hoover amounted to not more than the total goods normally purchased yearly from the United States and close to half of the Insular commerce. The profit these transactions generated went mostly to the States and created revenues for the Federal and State treasuries. The economic well-being of Puerto Rico was thus profitable for American business and government. Iglesias presented Resolution No. 4 (the $100,000,000 plan) for the economic rehabilitation of the Island. This was approved by the Convention, and President Green was to lobby on Capitol Hill and at the White House for its approval.¹

From Canada Iglesias proceeded to Washington to attend to his duties in the American Federation of Labor, the Pan-American Federation of Labor, Congress, and the different Federal offices. For some time he had not been feeling well, and so he went to Georgetown University
Hospital for a medical examination. After some testing, he underwent three delicate operations. In one of them a tumor was removed. He spent twenty-five days of "successive torments." The worst part for Iglesias was that he was far from home during the holidays and became very depressed. Fortunately, his daughters América and Libertad were working in Washington and tried making those four weeks less miserable. Doña Justa, his wife, also came to Washington to comfort him. After that period, he spent a week and a half in convalescence before returning to San Juan at the end of January.

With the promotion of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. to be governor of the Philippine Islands, President Hoover decided to make Attorney General James R. Beverly Governor of Puerto Rico (January 25, 1932). Beverly was a thirty-six-year-old Texan lawyer. After graduation from the University of Texas, he had taught economics for two years. Beverly came to Puerto Rico in 1925 to serve as legal advisor to the Public Service Commission. Later he was promoted to the Department of Justice and was named Attorney General by President Hoover in May 1928. Administratively Governor Beverly followed socio-economic policies similar to Roosevelt's. The main difference was that Beverly did not have the national impact and influence in Washington his predecessor had had.

As soon as Iglesias was informed of Beverly's designation, he wrote to him reporting the results of a two-month fact-finding study former Governor Roosevelt had commissioned the previous September. The study dealt with the measures being taken to relieve unemployment in the States with a view on how they could be applied in Puerto Rico. The conditions of Puerto Ricans in New York City were examined, and prospective programs were discussed for establishment to improve their socio-economic situation. The public and voluntary relief measures taken so far in the States had been based on charity, and only the New York Legislature had granted $20,000,000 for helping the unemployed. These types of programs could not be extended to the Island. The Hoover Administration was beginning to take steps to get Congressional legislation for unemployment relief and economic reconstruction. Iglesias believed that only socio-economic legislation approved by the President should and could be extended to Puerto Rico. In order to accomplish this, the Governor and the Legislature should take the necessary steps to petition Congress and the White House. The American Federation of Labor had already backed these plans of Iglesias.

In regard to the conditions of New York Puerto Ricans, Iglesias met
with twelve political, religious, labor and civic organizations, and several
well informed persons. The problem was that Puerto Ricans were mostly
very poor, uneducated (few knew English), lacking working skills, and
were discriminated against. As a result of the Depression, their situation
was made even more difficult. In order to improve the socio-economic
and cultural conditions of these fellow citizens, Iglesias suggested that
the Governor should recommend to the Insular Legislature that the
Employment Office of New York (which was run by the Puerto Rican
Government) be expanded so that it could give more services. However,
Iglesias did not make more recommendations because these had to come
from the New York Puerto Ricans and the New York government
authorities. Furthermore, more funds, studies, and plans had to be
provided before he could make his final suggestions. 6

Santiago Iglesias returned with his wife to San Juan on February
1, 1932. Of all the innumerable return trips he had taken, none had given
him more cause to rejoice and greater satisfaction than this last one. His
illness and surgery had given him a deep desire to return to Puerto Rico
and see his family and friends. 7 For the upcoming legislative session,
Senator Iglesias planned to get backing to urge the President and
Congress to include Puerto Rico in their socio-economic rehabilitation
laws as he had done in the American Federation of Labor Convention. 8
The reason behind Iglesias persistent insistence on asking for Federal
funds was that Puerto Rico was near bankruptcy. The Government was
facing a deficit for fiscal year 1932-1933. Expenses were estimated at
around $11,000,000 while the income was expected to be $10,250,000.
The economic conditions for that year deteriorated to such a degree that
the salaries of the Insular Government employees were reduced by
between 5 to 15 percent. 9

Governor Beverly opened the Legislature on February 9. He in-
formed its members of the critical economic situation and the necessity
of getting the Island included in the Federal plans for socio-economic
rehabilitation. Among the legislation Beverly proposed were: adoption of
a flag for Puerto Rico; a birth control program; and amendment of the
electoral law.

The flag bill was a very controversial one. It was submitted by
Senator Celestino Iriarte and the non-Socialist members of the Coalition.
The bill proposed that the Puerto Rican flag—which was then considered
a symbol of independence and was used as a party emblem by the
Nationalists—be made official and not be used as an electoral emblem
or by any particular group exclusively. The Nationalists became indignant and Albizu Campos gave a public speech condemning the bill because it was taking away from them their patriotic political and electoral symbol. He urged the Nationalists to protest. Some seventy-five marched to the Capitol in a most exalted spirit. As they were going up the staircase to the Senate gallery, the rail broke. One Nationalist was killed and several wounded. Tension increased. After a heated debate in the Senate, the flag bill was approved. Socialist senators Iglesias and Burset, as well as Barceló, Hernández López, and García Méndez, voted against it. The bill, however, was to die in the House. Two more decades would pass before the Puerto Rican flag became an official symbol as Senator Iriarte had proposed.

One of Governor Beverly's plan was to raise the local living standards by developing a birth control program. The birth rate was alarmingly high while the death rate was declining. A bill was introduced in the House to establish neo-malthusian clinics, as they were then called. Strong opposition came from Catholics, including the powerful American Catholic Alumni Federation, and Nationalists, who believed this to be part of an American genocidal plan to exterminate Puerto Ricans. The bill passed in the House after three ballots, but thereafter died in a drawer of the senatorial committee to which it was referred.

The move to have Puerto Rico included in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act (approved on January 22, 1932) was not to be successful either. Beverly complained that Córdova Dávila had failed in not having the Island included. Iglesias introduced a motion in the Senate to cable the President to ask for his support in this measure. After a debate, the wording of the cable was approved and passed by the House. Beverly also urged Hoover to change the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act to include Puerto Rico. The Resident Commissioner also introduced a bill in the House for the same purpose. Another similar bill was submitted to the Senate. After so much struggle, both bills died in committees.

The fusion plans between the Alliance led by Rafael Cuevas Zequeira and the puros headed by Rafael Martínez Nadal finally began to solidify by the middle of January 1932. José Tous Soto was against it. He wanted the Alliance to make an understanding with Barceló. On the 20th both parties held simultaneous meetings in San Juan. After marathonic consultations by several successive fusion committees, the agreement was reached in the early hours of the following day when the new political entity was agreed upon: Republican Union Party (Partido Unión
Republicana). As a result of the fusion, the Republican Union Party automatically was electorally recognized as a principal party because it legally inherited all the rights of the Alliance plus those of the Historical Constitutional Party. Thus, its electoral symbols were an eagle, two joined hands, and an elephant. Its platform rejected the present colonial government and asked for statehood, but, if that status was denied by Congress, independence would then be sought. An autonomous form of government was accepted only as a transitory measure. The Republican Union Party asked for an elected governor with powers to select his cabinet which would have to be approved by the Insular Senate. If Congress did not permit an elected governor, the appointed governor should have been a local resident for at least ten years. The members of his cabinet should also have been residents for a period of no less than five years. The Insular Legislative should have its powers broadened. Socio-economic Federal legislation ought to be extended to Puerto Rico. The educational system should be strengthened. The socio-economic program asked for a tax reform, the application of the 500-acre law, development of cooperatives, derogation of prohibition, and tariff protection for leading products. It proposed to help raise living standards of the working classes through social legislation, such as workers indemnization, social security, better housing, health programs, and working regulations.

The reason why the Republican Union Party had independence on its platform was that some members that came from the Unionist wing of the Alliance had been separatists and now were in the process of becoming stateholders. The separatist clause was called "the bridge of dignity" because independence was considered as a necessary honorable alternative to colonialism in case statehood should be denied by Congress after several petitions. Many pueros were vehemently opposed to this independence clause, and that was one of the main reasons why the fusion negotiations took so long. These former separatists were men like Celestino Iriarte, Leopoldo Figueroa, and Rafael Cuevas Zequeira.

One important person that did not join the Republican Union Party was José Tous Soto. The ideological reason was that he had ceased to believe in statehood and had become an autonomist. Statehood for Tous Soto had become an "absurdity" and an "anacronism." What he favored now was his plan for an associated free state with a constitutional amendment to the American Constitution. The type of autonomy he advocated was inspired in the British models of Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and South Africa.
What kind of man was the president of the Republican Union Party who together with Santiago Iglesias played such an important historical role between 1920-1940? Rafael Martínez Nadal had been born in Mayagüez on April 22, 1877, into a wealthy family. After attending local schools, he was sent to Barcelona in 1893 to attend the University. Martínez Nadal studied law for two years, but a conflict with a Carlist professor decided him to drop out. He then proceeded to Paris for two years where he studied business and French while enjoying La Belle Époque to the hilt. Later the young gentleman returned to Barcelona and continued more years of an elegant bohemian life. His inheritance (some $200,000) began to decrease alarmingly, so Martínez Nadal began a coffee importing business from Puerto Rico, which ultimately he had to discontinue. He then became a bullfighter manager, but went bankrupt. With only $3.75 in his pocket, he returned to Mayagüez in 1904. Martínez Nadal now began working as a farm manager (first coffee, then sugar cane). By now he had become interested in politics and joined the party of Barbosa in 1904. Martínez Nadal ran for a seat in the House of Delegates unsuccessfully in 1908 and 1910. He gave up farming for literature (writing short stories, a novel, essays); the theater (acting, translating, prompting, and traveling to the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Venezuela with different well known companies); and journalism. Martínez Nadal began studying law again (a correspondence course), passed the bar examination (1913), and worked at Tous Soto’s law office in Ponce for some time. In criminal and civil law he became famous, but was never a corporation lawyer. He continued active in the Republican Party, and was finally elected delegate in 1914. As a sportsman, Martínez Nadal had won a bicycle medal in Barcelona, loved jai-alai, boxing, baseball, and had a passion for cock-fights (then an illegal sport!) He was truly a renaissance man with a daring temperament.18

Soon after the death of Barbosa (1921), Martínez Nadal became the most prominent statehood leader and so he remained until his death in 1941. Throughout his life he was a staunch believer in statehood for Puerto Rico. Martínez Nadal had a profound admiration for the democratic principles and political institutions of the United States. As a federal state, the Island would progress politically, socially, and economically.19 The Americanization he favored was not “adulation, unconditional surrender, and a desire of political slavery,” but rather a devotion to a democratic system which gave freedom and happiness to its citizens.20 Even though Martínez Nadal was such a convinced political assimilist, he was not a cultural assimilist. It is difficult to find a Puerto
Rican political leader more criollo than him. Culturally he was educated in the Spanish system, spoke French, but was never fluent in English. Martínez Nadal was a supporter of Puerto Rican culture, customs, traditions, and there was not in him a "single trace of yanquismo." Nevertheless, he was a firm advocate of bilingualism. English should be taught well — without weakening Spanish — so that Puerto Ricans would master both. The mastering of English was not an obstacle, but a means of defense and progress. Puerto Ricans would thus become the best prepared people in the Hemisphere. Martínez Nadal did not believe that a knowledge of English would corrupt Spanish in Puerto Rico and cause it to disappear. To further improve Puerto Rican culture, local artists should be given scholarships to study in Europe so that the Island would figure well with the civilized countries of the world.

Even before the formation of the Republican Union Party had definitely concluded (February 15), a movement started to make a new coalition with the Socialists for the upcoming elections. Martínez Nadal was the first prominent leader to favor a new pact which would lead the Coalition to victory in November. Soon other leaders also joined the movement. Iglesias declared that the coalition with the pueros would continue until May 1932 (as it had been agreed to in 1928) and that the new pact would be definitely decided upon at the Socialist convention. Nevertheless, he was favorable to a new coalition because it was a historical necessity, and he pointed out that in France, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, and even in the United States similar political situations were taking place. Other Socialists also wanted a new pact. There were some, however, that desired that the Party go alone to the elections.

The Republican Union Territorial Central Committee met on February 29 and authorized Martínez Nadal to initiate conferences with the Socialist Party to form a free electoral pact for the November elections. As a result, the Republican Union President wrote to Iglesias, and the new coalition negotiations officially began. The Territorial Executive Committee of the Socialist Party met on March 5 and appointed a five member commission headed by Iglesias to start coalition negotiations with the Republican Union Party. This party in turn selected a seven member commission directed by Luis Sánchez Morales.

Resident Commissioner Félix Córdova Dávila had returned on February 22 to San Juan. For some time he had been thinking of resigning in order to be appointed associate justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. Governor Beverly enthusiastically recommended this nomination to President Hoover.
Iglesias declared that the Socialist Party had several candidates for the post of resident commissioner which Córdova Dávila was resigning. The Socialists, however, had not made any decision because they had not had an opportunity to select candidates and, furthermore, it was the Party's convention which had to suggest candidates for resident commissioner.28

Some time around this period—no precise date is remembered—Luis Muñoz Marín called on Iglesias at his residence. The reason for this midafternoon visit was that Muñoz Marín wanted Iglesias to push his candidacy for resident commissioner in the Socialist Party. The surprised Iglesias told Muñoz Marín, who had been absent from Puerto Rico for a long time and, furthermore, been inactive in the Socialist Party, that he could not impose Muñoz Marín's candidacy on the Republican Union Party. Nevertheless, Iglesias offered Muñoz Marín an opportunity to run as a senator or representative on the Socialist ticket. They talked at length on Insular politics, had supper, and then Muñoz Marín left by 10:00 P.M. when two friends picked him up.29

To substitute for Córdova Dávila in Congress, the first candidate to be proposed was José L. Pesquera. He was the well known president of the powerful Asociación de Agricultores de Puerto Rico, had been a Republican in the Alliance, and was now a member of the Republican Union Party. Pesquera received the backing of the influential League of Civic, Economic, and Social Affairs which urged the Republican Union Party to back his candidacy. Governor Beverly soon began to receive telegrams backing Pesquera.30 The Puerto Rico Industrial Association backed Rafael Ríos, Chief of the Bureau of Commerce and Industries.31

With Córdova Dávila's appointment to the Supreme Court on March 3, more names began to circulate (Cuevas Zequeira, Barceló, and Iglesias).32 Iglesias, because of his well known familiarity with Washington, was a most logical candidate. He soon received the backing of Bolívar Pagán (vice-president of the Party) and Socialist Senator Moisés Echevarría.33 Backing from the rest of the Party soon followed.34 A commission was formed which submitted Iglesias' candidacy for resident commissioner to Governor Beverly.35

Opposition to Iglesias' candidacy soon arose. The attacks were similar to those he had been subject to for three decades. The principal objection was that Iglesias was not Puerto Rican. No importance was given to the fact that he had lived on the Island since 1896, had married a Puerto Rican and had eleven Puerto Rican children, had defended the
working class as no one else had, knew the socio-economic problems of the Island completely, and was familiar with Washington.36

Since Córdova Dávila had been elected on the Alliance ticket, the members of the Republican Union Party considered that the post of resident commissioner belonged to them and not to the Socialists (who ran their candidate in 1928). Martínez Nadal did not want to make comments regarding the post until the Territorial Central Committee had reached an agreement. Pesquera and Cuevas Zequeira were both receiving support from different local party committees.37 By April the name of Republican-Unionist Senator Juan B. Soto was also being considered. Finally, the Republican Union Party submitted its three preferences to Governor Beverly: Rafael Cuevas Zequeira, Juan B. Soto, and José L. Pesquera. Cuevas Zequeira then withdrew his name from the preference list. On April 14, Governor Beverly appointed José L. Pesquera resident commissioner.38 It seemed that the influence of the Asociación de Agricultores had had more influence on the Governor's mind than the preference of the Republican Union or the Socialist leadership.39

When Luis Muñoz Marín had returned to San Juan in August 1931, he was politically independent, pragmatic, and flexible—even though he had socialist and separatist ideals. He had befriended Governor Roosevelt and wrote articles praising his administration. Having wanted Iglesias to attempt a political agreement, Muñoz Marín also visited Albizu Campos. Finally he reached an understanding with Barceló. Although the party that Barceló led was not radical at all, Muñoz Marín hoped to transform it into an instrument of his political ideals.40

For a long time Antonio R. Barceló had been trying to reorganize the old Unionist Party. The problem was that according to the electoral law—which he himself had sponsored and approved—the name of the Unionist Party and its electoral symbol now legally belonged to the Alliance Party (and therefore to the Republican Union Party). Barceló took the case to the Insular Supreme Court and lost. Then he appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston and lost his case again (December 23, 1931). The old Unionists then decided to change their name and register under a new name. They dug-up their political genealogic table and took one of their old names: Puerto Rican Liberal Party. On January 5, 1932, the Liberals began registering their Party in the small mountain town of Naranjito. By February 20, it had been duly registered all across the Island.41

The convention of the new Puerto Rican Liberal Party began on
March 12, 1932. The Party was regrouping several persons, such as Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, José S. Alegría, Manuel Benítez Flores, Luis Lloréns Torres, who had left the old Unionist Party. Some Alliance followers who did not join the Republican Union Party, such as Amador Ramírez Silva and Juan Rullán also joined in. Prominent in the leadership were Luis Muñoz Marín and his close associates (Samuel R. Quiñones, Ernesto Ramos Antonini, and Vicente Géigel Polanco).

Although the principal leaders of the Liberals were separatists, they were looking for ways to soft-pedal the independence ideal in order to keep in the party fold as many autonomists as possible, so they would not drift to the Republican Union camp. The autonomist wing of the Party was an enormous group (from 50 to 70 percent) and had among its members Jorge V. Domínguez, Carmelo Martínez Acosta, Ana Roqué de Duprey, Benicio Sánchez Castaño, Julio Benvenuti, Martín Travieso, Juan Hernández López, Mariano Abril, and Roberto H. Todd. The problem with the autonomists was that, although they were the majority, they were secondary leaders. Furthermore, they subdivided—according to Muñoz Marín—in eight different groups. One of these groups had monarquical adherants who were even dreaming of the “good old Spanish times.” The Party was controlled by the separatists. Nevertheless, the autonomists were able to exert some influence in the Party platform.42

The Liberal platform demanded independence for Puerto Rico and accepted some political reforms that would serve as a sort of transitory form of government (they refused to use the word “autonomy”) until full sovereignty was achieved. Measures should be taken to achieve economic independence as soon as possible in order to accelerate the process of descolonization. Absenteeism and latifundia were denounced (but they were not asking for the enforcement of the 500-acre law). Native agricultural and industrial development was to be promoted. Tax reforms were advocated. Workers were to be dignified. The emphasis of English in the public school system was condemned, and Spanish would be given more prominence. The influence of Muñoz Marín in the program was considerable.43

Prior to the Liberal convention Luis Muñoz Marín began to write for La Democracia again. In three articles, which were adopted by the Liberals as part of their ideology in their convention, he declared that independence was convenient to all social classes and that without it, Puerto Rico would “march to its ruin”. The economy was in such a bad state because of the preponderance of sugar cane. This glut of sugar occurred as a result of the artificial protection provided by Congressional
tariff laws. With independence, agricultural production would return to a normal state. In order to return to normality, the Insular economy needed a period of transition to make the necessary adjustments. Muñoz Marín pointed out the main problem of the agricultural economy, but did not explain which products would replace sugar (except for a short reference to the declining coffee industry). He had given a very good explanation of the ills of the economy, but was not producing any practical solutions. Nevertheless, Muñoz Marín was rapidly becoming a most prominent leader, second only to Barceló. On March 15 he reassumed the editorship of La Democracia, and for the next fifty-years, until his death in 1980, would be a first and foremost political man.

For the coming elections amendments to the electoral law had to be approved in order to accommodate the recent political re-alignments. The 1929 electoral law—which had been amended in 1920, 1924, 1927, 1928, and 1929—had been passed under the legislative majorities controlled by Antonio R. Barceló. Because he was now in the minority, Barceló was quite unhappy holding the short end of the stick of the electoral law he had forced on the Socialists and the pueros. According to the law, the parties that obtained over 20 percent of the votes were considered principal parties. As such, they had representation with voice and vote at the polls and the Insular Board of Elections. Parties with less than 20 percent or parties by petition had only observers with voice but no vote at the polls and the Insular Board of Elections. Therefore, only the Republican Union Party (as inheritor of the rights of the Alliance) and the Socialist Party (as a continuator of the Constitutional Socialist Party) were considered principal parties. The Liberal Party and the Nationalist Party were two entities that had recently registered and had only the right to have observers. Since full representation at the polls and at the Insular Board of Elections was of vital importance, the Liberal Party wanted to be considered as a principal party. The Socialists and Republican-Unionists also desired an amendment that would permit coalitions which in 1928 had been prohibited. On March 17, 1932, Santiago Iglesias presented a bill (number 26) proposing amendments to the electoral law. The most important proposed changes were: reduction from 20 to 10 percent of the vote requirement for a political party to have an observer in the Insular Board of Elections (with voice but no vote), an observer at the polls (with voice and vote), and consideration of the party as duly registered; the vote in 1936 to illiterate women; and permission for coalitions. Barceló objected to the bill because he wanted the Liberal
Party to be considered as a principal party and not as a recently registered one. Iglesias declared that the Liberals should not have any special privileges.\textsuperscript{48} On March 25 the Iglesias electoral bill was passed by the Legislature and he visited Governor Beverly to urge him to sign it.\textsuperscript{49}

Muñoz Marín editorialized that the reason Iglesias drafted the electoral bill the way he did was his desire for "political vengeance" so that the Socialists could "steal" the elections.\textsuperscript{50} Iglesias answered his former protégé that it was absurd to suggest that the Socialist working classes would "steal" the elections from landlords, bankers, and professional classes who had had the political power for so many years.\textsuperscript{51} He later added that obviously the Insular electoral machinery was in Liberal hands because 75 percent of the 7,000 public employees, and two-thirds of the judges, municipal employees, and police were Liberals; the electoral chief, Charles H. Terry, had Liberal inclinations; the majority of the registering boards were run by Liberals; and the Party was trying to get Congressional legislation to favor them electorally.\textsuperscript{52} Governor Beverly, displeased with some of the amendments to the electoral law, particularly the amendment allowing illiterate women to vote, vetoed the bill.\textsuperscript{53}

The Liberal Party decided to lobby in Washington to force the Insular Legislature to grant them the right to be a principal party. For this task Muñoz Marín was sent to the Federal Capital, where he was joined by Martín Travieso. These Liberals, however, also wanted to get publicity and make political capital by lobbying in Congress and the War Department.\textsuperscript{54} At their request, Congressman O.H. Cross introduced a bill on May 16 to amend the Jones Act by giving registered political parties equal rights as the principal parties. Iglesias commented that the Liberals were seeking in Washington rights they had denied to local political parties for twenty-five years.\textsuperscript{55} As a result of these activities in Washington, the Socialist Party decided to send Iglesias also to deal with the electoral problem whenever he thought it would be convenient.\textsuperscript{56} He and Bolívar Pagán left for Washington on May 19.\textsuperscript{57}

By this time, Iglesias, Martínez Nadal, and Barceló had reached a basic agreement on the electoral amendments.\textsuperscript{58}

In Washington, Iglesias and Pagán met with William Green, Governor Beverly, Resident Commissioner Pesquera, and officials of the War Department to discuss the electoral conflict. They also visited Representative Butler Hare, Chairman of the Insular Affairs Committee. At the hearings, they opposed the Cross bill (H. R. 12100). Making his stand against the same bill, Iglesias also wrote to Speaker John Garner.\textsuperscript{59} After
the hearing concluded, Iglesias declared that Congress would not pass the bill and that the Insular Legislature would approve the electoral amendments that would be satisfactory to the Liberal Party. On July 16 Iglesias left for San Juan.60

Governor Beverly submitted a new bill to amend the electoral law which had the support of Iglesias and Martínez Nadal.61 However, Iglesias added that what the Liberals (and Governor Beverly) really wanted was to have an electoral law that did not permit coalitions.62 Finally on June 30, with some Congressional pressure, the amendments to the electoral law were unanimously approved by the Insular Senate. The principal amendments approved were basically the same as those in Iglesias’ bill: reduction from 20 to 10 percent of the vote requirement for a political party to have an observer in the Insular Board of Elections (with voice but no vote) and an observer at the polls (with voice and vote), and consideration of the party registered; and allowance for coalitions. In case two principal parties should form a coalition, the new parties would then have voice and vote in the Insular Board of Elections and the same rights as the principal parties. The proposal for giving the right to vote to illiterate women in 1936 was dropped.63 Iglesias declared that the Liberals should now feel satisfied with the electoral law.64 But Barceló was still not completely content although he had voted in favor of the law.65

One Congressional piece of legislation that had been approved in May regarding the Island was changing its English name from the incorrect Porto Rico to its proper Spanish name of Puerto Rico.66

During his stay in Washington, Santiago Iglesias had also been dealing with the acute socio-economic problems the Island faced. He lobbied in Congress to help the American citizens of Puerto Rico be included in all Federal rehabilitation measures. 67 Iglesias also began drafting an economic proposal that would extend to Puerto Rico all Federal laws which protected the working masses and fostered economic recovery.68 He expected that Congress and the White House would favor this proposal. The American Federation of Labor had always been favorable to these ideas. Iglesias presented the proposal to William Green who was to submit it to the Republican and Democratic conventions.69 This was the first time the American Federation of Labor would bring the economic rehabilitation issue to the national conventions.70

The National parties in Puerto Rico presented a unique situation. The Republican Party was associated with the Republican Union Party, but
the political philosophies of the two parties were different. The Democrats were represented by the local Democratic Party. This was not an actual party, but was a sort of club composed primarily of a handful of Continentals. It had been organized in 1912. Henry W. Dooley had been its national committeeman since then, and Mrs. Jean S. Whittemore was the national committeewoman. It was the Democratic Party, the first National party, that included in its 1920 platform “ultimate statehood” for Puerto Rico. Statehood was again included in the 1928 platform. With the sudden death of Dooley (March 12), there was a fight between the pro-statehood faction led by Benjamin Horton and the pro-autonomy faction of W. Reese Bennett. The Horton group won, and statehood for Puerto Rico was included in the 1932 Democratic platform. Barceló had firmly opposed this statehood plank of the Democrats.

The pro-autonomy Democratic faction continued active. Two of its principal members were Liberal Francis Dexter (son-in-law of former Unionist Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrinaga) and Liberal Walter Mck. Jones. It was through Mck. Jones that the Liberal Party gradually was able to get control of the local Democratic Party and its corresponding patronage.

The Republican Party did not include statehood in its platform until 1940. In 1932 it favored only the inclusion of Puerto Rico in all Federal rehabilitation measures (as a result of the lobbying of William Green and the American Federation of Labor) and a residence requirement of five years for all public employees. Although the platform did not include statehood, as the Republican-Unionists wished, Martínez Nadal declared that it considered Puerto Rico as “an integral part of the United States” which thus made “statehood as the ultimate solution.”

What were the ideals of Santiago Iglesias in 1932? Had he actually “changed from a fiery radical organizer to a staid and dependable position with a well-oiled machine behind him?” Had he really “tasted the sweet fruits of political cooperation” and “again accepted the apple” of political power? Did the record of Iglesias after World War I become “one of accommodation, compromise, corruption, and hollow victories” and the last chapters of his life constitute a “tragic ignominy?” Iglesias’ political opponents —both autonomists and separatists— like to paint two Iglesias: the good one (when he was in opposition, 1896-1929) and the bad one (when he was in power, 1930-1939). Yet, Iglesias was generally always under their attacks during all those years. If he was a radical, he should become a moderate. If he was a moderate, he had become a traitor. What they failed to understand —or did not want to
understand—is that by the 1920's and 1930's numerous changes Iglesias (and the Free Federation and the Socialist Party) had advocated had become common practice and social laws, especially under the aegis of the Mediation and Conciliation Commission and the Department of Labor. It is true, however, that Iglesias did not deliver all that he promised, but who does? Socialism has become a word of numerous definitions, depending on the period, the country, and the person defining it. According to Iglesias, in Puerto Rico socialism had been classified variously as "red," "anarquist," "communist," "conservative," and "unsubstantial." Socialism in Puerto Rico had become adapted to local necessities and realities as it had occurred in other places. Generically in Puerto Rico all the principles of social justice and socio-economic reforms were classified as socialist. But for the believers in independence, the victories of the working classes were mortifying. Separatists (both Liberals and Nationalists) accused the Socialist Party of losing its proletariat conscience. They incited the Socialists to become really radical and try to establish a communist system. The separatists wanted the Socialists to do that so that the voters would refrain from voting Socialist, and then they would reach power. Once entrenched in the government, they would then repress the Socialists as they had done in the past. After three decades, the Socialists had not been able to eliminate the quasi-monarchical and feudal political traditions that permeated in the landlords and that in contemporary years had helped powerful corporations and businessmen corrupt Insular democracy. 79

Iglesias was vehemently opposed to independence because it would bring more exploitation to the working class. He believed that nationalism and independentismo signified in other countries militarism, reaction, and decadence. In Puerto Rico, however, separatists presented their ideal as one of freedom when they really had elitist, oligarchic, and despotic mentalities. Their republic would ultimately become repressive and fascistic. There were even some separatists who believed in the "red danger" and declared that if the Socialist Party should win, there would be no more religion, lands would be confiscated, and chaos would reign. 80 The Socialist Party wanted to develop the natural resources and extend to the masses the benefit of the government public service institutions. Socialism meant the industrial peace of organized labor. 81 The economic problems of Puerto Rico were not to be solved with independence, but with the cooperation of Congress and the White House. American institutions and democracy had greatly helped the Insular working classes. Independence was not freedom but oppression. 82
The first meeting of the pact commissions of the Socialists and the Republican-Unionists took place on March 22. All members unanimously backed the idea of making a coalition. They would continue negotiating for the next four months. Iglesias believed in a new coalition in which the Party would not lose its principles. By the end of June, it had been accepted that the post of resident commissioner, would be filled by a Socialist, the president of the Senate a Republican-Unionist, and the Speaker of the House would be from whichever party got the largest number of votes; more meetings, however, were still necessary for determining candidates for remaining offices.

In the Socialist camp there was some opposition to a new coalition. Humacao District Senator Joaquín Burset considered the previous coalition with the pueros as having produced "funest results," but would back the decision of the Party convention. A group of eighteen Socialists from Humacao protested that Iglesias and other principal leaders were having pro-pact meetings with the Republican-Unionists before the Socialist convention. They claimed that only a convention should deal with pacts. The answer to these accusations was that what Iglesias was dealing with were preliminary pro-pact negotiations in order to submit a pact to the convention. In addition, socialists in Cataño and Bayamón began to oppose a new coalition. A Socialist wrote to Iglesias complaining that the Party would corrupt itself by making a pact with its former enemies. He lamented that the public posts of the Socialist Party had fallen in the hands of opportunists who used them badly. An editorial in Unión Obrera wanted the Party to go alone in the elections and stated that those who favored a pact were the leading politicians and government employees. The criticism against a new coalition contained sound arguments.

After the electoral registrations of 1932, Iglesias optimistically declared that the Socialist Party had 180,000 followers, thus making it the largest. Commissioner of Labor Prudencio Rivera Martínez stated that he did not favor a coalition because it was only necessary when a party was weak. One Socialist gave numerous reasons against a pact: the Socialist would have to accept as good the most negative ideas of the Republican-Unionists; the Republican Union Party was most reactionary; 1932 was the best time to defeat both Liberals and Republican-Unionists; a coalition would make the Liberals the underdogs and this could make them win; a coalition would only produce premature victories in some areas for the Socialists; previous local coalition administrations
were a failure and now the Republican-Unionists were more conservative than the *puros*; nowhere in the World would true Socialists join with the bourgeoisie because of the ensuing negative results; and the Socialist platform was the only one that could solve the problems of Puerto Rico. Bayamón Socialists shared similar objections. The anti-coalition movement continued to grow when the Mayagüez Socialists instructed their convention delegates to vote against the pact. Delegates from Toa Alta and Dorado also rejected any pact with whatever bourgeois parties. So in these circumstances, the Socialist Party was going to celebrate its convention on August 1, 1932, in Mayagüez.

At 10:30 A.M. Santiago Iglesias opened the Party’s eighth convention at the Teatro Yagüez. For an hour and a half he spoke on the conditions of the Party, the work to be done in the convention, and suggested that “a new coalition should be considered.” Iglesias reminded the 502 delegates (34 were women) that they had complete freedom of thought and action. The pact with the Union Republican Party was on a fifty-fifty basis. The resident commissioner would be a Socialist, the president of the Senate a Republican-Unionist, and the Speaker of the House would go to the party that would receive the largest number of votes. In the Senate each party would nominate seven district senators plus as many at-large senators as desired (one Socialist and three Republican-Unionist). For the thirty-five House district seats there was a similar arrangement: seventeen and seventeen, the A.B.C. district (a Liberal stronghold) would be drawn by lot, and at-large seats as wished (one Socialist and two Republican-Unionists). Mayoralty candidates—with one exception (Ponce)—would belong to the party that had the largest local electorate support. Justices of the peace and municipal and district judges would be named on the basis of which party won the location. Of cabinet posts (Agriculture, Interior, Health, Labor, Treasury, and the Executive Secretariats) the first three would be Republican-Unionists and the others Socialists. All other governmental posts would be divided in similar ways.

During the sessions of the second day, the convention began to approve resolutions made by various committees. Resolutions from the Resolutions and Official Information Committee were the following: a birth control program; a measure to prohibit workers from carrying bags weighting over 100 pounds; a program of industrialization and public works to fight unemployment; development of natural resources; and curtailment of gambling. The Platform Committee again approved the
plank of extending the American Constitution to Puerto Rico as well as asking Congress that the executive branch be in local hands.\textsuperscript{101}

The most controversial aspect of the convention was the coalition dispute. It was expected that Commissioner of Labor Prudencio Rivera Martínez would be the leading opponent.\textsuperscript{102} The Pact Committee was composed of twenty-seven members and headed by bolívar Pagán. After long deliberations, it voted twenty-four in favor of the coalition with three votes against (Isaac García, José Alamo Ríos, and Nelson Silva Ocasio). Pagán gave a speech defending the majority vote, and García spoke for the minority. The most conflicting point was the socio-economic legislation clause. The Committee re-wrote the clause submitted by the Republican Union representative so that both parties would have a clear and precise mutual obligation to promote social legislation such as workers' compensation, housing, absenteeism, latifundia, and other social legislation. But the three dissenters did not think this clause would really mean much to the Republican Union Party.\textsuperscript{103}

Fifty-two delegates asked for turns to explain their views pertaining to the pact. To make the debate manageable, twelve speakers were given the opportunity to talk for ten minutes each; six were against (Julio Aybar, Sixto Pacheco, Tadeo Rodríguez García, Florencio Cabello, Armando Miranda, and Isaac García) and six in favor (Jorge Gautier, Antonio Reyes Delgado, Lino Padrón, Demetrio Guzmán, Víctor Coll Cuchi, and Blás Oliveras). Rivera Martínez seems to have changed his mind because he now did not oppose the pact. There were several criticisms against the pact. The Party had been created to reform the social system and not to reach power. A pact would weaken the principles of socialism. The Republican Union Party had voted against the Workers' Indemnization Bill of Iglesias. A pact would give the Republican-Unionists control over the Socialists for their benefit. Republican-Unionists would join Liberals in the Legislature to block social legislation. Finally Republican-Unionists were as bad as the Liberals and would do nothing for the workers. On the other hand, arguments for the pact were as strong and numerous. With the previous coalitions, the Socialists had been able to make changes in the social system since, obviously, sharing power in a coalition was better than being a political minority. In Congress Iglesias would be able to get changes beneficial to Puerto Rico. A pact would prevent Barceló from reaching power again and continuing his high-handed policies. The Republican Union Party was more liberal than the Liberal Party. A coalition would split the capitalist classes. Lastly, Barceló and the
Liberals, Governor Beverly, Washington authorities, and Republican Union plutocrats did not want a pact because the Socialists were dangerous. Iglesias did not participate in the debate in order to give Party members more freedom of thought. The report of the Pact Committee was voted upon with 266 favorable and 105 against. Aybar then made a motion that the dissenters consider that the pact had been approved and make that approval unanimous. But all dissenters voted against Aybar's motion.104

The convention then proceeded to nominate the candidate for resident commissioner. Santiago Iglesias was unanimously selected in a thunderous standing ovation. Afterwards, some legislative posts were voted on as well as the persons who would run the Party for the coming four years.105

For Luis Muñoz Marín the Socialist convention demonstrated that the leadership of that Party was weakening its ideals in order to achieve political power, but the Socialist masses were against that. Socialist politicians wanted only public jobs which they could obtain with a coalition. All this movement was due to Santiago Iglesias' ambition to be resident commissioner. The Party leadership was made-up of jingoistic Americans (as opposed to real Puerto Ricans) who were aburguesando (making bourgeois) the labor leaders and desintellectualizing the intellectuals.106

To these accusations Iglesias re-affirmed that the Socialist Party "had not changed and will not change" its principles. The socio-economic reforms advocated in the platform for the 1932 elections were essentially the same ones the labor movement and Iglesias had been advocating since 1897.107 What the Fuerzas Vivas were afraid of was that with Iglesias as resident commissioner, the workers would run Puerto Rico. There was a fear that the conservative wing of the Republican Union Party would join the Liberals as had occurred in 1924. But the Socialists would vote for their Party, regardless of how much money the Fuerzas Vivas might spend on the coming electoral campaign.108 The coming elections would must likely bring economic changes for Puerto Rico.109 What the opponents of the Socialist Party were trying to do was to create "confusion and disloyalty" among its followers.110

The Republican Union Party met to have its convention on September 1, 1932, in the same theater where the Socialists had gathered four weeks before. Rafael Martínez Nadal urged the delegates to accept the pact with the Socialists.111 The atmosphere was very favorable to the pact,
but Resident Commissioner José L. Pesquera refused to make any comments to the press.\textsuperscript{112} There were some delegates—especially in the Ponce delegation—that were hesitant to accept the pact as it had been approved by the Socialists. They feared that they would be under Socialist control which would ultimately destroy the Republican Union Party.\textsuperscript{113} The Pact Committee reported favorably on the coalition with the Socialists. According to a statement made by Rafael Cuevas Zequeira, Governor Beverly had told Iglesias that he and Washington did not want the Coalition and that the Republican-Unionists should work together with the Liberals. Beverly later denied this charge. Socialist Rafael Rivera Zayas urged the convention to vote for the pact. The convention then voted—one vote against—for the pact. The dissenter, Alfredo Saliva, then reconsidered and made the decision unanimous.\textsuperscript{114} Iglesias, who had been traveling around the Island organizing the different local electoral tickets, had to go unexpectedly to Mayagüez to make some changes in the pact.\textsuperscript{115} The convention voted in favor of Iglesias’ candidacy for resident commissioner, (389 in favor, one blank ballot, and one null ballot). In case the pact should ultimately not be concluded, the Republican-Unionists would then nominate their own candidate.\textsuperscript{116} The pact was finally completely formalized in October.\textsuperscript{117}

After the pact had been accepted by both conventions, the new coalition ticket began to be selected. The candidates who were going to form the coming legislative majority came from the following list. For the Senate the Socialists presented labor leaders Moisés Echevarría, Epifanio Fiz Jiménez, Bolívar Ochart, Sixto Pacheco, Bernardino Villanueva, and Tadeo Rodríguez García; and well-to-do lawyers Antonio Reyes Delgado, and Bolívar Pagán. The senatorial candidates for the Republican-Unionists were well-to-do lawyers Rafael Martínez Nadal, Juan B. García Méndez, and rich lawyers Adolfo García Veve and Celestino Iriarte; well-to-do farmers Juan Ramón Ramos and Agustín Fernández; Francisco Zeno, well-to-do owner of \textit{La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico}; retired businessman Luis Sánchez Morales; Alfonso Valdés, a very rich businessman and brother-in-law of Iriarte; and Pedro Juan Serrallés, sugar baron of Central Mercedita. Rodríguez García, Fernández, Zeno, and Sánchez Morales did not get elected. The House Socialist candidates were labor leaders Felix Acosta, Rafael Alonso Torres, Jorge Gautier, Julio Jiménez, Max Mattei, Nicolás Nogueras, Lino Padrón, and José Alvaro Salvá; Vicente Hita, a pharmacist; José Cora, a school teacher; Benigno Sorrentino, a well-to-do merchant; and Rafael Rivera Zayas, a
well-to-do lawyer. The Republican-Unionist candidates were rich lawyer Miguel Angel García Méndez and well-to-do lawyers Eduardo Capó Cintrón, Adolfo Dones Padró, Rafael Cuevas Zequeira, Juan Esteves Gómez, Agustín Font, Luis Antonio Rosario, and Leopoldo Tormes; Jorge Lucas Valdivieso, sugar baron of Central Pellejas; well-to-do farmers Felipe Carro, José Toro Rodríguez, Getulio Echandía, Edelmiro Méndez Serrano, and José Manuel Muñoz; well-to-do doctors Leopoldo Figueroa, Blas Herrero, and Juan R. Villamil; Etienne Totti, a well-to-do engineer; and María Luisa Arcelay, a well-to-do garment factory owner.118 Cuevas Zequeira did not get elected.

For some Liberals, the Socialist and Free Federation leaders were an ignorant lot made up of “false apostles,” “minotaurs,” and “wolves” who had devoured and digested the naïve and illiterate workers. Iglesias was simply a “filibuster,” a lackey of the “Yankee bourgeois,” and an ideological traitor.119 Liberal Senator Manuel A. García Méndez (brother of the two other Republican-Unionist leaders) went so far as to state that even if Iglesias were elected, he would fail because in the States all types of socialism were rejected and no one believed in his pro-Americanism.120 There was even a Socialist with separatist ideals who believed Iglesias had now become a moderate.121

Regardless of how Santiago Iglesias, the Socialist Party, and the Free Federation were categorized, the powerful Asociación de Agricultores was still hostile to them.122 The landowning association held its convention in the Ateneo on September 11, 1932, under the presidency of Julio N. Matos, a Liberal activist. There “prominent capitalist” Mateo Fajardo, a Republican for decades and in 1904 a candidate for resident commissioner, declared that Barceló was the “only” Insular political leader and that the only hope for agricultural and economic interests rested in the Liberal Party. He had left the Republican Union Party to join the Liberals and wanted Resident Commissioner José L. Pesquera to be re-nominated by them. Resident Commissioner Pesquera stated that he had ceased to be a Republican-Unionist because that Party was under the control of the Socialists. Pesquera even tried to form a pro-landlord agrarian party but failed. The Asociación de Agricultores then voted for a resolution condemning the Coalition because it was under Socialist control and recommending that the Association back Pesquera’s re-election to Congress. La Democracia later editorialized that the Liberal Party gave its “absolute solidarity” to the Asociación de Agricultores.123

Luis Muñoz Marín, editor of La Democracia who considered himself to be to the left of Santiago Iglesias, began to modify further his
political ideals and adapt them to the electoral necessities. At a well-attended lecture at the Río Piedras Campus of the University of Puerto Rico, he surprised the audience by calling the 500-acre law a “completely absurd political myth.” He now did not favor its enforcement. There was a possibility, he added, that some sugar mills could be operated as a quasi-public industry. This was one important reason for the cordial relationship between Liberals, La Democracia, and the Asociación de Agricultores.

The night before the Liberal Convention began, the Central Junta of the Party discussed at length the possibility of making Pesquera their candidate for resident commissioner, and, if not, of running him for an at-large seat. It was rumored that Barceló and some leaders were inclined toward Pesquera. Muñoz Marín also favored Pesquera. Before Barceló left for the convention at the San Juan Municipal Theater on September 12, a commission from the Asociación de Agricultores paid him a visit at his residence to lobby for Pesquera’s re-election.

The Liberals opened their convention with great enthusiasm. It had been briefly postponed due to conflicts and the need to know what the Republican Union Party would do with the pact and Iglesias’ candidacy for resident commissioner. Former Nationalist president José S. Alegría even forecast a November victory. He added that there “should be no compassion” for their political opponents; they should be crushed. Ex-Republican-Unionist Mateo Fajardo was given a standing ovation when he entered the auditorium. José Tous Soto sent a telegram declaring that “although he was not in the Liberal Party, he was with it.”

The most controversial issue at the convention was who was to be the candidate for resident commissioner. Barceló himself had some backers, but he rejected their support. The Non-Partisan Block of Women sent a delegation backing Pesquera. But the real Liberal candidates were Martín Travieso, Miguel Muñoz, Luis Muñoz Marín, and Benigno Fernández García. Travieso rapidly retired. Muñoz Marín declined and nominated Fernández García who was then unanimously acclaimed. Barceló then read a telegram from Pesquera backing Fernández García. Later in the day, Pesquera came to the convention and received a thunderous ovation and gave a speech of thanks and of support for Fernández García. After this, the Liberals went ahead, electing new party officials and nominating their November candidates.

Was the Liberal Party an authentic liberal party? Were the candidates they selected for the 1932 elections truly liberals? Political propagandists and historians who have autonomist or separatist sympathies have
generally portrayed stateholders (many Socialists, but especially Republicans, Republican-Unionists, and their successors) as conservatives, the rich, the "bad guys" of Puerto Rican history. The true liberals and the "good guys" are for them the separatists and autonomists (Federals, Unionists, Nationalists, Liberals, and later the Populars). All this might be effective political propaganda, but it is not good history. The Liberal senatorial candidates were well-to-do farmers Julio Benvenutti, Tomás Berríos Berdecía, Santiago Iglesias Silva, and Enrique Landrón; Herminio Miranda, well-to-do farmer and lawyer; Severo O'Neill, rich farmer, José Ruiz Soler, rich farmer and brother-in-law of Giorgetti, Walter Mck Jones, sugar baron of Central Hermina, Mateo Fajardo, sugar baron of Central Eureka, Mario Mercado, Jr., sugar baron of Central Rufina; Luis Sánchez Frasquier, well-to-do merchant; Antonio R. Barceló, Manuel A. García Méndez, Luis López de Victoria, Fernando Gallardo Díaz, well-to-do lawyers; Isabel Andreu de Aguilar, educator and wife of a rich merchant; and journalist Luis Muñoz Marín. Only Benvenutti, Berríos Berdecía, Barceló, Muñoz Marín, and Mercado were to be elected. The House Liberal candidates were Fernando Suria, Eugenio González, Fidel Martínez Mattei, Andrés Rodríguez, José Salichs, Domingo Rodríguez, Agustín Burgos, Francisco Santini, José Gregorio Merle, well-to-do farmers; Rafael Vallés, Antonio Tulla, Miguel Guevara, Francisco Ortiz Lebrón, rich farmers; Manuel A. Martínez Dávila, Ernesto Ramos Antonini, J. J. Ortiz Alibrán, Marcelino Carraquillo, Francisco Susoni Lens, Luis Velasco, Erasto Arjona Sioca, Angel M. Díaz, Pelayo Ramón Benítez, and Francisco Rebollo, well-to-do lawyers; J.A. Hernández Pérez, well-to-do farmer and lawyer; Manuel Pavía Fernández, Luis Pereira Leal, and Sergio Peña, well-to-do doctors; Manuel Rabell Fernández, Antonio Ruiz López, well-to-do pharmacists; Andrés Rodríguez Vera, journalist; Antonio Piñero Rodríguez, Virgilio Brunet, teachers; Adela Ramírez de Arellano, well-to-do garment factory owner; Joaquín Rovira, rich farmer and garment factory owner; Gerardo Arroyo Toro, rich contractor; Enrique Manrique, rich merchant; and Luis González, unknown. Victorious were Martínez Dávila, Ramos Antonini, Pereira Leal, Piñero Rodríguez, Suria, Ortiz Lebrón, Susoni Lens, Manrique, Hernández Pérez, and Piñero Rodríguez.

As can be seen, the immense majority of the Liberal candidates were professional and upper-class people with money. Their interests were neither with the working classes nor the small middle class. Not a single one was labor leader. Andrés Rodríguez Vera had never been a real labor leader, and only the two school teachers were from the middle class. Even
Luis Muñoz Marín himself had written in *La Democracia* denying his past association with the Socialist Party. A Socialist wrote in *Unión Obrera* that the *Fuerzas Vivas* were in control of the Liberal Party which was in favor of neither independence nor autonomy. The Liberals were the “cruel executioners” of the workers. The Socialist writer also stated that Muñoz Marín had said that he was Pesquera and that Pesquera was he; meaning that Muñoz Marín would defend the interests of the *Fuerzas Vivas* as fiercely as any landlord. The Liberal candidates for mayors and municipal assemblies were from the same social groups as the ones for the Legislature. The Liberal Party had become the party of the Fuerzas Vivas. At their convention they had not talked about independence, but spent time praising Resident Commissioner Pesquera. The Liberals spoke to the people in rallies and the press about independence and Yankee imperialism, but the *Fuerzas Vivas* actually controlled the Party. The Republican-Unionist newspaper *El País*, wrote that at the Liberal convention the most conservative candidates, men like Mercado and Fajardo, had won over liberal men such as Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, Juan García Ducós, Alfonso Lastra Chariez, and Luis Lloréns Torres. Victory for conservatism showed a lack of democracy in the Party. But for Mario Mercado *Fuerzas Vivas* meant “constructive force” that worked in favor of agriculture.

The Nationalist Party was the last to hold its convention. It met at the San Juan Municipal Theater on September 25. Among other nominations, the Nationalists named Julio Medina González for resident commissioner, Pedro Albizu Campos for senator at-large, and Francisco Vicenty for representative at-large. Albizu Campos attacked Barceló for having been a collaborationist with the metropolitan powers since the 1890’s and therefore not a true believer in independence. Fernández García was also called a false separatist. But the Nationalist Party had a limited electorate. With the help of Martínez Nadal and the Republican Union Party, the Nationalist Party had been able to obtain 30,314 signatures to register the Party. Barceló unsuccesfully filed protests against Nationalists registrations. The Nationalist Party was the only one that was unable to file candidates for all electoral posts.

Rafael Martínez Nadal clearly pointed out the difference between the independence ideal of the Nationalists and that of the Liberals. The Nationalists were sincere in their separatist belief. But the Liberals had closely collaborated with the United States, and now they called the Americans despots and destroyers of the Puerto Rican personality. The
Liberals were not sincere; the Nationalists were. But a large number of the electorate considered the Liberals bona fide separatists (especially their leaders) that could bring independence and therefore were not to be trusted even though most rank and file members of the Party were autonomists.

The anti-coalition movement among Socialists had greatly declined, but there were still some who refused to give-up in certain municipalities. This Socialist cantonalist dissidence was most prominent in Ponce and Cataño and, to a lesser extent, in Bayamón and Guaynabo. Bayamón, Cataño, and Guaynabo formed a representative district which was given, together with the three mayoralties, to the Republican-Unionists because they had more electors than the Socialists. In Ponce the situation was the reverse. The city was to have a Socialist mayor although the Republican-Unionists had a bigger electorate. Soon after the Socialist convention, some local Socialists led by Dr. José Lanauze Rolón, Rafael Lozano Castillo, Luis Fortuño, Heracleio Hoyos, and others, formed a group called Socialist Defense Board and planned to register a local party. These Socialists were not leaders of any prominence, but they considered themselves avid Marxists. Lanauze Rolón had previously been a Republican and a fervent admirer of Barbosa. Blas Oliveras, who knew them well and was the Socialist candidate for mayor of Ponce, thought that these leftist Socialists were elitists, and conservative communists who were not proletariats and did nothing constructive for the betterment of the labor movement. These cantonalist Socialists continued with their opposition to the new coalition until they finally formed the Communist Party which advocated independence and a communist regime for Puerto Rico. Luis Vergne Ortiz was elected president. Lanauze Rolón was to be the candidate for resident commissioner. Since it was too late (October 30, 1932), they urged their followers to vote in the column for independent candidates (but did not get one single vote). After the November elections, they planned to begin an Island-wide organization campaign.

The Cataño and Bayamón Socialist dissenters were vehemently opposed to the Republican-Unionist representative candidate (Leopoldo Figueroa, the Secretary of the Party). These cantonalists wanted to make a local ticket to run their own candidates for city hall and the House. Hoping to make political capital out of this controversy, the Liberal Party had nominated pseudo-labor leader and journalist Andrés Rodríguez Vera to run against Figueroa. Rodríguez Vera declared that his candidacy “was for the poor.” With this alternative, the Socialist dissidence of
Cataño and Bayamón rapidly declined and no cantonalist ticket was formed.147

Even though the San Ciprián hurricane had hit Puerto Rico on September 26-27, causing great economic hardships, the political campaign did not lose its momentum. Santiago Iglesias and other Coalition leaders kept campaigning as hard as they could.148 The Socialist did not have it easy. It was said that the managers (mayordomos) of Central Aguirre were threatening to fire the workers that did not vote Liberal.149 A Coalition commission headed by Iglesias went to see the Aguirre vice-president who denied having given money to the Liberals and repressing Socialists. Iglesias stated that 80 percent of Aguirre’s workers were Socialists, but that most managers and foremen were Liberals. Aguirre’s vice-president promised that the corporation would remain neutral during the elections.150 Pedro Juan Serrallés, Republican-Unionist senatorial candidate, promised to do the same in Central Mercedita.151 Yet, there were later complaints that managers of Giorgetti’s Central Plazuela were threatening to fire all non-Liberal workers. The same accusations were made against managers of United Porto Rico Sugar. The Coalition had no sympathizers from most sugar corporations.152

At countless rallies Iglesias delivered speeches.153 To the separatists leaders he apparently vented his most aggressive attacks. At a Caguas rally Iglesias supposedly called Albizu Campos a “charlatán,” “deceiver of multitudes,” and other “rude epithets.”154 In Mayagüez Iglesias seemingly became “desperate and rabid,” insulting the Liberals for an hour and a half. He went so far as to say that “the fatherland was the refuge of the canaille.”155 This speech style was not typical of Iglesias, but that was what La Democracia printed.

As a result of the ensuing acute economic crisis precipitated by hurricane San Ciprián, Governor Beverly wanted to convocate a special legislature session to alleviate thegrave problems. Martínez Nadal and Iglesias—due to the fact that the electoral campaign was in full swing—wanted a forty-eight hour session.156 Iglesias also suggested that a Coalition caucus should be held to plan the legislative session.157 The Coalition caucus met and agreed to cooperate with the Governor concerning the economic rehabilitation bills that had to do with Federal laws (a five million loan to reduce unemployment with public work programs).158 The chambers met and first held a posthumous memorial to Speaker Manuel F. Rossy who had died the previous August 6. Socialist House Vice-President Rafael Alonso Torres was then elected Speaker
and Republican-Unionist Jorge Romany made Vice-President.\footnote{159} Iglesias was dissatisfied with the legislative session because it had not been well planned and because it was called too close to the November elections.\footnote{160} Governor Beverly had requested important economic rehabilitation bills which were presented by or subscribed by Iglesias. In three days the five bills the Governor wanted had been approved by the Coalition with the Liberals voting against them. The Liberals claimed that the bills were politically oriented to help the Coalition win the coming elections.\footnote{161} Iglesias felt that the opposition of the Liberals was uncalled for. He also stated that another session should not be convened if the Liberals would not change their attitude.\footnote{162}

Santiago Iglesias' electoral program contained basically the same socio-economic reforms he had been espousing since he had arrived in Puerto Rico in 1896. These reforms were to be accomplished in close cooperation with Congress and the White House and with the backing of the American Federation of Labor and the Pan-American Federation of Labor. Social justice, not political independence, would make the people free.\footnote{163}

The Liberal resident commissioner candidate Benigno Fernández García was a Georgetown University law graduate (1908) and an intellectual. He had been elected on the Unionist ticket three times to the House of Representatives (1912, 1917, 1928). During his last term Fernández García had served first as floor leader for the Alliance and then as minority leader for the Liberal Party. For him the Coalition, formed by "reactionary" Republican-Unionists and "naive radical" Socialists, wanted to win solely to get political jobs for its followers. Santiago Iglesias should be attacked because of his "antiespañolismo" and materialism. Fernández García's electoral program required exemption of Puerto Rico from Federal shipping laws; elimination of Prohibition; acquisition of more tax rights from Congress to the Legislature for the development of local industries; the right for the Post Office to tax incoming merchandise from the States to help local industries and merchants; permission to the Legislature to name the Commissioner of Education and to de-emphasize the teaching of English; and the election of a Governor who may appoint all cabinet members. As for Insular independence, that would be asked for later.\footnote{164}

The other important candidate for resident commissioner was Nationalist Julio Medina González. He was a self-made man who had studied under Eugenio María de Hostos. A life-long believer in indepen-
dance, Medina González had founded a revolutionary committee right after the American Army had occupied his home-city of Mayagüez. Soon after, he published the newspaper *La Voz del Pueblo* which he defended in several court cases due to its separatist articles. In 1902 Medina González published another newspaper, *La Revolución*, which involved him in thirty-two legal cases. As a founding member of the Unionist Party, he was elected to the House of Delegates from Mayagüez. There Medina González introduced an independence bill, but it got nowhere. In 1905 he founded a magazine called *La Independencia*, one issue of which cost him a year and a half in jail. Later Medina González campaigned for independence together with José de Diego and was a founding member of the Nationalist Party. Throughout his sixty-six years, he had had seventy-eight political court cases, been in jail thirty-six times, received nineteen machete and gun wounds, and fought two duels. Medina González considered that 95 percent of the Liberals were bona fide separatists who would gradually move toward the Nationalist Party. He attacked the Liberal Party for having two Janus-like faces, independence and autonomy. If elected, Medina González would not go to Washington as resident commissioner but as a plenipotentiary minister to demand independence. In case Congress should refuse to grant it, the Nationalist Party would then appeal to The Hague International Court. Once the Republic of Puerto Rico was established, there had to be a period of economic transition in order to transform the Puerto Rican national economy into a different form from the present one.¹⁶⁵

By the middle of October, Santiago Iglesias was predicting a Coalition victory.¹⁶⁶ José Tous Soto declared that it would be a victory for "Iglesismo" with all its "class and sect prejudices." Nevertheless, the "agricultural-mercantile" vote could defeat the Coalition. Tous Soto was now politically an independent autonomist and had rejected a candidacy offered by the Liberals because he was taking a political vacation (which ended with his death on March 21, 1933).¹⁶⁷

Iglesias was accustomed to all kinds of attacks. An article in *La Democracia* called him a "card-board redemptor" who defended the colonial status for the benefit of American imperialists.¹⁶⁸ An editorial called him a pseudo-socialist and the Coalition campaign one of generalities.¹⁶⁹ Muñoz Marín, director of the Liberal campaign, asked to debate with Iglesias.¹⁷⁰ Iglesias answered that he had been debating all over the Island for two months.¹⁷¹ Muñoz Marín denied that what Iglesias was doing was a debate, but what the Socialist leader was afraid of was to face
the ideas of the Liberals. Muñoz Marín further attacked him by saying that the Socialist Party defended the "Yankee bourgeoisie" and attacked the Puerto Rican one and that the Republican-Unionists defended everything that was "Yankee" against all Puerto Rican things. The Coalition was a contradiction of ideals. Other articles in La Democracia said that Puerto Rican Socialists could not expect social justice from the United States due to its capitalist system. Another Liberal wrote in La Democracia that if the Coalition won, all public service companies would be expropriated by the government. The Republican-Unionists favoured doctrines that President Hoover rejected. The Coalition wanted to destroy private enterprise and create a bureaucracy that would be subordinated to its political ends.

Liberal senatorial candidate José Ruiz Soler (Vice-President and Treasurer of the Sugar Producers Association and brother-in-law of Giorgetti) agreed with this last article. He told the electorate of the danger of electing eight "Socialist propagandists" because these men would "impose the socialist doctrine" on the Republican-Unionists. Serrallés and Iriarte would not be able to neutralize or defeat the "extravagances" that were characteristic of the leaders of the Socialist Party. The Socialists were forever "frantic enemies" of the capitalists. Intellectual Epifanio Fernández Vanga (cousin of Giorgetti and also a brother-in-law) wrote that it was "terrible" but "just" that Iglesias be elected to Congress because the Island deserved such "punishment." Iglesias represented ambition marked with antipatriotism.

Regardless of all these political attacks, Iglesias and Martínez Nadal were sure of victory. Martínez Nadal considered that the elections were to be the most honest ever celebrated in Puerto Rico, but after them, the Liberals would scream fraud. As opposed to the Alliance victory in 1924, the Coalition would win "con las masas y sin las mesas" (with the masses and without the polls).

Due to the profusion of party flags and the lively spirits of the people, the elections of November 8, 1932, were "as colorful as a carnival." Although there were some cases of violence, the elections were the "quietest" since 1900. The orderly conduct was ascribed to the fact that literate women were at the polls. The most important aspect was the large number of voters. On the 452,738 registered (120,000 women), 383,722 voted. Surprisingly, only 15 percent failed to vote instead of the anticipated normal 20 to 25 percent. Fewer voters were expected because of the damage caused by San Ciprián hurricane and because the parties had less
money to mobilize their followers. The Coalition won with 208,232 (110,794 Republican Unionists and 97,438 Socialists), the Liberals got 170,168 votes, and the Nationalists received 5,257 dispersed votes (although Albizu Campos obtained 11,882 for the Senate). The Coalition won fourteen senatorial seats in six senatorial districts, losing only Guayama, elected thirty representatives and took fifty-one municipalities (twenty-nine Republican-Unionists and twenty-two Socialists). The Liberals elected five senators and nine representatives and won twenty-six municipalities (not a single large urban area save Caguas).181

For Iglesias the Coalition victory was against "reaction" because the people knew how to vote.182 The electoral results demonstrated that Puerto Ricans were "Americans" and would maintain and defend the "principles of the people of the United States."183 Resident Commissioner Pesquera congratulated Iglesias for his victory and offered his cooperation although he was opposed to his ideals.184

According to The New York Times, the principal issue of the electoral campaign was the "survival" of Barceló, the "political boss of the island."185 The Liberal leader felt "dejected and surprised" at the electoral results and declared that the Party was going to Washington to impugn them.186 Martínez Nadal stated that he had predicted these fraud accusations of Barceló, but that they were "pure fantasy." He also reminded Barceló that the economic aid the Liberals had received from the sugar corporations and other economic groups to fight the Coalition had cost the Republican Union Party alone some 25,000 votes.187 Iglesias considered that these elections had been the most honest since 1900 and that they should be compared with the elections of 1920 and 1924 when Barceló had absolute control of the electoral process. If Barceló wanted to discuss the elections in Washington, Iglesias said he would do so with "great pleasure and great care."188

Muñoz Marín was in a different mood. He declared that the Liberals had "defeated the most formidable and most diabolic fraud machine" in Puerto Rican history. The Liberal Party had demonstrated that it was the most powerful one.189 The young Senator-elect was "rapidly becoming the party's mouthpiece."190 He expected to introduce an independence bill in the coming legislative session and promised Liberal backing for the statehood bill planned by Martínez Nadal. Muñoz Marín's reasoning was that statehood was impossible and Congress would not grant it. Since the majority of Puerto Ricans were against "annexation" (he did not consider the Socialists to be statehooders), the "admission myth" would soon disappear.191
The party that was most disappointed was the Nationalist. During the campaign Pedro Albizu Campos had been very successful in attracting large crowds to his rallies. But he was unable to transform his oratorical triumphs into electoral votes. Although Albizu Campos received 11,882 votes for senator at-large, the Party had only obtained 5,257 votes. He reacted to this result by proclaiming that the “army of independence” had been established because five-thousand Nationalists “had responded to the proclamation to immediately constitute the republic.” The triumph of the Liberals, Republican-Unionists or Socialists was a “victory of Yankee imperialist policy” which was leading Puerto Rico to its “total ruin.” By “army of independence,” Albizu Campos was referring to the recently formed Cadets of the Republic. These Cadets had uniforms of white pants and black shirts, and their flag was black with a white Jerusalem cross (one of the symbols of the Puerto Rico coat of arms) in the center. The Cadets did military exercises, paraded in towns, and sometimes carried wooden guns. The color of the shirt, the flag, the military exercises, and the parades gave them a “fascist look.” Some of the ideals of Benito Mussolini were a source of inspiration. Albizu Campos began to reject the electoral process. The violent rhetoric was gradually to become physical. Albizu Campos began to consider himself President of the Republic of Puerto Rico, a cabinet was named, and foreign representation was to be established in eleven Latin American countries. The historical perspective of Albizu Campos was defective, but his perception of the political realities of the 1930's was worse. He was gradually leaving the world of the idealist for that of the fantasist.

The appointment of a native governor was one of the plans the Coalition had. The leading contender was out-going Senate President Luis Sánchez Morales.

The economic rehabilitation legislation approved the previous October did not have the Liberal votes. Therefore, ninety days had to pass before it could be implemented. As a result, Governor Beverly reconvened the Legislature on November 11 in order to get the Liberal backing and apply the legislation immediately. This time the Liberals voted favorably.

During these same days, Iglesias was hurriedly getting ready to leave for the Cincinnati convention of the American Federation of Labor. Governor Beverly had been informed that some threats against Iglesias’ life had been made by some “ardent” Nationalists, and police protection was thus given. The New York City Police was alerted to take the
necessary precautions. Together with his daughter Igualdad and a detective, Iglesias took the steamer *Coamo* on November 17. He landed on the morning of the 21st, took a train for Washington immediately, got to Union Station in the afternoon, and took another train for Cincinnati, arriving after the Convention had started.

The report of the Free Federation to the Convention stated several things. The Mediation and Conciliation Commission had dealt with 44 strikes involving 4,306 men and 2,260 women. Workers had collected $16,568 from the Wage Claim and Protection Bureau as a result of 1,260 claims against employers and $14,209.93 were still to be settled. The Industrial Commission had settled 18,838 cases of workers' compensation. Finally, the Free Federation gave its "support for the indivisible association and unification" of Puerto Rico with the United States. This petition was approved. Since Iglesias had arrived late, he had difficulties getting a resolution regarding Puerto Rico accepted. The resolution, like the ones of 1929, 1930, and 1931, demanded equal Congressional treatment for the Island in all socio-economic rehabilitation legislation. Obstacles were overcome and the resolution (No. 92) approved.

After the Convention, Iglesias returned to Washington. There he stayed with his daughters América, Libertad, Justicia, and Igualdad in an apartment in Wisteria Mansions (which he had been renting for several years) on Massachusetts Avenue near the old offices of the American Federation of Labor. He planned to return to Puerto Rico in the coming weeks (the new Congress began in March), but had to stay in order to buy a house so that the rest of the family would be able to join him. With some $2,000 to $3,000 of his savings, he made a downpayment for a four-bedroom duplex at 3175 Porter St., N.W. The house he had been living in since 1905 at Isern St., San Juan, was to be rented by 1937.

During this period Resident Commissioner-elect Santiago Iglesias began to get his work organized and to attend to new political developments. There were all kinds of stories as to who was going to be appointed to what post. For La Fortaleza Iglesias thought that a close friend of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt was to be chosen. Since Iglesias had been accused of being a foreigner, he pointed out that in Congress there were three outgoing senators and two senators-elect that had not been born in the United States.

The new Insular Legislature convened on February 13, 1933 and voted Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán as president and vice-president of the Senate and Miguel A. García Méndez and Rafael Alonso
Torres as Speaker and vice-president of the House. Republican-Unionist María Luisa Arcelay was the first woman in Latin America to have been elected to a legislature. Both chambers sent cables greeting Iglesias as resident commissioner-elect.

As Iglesias was preparing to begin his new duties, his political opponents were looking for ways to block him as they had traditionally done for over three decades. Dr. José A. López Antorgiorgi, a prominent Puerto Rican, resident in New York City, and a Liberal and Democrat, considered it unfortunate that Puerto Rico had elected a “communist” to Congress. Henry S. Ortega, a close friend of López Antorgiorgi and president of the Pan American Group of the All Nations Association, prepared charges accusing Iglesias of being a member of Moscow’s Communist International, and asked Republican Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., to prevent the Resident Commissioner-elect from taking his seat in the House. Iglesias quickly countered that Ortega’s accusations were “defamatory” and wrote to Fish explaining the false accusation. Representative Fish wrote to Iglesias, affirming “I wish to assure you that I have no intention to go any further in this matter, and am personally glad to welcome you to the 73rd Congress and to wish you every success.” The conflict settled, Santiago Iglesias was sworn to his House seat on March 9, 1933.

Notes

3. Ibid., 29 January 1932, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 28 January 1932; William Green to Santiago Iglesias, 29 January 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
5. Santiago Iglesias to James R. Beverly, 22 January 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
8. Ibid., 7 February 1932, p. 1.
10. Ibid., pp. 44-46; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 31-32.
18. Maldonado, Rafael Martínez Nadal, su vida, pp. 9-28; Enrique Lugo Silva, Rafael Martínez Nadal: su vida y obra (San Juan, P. R.: Departamento de Instrucción Pública, 1979), pp. 1-6; Gustavo Jiménez Sicardó, op. cit., pp. 143-147.
19. Angela Negrón Muñoz, “Hablando con Don Rafael Martínez Nadal, Presidente del Senado de Puerto Rico,” El Mundo, 5 March 1933, p. 1; Lugo Silva, op. cit., p. 11; Maldonado, Hombres de primera plana, pp. 76-77.

25. El Mundo, 1 March 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 3 March 1932, p. 1; Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 2 March 1932; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 3 March 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 19.

26. El Mundo, 7 March 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 9 March 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 11 March 1932, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 8 March 1932; Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 10 March 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 19.


29. Interview with Josefina Iglesias de Laborde, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 20 August 1977; El Vocero, 3 April 1981, p. 16. This visit of Muñoz Marín to Iglesias is not well known even though it is of such historical importance. Other members of the Iglesias family remember it well. When I interviewed Muñoz Marín he told me he did not remember, but that it could have taken place. The two friends that picked him up were Rafael Torres Massoranna (deceased) and Antonio J. Colorado. Once I interviewed Colorado and asked him about this visit, he categorically told me he did not know anything, but then proceeded to relate numerous minor anecdotes about Iglesias. Thomas Mathews told me that the visit did take place, but he did not include it in his book. Carmelo Rosario Natal mentions (p. 216) the visit in his biography of Muñoz Marín, but does not explain what took place during those six hours. Another problem with the Muñoz Marín visit to Iglesias is its date. It could have taken place before Iglesias left for the States in September 1931 or after his return in February 1932.


32. Ibid., 4 March 1932, p. 1.

33. Ibid., 5 March 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 6 March 1932, p. 1.

34. Ibid., 7 March 1932, p 1; Unión Obrera, 8 March 1932; Ibid., 15 March 1932, p. 3.

35. Ibid., 11 March 1932, p. 1.


37. Ibid., 8 March 1932, p. 1.

38. Ibid., 7 April 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 8 April 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 14 April 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 15 April 1932, p. 1.

39. Ibid., 11 June 1932, p. 8.

40. Rosario Natal, La juventud de Luis Muñoz Marín, pp. 212-217; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 20-
22; La Democracia, 12 November 1931, p. 1; El Imparcial, 12 November 1931, p. 1; El Mundo, 22 November 1931, p. 1.

41. Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 6-7; La Democracia, 7 January 1932, p. 1; El Mundo, 20 February 1932, p. 1.


44. La Democracia, 10 March 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 11 March 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 12 March 1932, p. 1.


47. El Mundo, 18 March 1932, p. 5; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, Statement relative to Senate Bill No.26.


50. La Democracia, 31 March 1932, p. 4


52. Ibid., 29 April 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 6 May 1932, p. 1.


56. Ibid., 5 May 1932, p. 1.

57. Ibid., 19 May 1932, p. 1.


59. Ibid., 1 June 1932, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Butler Hare, 1 June 1932; Santiago Iglesias to John Garner, 10 June 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
67. Santiago Iglesias to John Garner, 10 June 1932; Santiago Iglesias to Louis Mc Fadden, 11 June 1932; Santiago Iglesias to Michael Reilly, 11 June 1932; Santiago Iglesias to Fiorello La Guardia, 11 June 1932; Santiago Iglesias to George Schneider, 13 June 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
68. *El Mundo*, 3 June 1932, p. 3
72. *La Democracia*, 1 July 1932, p. 4.
76. Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
77. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-159; *La Democracia*, 27 October 1932, p. 4.
Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 25 June 1932; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 28 June 1932, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

85. Ibid., 20 March 1932, p. 1.
86. Unión Obrera, 29 March 1932, p. 2.
87. Ibid., 2 April 1932, p. 2.
88. La Democracia, 12 April 1932, p. 1; Unión Obrera, 11 June 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 23 July 1932, p. 1.
89. Unión Obrera, 14 April 1932, p. 2; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
91. Ibid.; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
93. Unión Obrera, 26 May 1932, p. 1; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 33.
95. Unión Obrera, 19 July 1932, p. 2; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 30.
96. Unión Obrera, 21 July 1932, pp. 2-3; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 30.
99. Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, “Respuesta de la Comisión de Pacto del Partido Unión Republicana a la última proposición de ‘pacto libre electoral’ entre los partidos Socialista y Unión Republicana sometida por la Comisión Socialista, julio 25 de 1932.”
102. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 3 August 1932, p. 1.
104. Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, “Actuaciones de la octava


106. La Democracia, 6 August 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 16 August 1932, p. 1.

110. La Democracia, 19 August 1932, p. 4; El Mundo, 27 August 1932, p. 1.

111. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 1 September 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 2 September 1932, p. 1; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 37.

112. El Mundo, 2 September 1932, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 2 September 1932, p. 1.

113. La Democracia, 3 September 1932, p. 1.
114. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 3 September 1932, p. 1; El Mundo, 3 September 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 4 September 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 7 September 1932, p. 1; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 38.

115. El Mundo, 26 August 1932, p. 2; Ibid., 3 September 1932, p. 1; La Democracia, 6 September 1932, p. 1.


117. Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, “Pacto libre electoral concertado entre los partidos ‘Socialista’ y Unión Republicana’ aprobado por las convenciones de los partidos respectivamente verificados 13 (sie) y 1, 2, y 3 de septiembre de 1932 en la ciudad de Mayagüez, Puerto Rico”; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 39-41.

118. Néstor Rigual helped me identify some of the lesser known legislators.
119. La Democracia, 3 September 1932, p. 4; Ibid., 9 September 1932, p. 2; Ibid., 27 October 1932, p. 4.

120. El Mundo, 15 September 1932, p. 1.
121. Ibid., 6 September 1932, p. 1.
122. Ibid., 13 September 1932, p. 1.

123. La Democracia, 12 September 1932, p. 1; Ibid., 22 September 1932, p. 4; Ibid., 29 October 1932, p. 1; El País, 12 September 1932, p. 1; Unión Obrera, 8 September 1932, p. 1; El Mundo, 12 September 1932, p. 6.
124. *La Democracia*, 12 September 1932, p. 5; Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.
133. *El Mundo*, 4 October 1932, p. 1; Nestor Rígual helped me identify the ones I did not know.
135. *Unión Obrera*, 13 September 1932, p. 3.
145. Unión Obrera, 8 September 1932, pp. 1-2; Ibid., 13 September 1932, p. 1.
146. La Democracia, 7 October 1932, p. 1.
149. El País, 6 October 1932, pp. 1, 7.
150. Ibid., 7 October 1932, p. 1; El Mundo, 8 October 1932, p. 1.
154. La Democracia, 17 October 1932, p. 1.
155. Ibid., 5 November 1932, p. 1.
158. Ibid., 18 October 1932, p. 1.
159. Ibid., 19 October 1932, p. 1.
160. Ibid.
163. Ibid., 20 October, p. 1; Ibid., 5 November 1932, p. 7; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 22 October 1932, p. 1.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid., 18 October 1932, p. 1.
168. Ibid., 12 October 1932, p. 4.
169. Ibid., 19 October 1932, p. 4.
171. Ibid., 28 October 1932, p. 1.
172. Ibid.; La Democracia, 2 November 1932, p. 4.
173. La Democracia, 4 November 1932, p. 1.
174. Ibid., 1 November 1932, p. 4; Ibid., 2 November 1932, p. 4.
175. Ibid., 2 November 1932, p. 1.
177. Ibid., p. 2.
178. Ibid., 2 November 1932, p. 1.
179. Ibid., 9 November 1932, p. 1.
181. Ibid.; Ibid., 27 November 1932, sec. II, p. 7; Ibid., 18 September 1932, p. 8; El Mundo, 10 November 1932, p. 1; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 45-47.
183. Ibid., 15 November 1932, p. 1.
184. Ibid., 11 November 1932, p. 1.
187. Ibid., 12 November 1932, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 16 November 1932, p. 4; El País, 17 November 1932, p. 1.
189. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
197. Ibid., 17 November 1932, p. 1; Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, p. 54.
198. James R. Beverly to Santiago Iglesias, 15 November 1932; Bureau of Insular Affairs, Department of War, Record Group 350, James R. Beverly to General F. Le J. Parker, 17 November 1932; H. V. Neary to Bureau of Insular Affairs, 18 November 1932; National Archives.
202. Ibid., p. 301.
204. El Mundo, 14 December 1932, p. 1; Interview with Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, Carolina, P. R., 29 September 1980.
205. El País, 29 December 1932, p. 1; El Mundo, 11 January 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 18 January 1933, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Luis Sánchez Morales, 3 January 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
207. Ibid., 9 February 1933, p. 1.
209. Miguel A. García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 16 February 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 17 February 1933, p. 1.
211. Henry S. Ortega to Hamilton Fish, Jr., 20 February 1933 (copy of the letter sent by José Vivaldi to Santiago Iglesias), Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; The Evening Star, 27 February 1933, p. 2; El Mundo, 28 February 1933, p. 3; La Democracia, 1 March 1933, p. 1; La Prensa, 25 January 1933, p. 1.
212. Santiago Iglesias to Hamilton Fish, Jr., 22 February 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; La Información, 25 February 1933, p. 1; La Democracia, 3 March 1933, p. 1.
213. William Green to Hamilton Fish, Jr., 2 March 1933; Hamilton Fish, Jr., to Santiago Iglesias, 2 March 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
214. El Mundo, 10 March 1933, p. 3.
Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias was assigned the same office, number 433, at the House of Representatives Office Building, now the Cannon Building, which José L. Pesquera and Félix Córdova Dávila had previously occupied. His salary was $10,000. Iglesias was the first and only Spaniard ever to sit in Congress. The office he occupied was empty. There was not a single paper in its files. With the help of his staff, Iglesias began to organize immediately. Contrary to present days staffs, his was very small —only two secretaries and a legislative aide. The secretaries were his daughters, Libertad and Igualdad. Laura later replaced Igualdad when she married Bolívar Pagán in September, 1933. Frank Thatcher (later husband of América) was the legislative aide. No one criticized Iglesias of nepotism because there were hard working and responsible people who formed an efficient team. Resident commissioners were then appointed to serve in the committees of Insular Affairs and Agriculture because the most important problems of Puerto Rico were dealt with there. Iglesias was thus appointed to serve on both committees. Since he now had to dedicate more time to his new job, Iglesias resigned his salary as Secretary of the Pan American Federation of Labor, a position he had held since 1927, and now received only $1.00 a year. Back in Puerto Rico, William D. López was named acting president of the Free Federation to fulfill most of the duties Iglesias could not do from Washington. The Free Federation, however, would be primarily run by Secretary General Rafael Alonso Torres. The Socialist Party was locally directed also by Alonso Torres and Bolívar Pagán who served as vice-presidents. Pagán, however, gradually would have more preponderance than Alonso Torres because the latter was too busy running the Free Federation.

Iglesias considered his immediate plan of action. The economic reforms proposed by President Roosevelt in his inaugural speech should
be applied to Puerto Rico because the most pressing problem there was economic rehabilitation. The Insular governor should follow presidential plans. The governor selected should have the confidence of the President. Iglesias personally did not favor any individual for governor. He was not submitting any legislation immediately because Congressional committees, not yet organized, were not ready for Puerto Rican bills. Furthermore, he had not received from Insular Senate the bill for an elective governor to send to the President. Iglesias believed that his reform should be made together with the economic reforms and not separately.  

On March 29 he gave his first Congressional speech in which he pointed-out the need for Puerto Rico to be included in all national rehabilitation measures. The socio-economic conditions of Puerto Ricans demanded immediate Congressional attention. President Roosevelt's entire economic program should be extended to the Island. There was a need to make reforms. In this maiden speech, Iglesias briefed his fellow congressmen on the social, political, and economic situation of the American citizens who lived in Puerto Rico. A copy of the speech was sent to Secretary of War, George H. Dern.

During this period when Iglesias was getting organized, he had been as active as usual in dealing with requests to lobby in Congress to get Puerto Rico included in certain bills. Speaker García Méndez had cabled a request that local farmers be included in new agricultural loans being approved by Congress. Iglesias succeeded in getting Puerto Rico included in the desired legislation. García Méndez also wanted Iglesias to get Congressional authorization to legislate locally taxes on alcoholic liquors and beverages. This was a more complex problem that would take longer to solve. Insular banks were undergoing a crisis similar to that experienced by stateside banks. Martínez Nadal and García Méndez cabled Iglesias asking that local banks be given the same protection as that of national banks. Governor Beverly had already suggested the same idea. Iglesias had a meeting with Secretary of the Treasury William Wooding, and, as a result, Puerto Rico was included in the emergency Bank Conservation Act.

The afternoon of April 6, Resident Commissioner Iglesias had a half-hour conference with President Roosevelt. During this meeting the general conditions of the Island were explained and a rehabilitation plan was submitted. Iglesias then asked for Federal aid to fight unemployment and a loan from the Reconstruction Finance Commission large enough to consolidate the debts of municipal and Insular governments. The loan
would foster commerce and create new sources of income. President Roosevelt favored the plan and wrote a note to Secretary of War Dern stating that a "conservation bill" could be established in Puerto Rico.13

Iglesias' direct relationship with Secretary of War Dern began with a letter explaining the Insular political situation.14 This was followed by a courtesy visit on March 21.15 At their next meeting (April 11), Iglesias submitted to Dern his plan for unemployment relief which had presidential backing.16 The plan proposed that 25,000 men were to work in soil conservation, forest reserves, and plant and pest control. The workers were to be recruited by the Insular Department of Labor under the same system as that employed in the States.17

The principle espoused by Iglesias and the Coalition that Puerto Rico should receive equal treatment in Federal rehabilitation plans was not acceptable, however, to General F. Le Jeune Parker, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Parker believed that the Island was receiving too much Federal aid (more than the average state) and that these funds had to be reduced. The Insular government had also to limit its expenditures.18 Governor Beverly knew of this tight-purse economic philosophy and did his best to cut spending. In his message to the new Legislature in February, he had proposed that expenses be reduced and that Puerto Rico look for its own solution for its economic problems. There had to be a reduction in the number of government employees and further salary cuts.19 Beverly asked the Legislature for a $9,366,969.78 budget.20 The economic situation was going to be so precarious by the end of March that the government barely had the necessary funds to pay its monthly payroll.21 Secretary of the Treasury Manuel V. Domenech declared that there was a deficit of $1,200,000.22 Salaries of public employees were cut ten percent (on top of the 10 percent of the year before), and higher officials received cuts of 15 percent.23 By the end of November and after several bank loans, the Treasury would end "Without a dollar in the bank to meet current obligations."24

Iglesias' plan to get jobs for 25,000 unemployed was reduced to a mere 1,200 and was administered by the Federal Forest Service local representative and not the Insular Department of Labor. The funds allocated totaled $197,610.25 Puerto Rico was not to be treated equally for, after all, it was only a colony where the natives were different from the other American citizens on the Mainland.

Under a specter of economic bankruptcy, the Legislature had begun its session. The State Insurance Fund had been in operation for over a
decade with yearly deficits. The Socialist Party platform favored the Funds improvement. Iglesias considered the improvement plan to be "ideal" and "just." But the Republican-Unionists legislators were against the plan because of the precarious economic conditions. Governor Beverly disapproved the way the State Insurance Fund was organized. No change in the Fund was effected because the Coalition refused to agree.

Another conflict developed over the legislative bill to regulate the needle industry. Rafael Alonso Torres presented it as a measure to improve the working conditions and raise the very low wages. The Needle Industrialists Association, naturally, opposed it. Claiming it would create more unemployment, Republican-Unionist Representative María Luisa Arcelay led the fight in the House against the bill. The two wings of the Coalition were at odds again. Commissioner of Labor Prudencio Rivera Martínez favored the bill. The bill was not approved. This second legislative conflict between the Coalition began to create disenchantment among some Socialists. In this type of controversy between the two parties, the attitude of Iglesias was always one of prudence, conciliation, and compromise. After all, more could be achieved by sharing power in a coalition than by acting as a legislative minority.

During these months the topic foremost in the minds of the close followers of the political scene (always a numerous group in Puerto Rico's highly politicized atmosphere) was who was going to be appointed governor. Was the new executive going to be another Continental or would a Puerto Rican be named? Governor Beverly considered that a non-native was better because almost everyone in the Island was related by marriage, business relationships or personal friendship. General Parker of the Bureau of Insular Affairs thought that a Continental could play a more impartial role. Mariano Abril reasoned that due to the economic depression, a Puerto Rican appointee would fail "irremediably," and so it was better to have a non-native.

Others thought differently. Mr. and Mrs. James Bourne, former Hyde Park neighbors and close friends of the Roosevelt's, who were working on the Island wrote to the President in favor of the designation of a native son. Francis Dexter did likewise, but also suggested that a Continental resident in Puerto Rico could be a good choice for governor.

The War Department had written to Governor Beverly asking him for names of candidates for La Fortaleza. The principal aspirant was Liberal
lawyer Martín Travieso and this was soon known. Having served as a member of the Executive Council (1908-1914), executive secretary of Puerto Rico (1914-1917), first Puerto Rican acting governor (1916), senator at-large (1917-1920), and mayor of San Juan (1920-1923), he was a strong contender. Iglesias wrote to Secretary Dern with a list of the Coalition-backed candidates for governor. They were: Rafael Martínez Nadal, Luis Sánchez Morales, Prudencio Rivera Martínez, and Celestino Iriarte. Later Iglesias sent President Roosevelt a memorandum in which the following names were added: Manuel V. Domenech, Martín Travieso, Merton L. Corey, Jean S. Whittemore, Antonio González, I. B. Dunlap, and James Beverly. Iglesias also informed the press that there were other candidates such as Rafael Ríos, James Kelly, Fiorello La Guardia, Bert Fish, and W. McManus, Jr.

To these actions of Iglesias, Henry S. Ortega protested and wrote to Secretary Dern accusing the Resident Commissioner of being a “communist,” as he had previously done regarding Hamilton Fish, Jr. The Puerto Rican colony in New York protested at Ortega’s ridiculous meddlings.

Another candidate for the governorship was Commissioner of Education Dr. José Padín. He had the backing of Mrs. Bourne who had written to her personal friend Franklin Roosevelt.

It seemed that Martín Travieso had a very good chance of being named. Antonio R. Barceló and Henry S. Ortega called Post Master General James Farley apparently to get his support for Travieso. But Farley was backing an unknown early supporter of President Roosevelt: Kentucky-born Robert Hayes Gore. Gore was a Catholic and a successful businessman (insurance in Chicago) and journalist (in Florida), but had no governmental experience. On April 27 President Roosevelt appointed him. The next day Iglesias visited the new governor to congratulate him and offer his support. Martínez Nadal wired his backing.

Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland presided at the hearings on Gore’s appointment at the Committee of Insular Affairs. Barceló was present and made no objections. Iglesias and Jean Whittemore backed Gore’s nomination. The support of the Coalition was contained in a cable sent by Martínez Nadal and Alonso Torres and read by Iglesias to the Committee. A letter was also sent to Tydings. Henry S. Ortega opposed the nomination because of “Gore’s lack of tact and diplomacy.” But the Committee was favorable, and thus the Senate approved the new governor on May 15.
Iglesias’ activities to get more economic aid and benefits for Puerto Rico continued. He was able to convince Senator Robert Wagner to include the Island in the Wagner-La Follette rehabilitation bill. Iglesias wrote to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins urging her not to forget Puerto Rico in any form of rehabilitation measure. For President Roosevelt, Iglesias had words of praise for his Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America. The Federal Government’s plan to reduce by 50 percent the pensions of veterans who were not living in the states and District of Columbia was strongly opposed by Iglesias, and he finally succeeded in preventing the reduction. A geological survey of Puerto Rico was favored by the government, so Iglesias introduced a bill (H.R. 5494) to get Congressional approval so that the Department of the Interior could make the map. Realizing that Puerto Rico was not getting the rehabilitation funds so badly needed, Iglesias gave another speech in the House asking for the inclusion of the Island in President Roosevelt’s economic relief plans. This was not going to happen because the War Department considered that the Federal policy to the Island had “been more liberal than that accorded to any other territory or any State.” General Parker was not in agreement with Iglesias’ policy extending all Federal relief aid to Puerto Rico (which did not pay Federal taxes as did the States). So since the Bureau did not agree with Iglesias’ relief policy, the War Department, the White House, and the Congress would not either. Therefore, Puerto Rico would get what Washington thought best and not what its elected representatives considered necessary.

The Liberal Party did not feel comfortable as legislative minority. Since as Unionists and as the dominant wing of the Alliance they had been in power for over two decades, it was not easy to be in opposition. Parliamentary conflicts always erupted. During one of these disputes, the Liberals walked off the Floor, calling the Coalition majority “tyrannical and despotic.” This was the first time such action had occurred. The Liberals ideal of independence had now become somewhat softened. Barceló had written to his “old friend” President Roosevelt praising the Democratic Party and informing him that the Liberal Party had the “backing of the popular majority” of the Island but that it lacked proper representation in the government due to the Coalition. The Liberals always considered themselves the majority because they were the largest single party and tried to ignore the voting reality that made the Coalition the obvious electoral majority. Accompanied by Walter Mck. Jones who served as translator, Barceló went to Washington, where he lobbied for his Party but not for independence.
Senators Rafael Martínez Nadal and Alfonso Valdés also went to Washington for the purpose of holding meetings and conferences with Iglesias, Gore, and other prominent people. Several times, by chance, they ran into Barceló, who wanted Martínez Nadal to ask for an elective governor for 1936. Iglesias declared that it was the Legislature that had to take that step and not the three political leaders. The Coalition leaders visited senators Wagner, Fletcher, Hendricks, and La Follette and representatives Mansfield, McDuffie, Lanzetta, House Majority Leader Byrnes, and American Federation of Labor President Green. Majority Leader Byrnes spoke favorably for statehood. Iglesias gave a dinner to which Governor Gore, New York Democratic Congressman James Lanzetta, Martínez Nadal, and Valdés were invited. The most important visit was to the White House. Secretary Dern took Iglesias, Martínez Nadal, and Valdés to see President Roosevelt on June 2. Roosevelt told them that he was interested in the well-being of the Island and hoped to visit it in the fall. He also told Iglesias that he backed Iglesias’ geological survey bill. The Coalition delegation thanked the President for having extended to Puerto Rico so many Federal rehabilitation measures and told him that the administrators should not forget that the Island was part of the American nation and thus entitled to the same treatment as the Continental citizens. Roosevelt was reminded that the Coalition was the Insular political majority which favored statehood while the Liberals wanted independence. On their return to San Juan, Martínez Nadal and Valdés declared that the Roosevelt Administration was “disposed to take Statehood action during the present term, as well as extended economic reconstruction measures to the island.”

General information of what Puerto Rico was like had never been promoted by the office of the resident commissioner. Most state-side knowledge of the Island had been limited, deficient, and mostly negative, usually it has been considered either a poverty-stricken place or a tropical paradise for vacations. Iglesias began to change this concept of the Island by asking the governor and the Insular departments to send printed material, photographs, and other types of information about the different aspects of Puerto Rican culture, industry, agriculture, natural beauties, and people. All this information would be exhibited and distributed from his office.

Governor Beverly flew to Washington at the end of May to meet with Iglesias and several Washington authorities. His period as governor was coming to an end and had probably been the most difficult economically
in the history of Puerto Rico. In two years he had been forced to reduce the budget by $2,000,000 by means of salary cuts, reduction of services, and dismissal of employees. Beverly's tight-purse fiscal policy had certainly not been popular, but the Island did not lose its credit. The Reconstruction Finance Commission had spent over one million dollars in self liquidating projects which helped the unemployed. Beverly had even criticized all local politicians for giving more attention to politics than to economic rehabilitation. He was to be the only Continental governor who settled permanently in Puerto Rico with his family after finishing his term.68

For the Century of Progress Fair in Chicago Governor-designate Gore went to give a speech on June 2 at a dinner sponsored by the Puerto Rican delegation. In his speech he declared himself a New Dealer and promised to apply that credo in Puerto Rico. Gore added that the Democratic Party would grant statehood to Puerto Rico "as soon as the Island" offered "the security that it could assume the responsibilities that weigh on the other States."69 Iglesias, as well as Barceló, Martínez Nadal, and Valdés, was present at the dinner and later had a long conference with Gore where they discussed the way to apply Federal rehabilitation and reforestation laws in Puerto Rico.70 The Bureau of Insular Affairs and the War Department were greatly perturbed by Gore's pro-statehood stand. General Parker considered that statehood was a very distant possibility and that such policy statements should be left to the President or the Secretary of War, and Secretary Dern so informed Gore. The Governor-designate then wrote to President Roosevelt saying that he knew it would take a long time for the Island to join the Union.71

Governor-designate Gore arrived accompanied by his wife, six of his nine children, his mother, and a small Florida military escort.72 The July 1 inaugural ceremonies began by Gore attending mass and taking communion at the San Juan Cathedral and later going to the official act in front of the Capitol, attended by a crowd of more than 5,000. The Governor promised in his speech to implant the New Deal in Puerto Rico and to fight exploitation. In this pro-labor address, he promised land reform, legalization of cock-fights, industrialization, practical education, reforestation and beautification, electrification, tourism, better wages and shorter hours, and opposition to birth control. As for status, Puerto Rico must first become self-sustaining in order to be able to join the Union. Gore ended the inaugural speech by stating that he "would make mistakes," but he would do his best to be successful.73
The reaction to Gore's address was most favorable. Socialist Vice-President Alonso Torres called the speech a "boaster" for organized labor. Francisco Paz Granela, Vice-President of the Free Federation, declared that that organization would "decidedly cooperate" with the new Governor. Martínez Nadal told the press that the Coalition would give "all its cooperation" to Gore's rehabilitation plans. Iglesias later wrote that both the Free Federation and the Socialist Party would cooperate with the plans proposed by Gore in his address. Even the Liberals were favorably inclined. Greeting Gore and offering advice, Muñoz Marín editorialized later in La Democracia. He warned the new Executive that the economic situation of the Insular government was too precarious to make any drastic reforms, that the tax-payers and economic interests were in a similar situation and that, thus, the funds to make reforms and fight poverty could not come from them. In other words, Gore should follow the conservative economic policies of his predecessor.

The only group that was against Gore was the Nationalists, but this was to be expected because they were becoming increasingly vociferous. Albizu Campos had already been attacking the Liberals for their historical "duplicity" and collaboration with Washington. He also accused them now of trying to become the representatives of the Democratic Party in Puerto Rico. President Roosevelt was considered a "dictator," and Congress was just an "organized despotism." The United States was an imperial power run by a "Protestant and Masonic oligarchy." Former-Governor Beverly had conceived a "Diabolic Plan" with Gore in Chicago. Puerto Ricans should fight back and "consolidate against the Nordic invader."

In the Fourth of July address, Martínez Nadal was the main speaker and there he answered part of the Nationalist rhetoric. He condemned political movements "born out of hysteria and paroxysm," Russia "under the iron fist of the relentless Stalin," and Italy and Germany under "the rigid hands of steel of Mussolini and Hitler." The tragedy of such countries should serve as a warning to the people of countries like Puerto Rico and the United States which want to preserve democracy. Martínez Nadal had high praise for President Roosevelt and added that Puerto Ricans would "unhesitating cooperate" to make the needed socio-economic rehabilitation. As for status, he stated that what the Island rejected was "the idea of being indefinitely kept in a state of servitude as a colony which ... lessens the prestige of the democratic traditions of the United States of America." The solution was either statehood or independence. Between the two, Puerto Rico preferred the first.
Iglesias thought of going to Puerto Rico during the summer, but considered it more important to stay in Washington working on Capitol Hill. He urged fellow Socialist to work out a basic program with Governor Gore which included the following: legislation to put into practice certain federal rehabilitation laws; approval of a workers’ compensation law; municipal reorganization; and a compromise between the public works bill vetoed by Beverly and the new Federal public works laws. Iglesias also urged the Socialists and Free Federation leadership to be disciplined and harmonious. The Coalition should keep a solid parliamentary majority and avoid divergences.

Among the principal Congressional legislation Iglesias had succeeded in extending to Puerto Rico were: loans to fight unemployment with public works granted by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; equal treatment for Puerto Rican veterans; a loan law for owners of mortgaged houses in danger of losing their residence; a bank law to protect depositors’ money; an industrial rehabilitation law which gave money for public works; a reforestation program; the law permitting the establishing of a liquor industry which also allowed the government to keep taxes collected; and the law that authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to grant loans to farmers with mortgaged farms. He had failed in convincing the War Department and President Roosevelt not to uphold Governor Beverly’s veto on new amendments to the electoral law for which the Coalition had voted twice.

There was another reason for Iglesias to remain in Washington. In the middle of July Mrs. Santiago Iglesias, daughter Luz and sons Manuel and Eduardo came to live in the Porter Street house. Iglesias was very close to his family, so he was very happy to have most of them together again after a six-month absence.

The National Recovery Act became law on June 16, 1933. Iglesias wrote to the National Recovery Administration to see if the act applied to Puerto Rico and was informed that it did. Two sections of the act affected workers and industry: the President of the United States had the power to approve fair competition codes submitted by labor organizations or make them if none were made; and the codes gave workers much protection and many benefits. The codes had to be approved by Washington and not by a local representative. Iglesias suggested to General Hugh S. Johnson that his Administration should have someone familiar with Puerto Rico to serve as advisor regarding its particular problems. No such person was named.
The Insular business community came out against the National Recovery Act through its two principal mouthpieces: the Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico and the Manufacturer's Association of Puerto Rico. They claimed that the Island was not the same as the Continent and that different regulations had to be used. Governor Gore backed this stand. Local industries should have separate codes. Secretary of War Dern tried unsuccessfully to postpone the application of the codes until the Puerto Rican government could present its case for different treatment for the local industries. Some Continental business interests wanted the codes adopted in the States for certain industries to be applied to their competitors in Puerto Rico. Besides having special codes adopted to the local economic realities, the Insular business community wanted a deputy-administrator named for Puerto Rico. Since the Island had not been included in the ten national regions, Iglesias proposed that an eleventh region to be made for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. This suggestion was not accepted. Iglesias then wrote to General Johnson, urging the appointment of a coordinator to deal with the formulation of codes because the local economic conditions were getting worse. But months would pass before a coordinator was selected.

The business groups (i.e., Chamber of Commerce, Manufacturers' Association, Asociación de Agricultores, Sugar Producers Association, Puerto Rico Engineers' Society, and Chamber of Insular Wholesale Merchants) and the government were in agreement that the fair competition codes in Puerto Rico had to be different. Wages should be increased but not so high as to drive out industries. Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez and Iglesias favored this principle. What Iglesias really wanted was that the differences between competing Insular and Continental industries be harmonized. A delegation from the leading business association went to Washington to lobby but it was unsuccessful. The Roosevelt Administration wanted the codes approved in Washington even though it was realized that they had to be different and consideration had to be taken of local suggestions. A special coordinator was then sent to Puerto Rico to formulate the codes. General Johnson wanted to have the Continental codes first and then develop the Insular codes. For industries that did not compete with Continental ones, there were to be no codes.

Ruby Black recommended Martín Travieso for head of the National Recovery Administration for Puerto Rico. Black, an influential Washing-
ton journalist, correspondent for *La Democracia*, and sort of lobbyist for the Liberal Party, was pushing a corporation lawyer whom the Socialists opposed and a prominent politician from the Party that had had Governor Gore under fire since August (this conflict will be explained later). Alonso Torres and Martínez Nadal were strongly opposed to Travieso also. For that position Gore and the Coalition favored Eduardo Saldaña, the former executive secretary of Puerto Rico and a Liberal. If Travieso were named, Gore would resign. Travieso was not appointed.\textsuperscript{102}

The coming codes of the National Recovery Act gave hope to the workers that their working rights and economic conditions would be improved. The business interests were simultaneously trying to increase their production before the codes were made and wages raised. From the beginning of the year there had been some important strikes, but in the summer the situation grew worse. The tobacco industry was declining alarmingly, factories were closing, and working hours were increasing while salaries remained very low. This situation caused a wave of strikes in August. Gore and Rivera Martínez tried to find a compromise situation but were not successful.\textsuperscript{103} Strikes in the needle industry—which employed 60,000 to 100,000 and was a $15,000,000 yearly business—also broke out as a result of low wages and poor working conditions. In Mayagüez, the center of the industry, street riots erupted as a result of the lack of lack of the authorities. The factory of María Luisa Arcelay was stoned, two people were killed (a woman and a three year old girl), and seventy were wounded. Governor Gore requested the intervention of Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez, and an agreement was reached by which workers received wage increases ranging between 15 to 25 percent.\textsuperscript{104}

The atmosphere created by the National Recovery Act and the strikes that had been taking place helped the Free Federation to organize more unions.\textsuperscript{105} There was a special convention held by the Executive Council of the Free Federation at the Capitol where 150 delegates representing 25,000 workers gathered. Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez also held a meeting between labor leaders and leading employers to discuss the application of the National Recovery Act. Governor Gore was present and delivered a speech.\textsuperscript{106} As a result of all these activities and strikes, the Free Federation was able to unionize more than 75 percent of factory and shop workers. Homeworkers had also begun to organize. There were now thirty-five unions with 12,000 members and nine homeworkers' unions with a membership of over 3,000.\textsuperscript{107} It was not a simple thing to get
workers organized during these depression years because union dues were more difficult to collect.

Although the Free Federation was augmenting its membership, some discontent among workers began to grow. They complained about police abuses, the Mediation and Conciliation Commission, the Department of Labor, some New Deal measures, and the Free Federation and Socialist leadership. Some workers apparently thought that because they had reached political power (but they had not found a gold mine and there was a World depression) and Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez had surged from the proletariat, the Department of Labor and the Mediation and Conciliation Commission should help them more. Rivera Martínez considered himself a moderator between labor, capital, and government, and, after all, no Department of Labor is supposed to be exclusively pro-labor. The Socialist Party was an organization essentially composed of workers with a handful of professionals, but they had to share power with the Republican-Unionists who were heterogeneous. Although the Socialists shared the legislative power, the Insular government was not a parliamentary one. The governor had a great deal of power and was independent of the political parties. The Socialists had the Department of Labor and later—after struggle—the Treasury, but they never received the Executive Secretariat of Puerto Rico as had been agreed upon. Because Republican-Unionists were better prepared academically, they received more government jobs than the Socialists. Another vital factor was that with Iglesias in Washington, the Free Federation and the Socialist Party could not operate as well as before, and this was their tragedy. Iglesias reminded his followers that this was a period of great unemployment and criticized the radicals that did not produce “fruitful effects.”

Iglesias urged General Johnson to name the Insular deputy administrator for the application of the National Recovery Act codes. As mentioned before, the Liberals had pushed Travieso for this post while the Coalition favored Saldaña. At the end of November, Boaz Long, an experienced diplomat and then Chief of the Recovery Boards Section of the National Recovery Administration, was finally appointed Deputy Administrator for Puerto Rico. The net results of the National Recovery Act in the Island, ironically enough, were very limited after so much controversy. Only three codes were to be made: for loading and unloading fertilizers, the needle industry, and bakeries. The Free Federation complained that the codes limited labor activities in achieving better working conditions, shorter working hours, and higher wages than before.
Parallel to these complications, ensuing from the application of the National Recovery Act, was the political fight between Coalitionists and Liberals for the local control of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration created in May, 1933, to help alleviate unemployment. As a result of the change of governors, the program did not begin operations until the end of August. The administrator of this program in Washington was Harry Hopkins; James Bourne was named to head the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (P.R.E.R.A.). Bourne, a Yale graduate, had administered a local cannery for the past three years. Before that, he had managed a large farm near Hyde Park where he and his wife Dorothy became close friends of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt. Mrs. Bourne had been brought to the University of Puerto Rico to organize the new Department of Social Work. It seemed that the Hyde Park connection was influential in getting Mr. Bourne to head the P.R.E.R.A. Bourne was responsible directly to Harry Hopkins and not to the Governor Gore nor the Coalition Legislature.\textsuperscript{114}

If the officials in Washington thought that a Continental was better prepared than a native to administer the Federal funds and would keep the agency apolitical, they were wrong. Since Bourne had been named over the head of Gore and the elected representatives of Puerto Rico, bitter conflicts were just a matter of time. An agency that would disburse large amounts of money would inevitably influence the voters, and political parties — naturally — always would want to control such bureaucracy. Politicians in power thought — logically — that they were the ones entitled to get the jobs and distribute the funds and not the minority opposition.

James Bourne had the offices of the P.R.E.R.A. in the Capitol. For 1933 he received $700,000 in Federal funds that were used for road building, extension programs, malaria control, needle work centers, and food distributions. Some of these programs were carried out in coordination with government departments and the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{115}

In Puerto Rico apolitical persons are rare as the almost extinct Puerto Rican parrot, and everyone knows the political sympathies of everyone else. Soon the Coalition realized that Bourne had hired a preponderance of Liberals.\textsuperscript{116} He denied the charge and called Martínez Nadal "a cheap politician."\textsuperscript{117} But Bourne had great influence in Washington; therefore, the protest of the Coalition did not change anything. Nevertheless an assembly of Coalitionists municipalities met and declared James Bourne \textit{persona non grata}.\textsuperscript{118}
A few days after this assembly, Iglesias had a conference with Harry Hopkins who told Iglesias that he knew of the fight but was "not going to pay any attention to" it, but he added, that if it continued, he would "withdraw" Bourne "from the Island and not a cent will go down ...for relief of the unemployed." Iglesias told Hopkins that such action would be unfair. Hopkins added that "Mr. Bourne is a friend of the President and he is my man. If he suits the President, he suits me. I am not going to pay attention to any political fight. No matter what he does..."[119] The Hyde Park connection was indeed a solid one.

Puerto Rico's economy was based on sugar, and the New Deal brought readjustments for this crop. The sugar tariff of 1930 had helped increased Puerto Rican sugar production to the detriment of Cuba's. The new Secretary of Commerce, Daniel C. Roper, had been an attorney for Cuban sugar interests and, together with the Good Neighbor Policy, changes favorable to Cuba were expected. The Tariff Commission favored a reduction of sugar production in the United States in order to raise its price and urged the reduction on Cuba's sugar duty. At the hearings Iglesias wanted the Island treated as if it were a state. After the fall of President Gerardo Machado in August and the radicalization of the 1933 Cuban Revolution, Washington wanted to help Cuba. Quotas were proposed, and Puerto Rico was to receive an acceptable quota of 875,000 tons, basically the local production. There was strong disagreement, however, on the amount allowed to be refined. The Island was already refining 115,000 tons, but this was to be reduced to 100,000 tons. Senator Pedro Juan Serrallés, whose family owned a refinery, protested because he had made more investments to increase production. Lower quotas meant unemployment and worsening of the economy. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace refused to accept all these sugar agreements because they were detrimental to the consumers. Since the Agricultural Adjustment Act was giving signs of success by reducing agricultural production, a new sugar plan had to be worked out for 1934.[120]

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of April, 1933, had a strong impact in Puerto Rico. Insular business interests vehemently opposed it as they had opposed the National Recovery Act. Both Governor Gore and Iglesias were against it. But their opposition was not successful. The worst part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was that it created a sharp inflation. Fancy rice rose from $2.40 a hundred pounds to $4.10; red beans, from $3.00 per hundred pounds to $5.25; codfish, from $19.00 per hundred pounds to $28.00; flour, from $3.50 to $6.15; lard, from $14.50
to $18.00. The cost of living reportedly increased by one third.\textsuperscript{121} This was another factor that precipitated more strikes.

Governor Gore began his term with great expectations. But it was not long before the political caldron began to boil and overflow, and he found himself in it. The trouble began with the cabinet appointments. Post Master General Farley—the godfather of New Deal patronage—wanted Democratic Committeewoman Mrs. Jean Whittemore for Commissioner of Education. Insular legislative leaders had met with Gore to discuss all types of appointments, but he did not want any party to impose any candidate on him. The parties should submit their lists.\textsuperscript{122} The Liberals did not want a Commissioner of Education that would change the policies on education (Mrs. Whittemore was considered too pro-American and was a statehooder). The War Department wanted that post to be apolitical and resented Farley’s meddling in what they correctly considered their own affair. Governor Gore and the Coalition were in agreement that the schools were not pro-American, English was not stressed enough, and that there was too much pro-independence inclination. Dr. José Padín, the Commissioner of Education since 1929, was highly respected as an educator and had numerous supporters. Ideally Gore would have wanted to govern without depending on any particular party. Briefly he even thought of governing with a real local Democratic Party he tried to form, but his only backing was the Coalition, which was, after all, the electoral majority. Cabinet members in Puerto Rico had generally been chosen from the legislative majority. The only two exceptions occurred in the early 1900’s when Continentals were named and during Roosevelt’s and Beverly’s terms when the parties were in a state of flux.\textsuperscript{123}

The Coalition wanted six cabinet members of whom Health, Interior, Agriculture should be Republican-Unionists, and Labor, Treasury, and Executive Secretariat Socialists. The Attorney General, Commissioner of Education, and the Auditor were to be Continentals who were the closest ones to be apolitical. Gore’s first appointment went to Republican-Unionist Rafael Menéndez Ramos for the Department of Agriculture. Barceló sent a list of candidates for posts in areas where the Liberals were the majority over the Coalition, but Gore was now inclined to name Coalitionists instead of Liberals. This was the mistake that would snowball and bring his downfall. The Liberal Party would give no quarter to Gore.\textsuperscript{124}

The gauntlet had been dropped, but the war had not yet started. At a press conference on August 11, Governor Gore declared that his ap-
pointees had to give him undated resignation letters and that "his action was in line with that of President Roosevelt." Barceló immediately withdrew all the Liberal candidates and backing to the Governor. Gore's behavior was considered an offence to the dignity of Puerto Rico. The White House was surprised by this news and denied that the President had asked for undated resignations. Some Coalition leaders were not happy with this situation. When Dr. Eduardo Garrido Morales was named, over Liberal opposition, Commissioner of Health to replace Liberal Dr. Antonio Fernós Isern, Gore, who had not yet asked for any undated resignations, did not ask Garrido Morales for any letter. The unwise policy that had never been used was not to be applied. Barceló, nevertheless, cabled a protest statement against Gore's Administration to President Roosevelt.

As the gulf in the relationship with the Liberals was widening beyond reconciliation, Gore's dealings with the Coalition were getting closer. The Legislature, however, twice passed a bill to make changes in the State Insurance Fund. Gore vetoed it both times and angered the Socialists. Because the fight between Gore and the Liberals was receiving most of the attention, these vetoes were neglected by those who ought to have protested.

The attacks of the Liberals against Gore were to become disrespectful, vitriolic, and vituperative in the coming weeks. At the end of August, he left for Washington. The trip had been postponed a few days because his health had not been good. No more cabinet appointments were to be made until his return. In the Capital Gore talked to Iglesias about naming two Socialists cabinet members for the Department of Labor and Treasury. He also defended himself against Barceló's attacks and denied he had ever asked for undated resignations. Gore then committed a terrible blunder by accusing Barceló of having invented that story. Muñoz Marín rapidly answered him in a front-page English editorial in La Democracia. He called Gore a "damn liar" and openly invited the Governor to sue the paper for libel. Even though Gore was being attacked so vehemently by the Liberals and was considered by them completely inept, the business community found him "accessible and understanding."

Iglesias and Socialist Senator Antonio Reyes Delgado, then in Washington, visited Secretary Dern and wrote to President Roosevelt in defense of Governor Gore. The Governor saw the President twice and declared that he had Roosevelt's "full moral support." The Liberals,
nevertheless, were prepared to continue to oppose Gore until he would resign without causing much embarrassment to Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{134}

One of Gore’s reasons for this Washington trip was to try to get Commissioner Padín replaced. The Governor complained that the public school system was not pro-American enough and the rising anti-Americanism wave had to be reversed. Secretary Dern and the White House were not in agreement with Gore and were supportive of Padín. The Governor, nevertheless, recommended Dr. José Gallardo to replace Padín.\textsuperscript{135} The Coalition through Iglesias, submitted a list of seven candidates for the post; Gallardo’s name was first.\textsuperscript{136} Later Iglesias and Bolívar Pagán sent a memorandum on the Commissioner of Education to Secretary Dern which emphasized the need of a pro-American orientation in the schools but did not endorse any candidate in particular.\textsuperscript{137} Because this was a very delicate problem, no decision was taken for some time.

Governor Gore returned to San Juan on September 18 and was warmly received by the Coalition leadership. His new plans included $500,000 to fight malaria, $1,000,000 to dry swampy slums, build 5,000 concrete houses for poor people, and other Federal funds that would generate work for 100,000 families.\textsuperscript{138} Cabinet members began to be named: Republican-Unionist Francisco Pons was reappointed Interior Commissioner; Baltimorean Colonel E. Francis Riggs became Chief of Police; Prudencio Rivera Martínez was kept in the Department of Labor; Republican-Unionist (instead of a Socialist) Carlos Gallardo became Executive Secretary; Democrat Benjamin Horton got the post of Attorney General; Republican-Unionist Manuel Domenech was retained as Treasurer (a post that a Socialist was supposed to get); and Auditor Leslie A. McLead was renamed.\textsuperscript{139}

Some Liberals believed that the best way to deal with Gore was to scoff at him. Gustavo Jiménez Sicardó co-authored a satirical political play called \textit{Gore’s Hell} which was a great success —it was reported on the front page of \textit{The New York Times}— right after the Governor returned. This play further damaged Gore’s Administration.\textsuperscript{140}

It was the appointment of Rafael Alonso Torres to the Board of Trustees of the University of Puerto Rico which finally would form the political hurricane that would destroy Gore’s governorship beyond repair.\textsuperscript{141} In those days the Board of Trustees was composed by the presidents of the legislative chambers, the commissioner of Education, and people who were considered intellectuals. Because Alonso Torres
was not an intellectual—he was a self-made man, a typographer by profession, and a prominent labor and political leader—a protest developed that the Liberals exploited to their advantage. \textit{La Democracia} rapidly led a daily offensive through its editor Luis Muñoz Marín in articles which began to criticize the Governor incessantly and coarsely. Muñoz Marín editorially censored the new appointment and called Gore "Caligula" and Alonso Torres "Consul" (referring to the notoriously degenerate Roman emperor's celebrated horse Incitatus). This un-edifying attack is astonishing, coming from a man that many considered Puerto Rico's greatest statesman. Alonso Torres was considered to be without "any cultural and mental" qualifications. An assembly of students at the main campus in Río Piedras protested the appointment of Alonso Torres. In those days there was marked degree of elitism at the University, and Alonso Torres had been critical of it, so he was double resented. Secretly, Muñoz Marín collaborated with University Chancellor Carlos Chardón to foment a strike. The irony of this protest was that when Alonso Torres had replaced Rossy as Speaker in the Board of Trustees a year before, no one had raised an eyebrow.

Iglesias congratulated Alonso Torres for his appointment and declared that the opponents had shown an unfortunate conception of modern universities that were then trying to dignify labor. The students should love the working people that were the immense majority. Mayor Blas Oliveras wrote that the student protest was "instigated by an aristocratic-Liberal-separatist caste" which was annoyed because the Alonso Torres appointment broke with an archaic elitism (which can be seen in the University yearbooks and the photographs of social activities of the \textit{Puerto Rico Ilustrado}). Cayetano Coll y Cuchí stated that 90 percent of the former trustees were not men of letters and had not even been university graduates. Many of Puerto Rico's greatest men had not been university graduates. Alonso Torres had the backing of some students, the labor unions, and the Coalition, but the opposition was more successful. The students took their protest to La Fortaleza, but Gore refused to see them. Therefore, they bought him an etiquette book.

Iglesias and Rivera Martínez represented Puerto Rico at the Washington convention of the American Federation of Labor (2-13 October, 1933). They presented a resolution that was accepted which asked that all Federal rehabilitation laws be extended to the Island and that the National Recovery Act codes be drafted in a way that Puerto Rico would not be kept as a cheap labor market.
To counterattack the Liberal offensive against Gore and the Coalition, a parade favoring the New Deal and President Roosevelt was organized. Some 35,000 persons paraded on October 15 in front of La Fortaleza where spirited speeches were given by Gore and Coalition leaders and messages read from Iglesias and Roosevelt. The Liberals discreetly participated because it was one thing to attack the Insular government and something else to attack the President. José Andreu Blanco, President of the Merchant’s Federation, tried to take part publicly in the parade but was not allowed to do so by the Liberals in the Federation. For this move, he was later ousted from the Federation presidency and replaced by Liberal Germán Rieckehoff.153

But the students at the Río Piedras campus were still active. The protest became a strike on October 18, and it was to continue until Alonso Torres was “deposed.”154 Chancellor Chardón now condemned the striking 3,000 students he had secretly supported. The situation became critical. The Nationalists, however, did not become an important factor in the strike because the Alonso Torres appointment was not a fundamental problem. Albizu Campos did not get personally involved.155

What made the Alonso Torres affair more complex was the conflict between Gore and the Coalition versus Commissioner of Education Padín. Shortly after the Governor had returned in September, Padín wrote to him requesting to send Mrs. Bourne to a convention in Washington. Gore correctly suspected that Mrs. Bourne would also use the trip to defend Padín, but the Governor could not deny the travel request. To General Creed F. Cox, new Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, and Secretary Dern she defended Padín and said he was not anti-American and that a program of Americanization in the schools would be harmful. Since she was a personal friend of Eleanor Roosevelt, Mrs. Bourne was invited to attend one of the famous White House afternoon teas. The President—who did not attend— wanted to know more about Puerto Rico and Gore, so Mrs. Roosevelt questioned her Insular friend. Mrs. Bourne told her that she did not consider that the Governor was doing well. Journalist Ruby Black repeated her opinion to her friend Senator Muñoz Marín. Dorothy Bourne later returned to the White House where she had dinner with her Hyde Park friends and — although there is no record of the conversation— it is not irrational to think that the problems of Puerto Rico were discussed.156

Commissioner Padín was not idling. He wrote directly to General Cox, bypassing the Governor, to defend his policies. This was not liked
by the War Department. Gore wrote to Cox that either Padín or he would have to resign. As a result of this ultimatum, the War Department decided to approve the appointment of José Gallardo to replace Padín. But when the papers got to the Oval Room, Roosevelt felt that Padín should stay. Since this was taking place the second week of October and the Alonso Torres affair was getting more complex, a compromise was reached between President Roosevelt and Secretary Dern. Roosevelt suggested that a competent study of the Insular educational system be made before a final decision be taken. This study plan leaked to the press in San Juan. Padín now wanted his resignation to be accepted but the War Department rejected it. The Governor was not informed of the ultimate purpose of the study.¹⁵⁷

One reason behind Alonso Torres’ appointment was to reduce expenses at the University (he was Chairman of the House Finance Committee) by eliminating certain positions. The post of publicity director was considered superfluous and was to be eliminated. The problem was that it was held by Muna Lee — Mrs. Luis Muñoz Marín. The jobs to be discontinued were held by Liberals who had been appointed when Barceló was in power. Most teachers were also Liberals for the same reason. The Coalition wanted to end this Liberal hegemony. All these things had finally created the strike, but in Washington some seemed to think that the occasion was somewhat similar to the recent student strikes at Havana University caused by the 1933 Revolution. The strike at the Río Piedras campus got worse. A student delegate was sent to Washington via Havana. The students from the large San Juan Central High School backed the strikers. The University alumni did the same. The Mayagüez campus students also joined the strike. Gore then offered military protection to the students that wanted to attend classes. He also accused Padín of fomenting the strike. Because Padín had not been removed, Gore wanted to resign by November 1st.¹⁵⁸ The Governor wanted to resign not only because of the political crisis but also because he had a kidney ailment which made him irritable. Due to this ailment, Gore almost had to be hospitalized for treatments at the end of October.¹⁵⁹

Martínez Nadal wired Iglesias that Padín was responsible for the student strike. Iglesias wrote to President Roosevelt and Secretary Dern urging the appointment of a new commissioner of Education to resolve the strike. Dern in turn refused to act on Padín’s resignation. Ex-Governor Beverly backed Padín, and the Commissioner also defended himself to the Secretary of War.¹⁶⁰
The Liberal Party was doing its best to remove Gore. The Coalition sent a commission to Washington to join Iglesias in defending the Governor because they were in complete agreement with his policies. They visited Cox, Dern, and Roosevelt and wanted Padín removed. Chancellor Chardón was backing Padín and instead favored the removal of Gore.\footnote{161}

The student strike generated much tension. A bomb exploded at the Governor's summer residence in Jáome shortly after Gore had left it. Four more bombs which almost exploded were found in La Fortaleza. Mrs. Gore was getting messages telling her that her children were in danger. A letter threatening to poison the Gore's was also received. The bombs had not been planted by wild-eyed terrorists, separatist fanatics or misled young idealists. They had been placed there by a group of professional men which included \textit{Gore's Hell} co-author Gustavo Jiménez Sicardó and five more (a lawyer, a doctor, a businessman, a politician, and a journalist).\footnote{162} Their names were then not publicly known.

Due to this explosive climate, the University trustees declared a recess until November 6.\footnote{163} The Alumni Association told the Governor that Alonso Torres had to go.\footnote{164} A meeting of University parents backed the strike. An assembly of high school students declared that if another recess was given, they also would strike. The Liberal Central Junta agreed to continue opposing Gore. As all these developments were taking place, Alonso Torres resigned, and the Socialist Party decided not to allow any of its members to be appointed to the University Board of Trustees.\footnote{165} The Liberals, however, were not satisfied. Leading Representative Ernesto Ramos Antonini declared that the Party’s slogan should be “War until Gore resigns.”\footnote{166}

The conflict between Padín and Gore was diplomatically solved when the President informed the Governor that the Commissioner had only three months left to complete his term and more problems should not be created by replacing him at that moment.\footnote{167}

At the beginning of November and before the University strike had ended, Muñoz Marín went to Washington to counteract the activities of the Coalition. He visited Secretary Dern and promised to reduce the attacks on Gore to facilitate his replacement. With Ruby Black’s help, Muñoz Marín had tea with Mrs. Roosevelt and briefly spoke with the President. The topic discussed at the White House was, naturally, the Puerto Rican crisis. Mrs. Roosevelt came to the conclusion that Gore did
not have the ability to govern.\textsuperscript{168} Muñoz Marín later returned with Secretary Dern to see the President, presented a memorandum against Gore, and urged his removal because the Governor was "entirely incompetent."\textsuperscript{169} The Liberal Senator was convinced now that Gore's days were numbered and advised Barceló to reduce the attacks on the Governor to ease out his forthcoming exit from La Fortaleza.\textsuperscript{170}

Due to his declining health and following medical advice, Governor Gore and his family sailed for New York on November 9 to go to Johns Hopkins Hospital for a kidney examination and a possible operation. One of the first visitors at the Baltimore hospital was Resident Commissioner Iglesias. After the visit he told the press that Gore was going to continue as governor. After the medical examinations had ended, Gore proceeded to Washington.\textsuperscript{171}

By this time Santiago Iglesias had become accustomed to his work on Capitol Hill. There he received numerous visitors and channelized to the Federal authorities the innumerable requests that came to his office from individuals, associations, institutions, municipalities, and government agencies and departments. In addition, he regularly attended the committees of which he was a member and the Senate committees whenever Puerto Rican matters were considered. Furthermore, Iglesias made his customary appearances in the House Chamber.\textsuperscript{172} Together with Commissioner of Agriculture Menéndez Ramos, Iglesias visited General Cox to get the Bureau of Insular Affairs to help the ailing coffee industry with Federal loans and to obtain protection for molasses used for manufacturing alcoholic beverages.\textsuperscript{173} To Interior Commissioner Pons he wired that funds to employ 5,000 had been approved for public works.\textsuperscript{174} Iglesias met twice with Deputy Administrator Boaz Long to brief him on the Island and the problems of the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.\textsuperscript{175} Funds had been obtained for the improvement of the ports of Arecibo, Mayagüez, and Ponce as well as for beginning an Insular topographical survey.\textsuperscript{176}

One of the most important meetings Iglesias had was with Chief Cox of the Bureau of Insular Affairs on December 4. The Resident Commissioner complained that certain Federal officials he had recently visited to obtain their cooperation in getting rehabilitation measures for the Island had been misinformed on its situation by other people. These people insinuated that public welfare programs would not operate well because there was too much politics in Puerto Rico. These detractors were giving these Federal officials distorted information and had used the political
controversies as an excuse to harm Puerto Ricans. Iglesias complained that the representatives of the National Recovery Administration had been delayed too long because of the political situation. Iglesias further stated that "some persons had been spreading malicious propaganda" in the National Recovery Administration based "on political prejudices," and that Harry Hopkins himself had "not been beyond the approach of these"... "malicious" gossipers. These stories had led Hopkins to believe that in Puerto Rico Republican-Unionists and Socialists "were more interested in politics than in taking care of the poor" and "exploited workers." Iglesias wanted Cox to do something against "such venomous propaganda." The Bureau had been at times not in accord with his (Iglesias') points of view and actions, but he never engaged in this type of "malicious gossip against the interests" of Puerto Ricans. Iglesias suggested to Cox that he should communicate with the misinformed Federal officials to explain the real conditions. Cox answered that the Bureau had "always tried" to do that. The Resident Commissioner concluded by saying that the Liberal minority had "done everything" within "their power to discredit the actions of the Legislature" and Gore. He was "astonished that politics" was "being used for [sic] these persons as a subterfuge to cultivate ill feeling against the efforts of those representatives in the States who have the interests of Puerto Rico at heart". "Social functions" were even being used to reach these Federal officials for "piercing their minds with wrongful and destructive ideas in derogation to the Island." 177

From the beginning of November to the middle of January, Senator Luis Muñoz Marín was lobbying in Washington for the Liberal Party. He was to be more successful than anyone could have ever imagined. The key to this success was provided by Ruby Black. She was a noted journalist in Washington and a close friend of Mrs. Luis Muñoz Marín. Black had a cordial relationship with Eleanor Roosevelt of whom she later wrote a biography. Black's articles appeared in several newspapers in the States, and she was the Washington correspondent for La Democracia. Black's house in Alexandria became the gathering place for Muñoz Marín and the Liberals. 178 Since Black was considered to be "in the confidence of Eleanor Roosevelt," she had a very close relationship with the New Deal Administration. 179 It was Ruby Black who got Muñoz Marín invited to the White House teas Mrs. Roosevelt gave and he was then able to impress the First Family completely. This gave him more influence on a president than any other Puerto Rican had had. 180 This formidable Muñoz Marín's
connection with the White House, together with his brilliant intellect, would make the Liberal Senator the most successful leader in the history of Puerto Rico and would even make him surpass his father in his political pragmatism. During this Washington sojourn, Muñoz Marín discussed the New Deal plans that Roosevelt, Hopkins, Wallace, Tugwell, and Dern were forming for Puerto Rico. He took special care to impress Mrs. Roosevelt with his rehabilitation plans.¹⁸¹

Senator Millard Tydings (Maryland Democrat and Chairman of the Insular Possessions Committee) arrived in Puerto Rico at the end of November for an eight-day fact-finding visit. The Liberal Party greeted his visit, and he had a two-hour interview with Barceló who explained the political and socio-economic problems. At a Rotary Club lunch, Tydings affirmed that the plans for independence in the local parties—though interpreted as referring to the Liberal Party—would be taken seriously by him. He offered the choice of working toward independence or for a closer relationship with the Union. If independence was really desired, he would help get it. As for a program of Americanization in the school system, Tydings declared that he saw no reason for it. In regard to unemployment, the Senator stated that there was less unemployment in Puerto Rico than in some parts of the States.¹⁸² In a letter to President Roosevelt, Tyding's wrote that: the Island needed a very knowledgeable governor who should speak Spanish; the Organic Act should be revised; Prohibition should be repealed to produce more revenues; there was "no real independence sentiment"; it would be better for the United States to be "out" of the Island, but this would be "much worse" for Puerto Rico; and that "under no circumstances should Governor Gore resign or be removed now" because it would hurt the American prestige "too much," and would make it more difficult for the next governor.¹⁸³

Secretary Dern and an assistant secretary to the President agreed with Tydings regarding Governor Gore. Dern had commissioned Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins, President of Dartmouth College, to make an evaluation of the Department of Education and Dr. Padín. Dr. Hopkins arrived in Puerto Rico on December 11, and spent a week. His report was favorable to Padín's educational policies and affirmed that the Commissioner of Education was above politics and that the charges of anti-Americanism were not true. He did not explain, however, why in the Department of Education only 1,700 teachers were Coalitionists and 3,300 were Liberals. Dr. Hopkins explained that the Island's situation was delicate and that it could become serious if Gore—who had "a genius for doing things
wrong”—ever returned temporally. He also accused the Coalition of trying to organize everything along political affiliations and trying to force the Liberals out of their government jobs. Hopkins further advised that Washington should not become identified too closely with the Coalition because it was dominated by "irresponsible elements," "ignorant" and "lawless factions," and "sordidly acquisitive groups." The charges of anti-Americanism against Páñin were really "a political racket." Pro-Americanism was just used as a cloak to hide the hypocritical selfish designs of Coalition politicians. There was practically no real anti-American resentment except in the Nationalist Party "led by a Negro with a persecution complex against the United States." The Island could not "afford statehood," and independence would turn it into another Haiti or Dominican Republic. Some form of middle ground autonomy would be the best. The Coalition was having many conflicts, and, therefore, the Liberals would most likely return to power in 1936. The memorandum on education submitted by Iglesias and Págán to Secretary Dem back in September and the letter Martínez Nadal wrote to President Roosevelt on the same subject which reaffirmed the same educational philosophy statehooders had advocated for three decades were discarded.

President Roosevelt would follow the conclusions of Dr. Hopkins. It is incredible to believe that after one week in Puerto Rico, without knowing Spanish nor the political history of the Island, the President of Dartmouth College had come to such an evaluation. Senator Tydings, who had known Puerto Rico for a longer time and was a close friend of Chief of Police Riggs (who knew who was who in the Island), did not consider the Coalition to be such a despicable group in his letter of advice to the President. Although Hopkins and Tydings had been in December in Puerto Rico, the political evaluation seemed to be from two totally different places.

The Insular economic situation had reached a deeper crisis by November. A dozen trade and professional organizations had come together with the Chamber of Commerce and asked President Roosevelt to apply all Federal recovery and relief measures. The cost of living had increased 25 percent, and there had not been a corresponding benefit in agricultural production. The "depression had practically paralyzed commerce and industry," and employment had declined so much "that privation and want had reached alarming proportions." In October $55,000 had been spent in food orders from Federal emergency relief.
Ship cargoes from the States had reached the lowest level in 20 years. There was, however, optimism that with the beginning of the sugar harvest (sugar accounted for 50 percent of the exports) in January, employment would rise and the economy improve.\textsuperscript{188} The Insular Treasury closed "without a dollar," and the money decline had almost stopped foreign imports, bringing no income to the customs, while internal revenues had declined "far below estimates" due to the Depression and "the slowness of disbursements from relief and public work funds."\textsuperscript{189} This critical economic situation precipitated numerous labor protests and strikes (there would be eighty-three strikes from July to December) which by the end of December created a most confused situation. Some considered that anarchy and a state of siege prevailed due especially to the longshoremen and public car owners (caused by the high cost of gasoline) strikes. The Liberals helped promote some of the strikes to create the impression that the Coalition was incapable of properly administering the Island. Certain corporation lawyers and reactionary people used this situation to indirectly undermine Gore's position. Some Socialists were involved in the strikes. When it was realized that the strikes were being politically exploited by the Liberal Party, many Socialists withdrew their support. The Insular government worked gradually to overcome the worst period of the Depression. This was no simple task when one takes into account that the Treasury Department had to defer the government December payroll until the second week of January because it had to meet a $1,900,000 payment on a bonded debt. This was happening after Governor Gore had already reduced expenditures by over $1,000,000.\textsuperscript{190} Ex-Governor Beverly urged the Bureau of Insular Affairs to act rapidly to calm the Island. If Gore was to be replaced, a military man should be appointed, and Beverly suggested General Blanton Winship. Jorge Bird Arias also wrote, asking for a strong governor.\textsuperscript{191} During the past six difficult months, curiously enough, the Nationalist Party had not taken any political advantage of the situation.

Governor Gore was uncertain about his future plans. He originally had planned to return to San Juan at the end of December; work out a legislative program with the Coalition; stay during the legislative session to sign the bills; and then resign.\textsuperscript{192} During his stay in Washington, Gore presented to Federal Emergency Relief Administration Harry Hopkins a draft project for rehabilitating Puerto Rico. The plan envisioned some $146,227,982 to be spent on the following: roads, school and university buildings, slum clearance, hydroelectric and irrigation, forestry, recon-
struction camps, malaria control, rural sanitation, agriculture pest control, distribution of agricultural products, land use, and aid for sugar, coffee, and tobacco.¹⁹³

Almost simultaneously, James Bourne was submitting to President Roosevelt and Secretary Dern another rehabilitation plan. President Roosevelt was favorably impressed by the last plan and recommended it to Dern.¹⁹⁴

Governor Gore meet with Secretary Dern on December 28. He was informed of the negative report of Dr. Hopkins and that it appeared Padín would be reappointed. As a result, Gore decided to resign. He did not have the complete support of the Roosevelt Administration. The Governor complained that the President had a number of advisors on Puerto Rico (such as Riggs, Mr. Bourne and his friends, and an influential group in Washington) that made it difficult for him to govern. Iglesias advised him not to resign when he was still under fire; that he should return to San Juan—if he had the President’s support— and later resign. The Governor, however, had basically made up his mind to resign also due to family pressure. He did not want to create more problems to President Roosevelt. Gore, however, had still the backing of General Cox. The Governor then visited Senator Tydings and defended his pro-Coalition policies which had been criticized by his opponents (Secretary Dern believed that the governors should be politically neutral with the Insular parties while governing with the electoral majority). Rumors of his resignation began to circulate. On January 8, 1934, Gore submitted his resignation to the President who accepted it on the 12th.¹⁹⁵ That same day Muñoz Marín, who had called Gore a “Caligula,” sent him the following letter:

Dear Sir:

Now that the fight on your Governorship of Puerto Rico is over, I wish to continue to honor that sportsmanship which you referred to at the beginning of the fight and which my people have adhered to throughout. In this connection I feel bound to say that, although by training, experience and native qualities the Governorship of Puerto Rico was not fitted to your qualifications, during the whole course of the struggle nothing to my knowledge has been found reflecting of your personal honesty or the sincerity of your motives.

Please accept my sincere good wishes for your health and future activities.

Very truly yours,

Luis Muñoz Marín¹⁹⁶
As Gore’s disputatious tenure came to a close, the most controversial strike in Puerto Rico’s history began to erupt. This was the sugar cane strike of 1934. It was taking place at what was the lowest ebb of the Depression in Puerto Rico when even the Insular government did not have the necessary funds to pay its employees on time. Strikes in various sugar mills had been occurring during the previous months. Sugar companies, as well as the needle and tobacco industries, were fearful of the effects of Congressional rehabilitation measures and wanted to reduce expenses in order to get higher profits. The United Porto Rico Sugar Company was to go bankrupt and would be recognized as the Eastern Associates. The disagreement with the convenio of January 1934 caused the sugar cane strike.\textsuperscript{197} For decades the Free Federation had been struggling to reach an agreement with the Sugar Producers Association in order to achieve uniform standards of wages and working conditions in most sugar mills and plantations. The convenio replaced the cumbersome individual agreements with scores of mills and plantation owners. Previous agreements had never included all of them and had greatly weakened the bargaining power of the Free Federation. It was difficult, for the workers to accept by federationist discipline a convenio that bound salaries and working conditions for a set period of time during the worst part of the Depression.

Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez convoked a meeting between the Free Federation and the Sugar Producers Association on December 15, 1933, to begin negotiations to make a convenio. Rafael Alonso Torres and Ramón Aboy Benítez were the respective representatives. Acting-Governor Horton opened the meeting. A committee was formed to write out a convenio which was finished on January 5, 1934. The agreement established an eight-hour working day in the fields and a twelve-hour working day in the mills; a new wage scale was set, but although some salaries remained the same as in 1932, most were lower than before (see Appendix I). Salaries depended on the price of sugar; if sugar went up, then there would be a 10 per cent increase in wages. There were also other agreements in working conditions and workers’ benefits.\textsuperscript{198}

Before the convenio was signed, several strikes by sugar workers had erupted (on December 25) to pressure for higher wages, better working conditions, and other benefits at Guánica Central, the largest corporation and not a member of the Sugar Producers Association. Other workers of the United Porto Rico Sugar Company, Fajardo Sugar, and Aguirre also
went on strike due to their disagreement with the terms accepted in the *convenio*. The strike became very serious because the workers were protesting against the sugar corporations, the Free Federation, and the Insular government. Guánica Central was paralyzed for the first time in its history.\textsuperscript{199} The leaders of the strike were members of the Free Federation and the Socialist Party which were in disagreement with the recent policies adopted by the labor and Party hierarchy. Among them were Tadeo Rodríguez García, Luis V. Pino, Florencio Cabello, and others.\textsuperscript{200}

Acting-Governor Horton became extremely preoccupied with the strike and asked Iglesias to help out. Iglesias backed the *convenio* and the actions of Rivera Martínez and Alonso Torres and condemned the atmosphere of chaos some were trying to create. He added that the Free Federation should send a group of leaders to explain to the strikers the importance of the *convenio*.\textsuperscript{201} Guánica Central used the *convenio* as a basis for its negotiations with the strikers. This, together with the participation of the Free Federation and the Department of Labor, settled the strike there.\textsuperscript{202} The Free Federation leaders (which included Francisco Colón Gordiany) that went to talk to the strikers were only partially successful because the strike continued in the lands of Aguirre, Fajardo, and United Porto Rico mills and in the area from Río Piedras to the east. The strikers considered that Alonso Torres had sold out to the sugar corporations.\textsuperscript{203}

Some Aguirre striking workers in Guayama considered that they had been abandoned by the Free Federation and the Socialist leadership and wrote to Pedro Albizu Campos to help them out. No one wrote the Liberal Party for support. The Nationalist leader went to Guayama, held a meeting, and founded a new labor union called Workers Association of Puerto Rico. Albizu Campos also went to the Humacao District (the Fajardo and United Porto Rico lands) and attacked the *convenio*, the Free Federation, the Socialist Party, and the Insular government, but he accomplished nothing because most workers did not trust the Nationalists. The Nationalist labor union was a total failure because it did not have a working class ideology.\textsuperscript{204}

There were also some Marxist groups in the Socialist Party and in the minute Communist Party which backed the strikers, but they were not successful in creating a numerous following.\textsuperscript{205}

The only group that was able to keep the strike going was led by Rodríguez García and Pino. They founded another union, Puerto Rico
General Syndicate of Workers, but this was stillborn because the Free Federation and the Socialist Party were very strong.\textsuperscript{206} The Free Federation was able to persuade most workers to accept the \textit{convenio}, and the strike ended by the third week of January.\textsuperscript{207}

The group led by Rodríguez García and Pino, however, did not give up and continued active. They founded Socialist Affirmation to defend their principles with the possibility in mind of making it a new political party for the elections of 1936. Pino became its president, and the group had separatist inclinations. The members of Socialist Affirmation were against the leadership of Alonso Torres, the recent policies of the Socialist Party, and resented the professionals that had become prominent leaders in the Party. The Socialist Party leadership acted swiftly and promptly expelled them on February 9, 1934. Socialist Affirmation had no chance of success because internal fighting weakened it and eventually caused it to fall apart.\textsuperscript{208}

The importance of the 1934 sugar strike and Socialist Affirmation was that most of the leaders became basically independent —even after they returned to the Socialist Party fold, as some did— and had started a slow process that would lead to the weakening of the Free Federation, the 1939 division of the Socialist Party, and the formation of a new powerful labor union in 1940 —the General Confederation of Workers led by Francisco Colón Gordiany and others. Some also began to follow Luis Muñoz Marín.\textsuperscript{209}

During the first week of 1934, Resident Commissioner Iglesias began preparing plans for the coming congressional session. A bill was presented eliminating Prohibition on Puerto Rico and giving power to the Legislature to regulate the liquor industry and trade.\textsuperscript{210} The bill was to be approved. As for the possible coming of a Coalition delegation to Washington, he suggested that the economic problems should be discussed and not just statehood as the final status for the Island.\textsuperscript{211} Iglesias predicted that the Legislature would ask for statehood which he personally favored. Muñoz Marín rapidly denounced statehood and said the majority in Puerto Rico did not want it. He favored independence.\textsuperscript{212} Some wanted Iglesias to come to Puerto Rico, but he could not abandon his heavy work-load.\textsuperscript{213}

Franklin D. Roosevelt's knowledge of American possessions resulted principally from his experiences as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson. He had visited Haiti and the Dominican Republic during their occupation. During his vice-presidential campaign in
1920, he had taken some credit, claiming he had brought order with marines and new constitutions to those twin countries. Roosevelt had leanings toward imperialist ideas and preferred the military to civilians for governors of the American territories. His concern for Puerto Rico was principally strategic, and, therefore, he did not favor independence for the Island. Roosevelt, nevertheless, thought that Puerto Rico had to be helped economically. As for the Puerto Ricans, he considered them to be “politically immature or incapable of administering their own affairs.” Because civilian Gore had not been successful and the Island was getting somewhat unruly, a strong and experienced hand in colonial affairs was rapidly needed. An hour after Gore’s resignation had been accepted, Major General Blanton Winship was nominated new governor. Winship was a 64 year-old bachelor-gentleman-lawyer from an illustrious Georgia family who had recently retired from the Army after thirty-three years. He had fought in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Cuban Pacification, the Mexican Punitive Expedition and World War I, and was condecorated several times (including the French Legion of Honor). In 1906 he had served as Acting Secretary of State and Justice of Cuba during the intervention. During Coolidge’s Administration Winship served as military aide in the White House, and then he was sent to the Philippines as a legal advisor to Governor Henry L. Stimson in 1928. A year later he returned to Washington as the Army’s Judge Advocate General and in 1933 went to Liberia to make reforms. Winship had proven himself a firm administrator. The New York Times editorially highly praised Winship and said that Puerto Rico was “fortunate to have so versatile and high-minded man to deal with its difficulties and improve the distressful condition of its people.” Martínez Nadal declared that he hoped the new Governor would “conduct his administration in harmony with the wishes of the coalition majority.” The Liberal Party also promised its support.

Iglesias met with Winship twice a few days afterwards. He was confident that Winship was going to govern with the Coalition majority. After the new Governor was approved by the Senate, Iglesias congratulated him and sent him a long memorandum on the economic and political problems of Puerto Rico. Later the Resident Commissioner had a talk with Winship at Dern’s office where he explained the Insular condition. Iglesias later wrote to Rivera Martínez, praising Winship and wanting the Coalition to explain objectively to the new Executive their problems and aspirations.

Before Muñoz Marín left Washington, he wrote to President
Roosevelt, telling him that the political tension would be reduced and that he would now dedicate all his efforts to the development of the New Deal in Puerto Rico. The Liberal Senator also suggested that the Insular status be defined. The President answered that he was pleased with Muñoz Marín’s intentions to cooperate in the future.226 When the Senator landed in San Juan on January 22, he was given a triumphant welcome by crowds of Liberals that applauded his work to get Gore to resign. Muñoz Marín praised Roosevelt in a speech and added that the status should be decided upon in order to make the economic rehabilitation. If the present opportunity was lost, it would be lost forever.227 For many Muñoz Marín was now becoming a leader who had the best connections and the confidence of the Roosevelt Administration.

Since President Roosevelt’s interest in Puerto Rico was growing, stories of a future presidential trip to the Island began to circulate. Iglesias declared that the President would be well received. At the end of January, the Roosevelts told Governor Winship that they planned to go to Puerto Rico in the spring.228 There were Congressional plans to revise the citizenship laws. Iglesias wanted Puerto Rico be treated equally as the States and wrote to William Green to get the support of the American Federation of Labor. The Resident Commissioner’s purpose was to give American citizenship to some people who did not have it due to technicalities and ignorance of the law or who now wanted the citizenship they had once refused. For this purpose, Iglesias delivered a speech on the House on January 26. His suggestions were to be accepted.229

In the field of education, Iglesias declared that the $78,750 assigned for vocational education was not sufficient for the local needs.230 He also wanted the Federal reforestation programs to be expanded in Puerto Rico.231 At the end of the month, Iglesias went to New York City for two days, but had to stay in Newark due to a hotel employee strike; he did not want to cross the picket lines.232 When he returned to the Capital, Iglesias was informed that Commissioner of Education Padín had been re-appointed. Iglesias stated that he would cooperate with Padín because the Commissioner of Education would stay politically neutral.233

Major General Blanton Winship took his oath as governor on February 5 and gave a short inaugural speech. The topics he discussed were: developing agricultural production and living standards; limiting governmental expenses; finding solutions to the conflicts created by the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act; improving the credit structure; praise of the civil service which should be based on
merit and not politics and improving education and health. He affirmed that he would seek advice and counsel from all political and civic leaders.234

Winship was well received and hailed as a master of discretion. Both Martínez Nadal and Barceló were pleased.235 Winship’s address to the Legislature followed the same pattern and asked for $1,000,000 in government cutbacks, no levying of new taxes, amendments to the workmen’s relief legislation, revision of pensions, protection for the coffee industry, liquor legislation, and agricultural improvements.236

With the opening of the Legislative session, the bankruptcy of the United Porto Rico Sugar Company, and the status created the most important debates. Muñoz Marín wanted the Insular government to buy the bankrupt sugar corporation in order to put into practice his agricultural rehabilitation plans.237 Martínez Nadal sympathized with the idea, but affirmed that the Treasury did not have the money for such a risky agricultural venture. Muñoz Marín’s plan was sent to a committee where it died.238 Speaker García Méndez presented a resolution to ask Congress to grant statehood to Puerto Rico and to make temporary autonomic reforms pending the granting of statehood. The resolution passed the House and was being legislated when Congress was in the process of granting independence to the Philippines (the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Law).239 The New York Times editorialized that statehood “may come when illiteracy” had “been further reduced and the people” were “better prepared to solve their economic problems. At the present time it is difficult to see how” the Island “could carry on alone. Responsibilities would have to be assumed that are now beyond the Island’s resources.” The editorial, nevertheless, favored autonomic reforms which included an elected governor.240 After a night-long debate in the Senate, the resolution was approved over the Liberal senators votes against it.241

The statehood resolution caused the single best known hunger strike in Puerto Rico. University of Puerto Rico Nationalist Professor Clemente Pereda began a seven-day strike in Old San Juan’s main square throughout the Easter holidays to protest against statehood and the “political hypocrisy with the hope that his suffering” would “purify the people.”242 Barceló visited him and declared that the protest was “useless and ill-advised” but made for “a noble cause.”243 The Nationalist Cadets of the Republic were his attendants.244 After he ended the strike, Pereda was hospitalized as the student body of the University passed a resolution “declaring him their spiritual father.”245
From Washington Iglesias had previously declared that he would support the status reform that the legislative majority would approve. He personally favored statehood, accepted the transitory autonomic reforms, but knew that the fundamental problems of the Island were economic. Furthermore, Iglesias clearly understood that status changes in Congress were very difficult to make. Yet when the statehood resolution was approved by the Senate, it produced in Iglesias a "deep satisfaction." For him the advantages of statehood were superior to its disadvantages.

There were rumors that the internal conflicts in the Coalition needed Iglesias's presence in Puerto Rico. Since Iglesias was a political leader with an extraordinary talent for unifying his followers—he was not known to expel people from the Free Federation or the Party—the conflicts could be promptly solved with his effective diplomatic skills. Iglesias' conciliatory abilities were successful later in bringing back some of the members of Socialist Affirmation who had been expelled from the Party, and they also kept the Coalition together. But Congressional work would not permit him to leave Washington until July.

Sugar cane was in Iglesias' mind for a while during this Congressional session of the Jones-Costigan Bill to control sugar production. Both the Agriculture Department and the State Department were very influential with Secretary Cordell Hull and Assistant Secretary Benjamin Summer Welles who were taking active part in the sugar bill due to President Roosevelt's special relationship with Cuba, then very unstable as a result of the 1933 Revolution. The United States did not have a sugar overproduction, but the close relationship with the Philippines and Cuba had created a surplus in the American market. The Jones-Costigan Bill "was undoubtedly an attempt by the United States to help the Cubans." There were also other motives, such as the reduction of low-grade farm lands and the elimination of protective tariffs on artificial or uneconomical industries. These other motives were advocated by Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford G. Tugwell. He considered that in Puerto Rico the sugar industry was monopolistic and mainly controlled by absentee corporations and some rich local families. In this period Tugwell was favorably inclined to grant independence to Puerto Rico (he later would change his opinion and favor statehood or permanent union under a commonwealth). Sugar quotas were to be established by the Agriculture Department. Puerto Rico, which back in 1933 had been assigned an acceptable quota of 875,000 tons, had its quota reduced at first to 821,000 tons and finally was set at 803,000 tons. Since the Island's
most important productive crop was sugar and the production for 1934 was estimated at 1,050,000 tons, there was going to be a considerable surplus and, therefore, the law sugar quota was greatly opposed by many. Thus a deluge of protesting cables and letters fell on Washington. Governor Winship fought the Bill, but did not get any help from the Bureau of Insular Affairs because it could not oppose such a presidential measure. Resident Commissioner Iglesias' office began to receive more mail than usual. Iglesias spoke on the House floor several times, fighting the low quota that would raise unemployment. At the House Agriculture Committee Iglesias argued that Puerto Ricans believed they were being treated as foreigners and that the sugar industry would be destroyed. Congressman Marvin Jones, the Committee Chairman, later praised Iglesias for his efforts in defending a higher sugar quota. In a speech from the House floor Iglesias asked for a 875,000 ton quota and bitterly complained of the discrimination against Puerto Rico in favor of Cuba. He and the delegate from Hawaii fought the Bill along similar lines, but failed. The Jones-Costigan Bill passed the House and the Senate, but no quota was assigned to Puerto Rico. Iglesias wrote to President Roosevelt and told him of the vital importance of sugar and that there should be no discrimination against Puerto Rico. Secretary of Agriculture Wallace declared that the Island would be treated like the States. A sugar commission went to Washington with Governor Winship and together with Iglesias paid a visit to President Roosevelt and other authorities to fight for a good quota. But Puerto Rico was assigned a quota of 803,000 tons regardless of all the efforts made. Regarding the Jones-Costigan Bill, ex-Governor Beverly wrote to former Governor Roosevelt that the

brain trustees think they are hitting the big apple when as a matter of fact they are hitting the small colonos and especially labor. I don't suppose they are really much concerned as that since the proposition seems to be to help Cuba and the banks which have invested in Cuba.

Beverly forgot to add that the American investments in the Cuban sugar industry and in commerce were larger and more powerful than those in Puerto Rico.

Muñoz Marín was quietly in favor of the Costigan-Jones Bill because he then had a dislike for American businessmen and absentee corporations and because he considered the Bill as part of the rehabilitation
plans he had discussed in Washington with leading New Deal personalities during his November-January visit. Now he was trying to become the most outspoken defender of the New Deal in the Island, and so he kept Mrs. Roosevelt informed of his plans. His adherence to the New Deal policies was one of the reasons why he wanted the Insular government to buy the bankrupt United Porto Rico Sugar Company and start implementing his rehabilitation plans.\textsuperscript{264} It is not illogical to think that Muñoz Marín knew that Tugwell favored independence and that, as a result, he considered these rehabilitation plans as a stepping stone toward the creation of the Republic of Puerto Rico. When Senator Costigan had presented his sugar bill, Ruby Black wrote very favorably about it, declaring that it was part of a general economic plan which Muñoz Marín in Washington had helped to work out to help Puerto Rico. She added that Tugwell was interested in the principles involved in the “Muñoz Marín Plan” against latifundia and for increased food production and the stabilization of sugar production.\textsuperscript{265}

At the beginning of March, Mrs. Roosevelt paid a visit to Puerto Rico. Iglesias considered that the trip would be advantageous to the Island because it would become better known in the States and it should bring the establishing of a definite coordinate plan so that Puerto Rico would never return to its present bad conditions.\textsuperscript{266} The First Lady came, accompanied by an assistant to Harry Hopkins and some journalists (one being Ruby Black). For a week she traveled around the Island, inspecting everything, as was so typical of her. Mrs. Roosevelt’s guide was no other than her friend Mrs. Bourne. The visit was considered highly successful.\textsuperscript{267}

In the same airplane that the First Lady took to San Juan came Assistant Secretary Rexford G. Tugwell. The purpose of the trip was to study the economic conditions and make a survey for a rehabilitation program.\textsuperscript{268} Regarding Tugwell’s visit, Iglesias wrote to Secretary Dern that he heartily approved of the trip because it was something he had asked former administrations to undertake, but they have never done so.\textsuperscript{269} There were numerous informal meetings to get the necessary information. One was held at La Fortaleza where everyone of importance was invited to discuss agriculture. Chancellor Chardón (a former Commissioner of Agriculture) proposed the purchase of United Puerto Rico Sugar Company, but Fajardo Sugar administrator Bird Arias opposed the idea. Commissioner of Agriculture Menéndez Ramos stated that Chardón’s proposal had merits, but it was more important to help the
small farmers whose farms were in receivers’ hands. Tugwell approved of Chardón’s proposal because it was also favored by Muñoz Marín, who had met several times previously with the Chancellor to discuss it.\footnote{270} After other activities, Tugwell left.

Tugwell named James A. Dickey (who participated in the Brookings report) representative of the Agricultural Adjustment Act for Puerto Rico for the purpose of preparing a rehabilitation program. Dickey began to work with the participation of Chancellor Chardón (of Liberal sympathies), Professor Rafael Fernández García (Chairman of the Chemistry Department at the University and a brother of Liberal leader Benigno Fernández García), and Commissioner Menéndez Ramos (a Republican-Unionist).

Strangely enough, the Commissioner of Labor was not included in such an important task. This group was called the Puerto Rican Commission and drafted what came to be known as the Chardón Plan. Muñoz Marín wanted to be part of the Commission but was told that he was only welcome in an unofficial capacity. The Commission—and Muñoz Marín—moved to Washington where they worked during May and June. Santiago Iglesias, who had been demanding a rehabilitation plan for years, was not invited to join. He was just to be informed of the developments. Noticing the preponderance of Liberals in the Commission, the Coalition leadership began to worry that the plan would encourage the idea of independence. Alonso Torres began to prepare another rehabilitation plan and sent it to Washington as a substitute for that of the Commission. Bourne, claiming his expertise at running the P.R.E.R.A., wanted to direct the new plan. In an editorial in \textit{La Democracia}, Muñoz Marín openly affirmed that the coming new rehabilitation plan for Puerto Rico implied a deep reform to the economy and began a “decolonization” process that led “firmly and definitely toward independence.” This certainly was not liked by the Coalitionists whose opposition to the plan began to grow because they saw in the coming rehabilitation plan unfair control by the Liberal electoral minority.\footnote{271}

The Coalition leadership was understandably perturbed at this glaring favoritism toward the Liberals. After all, the Federal agency directed by Bourne had already been filled with Liberals. Patronage—especially during bad economic periods—is something political parties cannot ignore if they want to be successful at election time. It serves to fertilize the electorate. The control of appointments to Federal agencies “could
make or break a political leader” or party. Having the reputation of enjoying the influence for distributing the relief funds gave tremendous political prestige. Muñoz Marín was “out” to get “control” of the rehabilitation patronage with all his energies. “He deliberately appropriated the New Deal identification in Puerto Rico.” 272 Speaker García Méndez had already informed Iglesias that the Federal rehabilitation plan should be implemented by the Insular government. 273 Republican-Unionist El País was on record as denouncing Bourne’s open favoritism toward the Liberals. 274 Iglesias personally informed President Roosevelt that the rehabilitation reforms should be worked out carefully. 275 There were even rumors that Bourne would replace Winship. 276 As for the intention of giving the implementation of the rehabilitation plan to apolitical technocrats in order to separate it from partisan politics, Iglesias questioned how this could be done without changing completely the governmental democratic institutions or where the apolitical technocrats could be found in such a highly politicized Island where everyone knew the ideals of the others. 277 The Resident Commissioner hoped that the Roosevelt Administration would receive with sympathy and listen to the Coalition leadership. Secretary Ickes told Iglesias that the Administration would not favor any political group and that any organization run with Federal funds would not foment the goals of any political entity. 278 It is understandable that since the Coalition was the electoral majority, it did not want the Federal agencies to fall into the hands of the Liberal minority who would use them to try to reach power again. Furthermore, they were doing all they could to prevent Muñoz Marín from creating a powerful organization to bring independence.

In this atmosphere the rehabilitation plan was basically finished by June. The expenditures were set at $30,000,000, but could go up to $100,000,000. The Coalition leaders were not happy about the plan and preferred Alonso Torres’ plan. Iglesias was immediately contacted by Dr. John F. Carter, a Tugwell aide who worked with the Commission, to get his support. 279 The Resident Commissioner then declared that all Puerto Ricans should disregard their political differences and give their unanimous support to the rehabilitation plan. Federal officials had clearly told him that no political party or person could claim or get personal advantage, whether political or otherwise, from the said plan. 280

During this second session of the 73rd Congress, Iglesias was dealing with other endeavors besides the intricate problems of the sugar quota and the rehabilitation plan. There was other New Deal rehabilitation legisla-
tion that was being considered in which he worked to get Puerto Rico included. Back in December 1928, Congress had established the Porto Rico Hurricane Relief Commission which had helped re-build and build roads and schools as well as aid farmers. A total of 3,033 loans amounting to $5,770,552 had been granted, but only 16 had been repaid in full. There were $5,735,367 to be collected. The San Ciprián hurricane of 1933 and the worsening of the Depression made repayment virtually impossible.\(^{281}\)

Iglesias introduced legislation to reform the loan regulations to help out the hard-pressed people who were unable to keep up with the payments.\(^{282}\) Iglesias, Chancellor Chardón, and former Resident Commissioner Pesquera (then president again at the Asociación de Agricultores) paid a visit to Ernest Gruening of the Interior Department to get his support.\(^{283}\) But Senator Tydings favored the elimination of the Relief Commission whose operations would be transferred into the new rehabilitation plan being drafted under Tugwell’s aegis. Thus Iglesias’ bill failed to pass.\(^{284}\) To assist the indebted homeowners, Iglesias helped to get the Federal Home Loan Bank to open an office in San Juan.\(^{285}\) Hard-pressed farmers were similarly helped by the opening of a branch of the Farm Credit Administration.\(^{286}\) When Social Security began to be discussed, Iglesias unsuccessfully tried to get Puerto Rico included (it would finally be extended to the Island in 1951).\(^{287}\) The Resident Commissioner participated in formulating the salary scales for the needle industry as demanded by the National Recovery Act. He was visited by a representative of the needle industry who told him that high salaries would force the industry to leave the Island. Iglesias believed that the wages paid should be such as to allow workers to “live decently.”\(^{288}\) He warned Boaz Long, that the implementation of Continental salary would be harmful to both capital and labor.\(^{289}\) At an office meeting with Long, Marfa Luisa Arcelay (representing the needle industry) and Teresa Angleró (needle industry labor leader), Iglesias used his abilities to reach an understanding which was acceptable to all sides and took into consideration all Congressional legislation.\(^{290}\) Iglesias dedicated time in getting Federal funds for public works, such as port improvements in Arecibo, Aguadilla, Mayagüez, and Ponce; roads; public buildings, etc. He kept up an active correspondence with Interior Commissioner Francisco Pons who was in charge of most of the projects approved. Municipal governments received the other largest number of Federal funds.\(^{291}\) The strengthening of the educational system had always been important to Iglesias. He worked —together with Commissioner Padín—to get for Puerto Rico
more Federal grants to aid education, and $300,000 was obtained, together with $80,000 for the Agricultural Experimental Station of the University of Puerto Rico. In Washington he brought together Puerto Rican students and residents and organized the Puerto Rican Association to promote Insular values.

To the first Central American Olympic Games to be held in El Salvador in December 1934, several Puerto Rican athletic clubs were invited. Iglesias went to Secretary of State Hull to get permission for the Insular delegation (the United States was not invited) to attend as diplomatic relations had just recently been resumed.

As a result of his work the Pan American Federation of Labor, Iglesias had many friends in Mexico. He was invited to attend the 1934 Convention of the Mexican Regional Federation, but was unable to do so. Some Mexicans wrote to Iglesias protesting the destruction of the celebrated murals painted by Diego Rivera in Radio City, Rockefeller Center. Iglesias protested to Secretary Dern, and Diego Rivera and other Mexican artists thanked him for that. To commemorate Pan American Day, Iglesias gave a high spirited and optimistic speech in the House, praising the ideals of Pan-Americanism which were then in the ascendancy. The Director of the Pan American Union, Dr. L. S. Rowe, had suggested the idea of the speech because he considered Iglesias to be well known in Latin America and the speech would be received there warmly. Rowe congratulated Iglesias for what he said in the House.

Governor Blanton Winship's tenure gradually began to unfold. Gasoline prices, which caused the great public car strike the previous December, began to be regulated (together with other petroleum products) by a commission when the Governor signed a new law. Some amendments to the electoral law beneficial to the Socialist Party were also approved by Winship, who was pressured by Barceló not to sign the bill. Iglesias declared that Winship would govern with the legislative majority. But there were conflicts between the Coalition and the Governor. The Socialists strongly wanted a Party member appointed to replace Republican-Unionist Manuel Domenech as Treasurer as had been agreed in the 1932 pact. Martínez Nadal sided with the Socialists, but Winship refused, and a conflict arose. Winship reappointed to his cabinet Gallardo, Garrido Morales, Pons and Rivera Martínez and sent their nominations to the Senate. By not submitting Domenech’s nomination, he could be kept in office indefinitely. The Senate accepted three nominees, rejected Gallardo because, according to the 1932 pact, the post
belonged to a Socialist, and declared Domenech persona non grata.\textsuperscript{301} The principal bills passed were a workers' compensation insurance (which had been strongly opposed by employers and insurance companies), a lottery, a liquor law, the statehood bill, and a 5 percent salary increase for public employees. Winship vetoed the workers' compensation insurance and the pay raise, reduced the budget by $500,000, and approved one for $9,876,000.\textsuperscript{302}

In regard to the Domenech controversy Iglesias urged Winship to appoint a new Treasurer from the list submitted by the Coalition. Winship then explained to him that Domenech was a most capable man and was better qualified than the men on the list. The reappointment of Gallardo, which Iglesias was opposed to, was equally favored by the Governor. Iglesias, however, had no choice but to work with Winship's appointments.\textsuperscript{303} The Socialist Party would continue to demand the post of Treasurer for its members and would obtain it in 1935. The Socialists also wanted the directorship of the lottery, but this position went to Republican-Unionist Adolfo de Hostos.\textsuperscript{304} The post of Executive Secretary never went to a Socialist.

Because the Roosevelt Administration was preparing an Insular rehabilitation plan with leading participation of the Agriculture Department, the President felt Puerto Rico would be better administered by the Interior Department than by the War Department (which opposed the change). Tydings had favored this idea and had submitted a bill to do it back in January 1934. Iglesias supported it. The transfer was executed by an executive order by Roosevelt on May 29, 1934. Thus, the Bureau of Insular Affairs was replaced by the Division of Territories and Island Possessions which had been established in 1933 to deal with Alaska, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands. This new division became the American version of the British colonial office. Iglesias interpreted this change as a step toward statehood, but Muñoz Marín denied that it was so intended.\textsuperscript{305}

As a result of the concurrent resolution on status approved by the Coalition, Iglesias presented two bills, one to amend the Jones Act (to achieve more autonomy) and the other to admit Puerto Rico as a state of the Union. Congressman John McDuffie, Chairman of the Committee of Insular Affairs, declared that statehood was not practical and doubted whether it was possible for it to be granted to Puerto Rico. Since the bills were submitted too late to be considered by the correct Congressional session, Iglesias declared that bills should be studied and later be
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modified and presented again to the next Congress. The autonomy bill went to the Insular Affairs Committee and the statehood bill to the Territorial Committee. At a hearing in the Insular Affairs Committee Martínez Nadal defended in Spanish (he was translated) the autonomy bill. He stressed the following points: Puerto Rico wanted to conserve the best aspects of both Spanish and American cultures. Since the Island was politically mature, it was time for Puerto Rico to assume its right to govern itself internally by electing its own governor and having fewer Washington controls. The Insular Supreme Court cases should go directly to the United States Supreme Court. Furthermore, Puerto Ricans had proven their loyalty as American citizens by fighting in World War I. When he finished speaking, Martínez Nadal was as warmly applauded by the Committee as he had been when Iglesias introduced him. Other Coalitionists also spoke. Barceló and Muñoz Marín had advised the Committee that they would not be able to attend the session.

Jorge Bird Arias, who once called Iglesias “Senator bolcheviqui” but now referred to him as “amigo” Iglesias, wrote to the Resident Commissioner telling him that economic conveniences of American business interests could push the Island toward independence and that the Roosevelt Administration was inclined to granting independence as demonstrated by the Costigan-Jones Act and the unjust low sugar quota. Independence would be politically and economically disastrous for Puerto Rico. Iglesias replied that Congress would settle the status issue at a “not too far” date. The separatist political leaders believed that the Costigan-Jones Act would help their cause because it would destroy the whole sugar industry. Such destruction should then accelerate the possibility of independence, although it would be socio-economic and political suicide.

President Roosevelt decided to appoint a high-level group to help coordinate the New Deal reforms and advice on the rehabilitation program for Puerto Rico. The Inter-Departmental Committee for the Economic Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico was named in June and headed by Oscar Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and Dr. W. I. Meyer, representing the Farm Credit Administration and the Treasury Department. By this time basic design of the Chardón Plan had been worked-out. It proposed to reduce unemployment; break up latifundia and reduce absentee ownership; reduce the flight of capital; and diversify agriculture. These objectives would be put into practice by a semi-public corporation that would obtain principally
sugar lands and mills. The Plan was very ambitious and was trying to offer something to almost every interest group possible. The proposed offers were: subsistence farms; agricultural rehabilitation for coffee, tobacco, and fruits; industrial and tourist development; tax reform; plant and pest control; soil conservation; cooperatives; agricultural insurance; and housing projects.\textsuperscript{309} The Chardón Plan looked like a panacea that was going to cure Puerto Rico's endemic economic ills. But it did not take into consideration the bureaucratic and political complications, "the perplexing controversy over economic realities," and "its proposals were naïve as regards entrenched business practices."\textsuperscript{310}

Iglesias originally had planned to be in San Juan before the arrival of President Roosevelt in July and in time to chair the Free Federation congress set for July 14. He also was trying to convince William Green to visit Puerto Rico. Because of the Congressional workload, Iglesias asked that the labor congress be postponed until Labor Day. Mrs. Iglesias and sons Manuel and Eduardo, however, were able to leave Baltimore on July 19. Only to attend some Puerto Rican activities in New York City was the Resident Commissioner able to leave Washington briefly.\textsuperscript{311}

Franklin D. Roosevelt was the third president to come to Puerto Rico. He had previously visited thirty years before. The presidential party landed in Mayagüez and arrived in San Juan via Ponce, after making several stops. Roosevelt told the Islanders that the rehabilitation plan had been agreed upon in principle. The idea for the President to give this speech had been suggested by Muñoz Marín. Socialist Affirmation handed President Roosevelt a memorial in which the rehabilitation plan was opposed and independence was defended. The Roosevelt visit lasted thirty-six hours, but it had a strong impact.\textsuperscript{312}

The Inter-Departmental Committee sent to Puerto Rico a three-person delegation to study the mechanical details of the Chardón Plan. Their report was moderately critical because it considered that the economic problems to be dealt with were more complex than the Plan considered them to be. Nevertheless, the backers of the Chardón Plan continued ahead, and on July 27, President Roosevelt gave a general explanation of the Plan to the press.\textsuperscript{313}

Iglesias was active in Congressional legislation almost until he left for New York to take a ship for Puerto Rico. One of the last acts was to try to eliminate a tax on steamship tickets in order to foment tourism.\textsuperscript{314} Summarizing his Congressional work, he stated that his goal had been to get Puerto Rico included in as much rehabilitation legislation as possible.
No previous Congress had included the Island in so many important laws. He had spoken six times in the House Chamber, presented ten bills, gone to numerous hearings in defense of Puerto Rican interests, visited President Roosevelt four times, received countless visitors in his office, attended to petitions, and visited important Federal secretaries and officials. Iglesias was now leaving for Puerto Rico to personally inform the Islanders of the results of his work and to get new ideas for the next Congress.315

On the Coamo Santiago Iglesias sailed from New York on July 18th to return to San Juan after the longest absence in his life.316

Notes

1. Interview with Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, 29 September 1980, Carolina, P.R.
4. Interview with Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, 29 September 1980.
10. Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 21 February 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 24 February 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 28 February 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 11 March 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 18 March 1933, p. 1.
11. Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 28 February 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 9 March 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 18 March 1933, p. 2.
12. Rafael Martínez Nadal and Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 6 March 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 10 March 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; U.S. Congress, House,
Extension of Remarks of Hon. Santiago Iglesias, 73rd Congress, 1st Sess., 10 March 1933, p. 128; El Mundo, 22 March 1933, p. 3.

13. El Mundo, 7 April 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 11 April 1933, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 27 April 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 8 May 1933, p. 3; Mathews, op. cit., p. 118.

14. Santiago Iglesias to George H. Dern, 14 March 1933; George H. Dern to Santiago Iglesias, 20 March 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, op. cit., p. 31; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

15. El Mundo, 22 March 1933, p. 3.


17. Santiago Iglesias to George H. Dern, 10 April 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, op. cit., p. 118.


25. R.Y. Stuart (Emergency Conservation Work) to Robert Fechner (Director of Emergency Conservation Work), 25 April 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 2 April 1933, p. 1; Mathews, op. cit., 119-120.


28. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 38; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 52, 72-73.


36. Ibid., p. 48.

37. Ibid.; Santiago Iglesias to George H. Dern, 31 March 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

38. Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 April 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; La Democracia, 11 April 1933, p. 1.

39. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 6 April 1933, p. 1.

40. La Información, 11 April 1933, p. 1.

41. Ibid., 12 April 1933, p. 1. Ortega was New York born of a Spanish father and a Puerto Rican mother of German descent. In 1933 he became the New York
representative of the Puerto Rico Manufactures Association (see El Mundo, 4 November 1933, p. 3).

43. Ibid., p. 55.
46. La Prensa, 1 May 1933, p. 1; El Mundo, 1 May 1933, p. 3; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 1 May 1933, p. 1.
47. Mathews, op. cit., p. 57.
48. La Democracia, 3 May 1933, p. 1.
49. El Mundo, 7 May 1933, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Millard E. Tydings, 4 May 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
51. Mathews, op. cit., p. 57.
54. El Mundo, 19 April 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 27 April 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 12 May 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 29 July 1933, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Watson Miller (Chief of the American Legion), 17 April 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel A. Muñoz (Commander of the American Legion in Puerto Rico), 17 April 1933; Memorandum on a visit to the Veterans' Administration, 2 May 1933; Frank T. Hines (Administrator of Veterans' Affairs) to Santiago Iglesias, 4 August 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
55. Manuel V. Domenech to the Director of the Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, 9 February 1933; Harold L Ickes to Santiago Iglesias, 1 May 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Ickes, 4 May 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
57. George H. Dern to H. M. McIntyre (Secretary to President Roosevelt), 16 May 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
58. F. LeJeune Parker to George H. Dern, 13 May 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
60. La Prensa, 25 April 1933, p. 1; La Democracia, 2 May 1933, p. 1.
62. La Prensa, 16 May 1933, p. 1; Mathews, op. cit., p. 60.
63. El Mundo, 19 May 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 20 May 1933, p. 3.
64. Ibid., 24 May 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 3 June 1933, p. 3; Porto Rico Progress, 15 June 1933, p. 3.
72. *Porto Rico Progress*, 29 June 1933, p. 3.
76. *La Democracia*, 30 June 1933, p. 1; Mathews, op. cit., p. 61.
83. Santiago Iglesias to F. Le Jeune Parker, 24 May 1933; F. Le Jeune Parker to Santiago Iglesias, 26 May 1933; Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 31 May 1933; William Green to Santiago Iglesias, 6 June 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Millard E. Tydings, 9 June 1933; Franklin D. Roosevelt to James R. Beverly, 16 June 1933; Santiago Iglesias to F. Le Jeune Parker, 26 June 1933; F. Le Jeune Parker to Santiago Iglesias, 29 June 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; U.S. Congress, House, Political and Civil Rights of Citizens of Puerto Rico, 73rd Congress, 1st Sess., 13 June 1933, p. 5910; Mathews, op. cit., p. 60.
85. Administración de Rehabilitación Nacional, *Declaración del Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América trazando pautas para la Administración de la Rehabilitación Nacional* (San Juan, P.R.: Negociado de Materiales, Imprenta y Transporte, 1933), pp. 3-8.
86. Edward F. McGrady (Assistant Administrator of the National Recovery Administration) to Santiago Iglesias, 6 July 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 8 July 1933.
88. Santiago Iglesias to Hugh S. Johnson (Administrator of the National Recovery Administration), 12 July 1933; Frederick F. Robinson (Assistant to Dudley Cates, Assistant Administrator of the National Recovery Administration), 17 July 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
89. Santiago Iglesias to Hugh S. Johnson, 21 July 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
90. *El Mundo*, 12 July 1933, p. 1; *La Democracia*, 12 July 1933, p. 1; Filipo de Hostos (President of the Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico) to Santiago Iglesias, 14 July 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de Hostos, 18 July 1933; Lupercio Colberg (President of the Manufacturer’s Association of Puerto Rico) to Santiago Iglesias, 19 June 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Lupercio Colberg, 21 June 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 122; Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
94. Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Ickes (Secretary of the Interior and Administrator of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works), 28 July 1933; Harold L. Ickes to Santiago Iglesias, 11 August 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 8 August 1933, p. 2.
95. Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 7 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel Méndez, 9 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Hugh S. Johnson, 8 August 1933; Dudley Cotes (Assistant to Hugh S. Johnson) to Santiago Iglesias, 9 August 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 9 August 1933, p. 3.
96. Santiago Iglesias to Hugh S. Johnson, 19 August 1933; Filipo de Hostos to Santiago Iglesias, 21 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de Hostos, 24 August 1933; Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 18 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 18 August 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124; Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
99. Santiago Iglesias to Creed F. Cox (Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs), 2 September 1933; Creed F. Cox to Santiago Iglesias, 13 September 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127; Rafael Alonso Torres and Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 30 October 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *La


106. El Mundo, 24 July 1933, p. 6; Ibid., 26 July 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 27 July 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 29 July 1933, p. 6; Ibid., 1 August 1933, p. 4; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 52.


110. Santiago Iglesias to Hugh S. Johnson, 17 October 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

111. Santiago Iglesias to Hugh S. Johnson, 31 October 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

112. Mathews, op. cit., p. 127; El Mundo, 23 November 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 24 November 1933, p. 3.


115. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 130-131; La Democracia, 1 December 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 15 December 1933, p. 1.


117. Quoted in Mathews, op. cit., p. 129.

118. Ibid., p. 130; El Mundo, 1 December 1933, p. 1; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 57.
119. Memorandum on visit to Harry Hopkins, 4 December 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

120. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 131-135; El Mundo, 17 March 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 15 August 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 18 August 1933, p. 3; The New York Times, 12 August 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 20 August 1933, p. 21; Pedro Juan Serrallés to Santiago Iglesias, 26 June 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Pedro Juan Serrallés, 12 July 1933; Pedro Juan Serrallés to Santiago Iglesias, 13 July 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Pedro Juan Serrallés, 18 July 1933; Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 11 August 1933; Juan Eugenio Serrallés to Santiago Iglesias, 29 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Juan Eugenio Serrallés, 6 September 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

121. Mathews, op. cit., p. 139; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 51; El Mundo, 10 August 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 12 August 1933, p. 1; Filipo de Hostos to Santiago Iglesias, 12 August 1933; Filipo de Hostos to Santiago Iglesias, 21 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de Hostos, 24 August 1933; Filipo de Hostos to Santiago Iglesias, 8 September 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de Hostos, 13 September 1933; Bakers' Association of Puerto Rico to Henry Wallace, 2 August 1933; Henry Wallace to Governor of Puerto Rico, 23 August 1933; J. M. Benítez (Secretary General of Merchants' Federation of Puerto Rico) to Santiago Iglesias, 20 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to J.M. Benítez, 21 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Henry Wallace, 5 August 1933; Henry Wallace to Santiago Iglesias, 26 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Henry Wallace, 19 August 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Henry Wallace, 25 August 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


125. The New York Times, 15 August 1933, p. 10; El Mundo, 12 August 1933, p. 1; La Democracia, 12 August 1933, p. 4; Mathews, op. cit., p. 70.


128. El Mundo, 22 August 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 23 August 1933, p. 1; El País, 30 August 1933, p. 2; Ibid., 31 August 1933, p. 2.


133. *El Mundo*, 9 September 1933, p. 3.


159. Robert H. Gore to Creed F. Cox, 28 October 1933, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Personal File, Box 244, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; El Mundo, 31 October 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 2 November 1933, p. 1; Mathews, op. cit., p. 102.

160. Santiago Iglesias to George H. Dern, 22 October 1933; George H. Dern to Santiago Iglesias, 25 October 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 23 October 1933; Franklin D. Roosevelt to Santiago Iglesias, 28 October 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 24 October 1933, p. 3; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 96-76.

161. El Mundo, 25 October 1933, p. 1; Ibid., 27 October 1933, p. 3; Memorandum for the Secretary of War, 26 October 1933; Memorandum submitted by the Legislative Commission of Puerto Rico, 30 October 1933; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 97-102.


165. Ibid., 6 November 1933, pp. 1, 4, 7; Ibid., 7 November 1933, p. 1; The New York Times, 7 November 1933, p. 31; Ibid., 12 November 1933, sec. IV, p. 8.


168. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
171. The New York Times, 10 November 1933, p. 2; Ibid., 14 November 1933, p. 12; Ibid., 16 November 1933, p. 11; El Mundo, 16 November 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 18 November 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 20 November 1933, p. 3; Mathews, op. cit., p. 106.
172. In the Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán remain most of Santiago Iglesias’ documents from 1933-1939. I have selected for this dissertation the most pertinent ones.
173. El Mundo, 15 November 1933, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Carlos Blondet (President of the Asociación de Agricultores), 29 November 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
174. El Mundo, 2 December 1933, p. 3.
175. Ibid., 12 December 1933, p. 3; Ibid., 20 December 1933, p. 3.
176. Ibid., 15 September 1933, p. 1; W.C. Mendenhall (Director of Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior), to Santiago Iglesias, 13 September 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
177. Memorandum on visit to Creed F. Cox, 4 December 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
183. Millard Tydings to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 December 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, op. cit., p. 107.
184. Memorandum on conclusions reached by Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins of Dartmouth College, as stated verbally by him to the Secretary of War on December 21, 1933; Ernest M. Hopkins to Creed F. Cox, 26 December 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 106-111; The New York Times, 17 December 1933, sec. IV, p. 8.
185. Ernest M. Hopkins to George H. Dern, 9 January 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
186. Ibid.
187. Rafael Martínez Nadal to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 21 November 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, op. cit., p. 109.
192. *El Mundo*, 29 November 1933, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres and Rafael Martínez Nadal, 2 January 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
193. Memorandum on the visit to Harry Hopkins, 4 December 1933; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres and Rafael Martínez Nadal, 2 January 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
194. James R. Bourne to George H. Dern, 6 December 1933; George H. Dern to James R. Bourne, 18 December 1933, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.
196. Luis Muñoz Marín to Robert H. Gore, 12 January 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. Governor Gore gave Santiago Iglesias the original letter which was never published.
200. Recorded interview between Prof. Kenneth Lugo (Department of History, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras) and Tadeo Rodríguez García, 27 October 1973; Recorded interview between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Luis V. Pino, 10 November 1973; Quintero Rivera, ed., *Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico*,
pp. 99-100. Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 29 January 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

201. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 70-71; El Mundo, 11 January 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 8 February 1934, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres and Rafael Martínez Nadal, 2 January 1934; Benjamin Horton to Santiago Iglesias, 9 January 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Benjamin Horton, 10 January 1934; Benjamin Horton to Santiago Iglesias, 11 January 1934; Benjamin Horton to Santiago Iglesias, 22 February 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Benjamin Horton, 28 February 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


204. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 15 January 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 16 January 1934, p. 1; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 72-73; Roca Rosselli, op. cit., p. 100; Quintero Rivera, ed., Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico, pp. 98-107; Silén, op. cit., p. 95; Juan Antonio Corretjer, El líder de la desesperación (Guaynabo, P.R.: n.p. 1972), pp. 41-42; Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos y las huelgas de los años 30 (Guaynabo, P.R.: n. p., 1969), pp. 12-13; El Mundo, 15 January 1934, p. 1; Arturo Meléndez,“Albizu Campos y el marxismo-IV,” Clariad, 16 to 22 December 1977, En Rojo, pp. 10-11; George Fromm, “La historia-ficción de Benjamín Torres (I),” Clariad, 27 May to 3 June 1977, El Rojo, pp. 4-5; ________, “La historia-ficción de Benjamín Torres (II),” Clariad, 3 to 9 June 1977, En Rojo, pp. 6-7; ________, “La historia-ficción de Benjamín Torres (III),” Clariad, 11 to 16 June 1977, En Rojo, pp. 4-6; ________, “La historia-ficción de Benjamín Torres (IV),” Clariad, 17 to 23 June 1977, En Rojo, pp. 4-5; ________, “La historia-ficción de Benjamín Torres (V),” Clariad, 24 to 30 June 1977, En Rojo, pp. 6-7; ________, “La historia-ficción de Benjamín Torres (VI),” Clariad, 1 to 7 July 1977, En Rojo, pp. 4-5.


206. Recorded interview between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Luis V. Pino; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 97.

207. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

208. Ibid., pp. 77-80, 97-99; Comité Insular Afirmación Socialista, Prontuario del libro en preparación “Opinión y Sentencia” (San Juan, P.R.: Imprenta La Estrella, 1934), pp. 2-30; Tadeo Rodríguez García, Brevario histórico (San Juan, P. R.: n.p., 1936), pp. 2-30; Quintero Rivera, ed., Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico, pp. 108-117; El Mundo, 9 February 1934, p. 2; Ibid., 10 February 1934, p. 7; Ibid., 12 September 1935, p. 2; Recorded interview between
Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Tadeo Rodríguez García; *Unión Obrera*, 6 November 1934, p. 1; *Ibid.*, 3 January 1935, p. 1; Recorded interview I between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Tadeo Rodríguez García; Recorded interview II between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Tadeo Rodríguez García, 30 October 1973; Recorded interview between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Luis V. Pino.

209. Recorded interview I between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Tadeo Rodríguez García; Recorded interview II between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Tadeo Rodríguez García; Recorded interview between Prof. Kenneth Lugo and Luis V. Pino; Quintero Rivera, ed., *Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico*, p. 97; see also two works by Taller de Formación Política, *La cuestión nacional: el Partido Nacionalista y el movimiento obrero puertorriqueño (aspectos de las luchas económicas y políticas de la década de 1930-1940)*, (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, Inc., 1982); *Huelga en la caña!* (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, 1982).


211. *El Mundo*, 3 January 1934, p. 3.


213. José Arnaldo Meyners (Publicity Director of La Fortaleza) to Santiago Iglesias, 30 December 1933; Santiago Iglesias to José Arnaldo Meyners, 10 January 1934, Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 29 January 1934; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 17 January 1934, p. 1.


216. Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-82.


221. *Ibid.*; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres and Rafael Martínez Nadal, 19 January 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


233. *Ibid.*, 3 February 1934, p. 3; Memorandum on the Commissioner of Education of Puerto Rico for the Secretary of War by Creed F. Cox, 2 February 1934, Department of War, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 20342, Part 2 Commissioner of Education of Puerto Rico, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 29 January 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal y Rafael Alonso Torres, 2 February 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

234. Inaugural address of Honorable Blanton Winship, Governor of Puerto Rico, delivered at San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 5, 1934 (War Department publication), Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *The New York Times*, 6 February 1934, p. 5.


253. Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-147; Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-84; Fairbank, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; Blanton Winship to Creed F. Cox, 29 March 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Blanton Winship, 29 March 1934; Creed F. Cox to Santiago Iglesias, 30 March 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.
254. See *Congressional Record*, vol. 78, pp. 2621, 2652, 6033-6035; *El Mundo*, 14 February 1934, p. 3; Gruening, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
256. *Ibid.*, 3 April 1934, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Marvin Jones, 27 March 1934; Marvin Jones to Santiago Iglesias, 28 March 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.
257. *El Mundo*, 5 April 1934, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel A. García Méndez, 10 April 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.
259. Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 26 April 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán; *El Mundo*, 27 April 1934, p. 3.
266. *El Mundo*, 13 March 1934, p. 3.

269. Santiago Iglesias to George H. Dern, 5 March 1934; George H. Dern to Santiago Iglesias, 9 March 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


271. Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 160; Bothwell, ed., *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 446-448; *La Democracia*, 31 May 1934, p. 1; *El Mundo*, 5 November 1935, p. 2; Memorandum on rehabilitation plans by Rafael Menéndez Ramos, no date but seems to be June 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

Ruby Black wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt informing her that Muñoz Marín had "the largest following on the island" and represented and guided "public opinion there as no one else" did. That he was "the only political leader" in Puerto Rico who had "supported the President's sugar policy, from the beginning on, not hesitating to risk his political future" by doing so. Iglesias had completely lined up with the sugar barons while Muñoz Marín had "kept majority opinion" in Puerto Rico "in favor of the administration measures, convincing the people of what he himself believed —that this administration faithfully and earnestly wishes to rehabilitate" the Island and "that the job cannot be done without some means of controlling the sugar industry." Furthermore, Muñoz Marín had transformed the Liberal Party into "a real liberal party" as the President had done with the Democratic Party. Ruby Black to Eleanor Roosevelt, 10 May 1934, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 100 Personal Letters, Box 1286, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.


274. This editorial of *El País* appears in Iglesias' newspaper scrapbook number nine in the March 1934 section. The corresponding issue is missing from the incomplete collection of *El País* at the General Library of the University of Puerto Rico.

275. *La Prensa*, 30 March 1934, p. 3.


285. Santiago Iglesias to Walter H. Newton (Member of the Board of the Federal Home Loan Board), 28 January 1934; Walter H. Newton to Santiago Iglesias, 9 February 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

286. Santiago Iglesias to William I. Myers (Governor, Farm Credit Administration) 12 March 1934; William I. Myers to Santiago Iglesias, 15 March 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Fairbank, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

287. *La Prensa*, 17 April 1934, p. 3.


290. *Ibid.*, 12 April 1934, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 23 April 1934, p. 1: Teresa Angleró to Santiago Iglesias, 5 April 1934; Teresa Angleró to Santiago Iglesias, 8 April 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Teresa Angleró, 9 April 1934; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 23 March 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 9 April 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


295. El Mundo, 28 February 1934, p. 3.
296. Ibid., 1 March 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 9 March 1934, p. 3.
297. Ibid., 18 April 1934, p. 3; U.S. Congress, Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias speaking on Pan American Day, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 16 April 1934, Congressional Record, p. 6863; L.S. Rowe, 9 March 1934; Santiago Iglesias to L.S. Rowe, 18 April 1934; L.S. Rowe to Santiago Iglesias, 19 April 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagan.
299. Ibid., 4 April 1934, p. 7.
306. Antonio Arroyo (Secretary, House of Representatives of Puerto Rico) to Santiago Iglesias, 9 May 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Antonio Arroyo, 16 May 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagan; El Mundo, 1 June 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 2 June 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 4 June 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 12 June 1934, p. 3; La Democracia, 30 May 1934, p. 1; U.S. Congress, House, A Bill to Amend Act Providing for Civil Government of Puerto Rico, H. R. 9831, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934, p. 10337. See also Congressional Record, pp. 12673-12674.
308. Jorge Bird Arias to Santiago Iglesias, 15 June 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Jorge Bird Arias, 26 June 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagan.
310. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 25.
311. El Mundo, 29 April 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 6 May 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 3 June 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 20 June 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 27 June 1934, p. 3.
Iglesias on tax on steamship tickets, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 15 June 1934, Congressional Record, p. 11935; Santiago Iglesias to Robert L. Doughton (Chairman, Committee of Ways and Means) 7 June 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 17 July 1934, p. 3.

315. La Prensa, 10 July 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 17 July 1934, p. 3; El Mundo, 7 July 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 9 July 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 14 July 1934, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Oscar L. Chapman, 6 July 1934; Oscar L. Chapman to Santiago Iglesias, 10 July 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

316. El Mundo, 19 July 1934, p. 3.
On the morning of July 23, 1934, a crowd of 6,000 enthusiastically greeted Santiago Iglesias as he arrived in San Juan. The day had became almost a legal holiday for the workers to welcome their maximum leader. His family, personal friends, representatives from numerous labor unions, leaders from the Coalitionist parties and the Free Federation, government officials, and the mayor of San Juan happily received the returning Resident Commissioner. Iglesias was taken in Martínez Nadal’s car around the streets of Old San Juan. When they reached the Municipal Theater, a door was found open, and Martínez Nadal and Iglesias were forced to address the crowd that rapidly filled the auditorium. The Senate’s President stated that he and Iglesias had been fighting for the socio-economic rehabilitation of Puerto Rico for ten years. In 1929 when they had proposed to the Senate the $100 million reform program, they had been laughed at. Their reform program was similar to the Chardón Plan, and the Liberals had then mocked that program. Now Muñoz Marín wanted to control the Federal rehabilitation measures which the Coalition had originated. Martínez Nadal concluded, praising Iglesias as the “best and hardest working” resident commissioner Puerto Rico had ever had. Iglesias then spoke on the intense desire of the people to achieve their economic reconstruction and praised the rehabilitation plans of President Roosevelt. Afterwards, he proceeded to his home where he met with the Socialist Territorial Committee and briefed them on his Congressional work. Alonso Torres then gave the local report.

In an *El Mundo* interview, Iglesias declared that it would take some time for the Chardón Plan to be implemented. No person who wished Puerto Rico well would oppose the Plan. The Legislature should make the necessary laws to put the Plan into practice. He insisted that nothing
should be done behind the backs of the legislators because that was the
train of thought of President Roosevelt and his Administration. As for the
Jones-Costigan Law, Iglesias added that enterprise and labor should be
treated with fairness. He considered the Law discriminatory, and that was
the reason why the New Deal Administration was preparing the rehabili-
tation plan to compensate for its bad effects. Iglesias reaffirmed his
support and cooperation with the Roosevelt Administration for the
Insular economic reconstruction and wished it should take place without
privileges for any person or specific group.2 Chardón visited Iglesias at
his residence where they discussed the Plan.3 There was, however, a
marked degree of discontent in the Island due to the tardiness of the
implementation of the rehabilitation measures envisioned by the New
Deal and the Chardón Plan.4 Iglesias, nevertheless, firmly believed that
President Roosevelt would work for the economic reconstruction of
Puerto Rico.5

since 1926 and former editor of the *Porto Rico Progress* (1913-1933),
had written that there were “indications of discord” in the Coalition that
“would require little less than genius to keep all its elements contended.”
Santiago Iglesias was the “one individual credited with being able to
enforce harmony within the Coalition.”6 In the Republican Union Party
Martínez Nadal had been severely criticized by a number of people who
came to be known as the “Group of 76.” The Group was principally led
by Rafael Cuevas Zequeira and San Juan Mayor Jesús Benítez Castañó.
A Republican-Unionist convention had met in Arecibo on July 8, 1934,
and expelled the “Group of 76” which did not have much support in the
rank and file of the Party.7

These political problems were one of the reasons for Iglesias’ trip.
For the next six weeks he would be busier than ever before as a result of
his two-year absence. In his home office-library Iglesias began receiving
people at ten in the morning and finished late at night. The problems dealt
with were the following: labor, municipal public works, rehabilitation,
politics, appointments for posts, etc. He had meetings with Winship, the
Coalition Commission, the Executive Council of the Free Federation,
Socialists, Republican-Unionists, labor leaders, and government offi-
cials, and answered the increased volume of mail. All these activities
helped to solve a number of problems and controversies that had devel-
oped in his absence. Iglesias’ soft-spoken and persuasive diplomacy
dispelled the discord inside the Coalition.8
It was Iglesias’ opinion that a Legislative Commission ought to go to Washington during the next Congressional session to present the Insular problems there. Roosevelt himself had suggested this to Martínez Nadal and García Méndez. For the coming Congress, Iglesias planned to resubmit the elective governor and statehood bills. Some leading Congressional figures were favorably inclined to grant statehood. The transfer from the War Department to Interior—which officially took place on July 31st—was considered by him as an indication of the Administration’s interests in improving the conditions of Puerto Rico.

In the Hotel Meliá in Ponce a banquet in honor of the Resident Commissioner was held by some one hundred well-wishers. Thirty-one congratulating messages were received—including, surprisingly enough, one from Barceló. The speeches—ten of them—began at 9:30 P.M. and lasted until 3:30 A.M.! Iglesias began his speech after 2:00 A.M. and started by answering a speech ex-Governor Beverly had given there some time before. Beverly had affirmed that the Socialists wanted to accomplish a culturally inferior task for Puerto Rico and that the Island could not depend on such types of people because that would be prejudicial to the best interests of the country. Iglesias now said that what the Socialists wanted for Puerto Rico was an opportunity to have a decent life and accomplish something for the betterment of the working classes. He continued by stating that rehabilitation plans that previously were deemed absurd now were praised. The political problem of Puerto Rico was considered before to be more important than the economic. Now it was the opposite. Everyone was now discussing the economic problems as the Socialists had done for years. The Jones-Costigan Law had changed the panorama, and the Chardón Plan was being formulated in order to make the necessary needed rehabilitation. Every group, together with the Federal and Insular governments, should participate in the Plan. Congress was willing to listen and help as shown by its rehabilitation measures which had included Puerto Rico. Iglesias promised to work hard in the coming Congress for Insular economic reconstruction as recommended by the President. Iglesias ended by stating that Puerto Ricans rejected colonialism and wanted permanent union and equality with the United States.

Sugar was the backbone of the Insular economic life. The 27 percent reduction in production due to the Jones-Costigan Law had increased unemployment and reduced revenues and trade. The colonos (individual sugar growers that did not own a mill) were the hardest hit because the sugar mills were principally grinding their own cane. The sugar growers
called a meeting and organized the Sugar Growers Association (Asociación de Colonos), and Jesús T. Piñero (a close friend and collaborator of Muñoz Marín) was elected president. Piñero wrote to President Roosevelt, describing the financial difficulties of the sugar growers and accepting the reductions in sugar production, while not accepting the manner in which they had been applied.  

A general assembly of business organizations was called by the Chamber of Commerce to discuss the grave economic situation. A document was drafted, expressing the grievances arising from the low sugar quota and requesting rapid action to resolve the problem. Copies were sent to Governor Winship and Secretary Wallace.  

Another assembly of municipalities and agricultural and business organizations, called together by the Coalitionists and Liberal leaders to discuss the economy, met on August 14. Muñoz Marín, Iglesias, and others spoke. A memorandum was drafted and sent to Governor Winship, urging him to get Washington to end the delay of the rehabilitation program. Memorials were sent to President Roosevelt, Ickes, and Wallace. The three political parties were in favor of the reconstruction plan. The only one in disagreement was Albizu Campos who called President Roosevelt an "economic despot." Muñoz Marín also wired the President and Ruby Black (who then wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt) explaining the grave conditions. President Roosevelt tried to get the bureaucracy to move faster. These developments also resulted in getting Dr. Ernest Gruening named director of the division of Territories and Island Possessions.  

Dr. Gruening was a physician, author, and journalist versed in Latin American affairs. His participation as an advisor to the American delegation to the Inter-American Conference held in Montevideo (1933) impressed President Roosevelt, who appointed him to the Interior post. He was also a friend of Muñoz Marín. The Liberal Senator had previously written to Gruening explaining the Insular political situation, and had stated that the "obvious purpose" of the Coalition was "the spoils of political power." President Roosevelt told Gruening that the conditions in Puerto Rico were "hopeless." Nevertheless, it would take the rehabilitation plan another year before the start of its implementation.  

Iglesias reaffirmed in an interview that labor backed the Chardón Plan. His only criticism was that labor was "not recognized in it" and should be represented and that the creation of a great system of patronage organized to take political advantage should be prevented.
The International Ladies Garment Workers Union sent labor organizer Rose Pesotta to Puerto Rico in July 1934 to help Teresa Angleró in strengthening the needle industry unions founded in 1931. The working conditions of that industry were very bad and had to be improved by unionization. Pesotta considered that the National Recovery Administration officials did not care much about the workers' grievances. She traveled around the Island with Angleró, reorganizing five local unions into a single one chartered by the I.L.G.U.W. with some 2,000 members. Before Pesotta left at the end of September, the unionized needle industry workers held their own convention.21

The coming thirteenth labor congress of the Free Federation was considered by Iglesias to be of transcendental importance because the Insular economic problem had to be analyzed in the light of the coming New Deal rehabilitation plan. The plan offered by President Roosevelt would greatly develop the infrastructure, reform agriculture, and begin an industrialization process. The Labor congress would appeal to the American Federation of Labor convention to get their help in achieving socio-economic reforms to change the lives of the workers.22

The congress of the Free Federation met in the Teatro Yagüéz in Mayagüez between September 2-4. There were 339 delegates representing 180 unions with 50,337 active members, twice the number of those at the previous congress of 1931. There were 24,666 inactive members who were behind in their union dues for a total of 75,000 members. Since 1901, the Free Federation had received $3,900,000 in aid from outside labor organizations. Pesotta was present and was impressed by the fervor of the gathering. Comparing the delegates with the ones that she was accustomed to in the States, Pesotta was surprised at the "tattered clothes" and "lean and hungry" look most of them had. Even Socialist senators "were poorly garbed." To President Roosevelt a cable was sent, expressing workers support of the rehabilitation plan and to William Green a message of thanks for this cooperation with the labor movement was dispatched.23

Iglesias delivered three speeches. In the first he explained his work in Congress. Iglesias stated, in his second address, that he was not afraid of the radicalism of university people, technocrats, and professionals that previously had opposed the ideas of the labor movement and now seemed to be in favor of them. The closing speech dealt with the difficulties created by the Jones-Costigan Act and the labor movements' backing of the New Deal economic reconstruction.24
Muñoz Marín sent a lengthy telegram, which was well received, in which he explained his rehabilitation plans. The telegram was answered by reminding Muñoz Marín that his ideas had been part of the program of the Free Federation for years. After discussing other topics and electing the officials, the convention ended.\textsuperscript{25}

There were more talks between Iglesias, Martínez Nadal, Winship, and Coalition leaders. The Resident Commissioner stated that the Roosevelt Administration was now giving more attention to the rehabilitation plan. During this period, Bolívar Pagán was elected acting-president of the Party.\textsuperscript{26}

Governor Winship had sailed for Washington to deal with the socio-economic measures being worked out there. It was rumored that he would not return. Iglesias cabled Winship to ask if he and Senator Valdés (representing Martínez Nadal) could follow him to cooperate in his endeavor. The Governor wired from the Coamo, welcoming the assistance offered.\textsuperscript{27} Before leaving, Iglesias declared that “he wanted the period of guessing and bluffing” by the Liberals, as well as their opposition to Winship, ended. In Washington he would see important Federal officials to explain the case of Puerto Rico and urge prompt action on the reconstruction program.\textsuperscript{28} In order to save time, Iglesias and Valdés left by plane on September 12. This was Iglesias first flight. It took twenty-eight hours to reach Washington via the West Indies and the East Coast.\textsuperscript{29}

Others were traveling to the Federal Capital that late summer to influence the final formulation of the rehabilitation plan and to lobby for its control. Members of the Sugar Producers Association did some soft lobbying in the late summer and fall that would not accomplish much for their interests. The Asociación de Agricultores sent its president, former Resident Commissioner Pesquera.\textsuperscript{30}

As soon as Iglesias and Valdés landed in Washington, they conferred with Winship on the plans for economic reconstruction. The Governor believed that the plan should not be used for making political capital. Then they went to visit officials of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Several visits were made to Gruening (who spoke Spanish fluently), Hopkins, Ickes, and others to discuss the reconstruction plan. Both Ickes and Gruening reiterated that the rehabilitation plan would not be used for making political capital or furthering personal individual careers. Iglesias lamented the delay in the plan caused in part by the reorganization of the
Division of Territories and Island Possessions and the absence from Washington of Interior Sub-Secretary Oscar Chapman. Jacob Baker, assistant to Hopkins, told Iglesias and Valdés that he had been informed that the idea behind the Chardón Plan was to destroy the Coalition by attracting the Socialists to make a deal with the Liberal Party.\footnote{31}

Luis Muñoz Marín and Jesús T. Piñero were also simultaneously active in promoting their ideas for the rehabilitation measures.\footnote{32} Back in San Juan, Chardón wrote to Secretary Wallace to urge the implementation of the much delayed plan.\footnote{33} Enrique Landrón, prominent Liberal and member of the Asociación de Agricultores, declared himself against the rehabilitation plan because it was against all the political ideas of the Liberal Party and would create an “unsurmountable” barrier against independence. He also implied that Muñoz Marín was rather unknowingly promoting this.\footnote{34} The future would prove that Landrón had prophesied quite accurately.

James Bourne had written to Harry Hopkins that the Coalitionists were trying to convince Winship that the P.R.E.R.A. was employing all Liberals and not Republican-Unionists and Socialists. Hopkins asked Jacob Baker, who had recently returned from the Island, for his opinion on this controversial matter. Baker started that there was “some validity in the claim” and that the important people in the agency were “all Liberals.” Bourne should change this policy to get the “heat off this recurrent charge.”\footnote{35} There were some cases in which enterprising Coalitionists pretended they were Liberals and were thus given jobs at the P.R.E.R.A.\footnote{36} But nothing actually was to change, and the Coalition correctly suspected that the same partiality to the Liberals would occur with the future administration of the rehabilitation plan.

After a conference with Ickes, Winship announced that $2 million would be granted for slum clearance. Iglesias declared that that sum should be rapidly granted and given and not lent so that the Insular Department of the Interior would begin working together with Federal officials as soon as possible. Valdés and Iglesias went to the National Recovery Administration and recommended that the needle industry be protected from cheap Chinese competitors with a tariff, that the codes be applied, and that shops should be built for needle workers.\footnote{37} With the corresponding Federal departments and agencies, Iglesias discussed Insular socio-economic problems and channeled numerous petitions sent from Puerto Rico, dealing with commerce, agriculture, public works, and loans.\footnote{38} The rumor that Muñoz Marín was trying to get Winship ousted
(because he did not favor the Chardón Plan) was denied by both Iglesias and Muñoz Marín. With Gruening, Iglesias and Valdés conferred at length on Puerto Rico’s economic and political problems. They were informed that the corporation that was to be established to run the rehabilitation plan would work in harmony with the Insular government; three of its directors would be from the governor’s cabinet; and the Chamber of Commerce ought to be represented too. Gruening further added that Winship had the backing of the Roosevelt Administration. Although there was a Congressional recess due to elections, Iglesias was so busy dealing with rehabilitation affairs he would miss the San Francisco convention of the American Federation of Labor.

Following the ideas suggested by Gruening, Iglesias and Valdés drafted a plan where they proposed how the reconstruction corporation should be organized to run the rehabilitation plan. The board of directors would be chaired by the governor and composed of the commissioners of Agriculture, Labor, Interior, a member of the Economic Commission of the Legislature, and two prominent representatives of the business and agricultural groups (a member of one of the different business associations and another from the Asociación de Agricultores were suggested). A board like this should result in fewer conflicts and work more harmoniously because all socio-economic interests and the government would be properly represented. This plan was sent to Winship, Gruening, and Chapman.

Interior Assistant Secretary Chapman announced some rehabilitation measures for Puerto Rico which consisted of agricultural diversification in sugar lands; helping coffee, fruit, and tobacco growers; creation of subsistence homesteads; housing improvements; and tourist development. Iglesias and Valdés then wrote to him, giving their whole-hearted approval. They sent Chapman the Homestead Law of 1921 and the Rural Improvement Act of 1923 which would aid in the coming socio-economic reconstruction.

Governor Winship, aided by Commissioner of Agriculture Menéndez Ramos, was active in Washington seeking solutions for the problems arising from the Jones-Costigan Act and to protect agricultural production from Cuban competition. He complained of the meager relief the Island was getting ($2,296,322 when it should get $32,232,894). President Roosevelt instructed Hopkins to send more funds. Thus $250,000 more was sent! Winship also wanted to develop tourism and expand the growing rum industry. Winship and Menéndez Ramos strongly suggested that the land bought to make homesteads should be
obtained from the cheaper available regions of the interior. These lands would give better socio-economic results than the more expensive sugar lands.44

Chancellor Chardón wrote to John F. Carter, Tugwell's assistant, that the operation of the rehabilitation plan should be given to experienced Puerto Ricans who were sympathetic with it.45 Carter believed that the selection of officials should be made by the governor and "subject to short-term operating contracts which would enable" Washington authorities "to check abuses." He was afraid that there was "a strong attempt to convert the rehabilitation program into a big patronage fund for the benefit of the Liberal Party." The object of the plan was "not primarily to provide political jobs for the white-collar group ... but to benefit the mass of the farmers and workers." In Puerto Rico the white-collar political group was "especially voracious." The "ideas and forces" behind the Chardón Plan as originally made "came from the Liberal Party." Carter suggested to Gruening that "we must not lose sight of our national interest in promoting economic stability" in Puerto Rico and that Winship should have "the greatest amount of influence — through his local control of funds and personal — compatible with the success of the program."46 After Gruening read these two letters, he wrote to Carter that he believed that a formula could be found to "to steer between the political pitfalls."47

This wise and sound counsel came too late because Gruening had already made his mind up and decided that Chardón would administer the rehabilitation plan.48 In his memoirs, Gruening wrote that at this time he was "innocently unaware" of Insular political complexities and was surprised when he later "discovered that five out of six Puerto Rican executives" he had chosen to run the plan "were members of the Liberal Party."49 It is impossible to believe this ridiculous justification from a sharp and successful politician who would later be governor and then senator of Alaska.

Muñoz Marín and Piñero had been in Washington since September. They "succeeded in getting very close to Dr. Gruening." This was not "surprising knowing the previous friendly relations between the doctor and the senator." To the Liberal Senator, Gruening "turned for political orientation."50 Muñoz Marín was working diligently to get the rehabilitation plan — which he always called the Chardón Plan — implemented as soon as possible. He informed President Roosevelt that the Liberal Party wanted the rehabilitation plan as a base to achieve independence. There were, however, many difficult legal, organizational, and financial
obstacles to be overcome before the plan could get started. Barceló completely backed the work being done by Muñoz Marín and planned to join him. Before departing, the President of the Liberal Party declared he would outline the party’s policies to Gruening and President Roosevelt in a memorandum. Barceló had made it known that he was “more interested in independence, and in the use of New Deal Agencies to speed its coming.” He also interpreted the Roosevelt Administration rehabilitation plan for Puerto Rico “as desirous of making the Island self-supporting before giving it political independence.” Meanwhile, Muñoz Marín accused Iglesias and Valdés of having always opposed the rehabilitation plan. The Liberal Senator was also liked by Interior Assistant Secretary Oscar Chapman who “was also ready to do favors for him” and got him in to see President Roosevelt. With Chapman’s and Gruening’s cooperation, Muñoz Marín was able to get President Roosevelt to prepare a Christmas message for Puerto Rico which the Liberal Senator read over the radio from a continental station on December 22. The message said that the rehabilitation measures were based on the Chardón Plan and would be implemented soon. This blatant favoritism, understandably, enraged the Coalition.

Why was the Roosevelt Administration favoring Muñoz Marín and the Liberal Party? Were the New Deal officials not impressed by Iglesias’ lifelong uphill struggle for social justice and economic rehabilitation? Why did the Washington policy makers prefer Muñoz Marín and the Liberal Party ideals and not those of Iglesias and the Coalition? Did they favor the Liberals because Muñoz Marín, although he claimed he wanted independence, could be turned into a leader that would keep Puerto Rico’s status undefined with some sort of improved colonial autonomous government and weaken the statehood push of the Coalition to end the degrading colony? No one knows what was in the minds of President Roosevelt, Ickes, Chapman, Gruening, Hopkins, and Tugwell because there is not enough documentation to provide a clear conclusion. But, Washington has never had a definite policy for Puerto Rico. One thing, definitely, is clear. The Roosevelt Administration was not respecting the wishes of the Insular electoral majority, and numerous promises made to Iglesias and the Coalition leadership were not being kept. Curiously enough, Secretary Ickes had recently written that Puerto Rico was “never referred to” in the Interior Department “as a ‘Colony’”, that such word had “never been used” there, and that Gruening was not “Minister of Colonies”. Yet, if Puerto Rico did not have an embassy in Washington
nor equal Congressional representation as the States of the Union, what was then the Island? Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory, a possession, because the United States has used the word colony for foreign imperialist nations exclusively and not for their own internal use. The only colonies in American history were the original thirteen; afterwards the United States had territories, possessions, and a federal district. But just because Ickes refused to think that Puerto Rico was a colony, the United States relationship with the Island has been since 1898 obviously one between a metropolitical power and nothing else but a colony that has euphemistically been called unincorporated territory, a possession, and a commonwealth. The New Deal policy that was being developed for the Island was considered —by one writer favorable to the policy— as "enlightened imperialism."  

Muñoz Marín, by this time, was also quietly getting control of the local Democratic Party organization, whose monopoly he and his followers would enjoy for the next four decades until the statehooders regained it for a short time. The Liberal Senator was being turned into a hero by the Roosevelt Administration and was gradually becoming the instrument of Washington policies in Puerto Rico.  

Enrique Landrón's observations were slowly beginning to be proven historically correct.

Although Congress was not in session, Iglesias was deeply involved in dealing with petitions that came to his office from Puerto Rico. The activity generated by these petitions, plus the complexities of the rehabilitation plan, prevented him from attending the American Federation of Labor convention of 1934. He certainly could not return to Puerto Rico as some wished. Valdés returned in November. The Mexican Federation of Labor sent Iglesias a message that he should have read to the American Federation of Labor convention. At this San Francisco convention, there were no Insular delegates; the report was mailed.

Agricultural problems consumed a great amount of the Resident Commissioner's time. The Coffee Growers Association wrote to Iglesias, asking for his aid in their payment of Federal debts contracted as result of the San Felipe hurricane. He in turn wrote to Secretary Hull, informing him that in the forthcoming commercial treaties with coffee producing countries, Puerto Rico should be fully protected with a tariff against the importation of cheap coffee. Iglesias succeeded in helping the coffee growers. The complications affecting sugar production that arose from the Jones-Costigan Act never seemed to end. Iglesias did his best to coordinate the interests of workers and sugar producers with the
Department of Agriculture and other Washington officials. The Sugar Producers Association congratulated him for the way he handled the problems of the sugar industry.\textsuperscript{63}

For local public works, Iglesias petitioned for a half a million dollar loan for Mayagüez while San Juan received $321,000 to build three schools and one jail. Other funds for port improvements in Ponce and Yabucoa were sought.\textsuperscript{64} Municipal government debts were causing terrible hardships, so several mayors asked Iglesias for his help. Besides advising that the Legislature should reform the municipal law to consolidate debts, Iglesias planned to bring Congressional attention to this problem.\textsuperscript{65}

It was the needle industry’s problems that generated the most work at the Resident Commissioner’s Office after those of the sugar cane industry. Gruening was visited to be informed that Puerto Rico’s needle industry needed the protection of a higher tariff to provide workers better wages. Some wanted the codes to be suppressed. The problems of this industry were most complex. President Roosevelt was informed of the difficulties. Boaz Long, Sub-Commissioner of Labor William D. López, and Iglesias worked on the needle industry complexities. Long, López and Iglesias labored on the needle industry intricacies, but no rapid solution was found.\textsuperscript{66}

The Communist Party had not been able to grow and become a political force since its founding on October 30, 1932. Its followers had become disenchanted with the policies of the Socialist Party.\textsuperscript{67} During the sugar cane strike of 1934, Luis Vergne Ortiz, the president and a lawyer, got involved in the strike with no apparent increase in his cadre.\textsuperscript{68} A group of communists met in Ponce on the anniversary of the Grito de Lares, on September 23, 1934, to reorganize the Party. Fourteen towns sent delegates. Among those present were: Luis Vergne Ortiz, José A. Lanauze Rolón, Miguel A. Bahamonde, Alberto E. Sánchez, and Juan Sáez Corales. Sánchez was elected secretary general. The Party, however, was not homogeneous. Lanauze Rolón and Bahamonde were Stalinists while Vergne Ortiz was a Trotskyist. The Communists were never to have a significant electoral force in spite of their propaganda. Their tactics were not violent. A year later the Party joined the Communist International and began petitioning to register. The Communists were separatists who wanted to make Puerto Rico part of an Antillean Soviet Socialist Federation which they planned to establish in the West Indies. Their labor strategy was to create cells inside the Free Federation and independent unions as well as to form new unions. Their success was very limited.\textsuperscript{69}
It was not only the Socialist and Republican Union parties which had internal conflicts: the Nationalists had them too. Some followers of Albizu Campos began to dislike his increasingly anti-American rhetoric and political tactics. Professor Clemente Pereda, poet Evaristo Rivera Chevremont, and Luis Antonio Miranda complained of the political leadership and wanted to organize a new separatist party. Emilio Soler López and Juan Augusto Perea, prominent leaders in Mayagüez, were censored by the Nationalist leadership. Later, the entire Mayagüez Nationalist leadership was expelled from the Party. As a result of this, the Partido Independentista was founded in Mayagüez on October 21, 1934, and Soler and Perea were elected president and vice-president. They proposed to establish a parliamentary republic where the power would be in the legislature and not in the president. The republic would be achieved through the electoral process. This new party, however, made no impact on the voters.

The Insular economy began to show signs of improvements by the fall of 1934. Government revenues for fiscal year 1933-1934 were $11,271,000 while the year before they had been $9,374,000. Except for 1931-1932, this had been the best year in the last five. There was now a cash balance of $144,700 in the Treasury. Savings accounts had increased by 23 percent, while the tax collected on horse racing gained by 26 percent. The State Insurance Fund showed no deficit for the first time because no insurance was issued where premiums were not paid in advance. There were still many difficulties ahead. Salaries for all rehabilitation employees were cut by 25 percent due to unforeseen expenditures caused by an influenza epidemic.

Strikes continued to occur even though the economy had showed an improvement. In Mayagüez, six-thousand people protested in November, 1934. One third of them were women that had lost their jobs as a consequence of the National Industrial Recovery Act needle codes. Iglesias visited Gruening and asked for aid to decrease unemployment. Sugar cane workers were suffering the expected economic difficulties resulting from the Jones-Costigan Act. The policy of the Free Federation was to solve labor conflicts by collective bargaining and not by strikes. This strategy was not liked by some workers who preferred to strike. Some workers disagreed with the sugar convenio for 1934-1935 and so went on strike, but their strength was unequal to that of the previous year.

The Roosevelt Administration had begun the process of giving
independence to the Philippines. Toward Latin America, the Good Neighbor Policy began a new era as the marines left Haiti and Nicaragua in 1934 and the Platt Amendment was abrogated. No one in Washington had officially declared that the rehabilitation plan being prepared for Puerto Rico was aimed at starting the process to grant independence to the Island. However, because Muñoz Marín and Barceló, who had developed a closer relationship with New Deal officials and the White House than had the Coalition, had distinctly stated several times in Puerto Rico and Washington that the plan’s goal was to create sovereign republic, the Republican-Unionists and Socialists were worried that independence was a real and near possibility. The push for statehood became stronger to counteract the apparent separatist trend. The Coalition’s problem was that not all Socialists were enthusiastically pro-statehood as were most Republican-Unionists. The Socialists, however, were generally anti-separatists and strongly pro-American.

Martínez Nadal had complained that some Socialists, like Rivera Martínez and Rivera Zayas, were not backing the statehood bill and that the Republican Union Party could end the pact. Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez declared that the Socialists Party had not agreed to ask for statehood in its platform or in the pact with the Republican-Unionists. Socialist Juan Carreras answered that not all Republican-Unionists were statehooders and therefore Martínez Nadal should not expect that all Socialists had to be pro-statehood. Carreras added that Republican-Unionists were violating electoral pact agreements to the detriment of the Socialists. This conflict with Martínez Nadal led Rivera Martínez to affirm that the Coalition would soon end.

Pagán informed Iglesias of the controversial statehood polemic between Martínez Nadal and Rivera Martínez, and other Socialists. Iglesias believed that the polemic should not take place and that it was a result of an absence of tolerance and bad understanding. The conflict only benefited the opposition. He himself would never have gotten involved in such polemic. Indeed, no Socialist convention had favored statehood, but, on the other hand, the Party had not come out against it. He himself had introduced in Congress the autonomy and statehood bills because the Legislature had voted for them. Iglesias added that a Coalition commission should go to Washington to deal with the status as well as with the socio-economic issue.

The critical statehood issue was taken up by the Socialist leadership. It was decided that the Party would form a status commission with the
Republican Union to go to Washington. Iglesias was in agreement with this decision. He added, however, that the commission should also deal with the economic problems and not only status because Congress and the President were giving more attention to economic than to political problems.\textsuperscript{81}

On January 3, 1935, Resident Commissioner Iglesias introduced eight bills in the House of Representatives. They were the following: H.R. 1390 to eliminate the tax on steamship tickets between the Island and the States; H. R. 1391 to establish a fish-culture program; H. R. 1392 to include the Island in a road construction law; H. R. 1393 to amend the Jones Act (to provide an elective governor and more autonomy); H. R. 1394 to grant statehood; H. R. 1828, H. R. 1829, and H. R. 1830 to give relief to María Miró Menéndez, Carlota Ballesteros, and Julio Santiago.\textsuperscript{82}

Most of these bills, however, were not to be approved.

The status issue was becoming important again. The delegate from Hawaii was asking for status reforms similar to Puerto Rico's.\textsuperscript{83} As a result of the statehood bill, Martínez Nadal joyfully declared that Iglesias was "in the heart of all Republican-Unionists" who valued him as one of themselves.\textsuperscript{84} Iglesias considered that the intention of the United States had always been to prepare the Island for statehood.\textsuperscript{85} On the House floor, he stated that Puerto Rico rejected colonialism and wanted permanent union with the States.\textsuperscript{86} Progressive Republican Congressman Vito Marcantonio (who had replaced Democrat James Lanzetta in the New York City district with a numerous Puerto Rican electorate) favored statehood which would end such discrimination as the Jones-Costigan Act.\textsuperscript{87}

Insular businessmen were not sure about their stand on status. None of the political parties were highly regarded. Many claimed that both stateholders and separatists were not sincere and were mainly interested in keeping or getting political power. The businessmen feared that both independence and statehood would increase government expenses, but they would pay the price of either status to have the political uncertainty finished. The sugar interests knew that statehood would be expensive, but it was safer than the present status or independence as shown by the Jones-Costigan Act.\textsuperscript{88}

The complications resulting from the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Jones-Costigan Act created a difficult situation for the sugar industry and the workers. For weeks the Sugar Producers Association and the Sugar Growers Association were in negotiations with the Agricultural
Worker's Unions and Factory Employees (affiliated to the Free Federation) to agree on the 1935 convenio. The Department of Labor helped in the negotiations. Some strikes began to occur, and there was a fear of a general strike as some 5,000 out of 123,000 sugar workers were striking. Governor Winship met with the sugar interests and workers' representatives and wrote to Iglesias asking for his influence in solving the crisis. Iglesias then wrote to Secretary Wallace and Fajardo Sugar and Aguirre directors, urging them to help in solving the conflict. The Resident Commissioner favored the labor policy of collective bargaining and wanted both sides to negotiate with help of the Department of Labor. Ernest Gruening was in complete agreement with this policy and urged Winship to get the sugar interests to negotiate. The convenio was finally agreed on January 29, 1935, and a general strike was averted. Iglesias considered it a "moral victory" although he realized there were many difficult labor problems to be dealt with in the future due to the grave socio-economic conditions and lack of education in the working classes.

At the beginning of the new year, Iglesias went to visit Gruening and discussed the multiple petitions of aid from the Insular government and different people and institutions. The Resident Commissioner understood that the Director had "an exceptionally keen interest in helping the people of Puerto Rico" with his "practical suggestions and influence with the higher authorities." Unemployment greatly preoccupied Iglesias because there were some 400,000 workers looking for jobs and Federal funds were needed to help them out. To Speaker Byrnes Iglesias presented a gavel made from old wood found in the Morro Castle and sent by the 65th Infantry of Puerto Rico.

Agricultural affairs (i.e., Federal regulations, loans, insurance) always consumed a great amount of time at the office of the Resident Commissioner. Coffee is the perennial sick man of Puerto Rican agriculture because of hurricanes and foreign competition. Iglesias wrote to Secretary Hull to negotiate a higher import quota of coffee to Spain for 1935. The State Department was unsuccessful in its efforts to help the coffee industry. In addition, Department of Agriculture regulations on the sugar industry created innumerable socio-economic complications in Puerto Rico. The sugar industry wanted proper compensation to offset the crop reduction. This would lead to endless consultations and negotiations which took place in San Juan and Washington. Secretary Wallace approved a two-year sugar production program which would give some
$11 million in cash benefits to the producers. The Sugar Producers Association considered the Wallace decision "inefficient, unjust, and onerous." The Sugar Growers Association was generally favorable to Wallace's program. This sugar complication led Carlos Chardón and Jesús Piñero (President of the Sugar Growers Association) to make the ridiculous statement that there was a "capitalist plot" to annex Puerto Rico to Florida in order to protect the large sugar interests and get a higher sugar quota. Iglesias considered this "conspiracy as totally imaginary." Disregarding most Insular protests, the Wallace program was gradually put into practice.

Muñoz Marín returned to San Juan on January 15, 1935 declaring that President Roosevelt's rehabilitation plan for the Island would end its "400 years of exploitation" and that "Puerto Rico from now on will be for Puerto Ricans." Barceló then began to reorganize the Liberal Party for its 1936 independence electoral campaign. He urged all Puerto Ricans to present a united front against the United States. He said that he had told President Roosevelt that the Island should be made independent, that the Washington administration had a lack of understanding toward Puerto Rican matters; and that American citizenship was used for no other purpose than to "humiliate" Puerto Ricans. As for the Republican Union Party, Barceló "asserted that it had always impeded the progress and well-being" of the Island. The Republican-Unionist El País dismissed Barceló's declarations as operatic bravado. The Liberals were Janus-like: one thing was said in Washington and another in Puerto Rico.

Governor Winship delivered his message to the Legislature on February 12, 1935. He stated that the Island would receive "sympathetic consideration" in all future national planning. The sugar restriction should be seen as a reminder of the danger of basing an economy on one crop whose prosperity depended on a high Congressional tariff. Furthermore, there was a need to divide the large plantations which would then help more Puerto Ricans to prosper. The Legislature approved three important laws. The previous year Governor Winship had vetoed the insurance compensation, but now he favored it and signed the bill. The law had its limitations, but it helped improve the services of the State Insurance Fund that had been established in 1928. The liberals opposed it because the Socialists would use it to further their political influence. A bill to regulate an eight-hour working day for some jobs also became law. The number of jobs that were exempted and the violations to the law by some employers created problems and controversies which caused
some workers to lose their enthusiasm toward the Socialist Party and Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez. Changes in the electoral law were also approved. Illiterate women were given the right to vote in a bill submitted by Bolívar Pagán and signed by Governor Winship. The universal suffrage law made Iglesias extremely happy because he had fought for years to enfranchise all women.

Assistant Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman and Director Ernest Gruening came to San Juan at the beginning of February. Gruening, however, had previously come to the Island in November 1934. The purpose of the February visit was to discuss the rehabilitation plan with political and government officials and become familiar with Puerto Rico. Chapman declared that the rehabilitation plan was near and that the funds were forthcoming. The Coalition leadership offered to cooperate with Gruening to implant the economic reconstruction. Before leaving, Gruening stated that $50 million in Federal funds would be used for the economic reconstruction. In case the plan should not materialize, Martínez Nadal wanted a Federal loan of $100 million.

Miles Fairbank wrote a confidential memorandum to Gruening and Chapman regarding the rehabilitation plan which he wanted to succeed. In Puerto Rico there was “no apparent organized opposition at all” (original underlined) to the Chardón Plan. There was not, however, “any wide-spread enthusiasm for the Chardón Plan, as such” (original underlined). The agricultural interests were divided. The coffee growers were the most enthusiastic due to their desperate situation. The sugar growers were for the Chardón Plan. The large sugar interests were the ones that were “apprehensive” due to the plans for land reform and the Federal sugar production regulations. The workers did “not know what [the Chardón Plan was] all about,” but the labor leaders were favorable. The middle class did not criticize the Plan, but objected to its methods and administrative organization. This group wanted politics to be kept out of the Plan and its organization not to become “a super-imposed government” above the Insular Administration.

Jorge Bird Arias, manager of the Fajardo Sugar Company, expressed the apprehension of his economic group to the Chardón Plan. He believed that the buying of sugar mills was “dangerous” because the government should not destroy its biggest source of tax-income. In the Philippines the sugar mills run by the government had been unsuccessful as were the government coal, cement, and banking corporations (some of which were also to be established in Puerto Rico and have similar bad results). Of
four large sugar corporations (Guánica, Aguirre, Eastern, and Fajardo), the only one whose lands were completely expropriated by the government was to be Fajardo in 1947. Guánica lost only 46.6 percent of its land, and some property was lost by Eastern. The land reform would also be applied to resident Spaniards and Puerto Rican owners.

Latifundia was the most controversial issue in the plans of economic reconstruction. Muñoz Marín in the 1920's had favored the application of the 500-acre Law. In 1932, however, he called this law a "completely absurd political myth." During the drafting of the Chardón Plan, he again wanted its enforcement (but when he became governor in 1949, he would stop applying it). Eastern Sugar Associates (the new owners of United Porto Rico Sugar) was the corporation at which the 500-acre Law was being aimed by the Liberal supporters of the Chardón Plan and the Interior Department. Attorney General Horton was not eager to begin enforcing it. Thus, steps began to be taken to remove him. Muñoz Marín suggested to Gruening that Horton be replaced and named three substitutes: Martín Travieso, Miguel Guerra Mondragón, and Benigno Fernández García. Guerra Mondragón was then made a special assistant to the Attorney General to deal with the 500-acre Law. Because Winship was not enthusiastic against latifundia, Muñoz Marín wanted Gruening to have the Governor removed as Gore had been.

Inside the Coalition the 500-acre Law had its opponents. Speaker García Méndez, who had become one of the lawyers of Guánica Central, led the wing of Republican-Unionists who did not want to apply the Law. When the enforcement of the Law began to be discussed in the Legislature, Muñoz Marín tried to capitalize on this conflict in order to split the Coalition by cooperating with the Socialists in some legislation. The strategy did not succeed.

As for the manner of how the rehabilitation plan would be definitely formulated and implemented, the struggle behind the scene continued. James Bourne wanted Gruening to let him run it; Chardón protested. Bourne then suggested to President Roosevelt that the plan be divided between him and Chardón. Now Muñoz Marín opposed this by pointing out that Bourne had spent $4.8 million in white-collar salaries since July, 1933, while only $3.5 million was paid in workers' salaries. The Chamber of Commerce attacked Bourne for establishing his own agencies to distribute surplus food and for ignoring local merchants. The Chamber also wanted the relief program to be administered by the Insular government. The Coalition did not want Chardón to manage the plan because he was a Liberal and not a good administrator.
On the House floor, Iglesias had already clearly specified that
in conferences which I have had with high officials, and which I shall
continue to have, it has been plainly stated that no party or individual
shall claim or obtain personal advantage, political or otherwise.

The rehabilitation plan that would be finally put into practice was
“expected to inaugurate a new era of social justice” which needed the
“authority and cooperation” of the Insular Legislature and the representa-
tives of “labor and capital.” All were to work with the Federal and
Insular government “to assure success for the welfare” of the Puerto
Ricans and “under no circumstances, should a ‘supergovernment’” be
imposed by Washington which would ignore the organic laws of the
Island. Gruening was informed of this stand on the rehabilitation plan
and was also asked for his cooperation in getting Federal socio-economic
legislation extended to Puerto Rico. Iglesias also informed Gruening
and Secretary Ickes that the Insular Senate had unanimously backed a
resolution asking for the application of the 500-acre Law. The long and
tortuous process of land reform was slowly beginning.

The Resident Commissioner visited President Roosevelt at the White
House on March 4, and they discussed the socio-economic measures
planned for the Island. The President stated that the rehabilitation plan
would be administered by a central council formed by the governor,
department chiefs, and the two presidents of the Legislature. The funds
were to come from the $48 billion national rehabilitation program.
Pagán and Martínez Nadal were jubilant over the ideas for the adminis-
trative organization of the plan. Muñoz Marín, however, declared that
the Resident Commissioner had been defending the sugar corporations
and not attacking latifundia and that Iglesias now wanted the rehabilita-
tion plan to be in the hands of its opponents. The Liberal Senator believed
that independence would be obtained in eight years. Carlos Chardón
went with Ruby Black to visit Mrs. Roosevelt and discussed with her the
plans for rehabilitation. Simultaneously, the Insular House of Repre-
sentatives wrote to Iglesias to ask that the rehabilitation plan be implanted
by the Insular government to avoid the creation of a supergovernment.
The Chamber of Commerce was also on record as opposing the super-
government.

In order to prepare the way to get control of the forthcoming
rehabilitation plan, James Bourne had registered a new corporation called
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. This created much confusion and controversy as the rehabilitation plan was becoming a Byzantine imbroglio. The Chamber of Commerce opposed this Bourne corporation as a blatant example of colonialism. The Coalition, naturally, also opposed it. Harry Hopkins told Iglesias that if the Insular government objected to Bourne's corporation, then no rehabilitation plan would be established.131

The Insular House of Representatives took the offensive against Bourne and asked President Roosevelt to investigate the P.R.E.R.A. because its relief undermined the desire for work and self-reliance and it operated separately from the Insular government. Bourne, who was not very diplomatic, ignored this attack as he had ignored the previous one by the Coalition and declared that the coming Federal funds would be controlled by his corporation. The legislative Coalition majority wrote to President Roosevelt and accused the P.R.E.R.A. of being dominated by Liberals. They declared Bourne's corporation illegal and, he himself, persona non grata.132 Socialist Affirmation, however, defended Bourne in a cable to President Roosevelt and attacked the Coalition.133

The Coalition fight against Bourne was not to be successful because he had powerful supporters who included the President and Mrs. Roosevelt. Governor Winship tried to get the two sides to reach an agreement without much success. A Washington investigation of the Coalition charges against Bourne came to nothing because he was backed by the Roosevelt Administration.134

As the Coalition confrontation with Bourne was taking place, Iglesias continued his activities in Washington. He visited Secretary Ickes and submitted plans, and memoranda on rehabilitation projects the Insular Interior Department had been working on the previous two years. Gruening also received the same information. These projects would reduce unemployment and raise the working classes' living standards. Iglesias also suggested that an experienced representative from the Insular Interior Department come to Washington to cooperate with the Federal authorities to develop these socio-economic reform projects.135 He believed that the Insular government and its laws in respect to the rehabilitation plan would be respected by the Roosevelt Administration.136 The Resident Commissioner did not favor Bourne’s rehabilitation plans, and on the House floor he denounced them in a speech.137

The Legislature was finishing the bill to create a rehabilitation corporation to administer the forthcoming rehabilitation plan by follow-
ing the pattern of similar corporations that had been established in thirty states and Hawaii. The new corporation would exclude Bourne’s corporation and any other one. Muñoz Marín was worried that this would give control of the plan to the Coalition, so he informed Gruening. Gruening ordered Winship to veto the bill. Winship tried to get the Coalition and Bourne to reach a compromise: three members would be from the P.R.E.R.A., three from the Insular cabinet, and the governor would be the chairman. Gruening still wanted the veto. There were more negotiations between Bourne, the Coalition, and Winship, and the bill was going to be signed. Antonio Navas, a P.R.E.R.A. employee then in Washington, was informed by José Soto Rivera, an aide to Bourne, of the absolute necessity of a veto. Because Gruening was out of town, he saw Baker, Hopkins, and Chapman. Chapman cabled Winship with an order to veto the bill. Later, Chapman denied that Navas had been involved.  

The Coalitionist legislators were furious at this colonial dictatorship from Washington because the veto was considered an undesirable intromission in the internal affairs of Puerto Rico. Martínez Nadal became indignant at this coarse act of colonialism. Not being a sepoy, he made a strong anticolonialist speech, attacking the Department of the Interior and its latest ukase and calling for an adjournment of the Legislature. Barceló then invited him to declare the republic and said he would back Martínez Nadal for the presidency. Muñoz Marín did not favor the adjournment because important legislation had to be approved (a stronger bill to enforce the 500-acre Law that had passed the Senate and was being considered in the House). Thus, without yet having approved the budget and other important legislation, the Legislature adjourned forty hours before it was scheduled to finish its work. Chapman considered that his cable to Winship “had been merely a routine message.” A spokesman from the Interior Department denied that Winship “had been specifically instructed to veto the bill.” Historical facts prove the opposite. Iglesias’ opinion of this crisis was that a “just and intelligent agreement” should be reached between Washington and the Insular leaders. He hoped that President Roosevelt would deal justly with this situation. Iglesias, however, would have preferred to make the legislative protest by keeping the Legislature in an indefinite session instead of ending it abruptly.  

Martínez Nadal now began to work more for statehood with the hope of getting at least an elective governor and more local autonomy. Secretary Ickes explained the Insular situation to the President and said
he did not object to a status plebiscite. He was in favor of the veto because Federal funds had to be controlled from Washington.\textsuperscript{145} Although Ickes did not come out favoring independence, he had toyed with the possibility of granting it as it had been given to the Philippines. In a draft for a letter to Senator Duncan U. Fletcher regarding the status of Puerto Rico, Ickes considered independence as an option.\textsuperscript{146} Senator Tydings, however, was always specific. He announced that he would sponsor a bill for Puerto Rican independence as had been done with the Philippines “if the people seriously desired independence.”\textsuperscript{147} It was also at this time when Tugwell published an article in the Atlantic Monthly favoring independence. The Liberals, who believed they would win the 1936 elections, were delighted with this article. The Coalitionists were worried and developed more impetus to fight for statehood.\textsuperscript{148}

Muñoz Marín was always in close contact with Ruby Black, and she kept Gruening and Mrs. Roosevelt well informed. Black wrote to the First Lady that the Coalition wanted the P.R.E.R.A. and the rehabilitation plan “as political machines” —for— “the 1936 elections.” She wanted Mrs. Roosevelt to help the cause of Muñoz Marín and did her best to bring together the Liberal Senator and the First Lady. Muñoz Marín wanted President Roosevelt to intervene and solve the crisis caused by the rehabilitation plan, and this was stated to Mrs. Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{149} How much this lobbying influenced the President is not known, but one thing is clear. Roosevelt did solve the crisis the way Muñoz Marín desired.

Governor Winship went to Washington and complained that Gruening was reducing his powers. This was true, and the main reason was that Winship did not favor the 500-acre Law and considered that government-owned sugar mills had not proven successful in the Philippines and Cuba. Gruening and Ickes, of course, disagreed. Because Attorney General Horton was not cooperative enough in fighting latifundia, he was about to be replaced by Liberal Benigno Fernández García. Muñoz Marín was backing a friend and the former Liberal candidate for resident commissioner.\textsuperscript{150}

The Coalition sent to Washington a delegation formed by Valdés, Speaker García Méndez, Pagán, Reyes Delgado, Rivera Zayas, and others to defend their policies and to press charges against James Bourne. Federal officials considered that most charges were political —favoring the Liberals— and not important enough to have him dismissed. Iglesias took his fellow Coalitionists to visit Ickes, Gruening, Baker, Chapman, Tydings, King, Kocialkowski Marcantonio, Speaker Byrnes and other
personalities without much success either. They also went to the White House, and were able to see only Mrs. Roosevelt because the President refused to see them. Ickes reaffirmed that there would be no politics in the rehabilitation plan. The delegation submitted several rehabilitation measures costing $139,540,546. These measures included projects dealing with public works, electrification and irrigation, housing, sanitation, and rehabilitation for farmers and workers.\textsuperscript{151}

The statehood push forced the defenders of independence to counteract.\textsuperscript{152} Muñoz Marín cabled to a friend in Washington to inform the Administration that "independence was acceptable at any moment," but that economic reconstruction was a just reclamation.\textsuperscript{153} Senator William King, after a visit by Iglesias and the delegation, withdrew his support for independence in favor of autonomy.\textsuperscript{154} Senator Robert Reynolds still believed in granting independence if the people favored it. Some Liberals told the Senator that they wanted independence with or without the reconstruction plan. At this time, Barceló pledged his "last drop of blood" for achieving independence.\textsuperscript{155}

During the first session of the 74th Congress, the Resident Commissioner had been dealing with many other matters besides the ones previously mentioned. He presented thirty bills dealing with relief, taxes, status, transfers of Federal property, and other matters.\textsuperscript{156} Iglesias worked very hard to get Social Security extended to Puerto Rico because it would have been of enormous benefit to the working classes, but was again unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{157} Unlucky also was Iglesias' bill to establish a Department of Social Welfare (which would become a reality in 1968 as the Department of Social Services).\textsuperscript{158} Obtaining more funds, which were mostly used for services and public works for municipalities, was an endless pursuit.\textsuperscript{159} The agricultural problems had decreased, and thus less work was generated. Iglesias, nevertheless, had still to deal with the production complexities and Federal regulations of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and farmer debts.\textsuperscript{160}

The process of establishing the rehabilitation plan (or Chardón Plan as the Liberals called it) was a long and confusing one. Chardón and Muñoz Marín closely collaborated with Gruening. On May 7, Muñoz Marín and Gruening met President Roosevelt at the White House where they discussed Insular problems and future plans. Finally, on May 28, the President issued an executive order, under the powers given by Congress in the Emergency Relief Act, appointing Gruening administrator of the rehabilitation plan which was called the Puerto Rican Reconstruction
Administration (P.R.R.A.). Gruening now had two powerful posts. Secretary Ickes was unhappy because he had not been consulted regarding this appointment. As administrator of the P.R.R.A., Gruening was under the supervision of the White House and not the Interior Department. Ickes was afraid that there would be a blowout in the Island and he and the President would be made responsible. The P.R.R.A. would begin with a fund of $35 million which would be increased to $100 million over the following years. By virtue of having these two vital posts, by having a budget more than twice that of the Insular government, and by establishing a 53,000 bureaucracy (about five times bigger than that of the Insular government), Dr. Ernest Gruening became the most powerful man in Puerto Rico and did his best to curtail the powers of Governor Winship. He, so to speak, became the metropolitan proconsul of Washington in San Juan.\textsuperscript{161}

The reaction of the Coalition delegation to the P.R.R.A. was positive. They expected it would function impartially. Chapman assured them, that in the P.R.R.A. organization all parties would be equally treated.\textsuperscript{162} The Coalition leaders, however, told Gruening that they would not cooperate if Chardón was appointed to a post in the P.R.R.A. because he was a liberal activist.\textsuperscript{163} Winship and the Coalition delegation had many meetings to discuss the rehabilitation plan to be developed.\textsuperscript{164} Iglesias considered that the rehabilitation plan would benefit Puerto Rico greatly; however, the powerful sugar mills would continue regardless of all the new radicalism of Muñoz Marín. What he feared was the establishing of a supegovernment to put the plan into practice.\textsuperscript{165} Being a realist, he knew that President Roosevelt had already established supergovernments in many parts of the nation.\textsuperscript{166} The rosary of promises made in Washington—from President Roosevelt down—to Iglesias and others affirming that the rehabilitation plan was to be apolitical and not favorable to Muñoz Marín and the Liberals, was not to be kept. The Coalition leadership realized this in May. The P.R.R.A. was to be filled with Liberals. Even the Bourne would later confess to their personal friends at the White House that the P.R.R.A. had become a Liberal Party program.\textsuperscript{167} No wonder the Liberals always called the rehabilitation plan the Chardón Plan. They knew what was coming. Jaime Benítez, a close friend of Muñoz Marín, considered that the Chardón Plan would make the economic reconstruction that was to be the base for achieving independence.\textsuperscript{168}

Most of the Coalitionist leadership stayed in Washington until June
in order to attend the hearings on the statehood bill presented by Iglesias. Former Governor Arthur Yager had come out in favor of statehood. Congressman R. A. Green was the chairman of the Committee on the Territories. The hearings took place on May 22 and June 2, 1935. This was the first time that a request was presented to Congress to make a final definition on the status of Puerto Rico. Secretary Ickes was not favorable to the bill.  

Martínez Nadal, however, was optimistic and believed that the Committee was favorable to statehood; but the process to achieve it was not to be fast. He gave an eloquent defense of statehood at a hearing. Statehood was also advocated by Iglesias, who complained that what Puerto Rico rejected was its colonial government. Martínez Nadal and Iglesias also defended autonomic reforms to the Jones Act (the other status bill of Iglesias) in the Insular Affairs Committee of the House. Barceló and Muñoz Marín came out, naturally, against statehood. Muñoz Marín's arguments were all economic and not cultural. He and Barceló did not ask for independence. Iglesias then declared that the majority of Puerto Ricans favored statehood. The statehood and autonomic reform bills would die in committee. As the status hearings ended, the Coalition delegation returned to San Juan. Iglesias planned to return to San Juan right after Congress ended the present session and stay until December. He was wanted in Puerto Rico to help solve the conflicts regarding the P.R.R.A. and the Coalition.

A special session of the Legislature convened on July 25, 1935, to finish the work that had been interrupted by the April strike. Important in the agenda was a law to enforce strongly the 500-acre Law. Muñoz Marín, as well as Socialist Rivera Zayas, presented antilatifundia bills. The bill approved by the Coalition was a watered-down version pushed by the Republican-Unionists. Gruening became furious and blamed Winship for permitting this bill to be passed. He, together with Muñoz Marín, wanted to oust Winship. The Governor, however, vetoed the bill and was able to survive the crisis. Iglesias did not approve of this land reform bill because it was too weak and suggested that a better one be passed in the next session. The Coalition leaders were doing all they could to have local control of the reconstruction programs of the P.R.R.A. They knew that Chardón was being strongly considered to run the agency locally and suggested four candidates (one being Miles Fairbank) who were considered acceptable to them.

Parallel to this struggle for control of the P.R.R.A. in San Juan, in Washington Muñoz Marín, Chardón, and Ruby Black were doing their
best to get control of it. They had Gruening’s support. Iglesias and Martínez Nadal did some lobbying to oppose certain Congressional legislation (the rotating fund) because they did not want a supegovernment to be created and handed to the Liberals to defeat the Coalition in 1936. The most important aspects of organizing the P.R.R.A. had been approved, and President Roosevelt told Winship that there should be no politics in it. Winship by now was strongly opposed by the Liberals while the Coalition supported him. Under Washington pressure, he vetoed the land reform bill.

Due to the complexities concerning the P.R.R.A. and normal Congressional work, Iglesias was unable to make a trip to the Island during that year. Puerto Rico had been included in some thirty laws approved by President Roosevelt and supported by the Resident Commissioner and various members of the Insular government. Among these were the following: a geological survey; farmer loans; rehabilitation funds; tariff protection for coffee; vocational education; agricultural benefits; appointment of six Puerto Ricans a year to West Point and Annapolis; extension to Puerto Rico of the National Labor Relations Board; Federal banking regulations; funds for public schools; and granting the same office rights as other representatives to the resident commissioner.

With the establishing of the P.R.R.A., the P.R.E.R.A. was to be dissolved. James and Dorothy Bourne did not consider this correct and went to Hyde Park to visit their friends. President Roosevelt then decided that the P.R.E.R.A. would get a new $9 million grant to operate for another year. Gruening, however, was made director of the P.R.E.R.A. while James Bourne was still to continue administering the agency as well as being chief of the Division of Relief and Relief Work of the P.R.R.A. Mrs. Bourne was appointed director of the Social Work Division. The Bournes and Gruening were not to get along well. The employees of the P.R.E.R.A. were very appreciative of the Bournes. A collection was taken to give them a present. Filled with emotion, the Bourne’s accepted a brand new Packard from their well-wishing employees.

To apply the 500-acre Law, the attorney general was the key person. Horton followed orders from Winship, and this was disliked by Gruening and Muñoz Marín. Horton was thus replaced by Liberal activist Benigno Fernández García. This post had been — with one exception — held by apolitical Continentals. The exception was when Unionist Salvador Mestre had served (1920-1923). The Coalition, understandably, was enraged by this appointment and protested because this was considered another step to favor the Liberals for the 1936 elections.
García had recently declared that the Liberals were certainly going to win in 1936. By September, 1935 the organization of the P.R.R.A. began to be established. Gruening appointed Chardón regional administrator and named to other posts people who were mostly non-Coalitionists. Two of the posts were given to a Socialist and a Republican-Unionist legislators to represent the electoral majority. They soon refused their appointments because they were only nominal, had no executive powers, and made without consulting the official authorities of Puerto Rico. In short, the Insular government was being completely ignored, and a supegovernment was being established. The labor movement was also being ignored even though the Free Federation had offered to cooperate. Gruening made certain rules to make appointments which Martínez Nadal considered merely oil to lubricate a political machine. The P.R.R.A. was rapidly being filled with Liberals as had happened with the P.R.E.R.A. Iglesias reminded everyone that President Roosevelt did not want politics in the P.R.R.A., but that desire now does not appear to have been sincere.

The P.R.R.A. also had internal conflicts that were due, to a certain degree, to the fact that Gruening was not a good administrator. There were two offices: one in Washington and one in San Juan. Chardón soon realized that he did not have much power because of the Washington office’s controls.

Martínez Nadal and Pagán issued a manifesto condemning the way Gruening was administering the P.R.R.A. Iglesias backed the manifesto. Gruening defended his policies, and Muñoz Marín attacked the Coalitionist manifesto. Nothing changed because Gruening had complete support from President Roosevelt.

As the conflict with the Coalition grew worse, Gruening was able to work well with Winship. The Governor did his best to get more Federal funds allocated to Puerto Rico to help the P.R.R.A. programs.

Iglesias attended the American Federation of Labor Convention held in Atlantic City, October 7-19, 1935. There he presented a resolution to ask President Roosevelt to urge Gruening to name a representative of the Free Federation to the P.R.R.A. because organized labor had been completely ignored. This resolution was approved. Attendance at this convention, plus a trip to the Orient, prevented the Resident Commissioner from visiting Puerto Rico as he had originally planned.

At the request of Manuel Quezón, Mr. & Mrs. Santiago Iglesias were invited to attend his inauguration as president of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines on November 15, 1935. The Resident Commissioner was part of a Congressional delegation headed by Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, Vice-President John W. Garner and other personalities were also going. Iglesias accepted the invitation because he would become better acquainted with some Washington officials who would be beneficial to his Congressional work. Before the American Federation of Labor Convention had ended, the Iglesias hurriedly left for Seattle to take the President Grant (October 16) for Yokohama, Shanhai, Hong Kong, and Manila.191

Ruby Black cynically reported that Iglesias was “fatigued” and had left for a spree in the Philippines.192 For taking some photographs of a Japanese naval base, Iglesias and other members of the Congressional delegation were arrested and accused of being American spies; after some explanations, they were freed.193 In Manila Iglesias delivered a message sent by William Green and the American Federation of Labor to the Philippine people.194 Perennially interested in labor matters, Iglesias studied local labor conditions and social legislation during his stay.195 On the return trip on the President Jefferson there was a stop-over in Hawaii. The Iglesias were warmly welcomed by the Puerto Rican colony which had invited him for a visit in June, 1934. He visited some homes, a sugar mill, and studied local working conditions.196 After returning to Seattle on December 14th, they took a train for Mexico City to take part in a meeting of the Pan American Federation of Labor of which he was Executive Secretary. Finally, they returned to Washington on Christmas eve. Iglesias then declared that Puerto Rico should demand and work for statehood or achieve a self-government status as an integral part of the United States. Anything else would be economic, political, and cultural suicide.197

During 1935 a number of workers had complained that the Federal rehabilitation programs were not benefiting the working class as much as they ought to. A new sugar convenio was signed without many complications. Socialist Affirmation declared that the red flag of the Socialist Party had faded and become yellow.198 This group, however, was not able to become an important force among the workers due to its internal fights and poor leadership.

The Workers Education program was a measure that Iglesias, the Free Federation, and the Department of Labor began in the second half of 1935 with funds from the P.R.R.A.199 Gruening, Chardón, and Muñoz Marín considered that it favored the Socialist Party too much.200 Chardón went so far as to denounce the Program as a “center of political agitation
and communist propaganda."\textsuperscript{201} Gruening took the funds away, and the Workers Education program closed down in spite of all protests.\textsuperscript{202} During 1936 Commissioner Rivera Martínez revived the Program with the very limited funds the Department of Labor had. Iglesias backed it, but his lobbying to get Federal funds to continue and strengthen it was unsuccessful. Workers Education lasted only a few months.\textsuperscript{203} Gruening did not favor that program.

By the fall of 1935, the economic recovery of Puerto Rico began to be felt as a result of the influx of Federal funds. Trade improved while unemployment still remained high.\textsuperscript{204}

While the P.R.R.A. began to develop its program with its characteristic slowness, Secretary Ickes arrived for a visit on January 7, 1936. He was shocked by the poverty and accused the rich for the situation. Ickes stated that the Legislature was controlled by the absentee sugar corporations and wanted the enforcement of the 500-acre Law to begin a land reform program. Some Liberal university professors, as well as other people, warned that a subsistence agricultural program was a serious economic error because the present commercialized crops were more profitable. Ickes partially agreed and suggested that agricultural cooperatives could be a good solution (which would not prove to be so).\textsuperscript{205} During his stay, the Secretary was well exposed to the highly charged local political situation. Registration for women voters was taking place. There were charges of fraud as over a dozen persons were killed and more than ninety received wounds. Martínez Nadal complained that the Liberals were using violence against the Coalitionists. Iglesias condemned these deplorable events. Ickes considered that the Liberals would win the coming elections.\textsuperscript{206}

Attorney General Fernández García, with Secretary Ickes' support, began proceedings in the Insular Supreme Court to apply the 500-acre Law to Fajardo Sugar and Rubert Hermanos Inc. The case was based on laws (number 33 of July 22, 1935 and 47 of August 7, 1935) that Senator Pagán had legislated. These cases would take four years of legal battles in San Juan, Boston, and Washington courts. To balance-out Fernández García, the Liberals got conservative Martín Travieso appointed to the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{207}

When Congress reconvened on January 3, 1936, Iglesias renewed his work there. The approval of the rotating fund needed to run the P.R.R.A. was now before Congress again. Iglesias —together with Martínez Nadal— had opposed this measure during the previous session because
they were doing all they could to prevent the Liberals from using those funds to support the political machine they were making out of the P.R.R.A. Gruening and Muñoz Marín considered that the real motive was that the Coalition opposed the economic rehabilitation the P.R.R.A. wanted to accomplish for Puerto Rico. Iglesias, naturally, denied this and tried unsuccessfully to prevent the Liberals from getting further control of the P.R.R.A. The rotating fund was approved, and President Roosevelt gave Muñoz Marín the pen which had been used to sign the new law.208

There was a need of a Department of Public Welfare for which Iglesias presented legislation (H. R. 11003, H. R. 11004, and H. R. 12119). The Bournes backed this proposal. Part of the reason for the change of alliances was that the Bournes and Gruening were gradually growing apart as a result of their conflicting interests and their personal power struggle. The Roosevelt Administration was not favorable to this new department and thus it did not materialize even though Ickes and Gruening supported its creation.209 Iglesias waged a much bigger struggle to get Puerto Rico included (H. R. 11062) in the Social Security Act, but was also to fail even though President Roosevelt and Ickes had given some backing. The bill failed to pass because Puerto Rico was not an incorporated territory as were Hawaii and Alaska.210

Gruening had now begun somewhat to reach an understanding with Iglesias. This came as a result of a long luncheon they enjoyed at the Capitol. Iglesias explained the Coalition policies in the past six months. Gruening now understood the Insular situation better and somewhat apologized for his conflict with Martínez Nadal and Pagán in the previous fall.211

The Nationalist Party considered that Governor Winship and Chief of Police Riggs were increasing their repression against Party members, especially toward Albizu Campos.212 In a speech Albizu Campos gave, he accused the University students of being effeminate men and female drunkards who were not fighting strongly for independence. The students organized a protest, and the Nationalists reacted. The police force was mobilized, and a clash resulted in which four Nationalists were killed by the police. At the burial of the Nationalists, Albizu Campos thundered against American repression and even attacked some members of the Liberal Party (such as Chardón and Benigno Fernández García). The political atmosphere became more turbulent, and the Nationalists continued to denounce the United States presence in Puerto Rico.213 The confrontation finally occurred when Colonel Riggs was killed by two
Nationalists after attending mass at the San Juan Cathedral on February 23, 1936. The situation grew even worse when the two Nationalists were killed at the police headquarters. Puerto Rico was in a bloody turmoil which was covered by the Continental press.214

Muñoz Marín was then in Washington, and Gruening asked him to make a statement condemning the shooting of Riggs.

"I am not," he said.
"I mean a statement regretting his death."
"I am not. I have taken on the coalition. I'm not going to take on the Nationalists, too."
"You should take them on and denounce their campaign of terrorism."
I said puzzled and indignant at his refusal.
"I'm not going to" was his emphatic reply.
I felt my indignation rising. "I'm afraid you're just another politician. I thought you were something different."
He laid his hand on my shoulder. "Ernest, you're excited. Many lives may have to be lost in the liberation of Puerto Rico. I take the long-range view in contemplating the destiny of my country."
"I'm afraid you are just contemplating the destiny of Muñoz Marín."
"The destiny of Muñoz Marín and the destiny of Puerto Rico are inseparable."215

Gruening asked Muñoz Marín to reconsider on the following day, but he refused again. As a result of this conflict — plus other things — their relationship began to disintegrate.216

The Associated Press reported what was said to be Iglesias' opinion of the Riggs shooting: that it "would cause tremendous damage" to the Island, that it was an act committed by a "madman that did not express the feelings of the masses," that the government had been too lenient with the Nationalists, and that that Party "should be forced to be disbanded."217 On the House floor, Iglesias condemned Riggs' assassination and emphasized that the Puerto Rican people were "absolutely innocent" of that murder. The Island hoped some day to join the Union.218 For demanding the disbandment of the Nationalists, Iglesias was severely criticized. He categorically denied he had said what was printed. The reporter, however, stated that what he had published was true.219 This press report led someone to write a letter threatening to kill Iglesias, and one Nationalist was supposed to have been plotting to go to Washington to shoot him.220

The Resident Commissioner wrote that:

Albizu Campos, through propaganda and in his public utterances, time
and again has incited his followers to kill me; so it is not surprising to me that the Nationalists of the Hitler—teachings—and-action type, on the pretext of the fabricated report that [it] is my desire to have their party disbanded should again decide to go through with the job.\textsuperscript{221}

The political situation had reached such a point that Iglesias believed that the United States should define its policy toward Puerto Rico and that the Island wanted statehood.\textsuperscript{222}

Mrs. Bourne wrote to her friend President Roosevelt analyzing the situation. She wrote that in the Nationalist Party a group of young followers had “become fanatical and developed a martyr complex” and suggested that the status issue be solved.\textsuperscript{223}

Governor Winship rapidly took action to curb the Nationalist activities. Raids were carried out, producing sufficient evidence that led to the arrest of Albizu Campos and six Nationalists on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the American government in Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{224} Liberal Representative Ramos Antonini protested at the repression and defended Albizu Campos. Gruening urged that law and order should be maintained. Martínez Nadal reacted to this by saying that Gruening’s statement was ridiculous because it was he who had begun the disorders in Puerto Rico by imposing a supergovernment, ignoring the Legislature, and violating local laws. As for Ickes’ declaration that Puerto Rico would not get more Federal funds, Martínez Nadal answered that it was unjust and cruel.\textsuperscript{225}

Disregarding the statehood stand of the Coalition and the Democratic Party, Gruening began to prepare a draconian independence bill for Puerto Rico. Ickes supported the idea at a cabinet meeting, where President Tydings also consented. Gruening’s draft was used by Senator Tydings to make the final bill, but it was basically the same thing. On April 27, 1936, Tydings presented two bills. The first one was to make a new electoral law, and the second called for a referendum on independence to be celebrated in November, 1937. This unexpected news exploded like a bombshell in jittery Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{226}

Barceló was somewhat satisfied with the independence bill and did not give much importance at first to the economic aspects. He wanted independence even if Puerto Rico “may die from hunger.”\textsuperscript{227} Muñoz Marín accepted it too, while considering the economic conditions unjust and arbitrary. He proposed important reforms to the Bill.\textsuperscript{228} In the following months, the Liberal Party began to split as a result of the differing stands of Barceló and Muñoz Marín. Barceló wanted to de-emphasize the issue of independence for electoral purposes while Muñoz
Marín considered the 1936 elections lost due to the draconian measures of the independence bill and its negative impact on the voters. Albizu Campos declared that the Nationalist Party did not accept the theory of a plebiscite. Puerto Rico was ready to begin negotiations to establish the republic without hostility toward the United States.

The Tydings independence bill had a traumatic effect on Martínez Nadal. He felt Puerto Rico had been betrayed and considered that his statehood ideal had momentarily vanished. If the Bill became law, Martínez Nadal would vote for independence because that was the honorable solution and superior to voting to become a permanent colony.

The reaction of Iglesias was different. He thundered on the House floor against the Bill, considering it as a hurricane that would devastate Puerto Rico. The Resident Commissioner wrote an article in which he stated the he was sorry to see the day that the United States “would ask” the people of Puerto Rico “to commit suicide. That is what independence as it has been offered means.” Iglesias would work indefatigably to prevent the passage of the fateful independence bill. He wrote to Martínez Nadal and explained the Washington situation and predicted that the Bill would not be approved. Besides that, he also described the struggles he had confronted in Washington against the unjust and undemocratic favoritism given to the Liberal Party politicians by the Roosevelt Administration to the detriment of the Coalitionist electoral majority.

Congressman Vito Marcantoni—who before had believed in statehood—presented another bill for independence. The main difference was that the economic terms were very generous. It would have the same luck as Tydings’ bill.

These independence bills created tremendous excitement in Puerto Rico, especially among politicians, students, and intellectuals. Separatist sentiment temporarily rose sharply. Most, especially the workers, remained calm as they waited for further and sounder developments. The police forbade further drills by the Nationalist Cadets. Ex-Governor Beverly wrote to Iglesias, explaining this effervescently erratic political situation. He urged the Resident Commissioner to return as soon as possible because there was a need of him and of “sane and level-headed leadership.”

As the bitter controversy surrounding the Tydings independence bill was making the headlines, the P.R.R.A. projects were becoming a reality. Hydroelectric development, coffee and fruit production reorganization,
subsistence farms, housing, pest control, workers cooperatives, health improvements, and other social and agricultural programs were being established. By November 1936, $13 million would be spent, of which $7 million was for labor expenses. The monthly payroll was $1 million. The most important project was the acquisition of the French-owned Central Lafayette for $3,815,000. This property would be turned into a worker's cooperative. A $1 million loan was received from the Public Works Administration to build a cement factory which would transform local housing construction. As a result of all the influx of Federal funds — plus other economic developments — the Insular economy began to improve. The budget was balanced and produced a $850,000 surplus. The 1936-1937 budget amounted to $12,051,894.77. The Tydings independence bill, however, did make the economy become somewhat unstable temporarily.  

The local branch of the Democratic Party was to have its convention on February 16, 1936, to elect the first delegates for the Philadelphia convention. La Democracia accused the Republican-Unionists of preparing a coup to control the Democratic Party and take it away from the true Democrats (i.e., Liberals) who were the only defenders of the New Deal in Puerto Rico. Pro-statehood Continentals were condemned for being Democrats in the States and Republicans in the Island because they voted locally for the Republican-Union Party. La Democracia, however, did not explain how a statehooder could vote for the separatist Liberal Party in order to be a true Democrat when that Party was not affiliated to the National Democratic Party. The Liberal newspaper did not explain either how autonomist and separatist Liberals could become members of an American party. The convention met at the San Juan Municipal Theater, and the Coalitionist Democrats — which included the Bournes — reelected Benjamin Horton National Committeeman, defeating Liberal Walter Mck. Jones. The Liberal Democrats protested to Chairman James Farley. With the backing of the local Democratic secretary — and obviously with Farley’s consent — a new Convention was held on March 29, where the Liberal Democrats attended and elected Mck. Jones National Committeeman. This group wanted Congress to give more autonomy to Puerto Rico and later hold a plebiscite to decide on the final status. They were not pro-statehood as the Horton group. Later, Farley certified the Mck. Jones group, and a campaign quota of $25,000 was assigned for the first time in Puerto Rico. With the control of the local Democratic Party, the Liberals planned to have an even stronger
control of Washington patronage. For the pursuit of Federal patronage and funds, the Liberals became 100 percent Americans, regardless of their separatist principles.

The office of the Resident Commissioner was always busy with endless problems and countless correspondence. The sugar problem never ended due to the quotas that resulted from the Jones-Costigan Act. The Sugar Producers Association wanted a more equitable quota. Low quotas created higher unemployment and lower income for Puerto Rico. The quotas were not augmented; however, sugar producers received over $12 million as payment compensation to balance the loses due to the low quotas.240

The Legislature approved several important laws during 1936. One was to apply the 500-acre Law more effectively. This piece of legislation was supported by the Coalition with Barceló and Benvenutti voting in favor. In the House, however, the Liberals voted against it. Senators Valdés and Pagán presented amendments to the electoral law whose most important change was the establishing of closed voting polls. This would greatly help to reduce electoral frauds because it prevented voters from voting more than once. To help unemployment, a $6 million public works program was approved.241 The labor laws approved by 1936 were considered by Vicente Géigel Polanco, a prominent separatist and friend of Muñoz Marín, "as an admirable set." Some of this labor legislation compared advantageously with the social laws of the most advanced countries in the Western Hemisphere and Europe.242 Santiago Iglesias, the Free Federation, and the Socialist Party had been the principal driving force that was mostly responsible for the enactment of this social legislation.

Tydings—with Muñoz Marín's backing—wanted Congress to pass his bill to regulate the Insular elections. Using the figures provided by the P.R.R.A. census, Tydings stated that there were 100 more voters in the electoral lists (852,904) than were qualified to vote. In the municipality of Coamo there were, 9,775 people over 21 years of age and registered voters numbered 14,144. What the Democrat Senator did not say was that the P.R.R.A. census had been made by Liberals who purposely omitted numerous Coalitionists. Such prominent people as Córdova Dávila, Huyke, Garrido Morales, Pagán, and Mrs. Whitemore were not included, and the total figure went up to possibly 80,000. As for Coamo, probably he did not know that it was a Republican Union stronghold in which the Liberals were easily defeated without the need of the Socialist votes. The
1932 voting figures had been the following: Republican-Unionists, 2,906; Liberals, 1,249; Socialists, 610; and Nationalists, 9. Gruening, Muñoz Marín, and Winship came to see Iglesias to discuss the electoral problem. Muñoz Marín proposed several electoral changes such as permitting the Coalition to have only one voting representative at the polls and having Federal employees serving as electoral supervisors. One can deduce that the Federal employees were to come from the P.R.R.A. and would control the polls. Muñoz Marín, whom most people erroneously consider the creator of closed voting polls, did not defend this reform for 1936. The Coalition did not like Muñoz Marín’s electoral plans and vehemently opposed Congressional intervention in local political affairs. Iglesias was able to prevent the approval of the Tydings electoral bill. To blame exclusively the Coalition — especially the Republican-Unionists — for undemocratic electoral procedures was unfair. Historically it had a cleaner electoral record than the Unionists-Liberals. The electoral record of the American Democratic Party was not pure. Democrats of Tammany Hall and the South had an electoral history much worse than Puerto Rico ever had.

The Coalition opposed the nomination of Fernández García for attorney general because he was a Liberal politician and that would create many electoral obstacles to Socialists and Republican-Unionists. Iglesias worked against Fernández García’s Congressional confirmation. The Roosevelt Administration backed Fernández García’s appointment, and therefore Iglesias’ objections were discarded.

Tydings independence bill had lead a group composed mostly of separatist professionals and intellectuals to form the United Front for the Constitution of the Republic of Puerto Rico to bring all the political parties together. The United Front was organized, but since the parties did not participate in it, it became a paper association. The Socialist Party favored the celebration of a plebiscite where statehood, independence, and autonomy would be the three alternatives. A bill for a plebiscite was presented in the House by García Méndez and Alonso Torres. It was approved, but the Senate did not take final action on it.

In Congress Iglesias continued to oppose the celebrated draconian independence bill. Tydings began to decrease his push for independence when he presented Joint Resolution 270 on May 25, to appoint a commission of Puerto Ricans and Continentals to study the issue of independence. Iglesias fought against the approval of this new measure and an identical one introduced by Kocialkowski in the House. He
presented a Joint Resolution 600 to establish a similar commission to study the political and economic conditions and not the status exclusively. Ickes did not like Iglesias’ bill because it went over the jurisdiction of the Interior Department. The bill that passed established a commission that would not deal with the independence issue. Iglesias had been successful in achieving this change.\textsuperscript{251}

By the spring of 1936, Gruening had come to dislike the Liberals he had formerly protected. Now he began to fire prominent Liberals on grounds of political activism and on “charges of kickbacks and political collections” for the Liberal Party. The Party expected its followers employed in the P.R.R.A. to contribute 10 to 15 per cent of their salaries to the electoral fund of 1936. The Coalition had previously complained of this favoritism and irregularities, but had been ignored. Gruening was discovering the Mediterranean Sea. The Legislature majority planned to make an investigation of these complaints and Ickes became furious. He disliked the idea of having the native legislators investigate a Federal agency. The formation of the Congressional commission just approved was blocked. Ickes now began to persuade President Roosevelt to place the P.R.R.A. under the control of the Interior Department so that he could dispose of Gruening.\textsuperscript{252}

Muñoz Marín considered that the Tydings Bill for independence had torpedoed the possibility of the Liberal Party’s winning the 1936 elections due to its unjust economic clauses. The division between the autonomist and separatist wings of the Party began to grow wider as Barceló and Muñoz Marín led each group. Muñoz Marín now began a drive to boycott the coming elections. Barceló invited the Coalition to do the same. The electoral boycott strategy began to split the Liberals further. Most of them wanted Muñoz Marín to run as resident commissioner.\textsuperscript{253} He wrote a manifesto in which statehood was discarded as “impossible”, autonomy was absolutely condemned and called “liberty with a long chain.” Independence was “the destiny of all Puerto Ricans.”\textsuperscript{254} Muñoz Marín rejected the offer to be a candidate for resident commissioner and began to push harder for the electoral boycott. This created a most serious crisis in the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{255} Black advised Muñoz Marín that the boycott strategy was erroneous and that Ickes and Chapman liked the idea of his running for resident commissioner so that they could get rid of Iglesias. In case Muñoz Marín would not accept the candidacy, Mck. Jones would be a superior candidate to Iglesias.\textsuperscript{256} Muñoz Marín favored the electoral boycott because it was a “political maneuver designed to strengthen” his position in the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{257}
Meanwhile, the trial of Albizu Campos and seven other Nationalists took place in July 1936. Barceló and Martínez Nadal cabled President Roosevelt, urging him to dismiss the charges. Martínez Nadal, having known Albizu Campos since the years he had lived in Ponce, even went to the trial. The Nationalist leader defended himself very well. Albizu Campos told the Federal Court that the violence involving the Nationalists was a result of United States suppression of Puerto Rican freedom. The celebrated trial ended with the Nationalists being found guilty and sentenced to seven years in the Federal prison in Atlanta.  

As the 74th Congress was coming to a close, Iglesias had been able to include Puerto Rico in some beneficial legislation approved such as: $15,000 matching grant for vocational education; an appropriation to have the Navy establish a hydrographic office branch in San Juan; taxes collected on liquor would go to the Insular Treasury; a soil conservation program; and funds for road and trail construction.

Iglesias was invited to attend the Cleveland convention of the American Socialist Party. He was unable to do so; nevertheless, he sent a message of support in the name of the Socialist workers of Puerto Rico. Iglesias wrote to President Green, asking him to present the following plank on Puerto Rico to the Republican and Democrat conventions. The plank stated that Puerto Rico's relation to the United States should be “regarded as permanent,” and more autonomy should be granted to prepare the Island “for final statehood.” This plank was rejected at both conventions. Because of the fight between the two Democratic delegations from Puerto Rico, the Democratic Party did not make any reference to the Island in the 1936 platform. The Republican delegation wanted a statehood plank in the G.O.P. platform. This was not granted. The platform favored Federal funds for the reconstruction of the Island. The only National party that took a stand on the status was the American Communist Party which supported independence.

Back in April 1936, some Republican-Unionists suggested that Speaker García Méndez should run for resident commissioner. He rejected the idea and backed Iglesias. In June some alleged Socialists were supposed to be trying to get “foreigner” Iglesias out of the Party’s presidency and replace him with Rivera Martínez. The Commissioner of Labor denied that there was such a movement. What he favored was that Iglesias should now stay in Puerto Rico to preside over one of the legislative chambers.

At Gruening’s suggestion, Iglesias had a two-hour conference with him on June 25. Gruening stated that his intentions and recommendations
for the P.R.R.A. had not been to make it a political machine and that the Coalicionist press had been unfair to the New Deal Administration. Chardón and other executives were not involved in politics, and the influence of Muñoz Marín was not actually very important. He (Gruening) had instructed Manuel Domenech to make an investigation of the charges leveled against the P.R.R.A. No ill feelings against Martínez Nadal and other Coalicionist leaders were harbored in his mind. Gruening considered that Iglesias had erred in opposing the appointment of Fernández García. He ended by telling the Resident Commissioner that he was willing to do his best to be absolutely fair to the Coalition.

Iglesias then frankly told Gruening that he was in many ways responsible for the political turmoil Puerto Rico was experiencing. The Island had always had a small group of separatists that had unceasingly been agitating. Public opinion had not given them much attention until the P.R.E.R.A. and the P.R.R.A. "machines were created." The Resident Commissioner and the Coalicionist leaders were "entirely in accord" with the New Deal policies of President Roosevelt. When Iglesias had first visited the White House, he had informed the President of the creation of the P.R.E.R.A., the transfer from the War to the Interior Department, and the establishing of the P.R.R.A. Later Iglesias had again visited President Roosevelt who had told him of "his desire to coordinate the representatives of every responsible and capable agency of the" Insular government. Afterwards, Iglesias had met with Gruening and Chardón and suggested that the rehabilitation plan should be apolitical "in accordance with the ideas and recommendations of the President." Gruening, however, then decided to take a "different course" and stated that he "wielded the big stick to organize" the machine and to control the corporations and the appointment of the men whom he "liked and desired." The "machine was handed over to men who boasted that they were in control of everything from the point of view of the Liberal Party." Thus the P.R.R.A. "became a machine, described and denounced as a single party machine organized to win the elections for the Liberal Party." During the organization of the P.R.R.A, Iglesias had been ignored while Gruening's office was filled with "Liberal advisers and office-holders." Gruening's big stick policy had "given power to those who oppose the ideals and institutions of social and economic justice represented by the American Government and... those who oppose the permanent union with the United States." The labor movement had also been ignored by the P.R.R.A. Iglesias further told Gruening that his policies did "not respect the will of the majority of the people chosen by the free elections of" 1932
which were "the cleanest elections ever held in Puerto Rico." The P.R.R.A. "machine" Gruening had created served "as an instrument to impose upon the Island a supegovernment." All this had contributed to the present political turmoil. The Coalition had complained of the blatant abuses of power, but the Roosevelt Administration "totally ignored" them. Meanwhile, the White House doors were opened for Muñoz Marín and the Liberal Party. Muñoz Marín was given information regarding the P.R.R.A. "in advance" while the Resident Commissioner did not receive "such courtesies." The Liberal Party used these privileges to make political capital. The Coalition had come to the conclusion that Ickes and Gruening had come to ignore "the petition of those men who for thirty years" had devoted "their lives struggling for the welfare of the Puerto Rican people." Iglesias told Gruening that he had opposed Fernández García's appointment because he was a political "agitator" and that there were other people "as capable as he." The Resident Commissioner concluded by stating that Gruening had "the power and the authority to make all necessary changes in" the "policy of the P.R.R.A. without any embarrassment or inconveniences to" himself "or anybody." Iglesias would do his "best in this cause to cooperate." The economic reconstruction of the Island was very important for "giving the most possible help to the people and dignify our American institutions in Puerto Rico." Iglesias and Gruening met two more time afterwards and continued discussing the same problems.

After finishing all the Congressional work and making a two-day trip to Philadelphia —to participate in an exposition of Puerto Rican products— and New York, Iglesias began to make arrangements to return to San Juan. The four years in Congress had been very hard, but he was his usual optimistic self and looked forward to a victorious electoral campaign. On July 14, Mr. & Mrs. Iglesias with sons Manolín and Eddie boarded the Barbara and sailed from Baltimore. That same day, Senator Pagán had stated that the death or assassination attempt against Iglesias would be considered as a challenge to the Socialists. This declaration was a result of some anonymous death threats that Barceló and Martínez Nadal had recently received.
Notes

1. La Tribuna, 21 July 1934, p. 1; La Voz del Obrero, 21 July 1934, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 23 July 1934, p. 1; El Mundo, 26 July 1934, p. 7; Rose Pesotta, Bread Upon the Water (New York, N. Y.: Dodd Mead, and Co., 1945), pp. 116-117; Sesión del Comité Ejecutivo Territorial del día 23 de julio de 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


4. La Prensa, 1 August 1934, p. 8; Ibid., 2 August 1934, p. 2; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 183-184.


10. Ibid., 29 July 1934, p. 1.

11. La Prensa, 1 August 1934, p. 8; El Mundo, 6 August 1934, p. 1.


15. The New York Times, 12 August 1934, sec. IV, p. 8; Ibid., 14 August 1934, p. 8; Ibid., 15 August 1934, p. 4; Ibid., 26 August 1934, sec. IV, p. 8; El Mundo, 14 August 1934, p. 7; Ibid., 15 August 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 18 August 1934, p. 1; La Democracia, 13 August 1934, p. 1; Rafael Rivera Zayas to Blanton Winship, 16 August 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


23. *Ibid.*, 4 September 1934, p. 7; *The New York Times*, 4 September 1934, p. 3; Pesotta, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131; Alonso Torres, *Cuarenta años de lucha proletaria*, pp. 263-264. Due to low wages, many workers were unable to join the Free Federation or became inactive because they were unable to pay their dues. Iglesias unsuccessfully had tried to see if it was possible that the American Federation of Labor would change its regulations and permit workers that were unable to pay union dues, due to low salaries, become organized and officially chartered. Santiago Iglesias to Frank Morrison, 1 March 1934; Frank Morrison to Santiago Iglesias, 2 March 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
31. *El Mundo*, 14 September 1934, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 17 September 1934, p. 3; Gruening, *op. cit.*, p. 188; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 22 September 1934; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 5 October 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 28 December 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
35. James Bourne to Harry Hopkins, 13 September 1934; Memorandum
from Jacob Baker (Assistant Administrator, Federal Emergency Relief Administra-
tion) to Harry Hopkins, 18 September 1934, Department of the Interior,
Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9-8-63 Part 1, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.; Mathews, op. cit., p. 95; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael
Martínez Nadal, 22 September 1934; Blas Oliveras to Alfonso Valdés, 10 May
1935; Enrique Matta to Santiago Iglesias, 19 March 1935, Archive of Igualdad
Iglesias de Págán.

36. Domingo Targa, El modus operandi de las artes electorales en Puerto
Rico (San Juan, P.R.: La Correspondencia, 1940), pp. 49-51.

37. El Mundo, 19 September 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 20 September 1934, p. 1;
Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 17 September 1934; Santiago Iglesias to
Harry Hopkins, 18 September 1934; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez Nadal,
22 September 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.

38. El Mundo, 21 September 1934, p. 6; Ibid., 22 September 1934, p. 1; Ibid.,
26 September 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 27 September 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 29 September
1934, p. 1; Filipo de Hostos to Santiago Iglesias, 19 September 1934; Filipo de
Hostos to Santiago Iglesias, 21 September 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de
Hostos, 26 September 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Ickes, 20 September
1934; Harold L. Ickes to Santiago Iglesias, 10 October 1934; Enrique Ortega
(Sub-Commissioner of the Interior) to Santiago Iglesias, 12 September 1934;
Santiago Iglesias to Enrique Ortega, 14 September 1934, Archive of Igualdad
Iglesias de Págán.

39. El Mundo, 25 September 1934, p.; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez
Nadal, 22 September 1934; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 5 October
1934; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Págán, 28 December 1934, Archive of
Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.

40. El Mundo, 26 September 1934, p. 2; Ibid., 27 September 1934, p. 1;
Ibid., 10 October 1934, p. 1; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 5 October
1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.


42. Santiago Iglesias and Alfonso Valdés to Blanton Winship, 11 October
1934; Oscar L. Chapman to Santiago Iglesias, 22 October 1934; J. M. Benítez
(General Secretary, Puerto Rico Federation of Merchants) to Santiago Iglesias,
26 September 1934; Santiago Iglesias to J. M. Benítez, 28 September 1934; José
de la Cruz (Executive Secretary, Ponce Chamber of Commerce) to Santiago
Iglesias, 1 October 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de Hostos, 19 October 1934,
Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 19-191.

43. El Mundo, 12 October 1934, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias and Alfonso Valdés
to Oscar L. Chapman, 15 October 1934; Oscar L. Chapman to Santiago Iglesias,
23 October 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.

44. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 191-194; The New York Times, 28 October 1934,
sec. IV, p. 8; Ibid., 4 November 1934, sec. IV, p. 8; Ibid., 13 November 1934,
p. 9; Blanton Winship to Benjamín Summer Welles, 8 October 1934; Blanton
Winship to J. H. Choate, Jr. (Director, Federal Alcohol Control Administration),
16 October 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Blanton Winship and Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Oscar L. Chapman, 26 October 1934, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9-8-98 Rehabilitation, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

45. Carlos E. Chardón to John F. Carter, 3 October 1934, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9-8-98 Rehabilitation, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

46. John F. Carter to Ernest Gruening, 8 October 1934, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Insular Possessions, File 9-8-98 Rehabilitation, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

47. Ernest Gruening to John F. Carter, 10 October 1934, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9-8-98 Rehabilitation, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


51. El Mundo, 17 September 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 20 September 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 27 September 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 10 October 1934, p. 1; La Democracia, 6 October 1934, p. 1; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 196-200. Gruening, op. cit., p. 188.


55. La Democracia, 31 October 1934, p. 1.


59. Hanson, op. cit., p. 100.


62. El Mundo, 10 October 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 16 October 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 17 October 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 30 October 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 19 August 1936, p. 8; Santiago Iglesias to Cordell Hull, 12 October 1934; William Phillips (Acting Secretary of State) to Santiago Iglesias, 27 October 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


73. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 86-88, 90; El Mundo, 23 November 1934, p. 3; Ibid., 9 December 1934, p. 1.

74. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 88-90; El Mundo, 22 October 1934, p. 5; "Proposed Agreement to be Entered into Between Employers and Employees of the Sugar Industry in Puerto Rico" (as approved by the Special Convention of the Agricultural and Factory Labor Unions of Puerto Rico, held in San Juan on October 20 and 21, 1934); Prudencio Rivera Martínez to John E. Dalton (Sugar Division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration), 8 January 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


76. El Imparcial, 12 November 1934, p. 22.

77. El Mundo, 13 November 1934, p. 4.

78. Ibid., 15 November 1934, p. 1.

79. Ibid., 14 November 1934, p. 1; Ibid., 16 November 1934, p. 1; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 86.

80. Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 16 November 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 21 November 1934, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


82. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 4 January 1935, p. 1; El Mundo, 4 January 1935, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 21 January 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see Congressional Record, vol. 79, pp. 48, 80.

83. Santiago Iglesias to Juan Carreras, 29 January 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


85. Ibid., 10 January 1935, p. 6.

86. Ibid., 17 January 1935, p. 3; see Congressional Record, vol. 79, p. 541.


89. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 89; El Mundo, 8 January 1935, p. 1; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 26 December 1934; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 7 January 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 4 January 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 9 January 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 11 January 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 18 January 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 23 January 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to John E. Dalton (Director, Sugar Division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in
Puerto Rico), 8 January 1935; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 10 January 1935; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 21 January 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


92. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 89-90, 95-96; El Mundo, 29 January 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 13 February 1935, p. 1; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 1 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Ramón Aboy Benítez, 6 February 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 28 January 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 29 January 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 6 February 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 25 January 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 1 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 7 February 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


94. Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 13 February 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


96. Ibid., 1 February 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 9 February 1935, p. 3.

97. Ibid., 16 January 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 8 February 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 26 February 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 2 March 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 19 March 1935, p. 3; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 7 January 1935; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 8 January 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 9 January 1935; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 14 January 1935; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 31 January 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 4 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 18 February 1935; José L. Pesquera to Santiago Iglesias, 15 February 1935; Victor Fusté (Secretary, Coffee Growers Section, Asociación de Agricultores) to Santiago Iglesias, 12 March 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Victor Fusté, 16 March 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

98. El Mundo, 5 February 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 20 February 1935, p. 6; Santiago Iglesias to Cordell Hull, 4 February 1935; William Phillips (Acting Secretary of State) to Santiago Iglesias, 16 February 1935; Cordell Hull to Santiago Iglesias, 12 April 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

99. El Mundo, 8 February 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 14 February 1935, p. 3; El
Imparcial, 13 February 1935, pp. 24-25; Miguel Angel García Méndez to Santiago Iglesias, 14 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 19 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Henry A. Wallace, 16 February 1935; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 19 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Ramón Aboy Benítez, 27 February 1935, Archive of Iguálad Iglesias de Pagán.

100. Henry A. Wallace to Santiago Iglesias, 4 March 1935, Archive of Iguálad Iglesias de Pagán.


110. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 93-95; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 14 May 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 2 August 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 8 August 1935, Archive of Iguálad Iglesias de Pagán.


115. Miles H. Fairbank to Ernest Gruening, 4 February 1935, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9-8-98, Rehabilitation, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


117. La Democracia, 12 September 1932, p. 5.


123. Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 17 February 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


Blanton Winship to Santiago Iglesias, 21 March 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 8 March 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 28 March 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


133. Luis V. Pino to Franklin D. Roosevelt, no date but around 25 March 1935; Luis V. Pino to Santiago Iglesias, 25 March 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


138. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 211-212; Jacob Baker to Blanton Winship, 12 April 1935; Antonio Navas to Rafael Torres Mazzorana, 14 April 1935; Blanton Winship to Harold L. Ickes, n. d. but must be 14 or 15 April 1935; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 16 April 1935; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 19 April 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Imparcial, 13 April 1935, p. 1; Ibid. 15 April 1935, p. 23.


141. Ibid.

142. El Mundo, 16 April 1935, p. 3.

143. Ibid., 17 April 1935, p. 2; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 27 April 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


145. Ibid., 17 April 1935, p. 4.

146. Harold L. Ickes to Duncan U. Fletcher, 15 January 1935, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior File 9-8-68, Government-Status, National Archives, Washington, D. C. On the letter sent to Senator Fletcher, Ickes omitted the part regarding independence.


149. Ruby A. Black to Eleanor Roosevelt, 16 April 1935; Ruby A. Black to Eleanor Roosevelt, 23 April 1935, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 100 Personal Letters, Box 1329, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.


(Assistant Administrator, Federal Emergency Relief Administration) to Rexford G. Tugwell, 7 May 1935; William A. Font (Assistant Administrator of PRERA) to Jacob Baker, 7 May 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Lino Padrón Rivera, 14 May 1935; Memorandum of Conference of Santiago Iglesias with Ernest Gruening, 25 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


154. El Mundo, 1 May 1935, p. 3; Alfonso Valdés to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 5 May 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


156. See Congressional Record, vol. 79, pp. 48, 57, 80, 534, 742, 783, 1502, 3317, 3419, 3918, 5480, 6068, 6258, 7194, 7740, 8032, 10023, 10812, 12157; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 8 March 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


158. Ibid., 15 April 1935, p. 3.

159. Ibid., 22 January 1935, p. 6; Ibid., 4 March 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 12 March 1935, p. 1; Ibid., 17 March 1935, p. 1; Ibid., 14 April 1935, p. 1; Enrique Ortega (Insular Department of the Interior) to Santiago Iglesias, 7 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Enrique Ortega, 25 February 1935; Enrique González Mena to Santiago Iglesias, 12 March 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Enrique González Mena, 20 March 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Alfonso González Marín (Mayor of Mayagüez), 29 June 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Blas Oliveras, 29 June 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Ickes, 7 May 1935; Harold L. Ickes to Santiago Iglesias, 14 May 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

160. El Mundo, 17 March 1935, p. 1; Ibid., 17 April 1935, p. 2; Ibid., 23 April 1935, p. 1; Ibid., 24 April 1935, p. 1; Ibid., 25 April 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 2 May 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 17 May 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 18 May 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 24 May 1935, p. 3; Ibid., 19 August 1936, p. 8; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 23 April 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 26 April 1935; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 2 May 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 10 May 1935; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 17 May 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 20 May 1935; José L. Pesquera to Santiago Iglesias, 9 April 1935; José L. Pesquera to Santiago Iglesias, 22 April 1935; Santiago Iglesias to José L. Pesquera, 28 April 1935; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 26 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Ramón Aboy Benítez, 7 March 1935; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 6 June 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Ramón Aboy Benítez, 13 June 1935; W. I. Myers to Santiago Iglesias, 21 February 1935; Santiago Iglesias to W. I. Myers, 11 April 1935; W. I. Myers to Santiago Iglesias, 22 April 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 25 April 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


163. Ibid., 6 June 1935, p. 1; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 10 June 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


165. Santiago Iglesias to Enrique Matta, 27 Matta 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


176. El Mundo, 5 July 1935, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 10 August 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 14 August 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 23 August 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


Torres, 26 September 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez and Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 28 September 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 30 September 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 2 October 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to William Green, 25 November 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


199. Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 18 June 1935; Rafael Alonso Torres to Ernest Gruening, 18 June 1935; Memorandum to Santiago Iglesias from Florence G. Thorne (Editor, *American Federationist*), 1 July 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 13 July 1935; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 31 July 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
200. M. W. Royse (Director, Teachers Training Center for Worker's Education at the University of Puerto Rico) to Hilda Smith (Worker's Education, Federal Emergency Relief Administration), 23 November 1935; América Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 26 November 1935; Florence G. Thorne to William Green, 27 November 1935; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 27 November 1935; Teresa Angleró to América Iglesias, 5 December 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

201. Carlos E. Chardón to M. W. Royse, 18 November 1935, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


203. Teresa Angleró to Santiago Iglesias, 13 January 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Teresa Angleró, 16 January 1936; Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 13 February 1936; Dorothy D. Bourne to América Iglesias, 14 March 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 80, p. 5299.


11 February 1936, p. 1; *Ibid.*, 15 April 1936, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Leo Kolciaikowski, 26 February 1936; Harold L. Ickes to Leo Kolciaikowski, 27 March 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Millard E. Tydings, 17 April 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Joseph Byrns, 21 May 1935; Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán to Elisa Díaz González, 24 January 1967, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 80, pp. 1694, 4769.


211. Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 17 January 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 11 February 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


220. Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 7 March 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 11 March 1936; Santiago Iglesias to the Federal Bureau of Investigación, 9 March 1936; J. Edgar Hoover to Santiago Iglesias, 13 March 1936; J. Edgar Hoover to Santiago Iglesias, 14 March 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
221. Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 11 March 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

222. El Mundo, 12 March 1936, p. 2; Ibid., 7 March 1936, p. 1; see Congressional Record, vol. 80, p. 3703.

223. Dorothy D. Bourne to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 25 February 1936, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9-8-68, Part I, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


234. Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 19 May 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de
Pagán; *El Mundo*, 18 May 1936, p. 1; Mathews, *op. cit.* p. 259; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 80, pp. 7519, 8562, 10620.


240. Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-287; *El Mundo*, 9 January 1936, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 14 January 1936, p. 6; *Ibid.*, 14 February, p. 3; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 10 January 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Ramón Aboy Benítez, 14 January 1936; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 31 January 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Ramón Aboy Benítez, 1 February 1936; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Santiago Iglesias, 27 April 1936; Luis Serrano (Secretary, South Puerto Rico Cane Producers Association) to Pat Harrison (Senator), 9 April 1936; Santiago Iglesias and Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Henry A. Wallace, 8 January 1936; Henry A. Wallace to Santiago Iglesias, 27 February 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Henry A. Wallace, 17 February 1936; Henry A. Wallace to Santiago Iglesias, 17 March 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Marvin Jones, 2 June 1936; Marvin Jones to Santiago Iglesias, 2 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


243. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 262-263; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 4 May 1936; Rafael Martínez Nadal, Bolívar Pagán, and Miguel Angel García Méndez to Leo Kocialkowski, 2 June 1936; Pablo Sosa to Santiago Iglesias, 2 June 1936; Pablo Sosa to Santiago Iglesias, 3 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. I personally know the social and politically history of Coamo because my maternal family is from this town and I have lived there. My maternal grandfather, Francisco A. Santini, was a landlord and politically a leading muñocista Unionist-Liberal-Popular who ran for the House in 1932 and was mayor (1957-1961). As a child, I was brought up to believe that Republican, Black and evil were synonymous. The “good guys” in politics were the muñocistas. The upper crust Casino was mostly Liberal in the 1930’s, and some Republican-Unionists were not accepted in it due to socio-political or racial discrimination. The Liberals used such electoral practices as vote buying, voting several times, and imprisoning Coalitionists with the hope of winning the elections.

244. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 262-263; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 82-83; La Prensa, 4 June 1936, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 5 June 1936; Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 9 June 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 10 June 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 25 June 1936.

245. Mathews, op. cit., p. 246; Bothwell, ed., op. cit., vol. II, p. 590; Santiago Iglesias to Antonio Pomales (Secretary to Martínez Nadal), 19 February 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 20 March 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 1 April 1936; Nomination of Benigno Fernández García, United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, 4 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


249. El Mundo, 18 May 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 23 May 1936, p. 3; Ibid., 30 May 1936, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 19 May 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see Congressional Record, vol. 80, pp. 7519, 8562, 10620.


Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 27 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Leo Kocialkowski, 27 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Millard E. Tydings, 27 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 27 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Ickes, 29 May 1936; Leo Kocialkowski to Santiago Iglesias, 29 May 1936; Harold L. Ickes to Santiago, 17 June 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 19 June 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 25 June 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 25 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see Congressional Record, vol. 80, p. 7999.


259. El Mundo, 11 July 1936, p. 8; José Padín to Santiago Iglesias, 13 November 1936; Santiago Iglesias to José Padín, 15 January 1936; Santiago Iglesias to José Padín, 3 April 1936; José Padín to Santiago Iglesias, 13 May 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán. In the Iglesias papers there are several folders containing the Congressional documents relating to the approval of these bills.

260. Clarence Senior (Executive Secretary of the Socialist Party) to Santiago Iglesias, 19 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Clarence Senior, 23 May 1936. At the 1934 Socialist convention Iglesias had also sent a message which had been warmly received.

261. Santiago Iglesias to William Green, 2 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


266. Ibid., 5 June 1936, p. 1.


269. Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 16 May 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 25 June 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 25 June 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 15 June 1936, p. 3.

The Dock area around Pier 3 was overcrowded with red-flag waving Socialists and some Republican-Unionists at dawn on July 19, 1936, to welcome their great leader. Professor Clemente Pereda appeared unexpectedly, shouting, "Long live the Republic!," several times. Some Socialists became enraged at this unfortunate provocation and went after Pereda. A policeman intervened and advised Pereda that it was prudent to leave the area. At 7:35 A.M. the Barbara docked; two bands played music, rockets were fired, and Santiago Iglesias was thunderously cheered when he appeared. As La Borinquena was being played, Iglesias and his family left the ship. Welcoming them were three daughters, Pagán, Martínez Nadal, Speaker García Méndez, and other leading Socialist legislators, government officials, labor leaders and prominent Republican-Unionists. Iglesias boarded Pagán's car but shortly afterwards was forced to leave it and join the thick parade through the streets of Old San Juan.1

From the balcony of his residence, Pereda took a crucifix in his left hand and showed it to the crowd of Socialists as they passed by. It appears he was trying to get the red devil out of the Socialists. The crowd simply shouted to him: "madman, madman!" Pereda then made several signs of absolution with his right hand. When Iglesias and the parade passed by La Fortaleza, Governor Winship came out to the balcony to greet them warmly. The Socialist parade ended in front of the Capitol where Iglesias delivered a speech in which he talked about the joy of returning, the warm reception he was receiving, the coming activities, the Puerto Rican's love of justice and democracy, the improvements of social justice, and his ideals and principles which were the same ones he had espoused for forty
years. Inside the Capitol, Iglesias met more prominent leaders and then left for his house on Isern Street.²

There with Martínez Nadal he had a long conversation in which they briefed each other on the latest political developments. After visits from numerous friends, Iglesias gave a short press interview. He declared that a new coalition would be made, that he would return to Washington if re-elected, that the electoral boycott was a great absurdity, and that the economic problems and not the political status were what should be discussed at the Socialist convention.³

On July 22, Iglesias granted an interview to El Mundo. There he stated that there were no obstacles to renewing the Coalition and that the P.R.R.A. would give representation to all parties. The Insular economic situation needed many improvements. Numerous workers, especially rural ones, had to improve their living standards markedly. The Department of Labor was giving emphasis to this development. The economic improvements would be achieved by working more closely with the United States and not the other way around. Congress would make changes in the Jones Act. On regard to national politics, Iglesias considered that President Roosevelt had the likelihood of obtaining a great victory in November.⁴

Isern Street was a very busy place. Numerous people and delegations came to talk to the Socialist leader.⁵ The Socialist Territorial Committee under Iglesias’ direction met to work on Party matters on July 25. Iglesias delivered a speech in which he explained his work in Washington. He urged his followers to “sincerely feel and believe in the principle of social redemption” and to use that belief to fight fascism. The Socialist Party firmly believes in democracy and rejects violence from any minority.⁶ Puerto Rico should continue in permanent union with the United States. Iglesias was authorized to name the Socialist representation in the Pact Committee to be formed with Republican-Unionists. The Party’s convention was to be held in Caguas on August 14, and the Socialists were urged to select their corresponding delegates.⁷

The Pact Committee had several meetings and the terms for the 1936 coalition were essentially the same as in 1932. Some Socialists wanted the presidency of the House for their Party and Sandalio Alonso wanted Iglesias to be the Speaker. It was agreed, however, that the Speaker would be from the party that would obtain the most votes. The Department of Education would be assigned to the Republican-Unionists and the Justice Department would be for the Socialists. This pact proposal would be presented to the corresponding party conventions.⁸
As Iglesias was strengthening the Socialists forces, the internal controversies of the Liberals were brewing. Barceló reconsidered the electoral boycott strategy and now wanted the Party to participate in the elections. Muñoz Marín continued insisting on the boycott strategy. At the Liberal convention held in Yauco on July 25, there was a voting deadlock. This was broken when Barceló cast his vote against the electoral boycott. Muñoz Marín’s platform of independence with economic justice, however, was accepted by the Party.\(^9\)

The Liberal city of Caguas was the seat of the ninth convention of the Socialist Party. When the convention began on August 14, the City was crowded with Socialists and red flags which overfilled the Campo Alegre Theater. Iglesias was warmly received as a band played *La Marseillaise*, the anthem of the Free Federation. Present were 272 accredited and 96 pending delegates. There were a considerable number of women in the convention. Notably absent was Rafael Alonso Torres who was seriously ill. Present in the Theater was Tadeo Rodríguez García, the former principal leader of Socialist Affirmation who now had actively rejoined the Socialist Party.\(^10\)

Iglesias opened the Convention at 10:00 A.M. and delivered a lengthy speech which was heard with “religious unction” by the audience.\(^11\) In it he explained his work in Washington and what the Party should continue doing. He emphasized the importance of having a strong unity between the Free Federation and the Socialist Party because a division would be disastrous for both entities. Iglesias also spoke of the history of the Insular labor movement and the conflicts the World faced. The unity between Puerto Rico and the United States was strongly emphasized. A boisterous standing ovation for over five minutes was given when he finished his speech.\(^12\)

Besides dealing with Party reorganization matters and the work accomplished in the previous four years, other subjects were discussed. The Spanish Republic was to be supported against fascist aggression. It was reported that for the first time in its history, the party had no debts and $6,145.50 saved. The position of the Socialist Party on Insular status was vague. Congress was asked to conduct a plebiscite on the three status possibilities to resolve the final political situation. A minimum program of seventy-seven points of socio-economic reforms to be developed in the next four years by the Coalition was approved. Iglesias was unanimously voted to run again for resident commissioner.\(^13\)

The most controversial aspect of the convention was the renewal of
the pact with the Republican Union Party. The main issue was which party was to select the Speaker of the House. The preliminary pact stated that the party which polled the most votes would name the Speaker as in 1932. Some Socialists led by Prudencio Rivera Martínez and Nicolás Nogueras Rivera wanted a Socialist Speaker in order to legislate more socio-economic laws. If this was not possible, the House presidency should belong for two years to one party and the remaining two years to the other party. Bolívar Pagán, who chaired the Pact Committee, defended the pact, and opposed the arguments of Rivera Martínez, Nogueras Rivera, and their followers. The debates were long and indecisive. Finally at 3:00 A.M. on August 17, Iglesias gave a speech that would break the deadlock.14

For an hour and a half Iglesias spoke, defending the pact and especially the issue that the Speaker should go to the party that received the largest amount of votes. He explained the history of the Party, the Coalition, European coalitions, and he argued that the Speaker’s post could not be divided into two-year terms. The speech convinced the delegates in favor of the pact, which was then unanimously approved. In the following weeks, the final details were worked out with the Republican-Unionists.15

As the Socialists were meeting in Caguas, the Republican-Unionists were holding their convention simultaneously in the Broadway Theater in Ponce. The “Group of ’76” had not amounted to any political force even though it had formed the Regional Party (August 4, 1935) but never registered.16 The Republican-Unionists approved a similar platform as the one of 1932 and accepted the renewal of the pact as agreed with the Socialists.17

The Liberal Party held its convention in San Juan’s Municipal Theater also on August 16, 1936. Present at the convention was Jesús Benítez Castaño who now became a Liberal since his Regional Party had vanished. Because Muñoz Marín came very close to defeating Barceló at the Yauco convention, he now tried to get the candidates he wanted nominated at this convention and thus obtain control of the Party machinery. Barceló, at 68 and in declining health, was still the indisputable leader and was not outmaneuvered by Muñoz Marín and his numerous followers. Muñoz Marín’s candidacy was proposed for resident commissioner twice, but he declined. Rodolfo Ramírez Pabón, a distinguished Mason and civic leader but not a prominent politician, was then offered the post. He also rejected the offer. No important leader was
interested in running for the Congressional seat. Finally, Dr. José A. López Antongiorgi accepted the candidacy. As a result of the conflicts between the groups led by Barceló and the groups led by Muñoz Marín, the latter walked out of the convention and were excluded from the new hierarchy that was formed. The Liberal Party was now under the control of the conservative wing.¹⁸

Muñoz Marín then called a meeting of his followers in Baños de Coamo and protested that they did not have proper representation in the Liberal Party. At a subsequent Caguas gathering, Muñoz Marín founded Acción Social Independentista. This was to be the nucleus of the future Popular Democratic Party. The struggle between Barceló and Muñoz Marín concluded by the middle of September. A truce was brought about and both sides worked together in the electoral campaign.¹⁹

Utah Senator William H. King came to Puerto Rico in August. As a member of the Insular Affairs Committee, he wanted to study the local situation first hand. His visit helped to clarify somewhat the status issue. King told the Puerto Ricans that they had to decide what status they preferred and that the United States did not need the Island. He personally thought that the United States should develop a policy for Puerto Rico. Iglesias had an interview with the Senator where he stated the need to raise the living standards of the working classes, and he explained that the coming elections were in the nature of a plebiscite. The issue being permanent union or independence. Attorney General Fernández García, now a believer of autonomy, told the Utah Senator that a plebiscite should he held to resolve the status issue. Senator King implied that the elections would reveal the political aspirations of Puerto Ricans.²⁰

Senator King was also interested in the teaching of English in the public schools. He did not approve of Commissioner Padín’s philosophy of language education and informed Gruening of it. Gruening in turn began to study the problem and now favored the intensification of English. The days of Commissioner Padín were numbered.²¹

Ernest Gruening returned to San Juan in August and began to step up his campaign to eliminate separatist Liberals from the P.R.R.A. Rafael Fernández García was thus removed as well as other prominent Liberals. The principal charge was that the Liberals had set up an organization to collect funds for the Liberal Party.²² Some of the money collected in the P.R.R.A. was used to finance the activities of Senator Muñoz Marín.²³ The close association between Gruening and Muñoz Marín was coming to an end.²⁴ An investigation of the P.R.R.A. showed that “a widespread
system of kickbacks" had been organized by the Liberals and P.R.R.A. employees "were pressured to join" an organization to collect money for the Liberal Party and Muñoz Marín.25 These fund raising activities were "in violation of the Federal Criminal Code," but no charges were pressed by the Insular Department of Justice nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation.26

Iglesias informed his followers that their complaints against the P.R.R.A. should be well documented.27 He believed that the political firings in the P.R.R.A. were justified because no single political party should have control of that agency. The administrators of the P.R.R.A. should consist of people drawn from the three parties in order to prevent favoritism.28 Gruening now had a conference with Iglesias at his Isen Street residence where the Resident Commissioner presented the complaints that had been prepared against Liberal favoritism in the P.R.R.A. Gruening thus continued his policy of dismissing more Liberals. He even tried to convince some Liberals leaders to drop the independence plank from the Party's platform. For him the 1936 elections were in the nature of a plebiscite.29 Chardón emerged denying that "a hunt was on to eliminate independence advocates" from the P.R.R.A. while Muñoz Marín complained that it appeared that Washington desired "to obtain a popular mandate against independence by means of coercion, persecution and political skullduggery."30 The days of Chardón were numbered.31 Martínez Nadal, however, declared that the Coalition never had wanted to control the P.R.R.A. and that proof of this was that he had backed Liberal Raúl Esteves, head of personnel of the P.R.R.A. and brother of Liberal Guillermo Esteves, assistant Regional Administrator of the P.R.R.A., to be the Regional Administrator of the agency; furthermore, he had never met with Gruening.32

The 1936 electoral campaign began for Santiago Iglesias the day he landed on July 19. From that day on, he injected new enthusiasm into his followers, revitalized the Socialist leadership, and brought cohesion to the Coalition. After the conventions had been held and the pact renewed, Iglesias began to mobilize the Socialist masses and to intensify the electoral activities. In his Labor Day speech he told the workers that disorganization was the only poverty they faced, a poverty which could be evaded by organizing labor unions. The Free Federation and the Socialist Party had never promoted hate between people and races in the local social, economic, and political struggles. He condemned the attacks on the American people and its institutions which guaranteed progress in
Puerto Rico. The speech ended, proclaiming the sincere union between Puerto Rico and the United States.\textsuperscript{33}

The San Juan Rotary Club invited Iglesias to speak at their weekly luncheon. He informed the Rotarians that he had not found one single representative or senator in Congress that could explain to him the reason for the Tydings independence bill. The Resident Commissioner told the audience that the Roosevelt Administration did not back the said bill. Weeks before it had been submitted, Tydings had informed Iglesias that he was thinking of presenting a bill for independence. Iglesias opposed this bill because he thought it was a grave error since 80 per cent of Puerto Ricans wanted to remain united with the States. In the remote possibility that Washington would grant independence, Iglesias wondered how could American citizenship be taken away from Puerto Ricans who wanted to keep it?\textsuperscript{34}

Together with Martínez Nadal and the top Coalitionists orators, Iglesias prepared the campaign schedule with the local leaders. He requested that the American flag, together with the party flag, be displayed prominently in clubs and at all activities. The campaign plan was called the Victory Crusade and began with a rally in Caguas on September 24. After encompassing the entire Island, the campaign would wind up in San Juan on November 1.\textsuperscript{35} Iglesias expected the Coalition to have a greater victory than in 1932. Barceló, however, predicted that the Liberal Party would win the elections by getting five of the seven senatorial districts.\textsuperscript{36}

Throughout the Island Iglesias campaigned with other Coalitionist leaders. On two occasions, he shared the speaking platform with former Resident Commissioner José L. Pesquera, who had rejoined the Republican Union Party. The principles and ideals defended by Iglesias during this electoral campaign were the same ones he had espoused during his lifetime. He sought socio-economic and political justice for the working classes. Living standards should be raised and permanent union with the United States should be solidified as a guarantee for liberty, democracy, and social justice. Iglesias thought that independence would bring more exploitation for the workers as had happened in other Latin American countries. The republic would be beneficial for the capitalists, military, professionals, and Creole elite. The Roosevelt Administration and the P.R.R.A. programs were praised. The 1936 elections were considered by Iglesias in the nature of a plebiscite. The choice was between the Coalition and the Liberal Party, between permanent union with the
United States and independence. The Liberals were accused of using P.R.R.A. facilities and money to control Coalitionist voters. The Socialist Party did its best to use frugally the limited funds it had for the electoral campaign.37

Iglesias analyzed his concept of the fatherland at a speech he gave in the San Juan suburb of Barrio Obrero. He stated that he did not believe in the “fatherland full of poetry and lyricism.” The fatherland he defended was the one of the “happy homes” for all Puerto Ricans with good living conditions for the workers. Iglesias was convinced of the universality of the human race and disliked racial differences. Although he had been born in Galicia, he was not sure he was an ethnic Galician because Spain was a mixture of various races. The fatherland of the human race was the whole World.38 The Nationalists, naturally, were not sympathetic to Iglesias’ beliefs. They condemned the Socialist leader as a defender of American tyranny and considered that he had defined the fatherland as “a trifle.”39

The Liberal candidate for resident commissioner, Dr. López Antongiorgi, carried on a very low profile campaign. The noted surgeon had been born in San Germán in 1881. He received his bachelor’s degree from Ohio University and his doctorate from Syracuse University (1904). At first he practiced medicine in New York City, and then in Arecibo and San Juan. Dr. López Antongiorgi had been active in the Unionist, Liberal, and Democratic parties. Returning to New York in 1917, he remained there until 1936 when he came back and settled in Bayamón. During the electoral campaign Dr. López Antongiorgi never seemed to have exposed his political ideals nor the plans he would promote in Congress. La Democracia only printed some small excerpts from two speeches he gave in which nothing of substance was said.40 A Liberal leader however, considered López Antogóirgi a candidate superior to Iglesias because the Doctor was of “genuine Puerto Rican blood” and the Socialist candidate “had not done anything that procured prosperity for the Puerto Rican people.”41

The Liberal Party actually did not attack Iglesias as much as it had done in previous electoral campaigns. Only one article attacking Iglesias was published in La Democracia. It was signed by someone who used the pseudonym of Arístides. This Liberal wrote that when Iglesias landed in Puerto Rico in 1896, he appeared as the “redeemer of the working classes.” Socialism was for him an “instrument” by which he could become rich, thus receiving the ignorant working people. After three decades Iglesias had been successful at making himself appear as the
“promised Messiah” of the workers. The people that followed him were under the effects of the “opium of deceit and treason” by which he had sedated them. The workers were gradually being awakened by Socialist Affirmation.\textsuperscript{42}

Socialist Affirmation was still active with Florencio Cabello and Miguel Bernard Silva.\textsuperscript{43} They condemned the Socialists as “bureaucrats of yellow socialism.”\textsuperscript{44} The Coalition was accused of preventing their group from becoming registered as a party. Socialist Affirmation urged its followers to vote for the Liberal candidates.\textsuperscript{45} But what kind of candidates were they? They were essentially the same as the ones of 1932, landlords and professionals.

Sunday October 25 found Iglesias campaigning in the Western towns of Lares, San Sebastián, and Las Marias. From there he proceeded to Mayagüez where he arrived at Palma Hotel at 7:30 P.M. After so many days of speech making, Iglesias felt tired and was considering not attending a big rally that evening in the city’s Columbus Square. On the way to the Hotel the Resident Commissioner had noticed a group of anti-Coalition young students mocking a Coalition parade that was passing by. This incident, plus the insistence of friends, convinced Iglesias to go to the rally where some ten thousand were listening to Coalitionist orators. Two undercover policemen were serving as his bodyguards. Shortly after 10:00 P.M. Speaker García Méndez introduced the Resident Commissioner to the enthusiastic political crowd.\textsuperscript{46}

The theme of the speech was motivated by the mocking action of the young students he had seen near the Hotel. The speech dealt with the use and abuse of public liberties. The democratic institutions that existed in Puerto Rico were praised; such institutions should be respected by the young.\textsuperscript{47} Iglesias told the audience of the need of preserving the “loving American institutions.” In a dramatic gesture he raised his right arm and cried, “Keep intact the union with the United States.”\textsuperscript{48} At this point, five revolver shots were heard as Iglesias sank to the platform in the middle of a great commotion. It was 10:25 P.M. by the City Hall clock.\textsuperscript{49}

One of Iglesias’ bodyguards jumped over the platform rail after the person who had fired the gun twenty feet in front had run away. The Resident Commissioner was rapidly taken to Perea Hospital where Dr. Nelson Perea treated him. Only one bullet had slightly wounded him in the arm (close to the armpit) and there was no danger. At 11:00 P.M. Iglesias received a phone call from Martínez Nadal who was, naturally, very worried. Mrs. Iglesias, who was in San Juan, was called at this time
and she left immediately for Mayagüez with some other members of the family. Iglesias spent the evening in the Clinic and returned home the next morning at 8:45 A.M.  

While the gunman was being detained, one Socialist began inciting the crowd to lynch him. The Coalitionist leaders promptly intervened and prevented such an action from taking place. Calm was restored by 11:30 P.M., and the rally continued until after midnight.  

The person who had fired the five bullets from a nine millimeter Smith revolver was Domingo Santaliz Crespo. He was a 32 year old White tobacco factory worker born in Rincón, resident of Dulces Labios section of Mayagüez, and a Nationalist. Santaliz Crespo held the rank of sergeant in the Rius Rivera Batallion of the black-shirted Cadets of the Republic. He had used an unregistered revolver. Taken before Municipal Judge Cristino R. Colón, Santaliz Crespo declared that he had decided to kill Iglesias as a result of the Resident Commissioner’s February 1936 remarks that the Nationalists should be disbanded. Stories soon began to circulate that there had been a plot where more Nationalists had been involved.  

Political tension rose sharply as a result of the assassination attempt. Governor Winship considered that the police could maintain law and order and that there was no need to mobilize the National Guard. The press condemned the attempt on Iglesias’ life. There were countless messages, phone calls, and visits of support for the wounded labor leader. Besides the Coalitionist leaders and followers, Barceló, Muñoz Marín, Gruening, and Ickes expressed their deep concern. The Communist Party also condemned the shooting calling it “abusive, criminal, and villainous” and considered the act prejudicial to the independence movement. The Communist Party recognized that Iglesias was a leader greatly loved by the Socialist masses. From Atlanta, Albizu Campos joined in condemning too the violent attack against Iglesias and said he did not know Santaliz Crespo.  

Governor Blanton Winship and Chief of Police Colonel Enrique de Orbeta came to Iglesias’ residence to confer with him. Martínez Nadal also came later and had a long talk. The house at Isern Street was now more crowded than ever. The Socialist leader declared that he would continue teaching the people that their happiness was under the protection of American institutions. He was greatly appreciative of all the messages and visits he had received.  

Two days after the assassination attempt, Iglesias began working in
his home office again, directing the electoral campaign as usual. He considered the elections very important due to the status issue that had been emphasized so strongly. At the last campaign rally held in San Juan, Iglesias did not participate as he had stopped making public appearances.57

From the beginning of the month of October, Iglesias had received complaints that in some towns Liberals were using unfair tactics against Socialist and Republican-Unionist voters. The Benítez Sugar Company of Vieques (Playa Grande Central) was accused of firing Coalitionists workers from their jobs. Eastern and Fajardo Sugar companies were believed to be taking similar action.58 In Río Piedras' Central Vannina foremen were accused of threatening Coalitionist workers.59 On election day Iglesias received several telegrams from Socialist leaders complaining of unfair tactics by Liberals to prevent Socialist electors from voting. Some P.R.R.A. facilities were also being used for the benefit of the Liberal Party.60

As in 1932 Iglesias and Martínez Nadal were convinced that the Coalition was going to win.61 The electoral campaign had been the shortest ever held lasting only one month. Radio was widely used for the first time. All women now had the same electoral rights as men. The anxiety that women would not vote in large numbers as men did was proven wrong as they did vote normally. Iglesias was credited with making independence the electoral fighting issue and placed separatists on the defensive for the first time in twenty-five years. Bars and places that sold liquor were closed from noon before election day until the day after. Closed electoral polls were used for the first time to greatly reduce multiple voting and further purify the electoral process.62 It rained on election day (November 3), thus cooling off some volatile passions.63 There was still, unfortunately, some violence which resulted in two dead and six wounded.64

For the 1936 elections there were 764,602 registered to vote. The Liberal Party received 252,467 votes (45.9 percent as opposed to 44.3 in 1932), elected five senators (as in 1932), twelve representatives (three more than in 1932), and won nineteen municipalities (seven less than in 1932). The Liberals expected to win the electoral districts of Arecibo, Humacao, and Guayama, but only won in the last one as in 1932. The only important municipalities won were Caguas and Humacao.65 The Coalition won with 297,033 votes (54.05 per cent as opposed to 54 per cent in 1932). The Republican-Unionists received 152,739 votes, elected seven senators (as in 1932), fifteen representatives (three less than 1932), and
won in twenty-seven municipalities (two less than in 1932). The Socialists obtained 144,294 votes, elected seven senators and twelve representatives (as in 1932), and won in thirty municipalities (eight more than in 1932). Iglesias was thus re-elected to Congress. It had been the Socialist Party who came out third in votes but first in winning the largest number of municipalities. No third party in the history of Puerto Rico has ever equalled this electoral achievement. The Communist Party obtained 77 votes in Utuado and 8 in Jayuya. The *Partido Independentista* got 3 votes in Maricao. The Nationalist Party, which did not participate in the elections, received 1 vote in Aguas Buenas. United Workers Affirmation Party, a Socialist dissidence group, obtained 8 votes in Loíza, 24 in Patillas, 28 in Salinas, and 368 in Humacao. The votes obtained in Humacao were enough to defeat the Coalition and allow the Liberals to win in that municipality by 221 votes.66

Iglesias was quite satisfied with the electoral results.67 The elections had proven that the majority of Puerto Ricans wanted “only union with the people of the United States” as he had always told Washington authorities.68 The Insular electorate had decided to maintain institutions that guaranteed peace, economic betterment, and social tranquility.69 For Muñoz Marín the electoral results were to be expected because of the negative results of the “monstrous Tydings Bill” which assured the victory of the Coalition.70 In the opinion of other Liberals, like Barceló and Lastra Cháiriez, the Coalitionist victory was made possible thanks to corporation “gold.”71 Iglesias answered this accusation by requesting that the Liberals show the list of corporations and landlords who backed the Liberal Party. Barceló and Lastra Cháiriez, furthermore, said Iglesias, should not forget the P.R.R.A. facilities used and the money collected from that agency for several years and from other sources.72 Gruening considered that the electoral results demonstrated that Puerto Rico wanted “permanent union with the United States.”73

*El Mundo* considered the 1936 elections a “model of equanimity” and thought that the amendments to the electoral law had “purified the moral atmosphere.”74 Ickes congratulated Winship for his share in conducting the elections so orderly.75 Barceló, however, thought differently and wrote to President Roosevelt claiming fraud and the partiality of Winship to the Coalition.76 Furthermore, he declared that he had proofs of fraud.77 The pro-independence *El Imparcial* editorialized that Barceló did not have the proofs to claim electoral fraud because the elections had been honest.78
Back in the middle of October rumors had begun to circulate that Chardón was resigning from the P.R.R.A. The rumors were correct. Gruening tried to persuade Chardón not to do so. He suspected that Chardón "was under pressure from Liberal Party leadership," but then became convinced that it was a "political ploy." The internal situation at the P.R.R.A. was very complex and there were many reasons behind Chardón's desire to resign. On November 11, 1936 Chardón sent his official resignation to President Roosevelt, who accepted it. With him also resigned over twenty high-ranking officials who were also Liberals. Miles H. Fairbank was then appointed to replace Chardón. A few days later (November 17), President Roosevelt ordered the P.R.R.A. transferred under the supervision of Secretary Ickes.

Parallel to these changes was the resignation of Commissioner of Education Padín. Gruening now had decided that the teaching of English should be intensified; thus Padín considered that his educational philosophy was not liked. He therefore resigned on November 21, 1936. Gruening presented the resignation to President Roosevelt, who accepted it. The Liberal Party rapidly began to lobby for the appointment of Dr. Juan J. Osuna, also a Liberal, because his educational philosophy was similar to that of Padín.

The fight inside the Liberal Party between Muñoz Marín and Barceló had been suspended during the electoral campaign. During this truce, Muñoz Marín had campaigned actively in the districts of Arecibo and Humacao. He wanted then to preserve the unity of the Party of which, he claimed, a 70 percent following. After November 3, Muñoz Marín planned to form a new party the platform of which would be independence with economic justice. When the electoral results in 1936 showed that the Liberals had lost, Barceló furiously blamed Muñoz Marín for the defeat. The truce now came to its end. Shortly afterwards the two leaders met and Muñoz Marín suggested their going to Washington to work for independence with favorable economic terms. Barceló flatly refused. Muñoz Marín was now slowly beginning to form a new party based on A.S.I. and was trying to lure some prominent Socialist to join him as vice-president. Now he proceeded to go to Washington (November 19) to further his political goals. Barceló declared that Muñoz Marín no longer represented nor was worthy of representing the Liberal Party. Walter Mck. Jones now became the Liberal representative in Washington. Lacking Gruening's and Barceló's support, Muñoz Marín's influence in the Roosevelt Administration was dramatically reduced.
Resident Commissioner Iglesias had originally planned to stay in Puerto Rico nursing his wound until December. The bullet had remained in the arm muscle and was never removed because it caused no pain. He was busy dealing with Party and governmental matters. To President Roosevelt he sent a congratulatory message, received a visit from Gruening, and had an interview with Winship at La Fortaleza.\textsuperscript{94}

The police carried out an investigation and arrested three more Nationalists who together with Santaliz Crespo had allegedly planned the assassination attempt.\textsuperscript{95} These three Nationalists were found innocent and freed. Santaliz Crespo was found guilty and received a ten-year jail sentence.\textsuperscript{96}

The Free Federation Executive Council met at Iglesias’ house on November 19. There they approved a three-year organization plan to begin in January 1937. The purpose was to revitalize and expand the membership of the Free Federation throughout the Island. Due to Alonso Torres declining health, Nicolás Nogueras Rivera was named acting secretary general of the Free Federation to relieve Alonso Torres of most of the workload. With thirty-three sugar mills out of forty-one a new convenio giving workers a 12 per cent increase in salaries was to be signed.\textsuperscript{97}

Early Sunday morning November 22, Iglesias left by plane for Washington. Recent political developments appear to have convinced him that the more important matters had to be dealt with Washington rather than in San Juan. Pagán was again elected acting president of the Socialist Party. Mrs. Iglesias later returned to Washington.\textsuperscript{98}

Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez was the Puerto Rican delegate to the Tampa convention of the American Federation of Labor on November 16 to 27, 1936. He presented the following resolutions: backing for Workers Education Program, labor representation in the P.R.R.A., application of Wagner Act, Social Security and Federal Housing to Puerto Rico, and definition by Congress of the Insular status. The resolutions were all approved.\textsuperscript{99} Iglesias was very much satisfied with this support.\textsuperscript{100}

In Washington the re-elected Resident Commissioner saw Gruening and Winship and discussed pending problems relating to political and socio-economic affairs.\textsuperscript{101} With Secretary Ickes Iglesias talked about the same subjects. He emphasized to Ickes the need to improve the teaching of English in the public school system.\textsuperscript{102} To the Buenos Aires Inter-American Peace Conference Iglesias sent a cable stating that Puerto Rico
must be considered as part of the United States. The Conference had asked for Insular independence. Barceló stated that Iglesias was a foreigner and condemned the cable as humiliating. Valdés and Pagán sent a cable similar to Iglesias.\textsuperscript{103}

As a result of these talks with Ickes and Gruening, the P.R.R.A. was to give more participation to Winship, the Legislature, and the government departments. Iglesias began preparing legislation for the coming Congress and asked for suggestions. He also wanted to know what candidates the Coalition supported for commissioner of Education. Juan P. Blanco was then considered the leading candidate.\textsuperscript{104} The Coalition Central Committee proposed that the Organic Act be amended to allow the governor to appoint new legislators to fill vacancies left as a result of resignations or deaths.\textsuperscript{105} Iglesias planned to submit a new statehood bill and another to make the Island an incorporated territory. Other planned legislation were: augment the justices of the Insular Supreme Court from five to seven; reform the citizenship law; and eliminate the traveling tax between Puerto Rico and the States. Iglesias wanted Puerto Rico to be included in all social and labor Congressional laws and to receive equal treatment as the states in budgetary matters.\textsuperscript{106}

The Insular economy in 1936 had improved over the previous year. Food purchases had increased by 17 per cent, textiles by 28 per cent, footwear by 21 per cent, and cigarettes by 28 per cent. Sugar accounted for 65 per cent of the exports and tobacco products amounted to 11 per cent. These two products had had a 25 per cent increase in value ($14,789,000) over the previous year due mainly to higher prices.\textsuperscript{107}

For the 75th Congress, Iglesias was re-appointed to the Insular Affairs and Agriculture committees and named to the Committee of Labor as his expertise in this field was difficult to surpass. He promptly submitted eleven bills. Some of these were the following: granting American citizenship to some people born in Puerto Rico of foreign parents, granting the governor the power to appoint new legislators when a vacancy occurred, eliminating the traveling tax between Puerto Rico and the States, establishing a fish culture program, increasing the number of judges of the Insular Supreme Court from five to seven, issuing a postage stamp, creating a public service commission, extending the Social Security Act to Puerto Rico, creating a Social Welfare Department, reverting to the Insular Treasury Federal revenues collected at the Customs, and incorporating Puerto Rico as a territory like Hawaii and Alaska. The territory bill provided that Insular revenues would continue
in the hands of the Puerto Rican Treasury. The statehood bill was shelved at the last minute apparently because Iglesia did not get the support he was asking from the American Federation of Labor. Nevertheless, he considered the territory bill not only as a step toward statehood but also as a step toward better socio-economic benefits. Iglesia also introduced legislation to make surveys of Jobos and Guayanilla harbors. He lobbied for these bills and other beneficial to Puerto Rico that were presented by different Congressmen.

*El Mundo* editorialized against Iglesia's territorial bill. The paper considered that the proposed incorporation with special taxation privileges was contradictory. *El Mundo* felt that no one in Puerto Rico wanted to have the same status as Alaska and Hawaii. Martínez Nadal, however, was in agreement with Iglesia's territorial bill.

The most important objection to the territorial bill in the Coalition came from Speaker García Méndez, a well known constitutionalist lawyer. He, nevertheless, supported the bill. His principal objection, however, was that by incorporating Puerto Rico, the Island would necessarily have to pay off Federal taxes and the present economy could not support that expense. He preferred Puerto Rico to achieve more autonomy first and then become a state. This, he felt, was more advantageous. García Méndez did not believe Congress would accept the incorporation of Puerto Rico as a territory without the corresponding taxation because that would be a privilege Alaska and Hawaii would ask for too. Iglesia wrote to the Speaker stating that his fundamental reason for the territorial bill was to end the discrimination Puerto Rico was suffering in numerous important progressive Congressional legislation.

The relationship between Iglesia and Gruening continued to improve as the latter became cooperative with the Coalition reversing his former favoritism toward the Liberal minority. Both men kept in contact during the following months dealing with Insular matters. Even Interior Assistant-Secretary Chapman was now beginning to cooperate with the Coalitionist electoral majority. The Roosevelt Administration was changing its former policy toward the Insular political parties.

Secretary Ickes also became somewhat more cooperative with Iglesia and the Coalition although he kept close contact with the Liberals too. Divide et impera policies are always beneficial for colonial overlords. The Interior Secretary went so far as to declare that in Federal aid Puerto Rico should be treated as if it were a state. Iglesia's bill to extend
the Social Security Act, or even parts of it, to the Island received administration backing but was to fail anyway.\textsuperscript{116}

With the transfer of the P.R.R.A. to the Interior Department, Secretary Ickes’ power over Puerto Rico increased. He ordered an investigation of Gruening’s management of the P.R.R.A. which revealed “amazing incompetence and extravagance.” Ickes wanted Gruening to resign, but it took some months before this occurred.\textsuperscript{117} Although Ickes was now somewhat more cooperative with Iglesias and the Coalition, he never become really close to them (Iglesias’ name does not appear in his diary). Because Ickes no longer trusted Gruening, he called upon Roger Baldwin to discuss Puerto Rican affairs. Baldwin was director and principal driving force of the American Civil Liberties Union and a friend of Gruening and Muñoz Marín. He was then collaborating with Muñoz Marín, preparing an advantageous independence bill for Puerto Rico. Baldwin asked for Ickes support, but the Secretary refused.\textsuperscript{118}

Barceló had come to Washington and complained to Ickes about the alleged electoral fraud of 1936. His complaint was considered ridiculous and infantile by Pagán and Martínez Nadal.\textsuperscript{119} Barceló and Mck. Jones did their best to improve the Liberal relationship with the Roosevelt Administration and to undermine the separatist plans of Muñoz Marín. Barceló’s separatism had decreased markedly.\textsuperscript{120}

Muñoz Marín continued his quest to achieve independence although his influence in the Roosevelt Administration had been greatly reduced. He had paid $35.00 to a lawyer friend for drafting an independence bill to Muñoz’s liking. With the backing of the American Civil Liberties Union, Muñoz Marín was able to convince Representative Wilburn Cartwright, Democrat from Oklahoma and member of the Insular Affairs Committee, to introduce the independence bill on February 18, 1937. This Bill envisioned a referendum between statehood and independence. It was not to be approved.\textsuperscript{121} Ickes and Gruening opposed it completely.\textsuperscript{122} Iglesias roundly condemned the Cartwright bill because its approval “signified the economic and political destruction of Puerto Rico.” He added that it was “one of the biggest and most disagreeable surprises” he had experienced in his four years in Congress.\textsuperscript{123} The Republican Union Party rejected the bill and the Liberals did not consider it of any importance.\textsuperscript{124}

As these developments were taking place in the National Capital, the Insular Legislature had begun its session in a most cordial manner because the Liberal Party had become more cooperative with the Coali-
tion. One reason for this cordial spirit was the passive strategy of the Liberals to divide the Coalition. Martínez Nadal, García Méndez, Pagán, and Alonso Torres were re-elected to their previous posts.125 The Senate sent Iglesias a congratulatory cable for his Congressional work. Iglesias wired back a reciprocal message.126

Resident Commissioner Iglesias had a thirty minute conference with President Roosevelt at the White House on February 23, 1937.127 The President told the Resident Commissioner that in the last three months the situation in Puerto Rico had become much better and hoped it would continue that way. Louisiana sugarcane and Western beet sugar growers had visited Roosevelt asking for a lower sugar quota for Puerto Rico, but he did not favor this. President Roosevelt was quite pleased with the benefits resulting from the Insular reconstruction programs. Poverty could be reduced with close cooperation between Puerto Ricans and Continentals. If this was not liked, Puerto Rico could chose to become independent. Iglesias quickly answered “that independence would mean economic suicide.” The President agreed with this.

On regard to the overpopulation problem, President Roosevelt suggested emigration to the Dominican Republic instead of New York because most Puerto Ricans did not speak English. To remedy this problem, he suggested to Iglesias the establishing of a twenty-five year educational program to prepare the people. After the said period concluded, a plebiscite on independence could be taken. During this period the people would learn English and American ideals and institutions. President Roosevelt now had come to the conclusion that Padín’s educational philosophy had been a mistake. Iglesias agreed to this plan and suggested that Congress should make a $2 million yearly appropriation to fund it. Iglesias was to work out the educational program with Senator Tydings, even though the Maryland Senator’s attitude, according to the President, was “to get rid of the Island.” As for the new commissioner of Education, he had yet been unable to make a choice.

Iglesias told the President that during the previous year an Insular Legislative commission had come to Washington and had not been able to meet him personally so that they could describe the socioeconomic conditions of Puerto Rico. The Resident Commissioner requested that a meeting with that group be arranged for the spring. President Roosevelt consented to this.

The President concluded the conference by telling Iglesias that Muñoz Marín had “become an educator in the wrong way” and so had lost
many of his friends. It was the Resident Commissioner who should be consulted on Puerto Rican matters. During this conference, President Roosevelt had refused to refer to the Cartwright independence bill. The new educational plan and the meeting between the President and the legislative commission were never to take place.

The imprisonment of Albizu Campos in Atlanta had not decreased the political activism of the Nationalist Party. Winship, with Gruening’s support, began to limit the activities of the Nationalists. He especially began to curtail the parades of the Cadets of the Republic. A most lamentable confrontation finally erupted in Ponce on Palm Sunday, March 21, 1937. When a Nationalist parade was about to start, a shot was fired which triggered a shoot-out between well armed policemen and the Nationalists. The confrontation came to be known as the Ponce Massacre in which 17 were killed and over a hundred wounded. Winship was blamed by many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, but the Roosevelt Administration kept him in the governorship.

The deplorable bloody news from Ponce brought Puerto Rico prominently back to the headlines of the Continental press. The issue of independence began to be debated again, as had previously happened with the killing of Riggs and the Tydings independence bill. This led Iglesias to write that Puerto Ricans were unfortunately “harvesting a crop from the seeds of violent propaganda which have been permitted to germinate and spread over a period of at least ten years.” Only “a very few dreamers” in the Island really wanted independence and most desired “to continue forming an integral part of the American Union.” He wrote a series of articles which were published in The New Leader, The Washington Star, and The Christian Science Monitor explaining that the majority in Puerto Rico was against independence. All this he also had reported to President Roosevelt, Ickes, Gruening, Tydings, and other Washington policy makers. In the House floor he delivered a speech explaining why Puerto Rico did not want independence. Iglesias and the Coalition backed Governor Winship.

There were several aspirants to succeed Padín as commissioner of Education. Besides Osuna, Dean of Education at the University, there were Dr. José A. Balseiro, Dr. Juan B. Soto (the University Chancellor), Dr. José Gallardo, Juan B. Huyke, and Juan P. Blanco. The last four were Republican-Unionists. The first choice of the Coalition and Iglesias was Blanco, but he was not appointed, and Gallardo became the leading candidate. Gruening and Ickes then recommended him to the President.
who appointed him on April 9, 1937. The Roosevelt Administration was now reversing its previous stand on the language issue, —the teaching of English was to be intensified as the Coalition had always advocated. President Roosevelt sent Gallardo a letter, which Gruening had drafted, informing the new Commissioner of Education of the importance of teaching more English. Iglesias and the Coalition were most satisfied by this victory. The separatists, understandably, were not.

During the 1st session of the 75th Congress, Iglesias continued working with the first twelve bills he had submitted and fifteen more that were later added. These other bills dealt with relief, citizenship, ports, immigration, transfers of Federal property, Social Security, minor amendments to the Jones Act, and extension of some Federal legislation to Puerto Rico. Not all were to be approved, nevertheless, they kept him occupied with visits, hearings, and a voluminous correspondence from the numerous people and groups interested both in the government, private enterprise, and in public life.

In 1937 efforts began to be taken to apply the Federal minimum wage to the needle and tobacco stripping industries which would benefit women mostly. The Free Federation and the Socialists Party favored the minimum wage law, but the needle industry businessmen, naturally, were opposed. Iglesias believed that no Puerto Rican industry based on low-wages would be able to last. He favored the establishing of the minimum wage.

With the coming of the Second Spanish Republic, Iglesias hoped to make a visit to the land where he had been born. The Spanish Civil War definitely prevented his making this trip. His sympathies, naturally, were strongly anti-Nationalist and for the Popular Front.

To improve the chances of getting the Social Security extended to Puerto Rico, Iglesias urged the Legislature to pass a resolution requesting it. The resolution was accomplished, but Congress still did not include the Island in the said Act.

Congress was scheduled to approve new sugar regulations during the session. The sugar refiners and the beet sugar interests which were formerly bitter enemies had now established an “unholy alliance” lobbying for quotas that seriously discriminated against Puerto Rico, as well as Hawaii, the Philippines, and Cuba. In the House Agriculture Committee Gruening emphatically protested against the quota discrimination aimed at Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. The two territories should receive the
same treatment as Florida and Louisiana. The Jones-O’Mahoney sugar bill generated more work for Iglesias between January to August than any other bill during that Congressional session. He told fellow Congressmen that the sugar cane industry was the most important producer of Insular income and gave employment to 45 per cent of the labor force. The new sugar bill would result in a loss to Puerto Rico of between six to eight millions in 1937. Iglesias wanted the Island to be treated as the sugar-producing Continental areas and Hawaii.

Secretary of Agriculture Wallace drafted an administration sugar bill to replace the Jones-O’Mahoney sugar bill. This new bill had President Roosevelt support. Now Puerto Rico and Hawaii were to be treated as if they were states. The House Sub-Committee of Agriculture, however, did not accept this change; thus Puerto Rico went back to its previous inferior position. Iglesias again defended Puerto Rico asking for a higher sugar quota in order to reduce employment. He pointed out that sugar cane wages in the Island in 1937 averaged $1.06 while in Louisiana they were .75 cents and in Florida .80 cents. Secretary Ickes protested at this discriminatory decision of the Agriculture Sub-Committee. He wanted Puerto Rican sugar to be treated like the rest of the domestic production. Iglesias continued advocating in Congress for equal treatment for Puerto Rico in respect to the new sugar quota. He pointed out that the Island was the second most important buyer of United States agricultural products with yearly purchases of $47 million. In Puerto Rico the Free Federation, the Department of Labor, the Sugar Producer’s Association, the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce, and numerous other prominent organizations also wanted equal treatment. Iglesias asked President Green to intercede with Congressman Jones in favor of Puerto Rico. President Roosevelt continued urging that there should be no discrimination against the Puerto Rican sugar quota. Iglesias maintained his protest in Congress. Secretary Ickes continued backing for a non-discriminatory quota. The American Sugar Refiners Association was still opposed as ever and attacked President Roosevelt’s sugar plan. Iglesias went on working to obtain the best possible deal out of a very complex and difficult problem. He finally asked President Roosevelt to sign the new sugar bill, regardless of the discriminatory aspects, because it was better than no sugar legislation. El Mundo published an editorial condemning Iglesias’ position on the sugar bill and his letter to President Roosevelt. This paper wanted no discriminatory sugar policy. The Sugar Producers’ Association was divided regarding
the sugar bill. Aboy Benítez, however, was in agreement with Iglesias’ stand.164 Nogueras Rivera also backed Iglesias.165 Genaro Cautiño Insúa of Central Guanani, considered that 95 per cent of sugar producers agreed with Iglesias’ position.166 Ex-Governor Beverly realized that Puerto Rico had very limited political power in Congress, and he did not like the sugar bill, but it was “better than no legislation.”167 On September 1, President Roosevelt signed the sugar bill that would apply until 1940. The new sugar quota was set by Secretary Wallace at 840,954 tons, from which the Island was permitted to refine 126,033 tons (the previous 1934 quota had been 803,000 tons). The Department of Agriculture had originally decided on a smaller quota of 831,508 tons, but then had given an increase.168

During this seven-month Congressional session the Resident Commissioner had been as active as usual.169 From the bills he had submitted, the following were approved: the commemorative postage stamp of Puerto Rico (H. J. Res. 73), elimination of tax on steamship tickets (H. R. 1481), transfer to Insular government of Cataño Rear Range Light Reservation (H. R. 6045), and funds for Agricultural Extension Programs (section 21 of Bankhead-Jones Act) (H. R. 7908).170 There was other Congressional legislation in which Puerto Rico had been included such as: transfer of some military property (S. 1973), loans for crop production (H. R. 1545), inclusion of Puerto Rico in Federal Housing Authority (S. 1685), and continuation of the administration of the hurricane loans (H. R. 6958).171 The Public Works Administration, which Ickes directed, had given $932,318 in grants in 1937 and $1,018,500 in loans for twelve municipal projects.172

At the end of the Congressional session Iglesias made a strong attack on certain negative propaganda that was being published against Puerto Rico. He considered the people behind it malicious or ignorant persons. The Resident Commissioner explained that Puerto Rico had certainly made great progress since 1898. It was true, however, that it had some problems, but they were being worked upon. He rejected the simplistic theory that the Island was ungovernable and violent in political ideals.173 For a few days in September, Mr. y Mrs. Iglesias took a brief vacation in Atlantic City, New York City, and Rhode Island.174

Muñoz Marín and Barceló had meanwhile returned to Puerto Rico by April 1937. Muñoz Marín wanted to get control of the Liberals while Barceló refused to give in. Barceló’s separatism had decreased markedly. He considered Muñoz Marín’s plans for independence as erroneous and
the ideas of social reform as too radical. After a long struggle Muñoz Marín and his followers were expelled from the Liberal Party. Thus Muñoz Marín began his uphill campaign to create ultimately a new political party.\textsuperscript{175}

Parallel to these divisionist struggles in the Liberal camp were the ones in the Coalitionists parties. At the time of the 1936 Socialist convention the rivalry between Commissioner Rivera Martínez and Senator Pagán began to grow deeper. Regardless of their respective virtues and defects, the Rivera Martínez-Pagán struggle for the ultimate control of the Socialist Party — they were not fighting with Iglesias, they were only getting ready to succeed him in the future — was more than a contest between two personalities. They represented two groups in the Party. Rivera Martínez was the top leader of a group of labor and Socialist leaders. His power base was the Department of Labor and his position as first vice-president of the Free Federation gave him prominence. Pagán led another group of labor and Socialist leaders and his center of power was the Senate vice-presidency together with his position as acting president of the Socialist Party. By virtue of this last position, Pagán had much influence in the Socialist political machine. The two groups had gradually been formed by the summer of 1937 and the Socialists began to take sides.\textsuperscript{176} The fight would lead to the division of the Socialists in 1939, the defeat of the Coalition in 1940, and the ultimate death of the Party in 1954.

This internal fight soon became quite bitter and some Socialists wanted Iglesias to come to Puerto Rico and resolve the serious controversy.\textsuperscript{177} Iglesias believed that the Socialist Party and the Free Federation should maintain their unity. They were, furthermore, democratic institutions that had capable and intelligent leaders who could resolve their own problems. His work in Washington would not permit his going to Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{178} Although Iglesias was in good health, he was 65 years old and, naturally, knew he would not last forever. He wanted his followers to solve their own problems and did not want to be the ultimate voice in the Party.

Upon the death of Socialist Secretary General Alonso Torres in the middle of September, two candidates ran for the post, Senator Epifanio Fiz Jiménez and Pagán supported Santiago Carreras. Thus the fight increased even more.\textsuperscript{179} Iglesias thought that both candidates were good and considered himself impartial in this electoral controversy.\textsuperscript{180} Carreras won a solid victory, but the internal fight did not cease.\textsuperscript{181}
The divisionist germ had slowly begun to attack the Republican Union Party. As far back as 1935 Martínez Nadal and García Méndez began to have their differences. This was mainly due to Martínez Nadal’s favoring Senator Valdés over Speaker García Méndez as the eventual successor to the Party’s presidency. With Martínez Nadal’s health declining (he had been having a long fight with cancer since 1935), the unity and discipline in the Republican Union forces began to become weaker. The Party was to split in 1940.\textsuperscript{182}

Iglesias did not go to Puerto Rico in the fall of 1937 because he was scheduled to attend the American Federation of Labor convention and a second session of Congress that had been planned by President Roosevelt.

The convention of the American Federation of Labor was held in Denver, October 4 to 15, 1937. Iglesias had previously sent President Green a report on Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{183} There he presented a resolution which asked the President and Congress to declare Puerto Rico and organized territory. The idea behind Iglesias’ resolution was that he believed that the Island wanted to be part of the United States forever.\textsuperscript{184} \textit{El Mundo} editorialized condemning this proposal of Iglesias because he had no right to take an action whose purpose was to perpetuate the existing colonial status.\textsuperscript{185} The convention did not approve the resolution. It recommended that Puerto Rico should get their support, as much as possible, in improving its economic situation and continue being part of the United States.\textsuperscript{186}

Rockwell Kent, a distinguished controversial artist, painted a mural depicting mail delivery in Puerto Rico at the Washington Post Office Building. The mural showed a Black mailman on horseback handing letters to a group of Blacks. One of the figures in the scene had an open letter sent by an Eskimo friend which had a message written in Alaskan Kuskokwin dialect. The message urged the Puerto Ricans to “change chiefs” so that they would then be “equal and free.” Kent had obvious separatist sympathies. Martínez Nadal (then in Washington) saw it and become indignant. \textit{El Mundo} printed an editorial stating that the mural was not representative of Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{187} Iglesias vehemently protested, calling the mural deceptive and stating that it had nothing to do with Puerto Rico. Kent defended his work and even went so far as to call Iglesias a racist. After a long controversy in which even the Minister from Venezuela got involved, the mural was ultimately removed.\textsuperscript{188}

During the November-December 2nd session of the 75th Congress
Iglesias presented two bills: H. R. 8504 to extend to Puerto Rico the Wagner-Peyser Act (the National Labor Relations Act) and H. R. 8780 to extend provisions of the act relative to wildlife restoration to the District of Columbia. As a resident of the District of Columbia, which then had no representation in Congress, Iglesias introduced this bill. This appears to be the only time a resident commissioner has presented legislation not dealing with Puerto Rican matters. The two bills were not successful. In the House floor Iglesias delivered two speeches. One dealt with making Puerto Rico an incorporated territory (December 10) and the other was concerned with the annual report of the Free Federation (December 17).

On December 13, Iglesias met with Secretary Ickes to discuss pending socio-economic Congressional legislation. Iglesias was mainly seeking support to extend certain parts of the Social Security Act (aid to children and public health) to Puerto Rico. Ickes favored this. The Resident Commissioner then suggested that Puerto Rico be made an incorporated territory and that the Jones Act be liberalized. The Secretary was non-committal about these two matters.

Iglesias had become accustomed to living in Washington by 1937. Daughters Libertad and América had by now gotten married. Grandson Thomas (Tito) Rice Iglesias had come to live in the house. Iglesias began a normal day at 7:00 A.M. by reading The Washington Post. His breakfast consisted of half a grapefruit, some cornflakes, and a cup of warm milk (he was not a coffee drinker) with crackers. Around 8:30 he left for Capitol Hill in a 1937 four-door black Buick Roadmaster his Party friends in Puerto Rico had given him in December 1936. Son-in-law Thatcher drove as Iglesias never learned to drive. On the Hill he was highly regarded and well known by his fellow Congressmen due to his strong personality, dedication, and conspicuous white mustache. Iglesias would work regularly at his office until 5:30-6:00 P.M. His relationship with the press was very close, as he himself had been a journalist, and he always spoke frankly to the reporters. Back at the house he read The Evening Star and had supper around 7:00 P.M. His eating habits were frugal with soups and stews being the favorite dishes. In the evenings Iglesias would talk with the family invariably, play his modest record collection of operatic arias (on some Saturday’s he would listen to the Metropolitan Opera Broadcasts), play chess, listen to Mrs. Iglesias play the piano (mostly Puerto Rican danzas), attend to his correspondence, work on Congressional papers or his second volume of Luchas emancipadoras, and read
books and magazines. The Iglesias attended different functions in Washington social circles; however, he found these type of activity boring as he did not smoke nor drink. He enjoyed good health all the time. Every Thursday evening the Iglesias family regularly went to the Canton Pagoda Restaurant on Pennsylvania Avenue between 13th and 14th streets. Some Saturdays Iglesias went with Manolín or Eddie to have some excitement at Bowie Race Track in Maryland. Most Sundays Iglesias went to the movies with grandson Tito or with Mrs. Iglesias. Iglesias spent many enjoyable occasions with Tito. Together they played Chinese-checkers and went to the National Zoo and Glen Echo Amusement Park. Sometimes Tito was also taken to the office on Capitol Hill. The Porter Street house was regularly visited by Puerto Ricans studying in Washington, other friends, labor leaders, and Coalitionist political leaders.192

During 1937 the Free Federation of Labor had begun a three year organization plan called Three Years of Renovation and Life. The plan was developed by means of public meetings, lectures, radio broadcasts, and articles in the daily press. Seventy-seven new unions were organized in Puerto Rico. By August there were 195 affiliated and non-affiliated active unions and 157 that were inactive. Besides the sugar convenio, there was also a longshoremen convenio. In the tobacco stripping industry twenty-five convenios between unions and employees were signed covering twenty-five thousand women workers. The year had been a very active for the labor movement.193

Since his arrival in 1896, Iglesias had been the guiding force of the labor movement. He was a most effective leader who had kept the labor movement strongly united. After four years in Washington, however, his absence began to be felt as the labor movement slowly began to disintegrate. Iglesias absence was not the only factor for the disunity. New socio-economic changes, different labor philosophies, and rivalries among labor leaders gradually began to weaken the Free Federation and balkanize the labor movement for the rest of the century. In May 1937, Nogueras Rivera informed Iglesias of the internal divisions that Francisco Colón Gordiany, a separatist Socialist and the Senate’s assistant-secretary, was creating in the Free Federation. Curiously enough, Colón Gordiany had previously written to Iglesias explaining his plans to create a strong public-car drivers’ union affiliated with the Free Federation and with a union in the States. Furthermore, he did not consider that his labor activism’s aim was to fight against the Free Federation or the Socialist Party. Nationalists and Communists were also involved, creating trouble
for the Free Federation. By the end of the year, these internal conflicts in
the Free Federation began to grow worse as in the Socialist Party.194

With the transfer of the P.R.R.A. from the White House to the Interior
Department and with the appointment of Miles H. Fairbank to direct the
agency in Puerto Rico, the political controversies ceased. Fairbank was
a prudent administrator. Secretary Ickes finally received Gruening's
resignation in July 1937. Gruening, however, remained directing the
Division of Territories and Island Possessions.195 Fairbank continued to
develop P.R.R.A. programs that were greatly beneficial to Puerto Rico,
even though smaller Congressional funds were granted. These funds
ultimately totalled $69,741,843.32 and the P.R.R.A. generated another
$12,321,859.80.196

Notes

1. El Mundo, 20 July 1936, p. 5; Reunión del Comité Conjunto de la
Coalición, 9 July 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 29 July 1936, p. 5.
6. Ibid., 27 July 1936, p. 7; “Sesión del Comité Ejecutivo Territorial del día
25 de julio de 1936,” pp. 126-135, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
7. El Mundo, 27 July 1936, p. 7; Ibid., 3 August 1936, p. 7; Pagán, Historia
de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 86; “Sesión del
Comité Ejecutivo Territorial del día 25 de julio de 1936,” pp. 126-159; Santiago
Iglesias to Socialists members of Pact Committee, 10 August 1936, Archive of
Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
8. El Mundo, 29 July 1936, p. 5; Ibid., 30 July 1936, p. 7; Ibid., 11 August
1936, p. 1; Ibid., 13 August 1936, p. 4; El País, 11 August 1936, p. 1; Pagán,
Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 86-
88; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 6 August 1936, Archive of
Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
611-612; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-
1956), vol. II, pp. 84-86; Mathews, op. cit., pp. 296-297; Bhana, op. cit., pp. 26-
27.
10. El Mundo, 15 August 1936, p. 5; El País, 15 August 1936, p. 1; La
Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 15 August 1936, p. 1; Socialismo, 15 August
1936, p. 1; El Imparcial, 8 October 1937, p. 26; “Actuaciones, procedimientos,
resoluciones, acuerdos y prácticas de la novena convención ordinaria del Partido
Socialista, celebrada en la Ciudad de Caguas, durante los días 14, 15, 16 y 17 de agosto de 1936,” pp. 1, 71, 117, 121-122, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


15. Ibid., pp. 590-609; El Mundo, 17 August 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 18 August 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 19 August 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 21 August 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 24 August 1936, p. 4; El País, 17 August 1936, p. 2; El Imparcial, 17 August 1936, p. 2; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, p. 95; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 100-102; Santiago Iglesias to Socialist vice-presidents, 18 August 1936; Leopoldo Figueroa to Santiago Iglesias, 27 August 1936; Alfonso Torres to Leopoldo Figueroa, 31 August 1936; Leopoldo Figueroa to Alfonso Torres, 1 September 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


23. Earl Parker Hanson to Ruby A. Black, 21 September 1936, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 100 Personal Letters, Box 1329, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. Hanson was then a believer of independence.


33. El Mundo, 9 September 1936, p. 5.


35. Santiago Iglesias to Socialist leaders, 21 September 1936; Itinerario de mítines de la Cruzada de la Victoria del 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


37. Ibid., 27 September 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 30 September 1936, p. 5; Ibid., 1 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 3 October 1936, p. 11; Ibid., 4 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 5 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 6 October 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 7 October 1936, p. 5; Ibid., 8 October 1936, pp. 1, 8; Ibid., 9 October 1936, p. 9; Ibid., 10 October 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 12 October 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 13 October 1936, pp. 1, 5, 8; Ibid., 14 October 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 15 October 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 16 October 1936, p. 8; Ibid., 17 October 1936, p. 8; Ibid., 19 October 1936, p. 5; Ibid., 20 October 1936, p. 5; Ibid., 23 October 1936, p. 2.
39. Medina Ramírez, op. cit., p. 110. This work has this alleged quote of Iglesias, but does not give its source. I have not found any contemporary documentation to back the quotation as having been said by Iglesias.
41. La Democracia, 1 October 1936, p. 4.
42. Ibid., 15 October 1936, p. 1. What is interesting in all this is that in 1952, Muñoz Marín asked the few Socialists that were left to vote for him because his Party was against independence rather than voting for the Puerto Rican Independence Party. Muñoz Marín asked the Socialists not to vote for the separatists who were the ones that had attacked Iglesias so much during the 1930’s. What Muñoz Marín did not say in 1952 was that he himself had been the most important opponent to the policies of Iglesias in the 1930’s, although now he was espousing basically those same policies he had previously condemned. See Bothwell, ed., op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 163-164.
43. El Mundo, 10 October 1936, p. 16; La Democracia, 15 October 1936, p. 7.
44. La Democracia, 23 October 1936, p. 6.
45. Ibid., 24 October 1936, p. 2.
46. El Mundo, 27 October 1936, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 26 October 1936, p. 1; El País, 26 October 1936, p. 1.
49. Ibid.; El Mundo, 26 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 27 October 1936, p. 1; El País, 26 October 1936, p. 1; La Democracia, 27 October 1936, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 26 October 1936, p. 1; El Imparcial, 26 October 1936, p. 3.
50. El Mundo, 26 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 27 October 1936, p. 1; El País, 26 October 1936, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 26 October 1936, p. 1.
52. El Mundo, 26 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 27 October 1936, p. 1; Ibid., 28 October 1936, p. 4; El País, 26 October 1936, p. 1.
53. El Mundo, 27 October 1936, pp. 1, 7, 8; Ibid., 28 October 1936, pp. 1, 7; Ibid., 30 October 1936, pp. 4, 17.
54. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 29 October 1936, p. 1.
58. Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 5 October 1936; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 7 October 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

66. Junta Insular de Elecciones, Estadísticas de las elecciones de 1936, p. 3; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 114-115. Interview with Ernesto Carrasquillo, Yabucoa, Puerto Rico, 28 May 1981. United Workers Affirmation Party, commonly known as “pick and shovel” due to its electoral symbol, had been formed due to a conflict between Epifanio Sandó, a regional Socialist leader, and Cristóbal del Campo, Socialist mayor of Yabucoa. It had nothing to do with Socialist Affirmation. This conflict, together with another fight between Mario Fuentes and José Alvaro Salvá — Humacao Socialist leaders — plus the votes that the members of Socialist Affirmation gave to the Liberal Party, resulted in the Socialist defeat in Humacao. Interview with Ernesto Carrasquillo, Yabucoa, Puerto Rico, 30 November 1981.

70. Ibid., 5 November 1936, p. 1.
71. Ibid., 6 November 1936, pp. 1, 10; El Imparcial, 6 November 1936, p. 3; Bothwell, ed., op. cit., vol. II, pp. 695-697.
80. Gruening, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205.
85. Pablo L. Sosa to Santiago Iglesias, 30 November 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
98. *El Mundo*, 23 November 1936, p. 1; *El Imparcial*, 23 November 1936, p. 3; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 17 November 1936; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 20 November 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

104. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 4 December 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
105. Alfonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 8 December 1936, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
113. Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 8 February 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 11 February 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Miguel Angel García Méndez, 18 February 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
114. Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 7 January 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 8 January 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 2 March 1937; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 6 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 29 March 1937; Anotaciones para un libro, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
115. Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 13 February 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
120. Mathews, op. cit., p. 309; The San Juan Star, 14 February 1977, p. 3; El Nuevo Día, 17 April 1979, p. 5; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 20 January 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
126. Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 11 February 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 11 February 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
127. El Mundo, 24 February 1937, p. 1; Ibid., 7 March 1937, p. 1; Memorandum on visit to President Roosevelt, 23 February 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
128. Memorandum on visit to President Roosevelt, 23 February 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
129. Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 1 24 February 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 24 February 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
130. Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 20 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 22 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 26 March 1937; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, pp. 287-293.
131. Medina Ramirez, op. cit., p. 117.
134. Santiago Iglesias to the editor of The Nation, 29 March 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 8 April 1937.
137. El Mundo, 10 April 1937, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 6 April 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Marvin H. McIntyre, 7 April 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Oscar L. Chapman, 7 April 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
140. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 316-319; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 13 January 1937; Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 11 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 11 March 1937; Rafael Martínez Nadal to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 March 1937; Juan P. Blanco to Alfonso Valdés, 27 January 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Ickes, 11 March 1937; Charles West (Acting Secretary of the Interior) to Santiago Iglesias, 24 March 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
142. See Congressional Record, vol. 81, pp. 820, 2314, 2731, 2991, 3673, 3923, 4315, 6490, 6579, 7286, 7859, 8348, 8370.
143. In the Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán numerous letters and documents have been kept dealing with all these subjects.
145. Santiago Iglesias to Francisco Largo Caballero, 20 February 1937; Francisco Largo Caballero to Señor Presidente del Partido Socialista de Puerto
Rico, 26 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Guillermo Atiles Moreu, 15 March 1937; Agustín Cueto (President of the Asociación Pro Frente Popular Español de Puerto Rico), to Santiago Iglesias, 15 September 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Cordell Hull, 28 June 1937; Cordell Hull to Santiago Iglesias, 3 July 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

146. Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar Pagán, 13 February 1937; Rafael Martínez Nadal to Santiago Iglesias, 11 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Martínez Nadal, 12 March 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, pp. 247-249; El Mundo, 27 May 1937, p. 4; see Congressional Record, vol. 81, p. A 1240.


149. El Mundo, 19 March 1937, p. 1; Ibid., 30 March 1937, p. 1; Ramón Aboy Benítez to Henry A. Wallace, 13 March 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 13 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 24 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Henry A. Wallace, 8 March 1937; Henry L. Braun (Acting Secretary of Agriculture) to Santiago Iglesias, 1 April 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Marvin Jones, 9 March 1937; Marvin Jones to Santiago Iglesias, 10 March 1937; Luis Serrano to Paul Maloney (Representative for Louisiana), 19 February 1937; Luis Serrano to Santiago Iglesias, 8 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Luis Serrano, 12 March 1937; Luis Serrano to Marvin Jones, 10 March 1937; Luis Serrano to Ernest Gruening, 24 March 1937; Luis Serrano to Fred Cummings (Chairman, House Sub-Committee on Agriculture), 27 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Filipo de Hostos, 22 March 1937; John Bass, Memorandum regarding the confidential committee print of the O'Mahoney sugar bill dated March 2, 1937, 3 March 1937; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 21 April 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 23 April 1937; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Colonel William B. Rigby (Counsel for Puerto Rico), 6 March 1937; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Santiago Iglesias, 8 March 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 10 March 1937.


151. El Mundo, 15 April 1937, p. 3.

152. Ibid., 17 April 1937, p. 19.


155. Ibid., 20 May 1937, p. 3.

156. Filipo de Hostos to Harold L. Ickes, 3 July 1937; E. K. Burlew (Assistant to Secretary of the Interior) to Marvin Jones, 7 July 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

159. *Ibid.*; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 81, p. A 1453.
162. *Ibid.*, 12 August 1937, p. 4; *Ibid.*, 25 August 1937, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 21 August 1937; M. H. McIntyre to Santiago Iglesias, 24 August 1937; Luis Serrano to Santiago Iglesias, 22 August 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Luis Serrano, 31 August 1937; Pedro Juan Serrallés to Santiago Iglesias, 24 August 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Pedro Juan Serrallés, 31 August 1937; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 26 August 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 30 August 1937; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 81, pp. 8317, 9443, 9005.
165. Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 27 August 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 30 August 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
166. Genaro Cautiño Insúa to Santiago Iglesias, 1 September 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Genaro Cautiño Insúa, 8 September 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
170. In the folders dealing with these bills the date of approval was added when the bill was accepted.
174. Santiago Iglesias to Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán, 8 September 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
177. A. Ferrer Collazo to Santiago Iglesias, 34 [sic] July 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 29 July 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 7 August 1937; Pascuala M. de Figueroa to Santiago Iglesias, 2 August 1937; Pablo L. Sosa to Santiago Iglesias, 6 August 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.

178. Santiago Iglesias to A. Ferrer Collazo, 3 August 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Pablo L. Sosa, 8 August 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Pascuala M. de Figueroa, 10 August 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Págán.


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188. El Mundo, 16 September 1937, p. 3; Ibid., 22 September 1937, p. 2; Ibid., 3 November 1937, p. 1; Ibid., 9 November 1937, p. 5; Ibid., 10 November 1937, p. 1; Ibid., 11 November 1937, p. 1; Ibid., 23 November 1937, p. 7; La Prensa, 9 November 1937, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Henry Morgenthau (Secretary of the Treasury), 14 September 1937; Henry Morgenthau to Santiago Iglesias, 28 September 1937; Diógenes Escalante (Minister from Venezuela) to Santiago Iglesias, 4 November 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Diógenes Escalante, 8 November 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

189. See Congressional Record, vol. 82, pp. 377, 2052.


191. Memorandum on a visit to Harold L. Ickes, 13 December 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


193. American Federation of Labor, Report on the Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, pp. 213-221; Pascuala M. de Figueroa to Santiago Iglesias, 2 August 1937; Pascuala M. de Figueroa to Santiago Iglesias, 14 December 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Pascuala M. de Figueroa, 21 December 1937; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 3 October 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 11 November 1937; Santiago Paz Granela to Santiago Iglesias, 2 October 1937; Santiago Iglesias to Francisco Paz Granela, 26 August [sic] 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 26 June 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 11 September 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 15 September 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 27 August 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 11 September 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 27 September 1937; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Antonio Ayuso Valdivieso, 6 November 1937, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Fromm, op. cit., p. 32.


The third session of the 75th Congress began on January 1938. Besides serving on the Insular Affairs, Agriculture, and Labor committees, Iglesias was appointed to the Committee of Territories. This was the first time a resident commissioner had served on four committees. Resident commissioners usually got appointed only to two and sometimes three committees. Generally most Congressmen serve on two committees. As a result of this fourth appointment, his committee work increased. In respect to bills submitted, Iglesias presented only four during this session. They were: for slum-clearance projects in Puerto Rico (H. R. 10050), for procedure in the District Court of Puerto Rico (H. R. 10263), for the relief of Rafael Martínez Roger and Antonia Martínez Roger (H. R. 10709), and for the creation of the Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (H. R. 10786).\(^1\) Iglesias also worked unsuccessfully for wildlife restoration and the extension of Social Security for Puerto Rico.\(^2\)

Two important events occurred in the labor movement early in 1938. The first one did not produce much news but was, nevertheless, important. The convenio that was signed between the Sugar Producers Association and the Free Federation included for the first time all the forty-one sugar mills. Compared with the 1934 convenio, salaries were 30 per cent higher (see Appendix I). The sugar growers (colonos) were the ones that continued to refuse to sign the convenio. Puerto Rico was the only place in the entire world where there was a collective agreement between the sugar industry and labor.\(^3\)

The second event that made numerous headlines was the dock strike of 1938. The economic betterment of the workers was the principal cause for the strike. There was, however, another vital factor: the participation of the local representatives in the Congress of Industrial Organization
(C.I.O.) led in the States by John Lewis. The struggle between Green and the American Federation of Labor versus Lewis and the Congress of Industrial Organizations had been extended to Puerto Rico. With the coming of Fred W. Small in September 1937, the Congress of Industrial Organizations began a strong push to organize workers and weaken the Free Federation. Florencio Cabello, former leader of Socialist Affirmation, participated in this campaign. Small was to be partially successful. He had also the support of members of the Communist Party (like Alberto Sánchez, Juan Sáez Corales, and César Andreu Iglesias) and the Nationalist Party. The dock strike had been brewing for a long time and finally exploited on January 3, 1938. The conflict would be ultimately settled by May.\(^4\)

A long dock strike, naturally, would almost totally paralyze the Insular economy.\(^5\) Iglesias kept himself well informed, offered his cooperation, and hoped for a rapid and just agreement between the workers and the shipping companies. He consulted the Federal Department of Labor and the two shipping companies (New York and Puerto Rico Steamship Company and Bull Insular Lines) to hasten the solution of the conflict.\(^6\) The strike continued. Iglesias presented several plans to settle the bitter controversy, but they were rejected. On February 7, a temporary agreement was reached under which the workers would return to work and the controversy would be settled by an arbitration board. After many obstacles, an agreement was reached on May 26, 1938.\(^7\) One of the important results of this dock strike was that some workers began to dislike the policies of the Free Federation and to join other unions. Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez was considered too pro-business by a number of workers.\(^8\) Surprisingly enough, Luis Antonio Miranda, editor of the separatist-satirical Florete, praised Rivera Martínez highly for his stand during the dock strike.\(^9\)

The most important problem Iglesias had to face on agricultural affairs dealt with farm bill H. R. 8505. The bill’s purpose was to set the new regulations the Department of Agriculture was to apply to agricultural production. The tobacco industry was to be the most negatively affected one. The bill that the House approved treated equally all the forty-eight States, but discriminated against the territories and possessions. Iglesias, together with delegates Samuel King of Hawaii and Anthony Diamond of Alaska, presented a common front for equality in Federal agricultural regulations. With the help of Ickes and Gruening, they began to lobby for equality in the Senate and were successful. They
also went to the White House and received President Roosevelt's support. As a result the bill was passed without discrimination toward Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Besides this controversial bill Iglesias attended to the regular affairs of the sugar industry (i.e., prices and salaries) with the Federal Department of Agriculture. The protection of the always delicate coffee industry also generated its usual workload. The Resident Commissioner was able to have Puerto Rico included for two more years in the Federal law (Frazier-Lemke Act) that made loans to farmers possible.

Iglesias did his best to get equal treatment for Puerto Rico in legislation that would help the Island develop its socio-economic structure and raise living standards. He wanted to reduce discriminatory laws to a minimum. Puerto Rico should be considered inside the national structure as the final status was to be statehood. The Resident Commissioner lamented that some states received five times more Federal funds than the American citizens of Puerto Rico. The Island was assigned fewer Federal funds than any state. Puerto Rico was actually not an economic burden to the Union as American business interests profited with trade and investments. During the final session of the 75th Congress, Iglesias worked diligently for the approval of a number of his bills and the inclusion of the Island in other bills various colleagues had presented.

Iglesias' work on Capitol Hill resulted in the approval of several of his bills. They were: granting the governor the power to fill vacancies in the Legislature (H.R. 1486); the citizenship bill (H. R. 10050); port improvement for Jobos, Fajardo, Guayanés, Guayanilla, Arecibo and San Juan (H. R. 3034, H. R. 4006, H. R. 5692); and transfer of some Federal property to the Insular government (H. R. 7693). Also obtained were improvements for the lighthouses of Cataño and Guánica and permission for Mayagüez to issue more municipal bonds. Of more importance than these accomplishments was other legislation in which Iglesias was able to get Puerto Rico included or legislation specifically for the Island. These were: Bankhead-Jones Act (H. R. 7908 which gave $400,000 in funds for agriculture); National Housing Act (H. R. 8730 which could produce some $3 million); to provide for the establishing of fair labor standards in employment and affecting interstate commerce (S. 2475); transfer of Escambrón Tract to Insular government (S. 2531); the La Follette bill to fight venereal diseases (S. 3290); slum clearance (S. 3929); soil conservation (H. R. 8505); Fair Labor Standards Act; vocational education and civilian rehabilitation (H. R. 9621); road constructions;
funds for the Agricultural Experimental Station; changes in the Puerto Rico Federal Court (S. 1986 and S. 3469); and provision for the ratification of all joint resolutions of the Legislature of Puerto Rico and the former legislative assembly which had been annulled by the Boston Federal Court (H. R. 10652). 16

Between 1933-1938 the Federal Government spent some $142 millions in Puerto Rico. The yearly average was more than the Insular budget which was $15,840,269 for 1938-1939. The figures are the following: Farm Security Administration, $799,092; Home Owners Loan Corporation, $3,164,747; Civilian Conservative Corps, $4,012,755; Farm Credit Administration, $10,869,732; Public Works Administration, $12,924,168; Federal Emergency Relief Administration, $31,363,879; Agricultural Adjustment Act, $19,781,588; and Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, $53,276,509. 17 There were still complaints that the Federal Government had failed in solving the economic problems of Puerto Rico. 18 Santiago Iglesias was responsible for obtaining a considerable portion of these funds. It is true that the funds had not resolved the economic situation, but there were improvements and the infrastructure had been improved noticeably.

During the 3rd session of the 75th Congress, Judge Félix Córdova Dávila resigned and a substitute to fill his vacancy at the Supreme Court had to be named. There were many aspirers to the vacancy and more than eighteen names were submitted to the Federal Department of Justice. Iglesias sent Attorney General Homer S. Cummings a list of twelve candidates. The most important ones were: Rafael Cuevas Zequeira, Bolívar Pagán, Rafael Rivera Zayas, Rafael Sancho Bonet, Juan B. Soto, and Roberto H. Todd, Jr. 19 The vacancy was filled with Todd, Jr.

Iglesias and the Free Federation favored the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the Fair Labor Standards Act of June 1938, which had established for industries a mandatory minimum wage of 25 cents an hour by October 1938. The Resident Commissioner considered that this wage and hour law would end the cheap salaries in the Island and improve workers' living standards. He also knew there would be controversy. A period of readjustment was considered difficult as adjustment in the tariffs would have to be made to protect the industries adversely affected. 20

Business interests rapidly protested because they considered that the Wage-Hour Law would destroy local industrial development. The Roosevelt Administration began to receive numerous protests. Hardest hit was the needle industry, then a 21 million a year business. The Law,
they argued, would create more unemployment. Gruening considered the controversial Law to "be ruinous for Puerto Rico." Both El Mundo and El Imparcial editorialized condemning Iglesias for not protecting local industries. He considered Insular criticism against the Wage-Hour Law similar to the one in the States.

Governor Winship, with business support, began to lobby to prevent the application of the Wage-Hour Law because it would create more unemployment. The Interior Department and Martínez Nadal were also against the Law. Puerto Rican industry, then mostly needlework, could not compete with other countries such as China, Japan, the Philippines, and Belgium. Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez came to this conclusion too. The Free Federation, however, continued to insist on the enforcement of the Wage-Hour Law. As a result of all these complications, the Law was suspended in Puerto Rico while its economic impact was being carefully studied. Neither the Liberal Party nor Muñoz Marín became involved in this controversy. The economic policies of Muñoz Marín favored lower Insular salaries in order to help Puerto Rico become industrialized, reduce unemployment, and raise living standards.

Throughout his career, Santiago Iglesias had never been a caudillo in the pejorative dictatorial meaning of the word. What he had been was a convincing and respected leader. His followers generally referred to him as maestro. He was something like the elder brother of the family or the first among equals. These unique and admirable qualities in Iglesias' leadership allowed him to run the Free Federation and the Socialist Party simultaneously, without much conflict. Iglesias was able to ride both "horses" masterfully and to keep most leaders working harmoniously. His serving in Congress, however, created a vacuum in Puerto Rico which fomented the personal ambitions of many leaders, crystalizing around the rivalry between Prudencio Rivera Martínez and Bolívar Pagán. Harmony and discipline began to erode alarmingly as the numerous attacks among the various leaders began to wreck the Free Federation and the Socialist Party. This division would ultimately ruin the careers of most of the leaders involved, weaken the labor movement in general, destroy the Socialist Party, and greatly benefit the political opposition (mainly Muñoz Marín). During the long controversy between Rivera Martínez and Pagán, Iglesias wanted the conflicting sides to solve their problems by themselves. He did not want to be the supreme judge. The role he accepted was as an impartial arbiter.
With the victory of Santiago Carreras against Epifanio Fiz Jiménez the rivalry between Bolívar Pagán and Prudencio Rivera Martínez did not disappear.²⁹ Rivera Martínez's appointment as commissioner of Labor was to end in April 1938. By February stories began to circulate that Juan Carreras, Treasurer of the Socialist Party and brother of Santiago Carreras, was to be named as commissioner of Labor instead of Rivera Martínez.³⁰ Iglesias understood the importance of the situation and urged everyone involved to be most careful in dealing with this delicate and sensitive subject.³¹ He informed Pagán and Winship that Rivera Martínez should be reappointed.³² The Senate approved a second term for Rivera Martínez as Labor Commissioner.³³ Iglesias insisted that all Socialists should work harmoniously and that the internal conflicts of the Party should not be discussed in public because such airing would produce very negative results.³⁴ This wise counsel was not taken and the rivalry between Rivera Martínez and Pagán began to slowly escalate. The division in the Party started to take form and the Free Federation began to weaken too. For this reason some workers lost their former fervor toward these two organizations.³⁵ Through the press, letters, and the trips the different leaders took to Washington, Iglesias was kept informed of the Party conflict developments. He emphatically told both Rivera Martínez and Pagán that he would not go to Puerto Rico until they had reached a conciliatory agreement for the benefit of the Party and the labor movement.³⁶

The conflict in the Republican Union Party continued underground between Martínez Nadal and his close followers (Valdés, Figueroa, and Iriarte) and Speaker García Méndez and his group. This fight did not make the news as the one in the Socialist and Liberal parties, but in the statehood Party it was slowly forming a tragic split that would debilitate the party for three decades.³⁷

On July 12, 1938, Muñoz Marín registered his new party: the Popular Democratic Party. The original goals were independence and social justice. Gradually, Muñoz Marín would drop independence and would advocate only social reforms because the electoral masses did not want independence as a result of Iglesias' pro-American teachings to the working classes. The status would not be an electoral issue at this time for Muñoz Marín. By the summer of 1938 he had the support of some 40 per cent of the Liberals. With the death of Barceló on October 15, 1938, most Liberals gradually drifted to the Popular Democratic Party.³⁸

Many Socialists wanted Iglesias to come to Puerto Rico as soon as
Congress adjourned in June. He was wanted to solve the Party conflicts directly and to revitalize the Free Federation by celebrating a labor congress like the last one in 1934. Plans were made to hold the congress during Labor Day or later in November, but it never took place. The reasons Iglesias gave for not coming, besides insisting that the Socialist leaders should solve their rivalries themselves, were the following: work with Washington authorities on the Wage-Hour Law; work on the reports of the Free Federation and the Pan-American Federation of Labor for submission to President Green; work on pending Federal grants with Secretary Ickes; work on writing the second volume of _Luchas emancipadoras_; and attendance at the American Federation of Labor convention. In July Martínez Nadal and Pagán were in Washington and met with Iglesias. They agreed to renew the Coalition for the 1940 elections. Work in Washington always kept Iglesias occupied even if Congress was in recess. He had visits from Winship and several business groups regarding the Wage-Hour Law and other Federal matters relating to funds for housing and coffee tariff protection.

Iglesias left Washington for Houston on September 27 to attend the American Federation of Labor convention, October 3-13, 1938. He planned to submit resolutions favorable to the socio-economic and political development of Puerto Rico and aimed toward statehood as the "final objective" for the status solution. The report of the Free Federation stated that 143 new unions had been formed for a total of 338 (as opposed to 195 in 1937) affiliated unions. Iglesias presented again a resolution asking Congress to make Puerto Rico an incorporated territory. It was not approved as in the previous year. Successful was Iglesias' proposal for reorganizing the Pan-American Federation of Labor throughout Latin America.

After returning to Washington, Iglesias went to New York City on November to be the main speaker at the first meeting of the Federation of Puerto Rican Societies. This group consisted of twenty-nine Puerto Rican social and civic organizations with a total membership of 200,000 people. The Resident Commissioner gave a speech praising the American form of government because it was a guarantee for liberty and justice. He urged the Federation members to work together to improve their well-being. One person did not like the speech and walked out complaining that he could not stand that "Prussian lion" of Iglesias. Oscar Rivera García, first Puerto Rican elected to the New York Legislature, criticized Iglesias, calling him a foreigner who now wanted to be the leader of the New York
Puerto Ricans. He also stated that Puerto Rico was being represented in Washington by someone that had not been born on the Island. The Republican Assemblyman seems to have forgotten Iglesias' long relationship with the Puerto Rican community in New York City and his lifelong dedication to the Insular working class.48

The plan proposed by the State Department to reduce the tariff on Cuban sugar, rum, and tobacco caused serious alarm in Puerto Rico because the tariff reduction would badly hurt the economy. Puerto Rico purchased yearly from the United States some $65,470,000 while Cuba bought only $49,615,000. The Puerto Rican economy had lately declined and Treasury revenues had been reduced by $1,045,000 as compared with the previous year. The proposed tariff reduction was considered very unfair.49 La Democracia accused Iglesias of not doing anything to defend Puerto Rico.50 The Resident Commissioner stated that a study was being made to show that the tariff should not be reduced because it would hurt the Insular economy.51 He later added that his office was doing everything possible to help the Island but that some tariff reductions, nevertheless, could help Puerto Rico.52 El Mundo editorialized that low tariffs would badly damage the economy and that the Resident Commissioner and everyone else should fight in Washington to defend the welfare of Puerto Ricans.53 Iglesias then wrote to José Coll Vidal, director of El Mundo, a letter in which he explained that a resident commissioner could not stop or change a national policy that the State Department and the President were formulating. His office always gave help to the Governor, the Interior Department, the Insular Government, and all local organizations that asked for his aid. Nevertheless, all these people could not change a national policy when it was still being prepared by the Administration. Once the formulated policy went to Congress, then the necessary steps could be taken to change the policy. That kind of action he always had taken in the past.54 The new Cuban tariff was to be discussed in Congress in January 1939. Assistant Secretary of State, Benjamin Summer Welles, had already declared that the tariff was not going to hurt Puerto Rico.55

During this same period Iglesias was seeking support for his bill to incorporate the Island as a territory like Hawaii. This measure was considered by some as an impossibility, while others saw it as a preliminary step toward statehood.56 La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico editorialized condemning this plan. Iglesias was ridiculed as walking backwards like a crab.57 He ignored the attack and continued working for
support in the Interior Department as a new statehood bill was also being drafted. Gruening came out favoring the incorporation plan completely and suggested that the Legislature should approve a resolution backing it. Governor Winship, however, made no comments on the subject. Pagán declared that he would present a bill asking for support for Iglesias' incorporation bill.\textsuperscript{58}

For the 76th Congress Iglesias asked to be reappointed to the four committees he had previously served. He was reappointed and again became a member of the committees of Insular Affairs, Agriculture, Labor, and Territories.\textsuperscript{59} Iglesias appeared before the Committee for Reciprocity and Trade Agreements where he opposed the reduction of the Cuban sugar tariff. Governor Winship also spoke defending the Puerto Rican economy.\textsuperscript{60} The trade agreement that was finally signed with Cuba did not affect Puerto Rico. Eight bills were introduced in January by the Resident Commissioner. They dealt with: Social Security, incorporation of Puerto Rico as a territory, the amendment of section 40 of the Jones Act to allow the Legislature to make changes in the Insular courts, the amendment of section 38 of the Jones Act to allow more power to the Public Service Commission, aid for wildlife restoration, transfer of certain Federal property to the Masons, a fish-cultural project, and relief for Julia Santiago.\textsuperscript{61} Iglesias lobbied consistently for these bills while dealing with the regular work of advising Insular departments, associations, and people in obtaining Federal aid to improve socio-economic conditions. With Miles H. Fairbank he discussed the necessity for the continuation of Federal funds for the P.R.R.A. for permanent work and relief help. The problem here was that Secretary Ickes had no personal interest in the P.R.R.A. and would have been happy to get rid of the said agency. He had only taken it because Gruening had mismanaged it.\textsuperscript{62} Iglesias wrote to Pagán explaining his great desire for the extension to Puerto Rico of the Social Security Act. Congressional leaders advised him that in order to accomplish this, Puerto Rico had to become an incorporated territory. This was the principal reason for the incorporation bill.\textsuperscript{63} As on prior occasions there was strong criticism of this bill. Congressman Vito Marcantonio was the loudest critic of the bill and of other plans of Iglesias.\textsuperscript{64} The Resident Commissioner disregarded the critics as usual. At a White House reception the Iglesias' attended, he reminded the President and Mrs. Roosevelt of the needs of the Puerto Rican people.\textsuperscript{65} Realizing that in Congress the most important power a member has is the right to vote, Iglesias began to look for ways to get the
right to vote for all territorial delegates and the resident commissioner without amending the Constitution. This was an impossible dream to accomplish due to the fact that Puerto Rico was a colony; nevertheless, he tried.\textsuperscript{66} The power struggle between Rivera Martínez and Pagán continued. Iglesias used all his diplomatic skills to bring together the two factions that were slowly taking form. When Commissioner Rivera Martínez came to Washington in January 1939 Iglesias cabled Senator Pagán to come for a summit conference to arrange a reconciliation between them. Iglesias wanted to end the dangerous fight before it could develop disastrous consequences. Pagán complained that Rivera Martínez and his followers were very active and disposed to form a new party; due to his work, Pagán was unable to fly to Washington.\textsuperscript{67} By the same token Iglesias could not leave Washington to go to San Juan and intervene personally in the conflict. He planned to go in June. To find harmony in the unnecessary power struggle, Iglesias personally analyzed the problem with Rivera Martínez and wrote to Pagán explaining the need to end the futile strife.\textsuperscript{68} Rivera Martínez, after conferring for five days, then agreed to reach an understanding with Pagán. The conflict, unfortunately, continued.\textsuperscript{69} With the death of Rafael Alonso Torres in February, 1939, the cohesion in the Free Federation and the Socialist Party was further weakened.\textsuperscript{70} Iglesias was greatly saddened by the death of Alonso Torres, as he had been his closest associate for four decades. He considered this death a "calamity" for the working classes.\textsuperscript{71}

Lino Padrón Rivera was voted vice-president of the House. It was not a simple task, however, to find a substitute to fill the seat of the late Alonso Torres. There was no controversy over leaving Nogueras Rivera as secretary-general of the Free Federation. Iglesias urged Pagán and Rivera Martínez to agree on the replacement for the House vacancy and avoid more conflicts. Nogueras Rivera, who was in the group siding with the Commissioner of Labor, suggested three candidates: Prudencio Rivera Martínez, Cirilo Avilés, and Francisco Paz Granela.\textsuperscript{72} All three worked in the Department of Labor. Other candidates were Iglesias' daughter Josefina and Ramón Barrios. Iglesias cabled Pagán that Josefina should not run and that Rivera Martínez was an excellent candidate; but if he did not accept, Nicomedes Rivera and Nicolás Nogueras Rivera were suggested as alternates. The Commissioner of Labor rejected the House seat. At the Socialist Territorial Committee—which Rivera Martínez did not attend— Nicomedes Rivera was unanimously elected.\textsuperscript{73} Pagán com-
plained to Iglesias that the Commissioner of Labor was creating difficulties. Iglesias lamented this situation and suggested that Pagán did not take drastic action.\textsuperscript{74}

Since the fall of 1938 stories had been appearing in the press of "phantom" employees in the Capitol and of payment irregularities. These irregularities came to be known as "The Capitol Racket" where Coalitionists were involved. Socialist Senator Sixto Pacheco was even arrested. The Department of Justice, which was controlled by the Liberal Party, conducted a much publicized investigation.\textsuperscript{75} All these, together with his sympathies with Rivera Martínez, led Senator Fiz Jiménez, to a vitriolic attack on Pagán, the Senate, and the Coalition government. This attack, naturally, created a most serious political crisis for the Coalition and further divided the factions of Pagán and Rivera Martínez as Fiz Jiménez was expelled from the Socialist Party.\textsuperscript{76} Iglesias was indignant at the corruption at the Capitol. This, however, was not the first time government funds had been misused, but it was the first time the Department of Justice had made an investigation. Previously the Legislature majority had control over the Department of Justice and, therefore, nothing had happened although more funds had been involved. Martínez Nadal also had a similar opinion of the case.\textsuperscript{77} When Federal laws had been violated in the P.R.R.A., no one had been prosecuted. It appears that the Department of Justice, and the Federal Department of the Interior, which was responsible for running the Island, had two different yardsticks to measure governmental irregularities. Pagán complained that the Department of Justice took more measures against Socialists than against Republican-Unionists during the controversial investigation. The reason for this partiality was that the Liberals were looking for ways to divide the Coalition, destroy the Socialist Party, and reach an understanding with the Republican Union Party.\textsuperscript{78}

Iglesias always gave the same advice to both Rivera Martínez and Pagán and constantly urged them to stop the attacks and reach a harmonious understanding. This power fight was for him simply a painful tragedy which only benefited the opponents of the Free Federation and the Socialist Party.\textsuperscript{79} He was doing his best to persuade his followers of the infecundity of the current fratricidal fight.\textsuperscript{80} Iglesias found it hard to accept the reasons for so much intrigue which was weakening the organizations to which he had dedicated his life.\textsuperscript{81} The situation had become a torment for him because it was destroying the people involved.\textsuperscript{82}
The followers of Rivera Martínez came to be known as Socialist Opposition. This group included Blas Oliveras, Antonio Reyes Delgado, Saldalio Alonso, Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, Francisco Paz Granela, José Ferrer y Ferrer, Epifanio Fiz Jiménez, Cirilo Avilés, and others. The group met on March 18 and 19, and after a stormy session, agreed to a truce with Pagán's group until June. Iglesias favored the truce, and he thought that Rivera Martínez would not be able to destroy the Socialist Party.

As these events had been evolving in Puerto Rico, the Resident Commissioner continued attending to his multiple Congressional labors in order to improve the socio-economic conditions of his numerous constituency. Governor Winship had proved most cooperative and did his best to obtain Federal grants. The Governor complained that the New Deal appropriations for the States averaged $222.29 per capita, $141.50 per capita for Hawaii, $282.28 per capita for the Virgin Islands, and merely $57.41 per capita for Puerto Rico. The economy still needed more aid and protection from Washington because of the still high unemployment rate as there were two workers for every job. Iglesias submitted eight additional bills during February and March. These dealt with relief for Mary Rose Williams, sections II and VI of the Social Security Act, the building of a monument to the American army in Mayagüez, surveying of Punta Santiago Harbor in Fajardo, making rules governing the United States district courts, extending wildlife restoration projects, drafting an amendment to an act to amend the second deficiency bill, and drafting an amendment to amend the agricultural appropriation bill. The bill to incorporate Puerto Rico as a territory gradually faded away as it did not get Secretary Ickes' support. This did not discourage Iglesias from continuing to lobby for the other bills and from dealing with the numerous requests that came from Puerto Rico. A $12 million grant for housing development was obtained.

The European political situation had reached a point that by early 1939, a great war was foreseen in the immediate future. As a result of this, the strategic importance of Puerto Rico for the defense of the Panama Canal became of great importance to the Roosevelt Administration. The Island would now become a recipient of large military grants to make it a key defense post. To build a base for the Navy in San Juan a grant of $9,300,000 was made. Iglesias considered that the defense appropriations would have a great impact on the economy because they would generate many jobs. Secretary Ickes began making plans with the War
Department to grant funds to develop the economy for defense purposes. Governor Winship found it desirable to fortify the Island as its strategic value was of vital importance for the defense of the Hemisphere. Defense appropriations in the coming five years would make a stronger impact in the Insular economy than the reconstruction ones of the New Deal.

Before the defense appropriations become a reality, by March 1939, the economy of Puerto Rico had become quite critical. The application of the Wage-Hour Law was considered a Damocles’ sword by the business interests, while the workers favored the law. Both positions were understandable. An Economic Congress formed by numerous business and civic groups met on March 12, 1939, and discussed the difficult economic situation and ways to improve it. The economic crisis, together with the critical local political situation, plus Washington’s policies toward Puerto Rico, led Martínez Nadal to pronounce a celebrated speech blasting the Roosevelt Administration “Fascist control” of Puerto Rico. After a political career of three decades, he now felt “bitterness, disgust, and disillusionment.” The speech caused great excitement. Radio Berlin even used it to discredit the United States. Martínez Nadal was congratulated by almost everyone of importance in the Island regardless of party affiliation and backed by the Legislature. The speech was translated into English, and Iglesias inserted it into the Congressional Record and asked for better treatment for Puerto Rico. He wrote to Pagán stating that the speech would have no positive impact in Washington. Martínez Nadal later cabled President Roosevelt softening the effects of the celebrated speech.

Agricultural problems during 1939 were not as numerous as in previous years, but still Iglesias had to deal with them. Coffee and tobacco did not need much help as previously. With Commissioner of Agriculture Francisco A. López Domínguez, who had succeeded Menéndez Ramos, Iglesias kept in close contact to get Puerto Rico included in beneficial Congressional Legislation. Secretary Wallace was always cooperative with Insular agriculture. It was sugar cane, as usual, which continued prominently on the agriculture agenda. New Congressional sugar legislation would discriminate against Puerto Rico as the quota was to be lowered. Iglesias opposed this move with his usual tenacity. In the Congressional Sugar Bloc, Puerto Rico was represented by Delegate King of Hawaii. But in June, Iglesias was made a member. Secretary Ickes was now against the quota system. In September 1939, President
Roosevelt had a 180 degree change and decided to eliminate the quota system which had been so detrimental to the Puerto Rican economy. The New Deal Administration reversed its policies of 1933-1934 which Iglesias and the Coalition had always opposed.\textsuperscript{101} Iglesias' work on the Agricultural Committee was appreciated by Secretary Wallace, who wrote him a letter thanking him for working "early and late on many occasions in order to give proper consideration to the problems of the" Department of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{102}

During the last part of the Congressional session, Iglesias submitted eight additional bills dealing with river surveys, promoting the merchant marine policy and eliminating its discrimination against Puerto Rico, compensating World War I industrial workers in Puerto Rico, statehood, elective governor, and an additional resident commissioner. Iglesias continued his usual lobbying to have the Island included in all beneficial Congressional legislation.\textsuperscript{103}

It was the Wage-Hour Law which kept Iglesias busiest during the Congressional session. This Law had a strong impact in Puerto Rico as it had augmented unemployment figures by 70,000 (40,000 in the needle industry alone).\textsuperscript{104} Business interests convinced Governor Winship that the Law had to be amended.\textsuperscript{105} Originally Iglesias thought that this amendment would not be accepted by Congress. He added, however, that certain special exceptions could be made.\textsuperscript{106} Speaker García Méndez cabled the Resident Commissioner stating that the needle industry would be wiped out if the Wage-Hour Law was totally applied. Iglesias told this to Elmer H. Andrews, administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Federal Department of Labor, who began to work for a solution.\textsuperscript{107}

The Wage-Hour Law created a crisis in the Free Federation as numerous workers wanted its enforcement while the leadership realized the great unemployment problem that would be created.\textsuperscript{108} The Executive Council of the Free Federation met and rejected the motion of Rivera Martínez to exempt the needle industry from the Wage-Hour Law and to allow the Legislature to approve a local law to regulate such wages and hours. Winship also met with them in order to change this decision.\textsuperscript{109} The Governor was able to get the Free Federation and representatives from the needle industry to hold meetings in order to reach an understanding.\textsuperscript{110} Andrews then recommended that Congress amended the Wage-Hour Law. This was then accepted by the Free Federation. Representative Mary T. Norton and Senator Elbert D. Thomas then presented legislation to amend the law to the labor committee they chaired. Iglesias then proposed that the Legislature had the power to regulate wages and hours. He explained to Congress the labor realities of Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{111}
All this situation caused some labor unrest from which Nationalists, Communists, and even Muñoz Marín tried to make some political capital. Congressman Vito Marcantonio also got involved.\textsuperscript{112} Marcantonio now belonged to the American Labor Party and favored independence instead of statehood as the final status of Puerto Rico. He opposed the amendments to the Wage-Hour Law in the House floor and attacked Governor Winship, whom he disliked intensely. Iglesias energetically answered Marcantonio stating that he was surprised at the defense of the Puerto Rican workers by the Congressman from New York. If Puerto Rico followed Marcantonio’s ideas, Iglesias refuted, more than a hundred thousand would die of hunger. The Resident Commissioner added that he wanted the Wage-Hour Law applied with flexibility to the special economic conditions of the Island.\textsuperscript{113} El Mundo editorialized praising Iglesias position and congratulated him for now favoring flexibility toward the Wage-Hour Law and not its total enforcement as he had previously wanted. If he had done this before, Puerto Rico’s economic crisis would not have become so critical.\textsuperscript{114}

The amendments to the Wage-Hour Law continued to be studied in Congress and chances of approval during that first session became more difficult because a consensus by all interested groups was difficult to achieve.\textsuperscript{115} Thus no decision was to be taken during 1939. Iglesias, nevertheless, continued working with the complex and controversial law, looking for a solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{116} The conflict was solved later in 1940.\textsuperscript{117}

During the January-August first session of the 76th Congress, Iglesias had submitted twenty-four bills, three petitions, debated five times, and made twenty-four extensions of remarks. Other members of Congress had also presented legislation affecting Puerto Rico. There were fourteen bills presented in the Senate and twenty bills presented in the House. None of Iglesias’ bills were approved, however; it sometimes took more than one Congressional session to have a bill approved. The bills beneficial to the Island submitted by other Congressmen and backed by Iglesias provided $65 million. These were the following: sections V and VI of the Social Security Act (maternal and child health and rural health services), $500,000; agricultural extension laws, $400,000; roads and bridges, $1,000,000; New Deal reconstruction programs, $1,000,000; P.R.R.A. funds, $7,000,000; housing, $14,030,000; education, $400,000; harbor improvements, $2,500,000; San Juan drydock, $1,300,000; defense construction program, $25,300,000; relief funds to
be used by the governor, $10,000,000; and electrification, $3,000,000. There was also some minor legislation.118

Simultaneous with this Congressional session, other developments were taking place. Criticism against Governor Winship—Marcantonio was the leading critic—had influenced President Roosevelt to remove him. The President had never been able to develop a good relationship with the Governor, so he favored a change. Defense plans also played an important part. Ickes wanted the change as he did not get along with Winship. Gruening was not in agreement with making the change because he knew that Winship was quite popular in Puerto Rico, regardless of what separatists thought of him.119

Ickes erroneously considered that Martínez Nadal, whom he disliked intensely, was the one who controlled Puerto Rico and Winship just followed the policies of the Senate President. It was the executives of the White House and the Interior Department who pulled the principal strings that really controlled the Island.120 As rumors circulated about Winship's removal, messages of support for the Governor began to arrive at the White House. Martínez Nadal, García Méndez, and the Free Federation backed him.121 Iglesias wrote to President Roosevelt supporting Winship which he considered "Puerto Rico's greatest Governor."122 The President answered (Ickes wrote the letter) that the change was to take place and that Admiral William D. Leahy would "serve the people of Puerto Rico with ability and understanding."123 The Chief Executive had made his decision. He also was planning to replace Attorney General Fernández García with a Continental.124 Winship went to the White House and tried to stay on the job but was not successful.125 President Roosevelt officially announced, on May 12, that Admiral Leahy was to be the next governor of Puerto Rico.126

Winship served in La Fortaleza until the end of June. During his five years in Puerto Rico he had set a record of ninety-three trips to Washington to deal with the complex Insular problems. The Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring Winship an adopted son of Puerto Rico as a token of his public service and popularity.127

Admiral William D. Leahy had been born in Hampton, Iowa, on May 6, 1875. He graduated from the Annapolis Naval Academy (1897) and had fought in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba in 1898. He served in the Philippine campaign, in Panama, and in World War I. In the Navy he rose to the rank of admiral by 1936. The following year Admiral Leahy had been appointed Chief of Naval Operations, a position he held until
May 1939 when he retired. Because Puerto Rico was being turned into the “Gibraltar of the Caribbean” and the “Hawaii of the Atlantic,” his appointment served primarily to strengthen the United States defense for the war that was brewing in Europe. The strategic location of the Island had become paramount again as in previous periods. The appointment was generally well received. Two complaints, however, came from the American Civil Liberties Union and Oswald Garrison Villard, chairman of a small group called the Committee for Fair Play for Puerto Rico. They wanted a civilian for governor.

Due to the change of governors, legislation Iglesias had submitted in Congress, and other matters, Martínez Nadal, Pagán, and others went to Washington in June and met with Leahy and members of the Roosevelt Administration. Iglesias congratulated Leahy for his nomination and offered to cooperate with him. There were rumors that Leahy might be named to another post instead of the one of governor. This prompted some labor leaders to ask that Iglesias or Rivera Martínez be then appointed to the governorship. Such an appointment became unnecessary as Leahy was confirmed as governor of Puerto Rico by the Senate on June 13, 1939. Iglesias again congratulated the new Governor and offered his cooperation. Leahy assumed his post in September.

The new strategic importance of Puerto Rico for the United States initiated a new statehood drive. Even in the Liberal Party a movement was developing to put statehood in the Party’s platform. The Legislature approved a resolution expressing satisfaction that the Island had been included in the defense plans and this, together with the Coalition electoral majority, was regarded as a step toward statehood. A committee which drafted amendments to the Organic Act was named to prepare the way for statehood. Martínez Nadal, Pagán, Iglesias, and other Coalition leaders met in Washington and lobbied for statehood. This was the reason for Iglesias’ bills for statehood and other political reforms that had already been mentioned. Senator Ernest W. Gibson, Vermont Republican, supported the admission of Puerto Rico as a state. The Roosevelt Administration was interested in defense, and satisfied with the existing colonial status. There was no interest in statehood; thus, nothing much was accomplished.

The relationship between Secretary Ickes and the Coalition had never been good. By 1939, the situation reached one of its lowest points. The Interior Secretary came to consider Martínez Nadal an “s.o.b.” and García Méndez a “little better than a gangster.” What Ickes thought of
Iglesias is not known. The Resident Commissioner is not even mentioned once in his published diary. The cause of the enmity between the Secretary of the Interior and the Coalition was that Ickes wanted the Coalition to follow his policies. The Coalition leadership wanted Ickes to recognize that they were the electoral majority in Puerto Rico and should not be treated as colonial puppets, as had been the case on numerous occasions. Martínez Nadal, who was not as patient as Iglesias, went so far as to declare that he would not visit Ickes so that he (Martínez Nadal) would not lose his patience. The statehood leader of Puerto Rico was not afraid of expressing his views on the dictatorial style Ickes used sometimes when dealing with the Island. It was Ickes’ insistence on the passing of legislation creating the Water Resources Authority (the electric utility) that made the Interior Secretary dislike the Senate President intensely. Martínez Nadal defeated the legislation in Puerto Rico and succeeded in defeating it in Congress too (July 1939). Iglesias also participated in opposing this legislation. El Mundo, whose editorials greatly criticized Iglesias and the Coalition numerous times, praised the defeat of the Water Resources Authority bill.

In the middle of this electric bill controversy, Iglesias had had a forty-five minute interview with Ickes, at the Secretary’s request on July 11. The Interior Secretary was in a “bad mood” and complained that Martínez Nadal had not been present when Iglesias and other Coalition leaders had visited him four weeks before. The Senate President had returned to Puerto Rico and made statements to El País attacking Ickes. The paper also published editorials in the same vein. Secretary Ickes considered these attacks “unjust and disrespectful.” He added that he would “never do anything with” Martínez Nadal and would “remain aloof of any action regarding Puerto Rico in view of the treatment and response that he received” for “his sincere actions.”

Iglesias then told Ickes that there was “a misunderstanding in all this affair” that was “very regrettable,” but that the people of Puerto Rico as a whole were “not in any way responsible for the views that any individual could “express and give away in any newspaper.” Puerto Rico should in no way “suffer” from this situation. The Resident Commissioner urged the Secretary “to continue to give the Island the benefits of all his activities and actions and good recommendations in order that the people and Puerto Rico itself” would “not be deprived of any of the good things that his Department could do as it” had “been doing in the past.” Iglesias also stated that neither Congress nor the Interior Department should ever
use “a big stick against the Government and the Legislature of Puerto Rico” to compel them to do what they rightly or wrongly did not want to do “whenever there is a difference of opinion.” Ickes answered that he did not want to do that and that Congress and the Roosevelt Administration would “never do anything to compel the Legislature of Puerto Rico” to do what they wanted. Historical facts, however, show this was not true. A few weeks later, Ickes denied he was trying to eliminate Martínez Nadal; but the Senate President was warned to be more careful with his actions.

The New York World’s Fair had opened on April 30, 1939. There Puerto Rico had a pavilion with an exhibit on the Island and its products. On July 25 Iglesias delivered a brief speech to commemorate Puerto Rico’s Day at the Fair. Two days later he had it included in the Congressional Record.

As has been previously mentioned, the independence ideal had begun to decline in the Liberal Party after the 1936 elections. Under the leadership of Senator José Ramírez Santibañez, Barceló’s successor, the pro-American sympathies of the Liberals began to grow. This development led numerous followers to leave the Party and join Muñoz Marín’s rapidly growing Popular Democratic Party. This pro-Americanism of Ramírez Santibañez would ultimately lead the Liberals to become a statehood party in 1940. As the Liberal leader saw his followers decrease in numbers, it became imperative to look for an understanding with political leaders in other parties. Senator Ramírez Santibañez made contacts with the Socialists, but most especially, with the Republican Union Party. Martínez Nadal’s declining health and the confusing political atmosphere led the Republican Union forces to lose some of their cohesion. Yet, most Republican-Unionists favored the renewal of the Coalition as a deal with the Liberals brought back the bitter memories of the 1924 Alliance. Some Republican-Unionists, however, favored Rivera Martínez over Pagán.

When Martínez Nadal and Pagán had been in Washington in June, Ramírez Santibañez, Rivera Martínez, and García Méndez had allegedly made a tripartite agreement to form a new political entity. Ramírez Santibañez was to be Resident Commissioner, Rivera Martínez Speaker, and García Méndez President of the Senate. This new development, together with García Méndez’s 4th of July speech, created a severe crisis in the Republican Union Party. The Territorial Committee met and party unity was apparently restored as Martínez Nadal did not have sufficient power to expel García Méndez. The Coalition was also to be kept.
The truce made in March between Rivera Martínez and Pagán, as can be deduced, had not resolved the power struggle inside the Socialist Party. A break had taken place. Iglesias was well aware that the truce had not been a success. In an interview on July 3, he declared that he would return to Puerto Rico after the adjournment of Congress in July to definitely solve the power struggle in the Socialist Party. The Coalition would be renewed for the 1940 elections. There had been errors, but the economic and political lives of the people had been transformed. During his lifetime, he had detested internal fights and would not support such type of sterile polemics. His objective had been, and would continue being, the socio-economic improvement of the people.\(^{142}\)

Rivera Martínez and his followers of Socialist Opposition were very active by the middle of June. Pagán and his group were worried about the strong influence Socialist opposition had over the Free Federation and its relationship with Ramírez Santibañez and García Méndez. The talks between Ramírez Santibañez, García Méndez, and Rivera Martínez came to be known as Tripartism. Rivera Martínez, however, declared that the truce continued and that a convention should be called with Iglesias present to solve the controversy.\(^{143}\)

From Washington Iglesias declared that Pagán had worked well.\(^{144}\) Rivera Martínez considered this statement as a mere personal opinion and added that the truce continued.\(^{145}\) When Pagán returned from Washington on July 10, he reported that Iglesias would not come to deal with the Party’s controversy as the Socialist leadership would resolve it themselves.\(^{146}\) Now stories began to circulate that the creation of a new party (i.e., Tripartism) was gathering strength and that Washington authorities looked favorably upon it.\(^{147}\) Rivera Martínez now declared that it was too late for Iglesias to come to Puerto Rico to settle the Socialist power struggle.\(^{148}\) The Commissioner of Labor had crossed the Rubicon. The break with the Socialist Party had been taken.

Pagán now closed ranks with Martínez Nadal, who was having similar problems, to defend the Coalition from Tripartism.\(^{149}\) Both Pagán and Rivera Martínez began to organize their supporters as the fight between both groups escalated. The Liberals were working closely with Rivera Martínez.\(^{150}\)

As a result of these developments together with the continuation of the Congressional session until August, Iglesias decided to postpone his trip; but backed the celebration of a Socialist convention to take official action finally regarding the conflict between Rivera Martínez and Pagán.\(^{151}\) The Socialist Convention met on August 20, but Rivera
Martínez—who had gone to New York—and his followers did not attend. The Commissioner of Labor was unanimously expelled from the Party. Pagán now reorganized the Socialist hierarchy and achieved complete control of the Executive Territorial Committee. Iglesias backed the decisions of the convention and praised Pagán’s “sincerity, intelligence, and dynamism.”

As this had been taking place, stories began to circulate that Secretary Ickes was fomenting Tripartism. Iglesias furiously denied that the Interior Department was involved in Island politics. There was even a story that Iglesias would become Speaker and García Méndez resident commissioner in order to reconcile the Coalition with the Interior Department. Ickes categorically declared that he had no interest in the formation of a new party and denied he wanted to eliminate Martínez Nadal. This was not true; Ickes was fomenting the Tripartist movement in order to destroy Martínez Nadal and the Coalition.

It was under these political circumstances that Governor Leahy began to govern Puerto Rico on September 11, 1939. George Malcolm, who had served as a judge in the Supreme Court of the Philippines, replaced Fernández García as attorney general. Martínez Nadal offered to cooperate with Leahy. The Governor, however, would closely follow the advice of Secretary Ickes. Thus the fight between Martínez Nadal and Ickes continued. In September Gruening was made governor of Alaska.

In the middle of September, Martínez Nadal got so seriously ill that Extreme Uction was administered as the doctors thought he had died. Surprisingly, the statehood leader revived and began to slowly improve. He was taken to Johns Hopkins University Hospital in Baltimore late in October. There he underwent surgery and by December he was feeling much better. Iglesias visited his close friend at the Hospital. From the Baltimore bed, Martínez Nadal kept in touch with Insular developments. He wrote to Governor Leahy complaining he was appointing persons that were not Coalitionists to posts that should go to Socialists or Republican-Unionists. Also a strong attack condemning Tripartism was issued.

When Congress finally adjourned at the end of August, Iglesias and his wife took a short vacation to New England and made a brief trip to New York City to see Leahy leave for Puerto Rico. Rivera Martínez went to Washington to talk to Iglesias, but found he was then out of town. In Washington the Resident Commissioner attended to routine office work before a special session of Congress began at the end of September. He was greatly disgusted, but never would lose his optimism, with
the Party fight. To Nogueras Rivera Iglesias wrote that “fratricide fights” were “suicidal and contrary to the goals for the defense” of the working classes.\textsuperscript{164} His fights had always been against the exploiters of the workers and not against the comrades.\textsuperscript{165}

Free Federation Secretary-General Nogueras Rivera kept Iglesias informed of the developments in the labor movement. The Conciliation and Mediation Commission had intervened in sixteen strikes involving 15,000 workers during 1939 as opposed to forty-five strikes and 30,982 workers in the previous year. The opponents of the Free Federation had been less active and the Communists even backed the extension of Social Security to Puerto Rico. During the year 120 new unions were chartered for a total of 458, as opposed to 378 in 1938 and 195 in 1937. A teachers’ and a musicians’ union were organized for the first time. Collective agreements were made practically all the shipping companies. This was important, because due to the 1938 dock strike, no agreements had been signed and the work was being done under the provisions made by the Arbitration Board. The Free Federation was strong and growing. The Congress of Industrial Organizations had not been able to expand and had only one union chartered.\textsuperscript{166}

The Free Federation asked Iglesias to be the delegate to the American Federation of Labor convention to be held this time in Cincinnati, October 2-13, 1939. He submitted the annual report that dealt with the controversial Wage-Hour Law and the work done by the Free Federation.\textsuperscript{167} The most important thing Iglesias did at the convention was to start reorganizing the Pan-American Federation of Labor. Together with Green, Luis Morones, the vice-president, and others the plans were made. Iglesias was to go to Mexico and other Latin American countries to start the reorganization as he was the secretary.\textsuperscript{168} When Iglesias returned to Washington, he delivered a speech in Congress on the importance of the Pan-American Federation of Labor.\textsuperscript{169}

Back on Capitol Hill, the Resident Commissioner continued attending to his work. He went to Baltimore to visit his ailing friend Martínez Nadal. Iglesias now had decided to return to Puerto Rico by boat with Martínez Nadal after the later had undergone surgery. On this voyage — at the end of November or beginning of December — the Socialist leader planned to discuss political problems with Martínez Nadal and look for their solutions.\textsuperscript{170}

Commissioner of Labor Rivera Martínez left for the States again on October 24. Before departing he declared that his party —*Partido
Socialista Puro—would join the Liberals and part of the Republican Union Party to form a new organization (i.e., Tripartism), because the Coalition had betrayed the masses. In his absence, his followers began registering the new party. In Washington Rivera Martínez made a visit to Iglesias. He asked the Resident Commissioner to join his Party (Rivera Martínez'). Iglesias analyzed the whole situation with him and told him that as a labor leader he (Rivera Martínez) had shown to have a “brilliant intelligence”; but as a political leader, he had always been “infantile” to the point of being “absurd.” Rivera Martínez proposition for Iglesias to join his Party was rejected as just “madness.” The Commissioner of Labor left and returned to Puerto Rico to organize his followers. On December 3, 1939, Rivera Martínez and his followers founded in San Juan the Partido Laborista Puro. For the first time in Puerto Rican history, a new party was created to join another party (the later fusion with Liberals and the followers of García Méndez).

The Pan-American Federation of Labor had declined at the beginning of the 1930’s as the labor movement in Latin America became stagnant during the Depression. By the end of the decade, the rivalries between Luis Morones and Vicente Lombardo Toledano and their unions plus the competition between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization, gave new hope for the revival of the moribund Pan-American Federation of Labor. Santiago Iglesias took a special interest in this task which culminated in his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1939, to prepare the way for the sixth congress of the said Federation.

Iglesias flew from Washington to El Paso on October 30. After some flight difficulties, he arrived in Mexico City on November 3. There he met Morones and labor leaders of the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (C.R.O.M.). Iglesias had an interview with General Juan Andreu Almanzán, who was being backed by Morones for the presidency, as well as with American Ambassador Josephus Daniels. The Resident Commissioner also traveled through various Mexican states, meeting labor leaders before returning to Washington on November 19.

In the afternoon of November 20, Iglesias took a plane for Havana via Miami after informing President Green and Secretary Morrison of his previous trip. He went to Cuba as an observer of the Second Inter-American Labor Conference being held by the Geneva based International Labor Organization and to obtain support for the Pan-American
Federation of Labor. In this he was unsuccessful and the sixth congress of the Federation would never take place. His unexpected death would give "another severe blow to the P.A.F.L." In Havana Iglesias had the satisfaction of meeting an old friend he had not seen for a long time. On November 26, the Resident Commissioner returned to Washington.

In this trip to Mexico, Iglesias had gone to Acapulco. There he was bitten by mosquitoes and began to feel ill. He appears to have consulted a doctor who gave him some injections. When Iglesias arrived in Washington, he told no one in his family of his illness as he had to go to Cuba and hated hospitals. On Sunday November 26, he returned from Havana and did not go to the office on Monday and Tuesday because he did not feel well. Yet, Iglesias insisted he was not sick so that a doctor would not be called and he would not be hospitalized. For him his home was better than a hospital. Mrs. Iglesias then realized her husband had a high fever and called a doctor. Iglesias was unable to explain the symptoms and the doctor gave him some pills, thinking he had some kidney infection. That evening, the fever became worse and the next day Iglesias was sent to Garfield Hospital (Wednesday). Now Mrs. Iglesias remembered the story of the mosquito bites and phoned her doctor brother in New York City. Dr. Eufemio Bocanegra then suggested a malaria test which was made and proved positive. It was a bad case of malaria and Iglesias' was greatly weakened after so many days of fever. The situation began to worsen. On Monday, Iglesias went into a coma. At dawn December 5, 1939, Santiago Iglesias died.

The tragic news produced a great consternation and family and friends cried. It had happened too fast. Iglesias was known to have good health, so most considered he would recover and leave the hospital. Many messages of condolence were sent. President Roosevelt told the press that he lamented Iglesias' death as he considered him a friend of many years. Secretary Ickes stated that Iglesias had been a "vigorous champion" of the working classes in Puerto Rico and Latin America. Under-Secretary Welles praised Iglesias due to his work in improving Hemispheric relationships. For President Green, the death of Iglesias was a great loss for the labor movement. Muñoz Marín considered that the history of Puerto Rico could not be written without Iglesias' name having great prominence. Former Mexican president Plutarco Elías Calles lamented the death of his friend Iglesias and believed that the Hemisphere had lost one of its "most constant defenders" of democracy. In Puerto Rico there was great sadness, but especially among the working masses.
The only person that was not informed was Martínez Nadal, who was still recuperating in Baltimore. The calamitous news was gradually reported to him days later in order to prevent health complications. All Insular political and labor leaders praised Iglesias’ achievements. Governor Leahy proclaimed the funeral day one of public mourning.184

Aboard the Borinquen, Mrs. Iglesias and some family members accompanied the remains of the late labor leader. They left New York City for San Juan on Thursday and arrived on Monday, December 11. The body was laid out in state at the Senate chamber in the Capitol. A Congressional delegation had also arrived composed of representatives Mary T. Norton, W. Sterling Cole, and the Sergeant of Arms of the House, Kenneth Tommey. Thousands came to pay their last respects. Some workers walked miles barefooted to give their last farewell to the man that had awakened the conscience of the laboring classes and had made them into a political force which had brought social justice and democracy. The state funeral was a most impressive event as three-hundred and fifty-three guards of honor were made by political groups, government departments and agencies, civic and religious groups and associations, and relatives. The eulogies lasted from 10:00 A.M. on until 3:00 P.M. on Tuesday, December 12. There were sixteen orators. Then the last remains of Santiago Iglesias were carried on foot to Old San Juan Cemetery as some fifty-thousand participated. At the Cemetery gate, there was a sign that read: Adiós Maestro. It was 5:30 P.M. when the casket was laid down and the tomb closed.185

Memorial services were later held in the United States Capitol for Congressman Santiago Iglesias on April 24, 1940.186 Bolívar Pagán, who succeeded Iglesias in Washington, was the principal speaker at this occasion. He stated that Iglesias had been a “soldier of liberty and democracy” who had awakened “the Puerto Rican workingmen and all the common people to his modern ideas of civil rights, social equality, and economic freedom.” Iglesias was the main voice heard in a 40-year fight to raise up conditions of labor, to make the common man be conscious of all the rights and privileges under American democratic institutions, and to put in the minds and in the hearts of Puerto Ricans the love for America and the aim and hope that the destiny of our island be united forever with the destiny of these great United States —striving that some time in the near future Puerto be admitted as a sister State in the Federal Union.

For four struggling decades Iglesias
had been a live wire, a human dynamo, an energetic, honest, and far-sighted statesman at the service of the people. He was a man of principles and always against all odds stood with courage and fearlessness by them.\textsuperscript{187}

The Insular Legislature approved laws making Labor Day dedicated also to the memory of Santiago Iglesias and provided funds to erect a statue to his memory.\textsuperscript{188} The statue was ultimately erected in 1968.

Notes

1. See *Congressional Record*, vol. 83, pp. 4258, 5374, 7179, 7801.
6. *El Mundo*, 12 January 1938, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Manuel Rubio Salinas, 4 January 1938; Ernest Gruening to Rafael Menéndez Ramos, 4 January 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 13 January 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 13 January 1938; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Ruth Hampton, 11 January 1938; Rafael Menéndez Ramos to Ernest Gruening, 13 January 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Manuel Rubio Salinas, 13 January 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Manuel Rubio Salinas, 17 January 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 17 January 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


Santiago Iglesias, 19 February 1938; Marvin Jones (Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture) to Santiago Iglesias to Marvin Jones, 31 January 1938; Marvin Jones to Santiago Iglesias, 1 February 1938; Manuel González Quiñones (Secretary, Asociación de Agricultores) to Santiago Iglesias, 2 February 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Manuel González Quiñones, 8 February 1938; Manuel González Quiñones to Santiago Iglesias, 10 February 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Henry A. Wallace, 3 February 1938; Henry A. Wallace to Santiago Iglesias, 12 February 1938; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 17 January 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, 17 January 1938; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 1 February 1938; Ernest Gruening to Santiago Iglesias, 3 February 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Blanton Winship, 4 February 1938; Harold L. Ickes to Ellison D. Smith (Chairman, Senate Agriculture Committee) 29 January 1938; Anthony Diamond, Samuel King, and Santiago Iglesias to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 February 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


12. El Mundo, 18 April 1938, p. 10; Ramiro L. Colón (Manager, Cafeteros de Puerto Rico) to Santiago Iglesias, 18 April 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Ramiro L. Colón, 25 April 1938; Ramiro L. Colón to Santiago Iglesias, 19 May 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Ramiro L. Colón, 16 May 1938; Victor Fusté (Secretary, Coffee Group of Asociación de Agricultores) to Santiago Iglesias, 14 April 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Victor Fusté, 23 May 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

13. Manuel González Quiñones to Santiago Iglesias, 2 February 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Manuel González Quiñones, 8 February 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Manuel González Quiñones, 17 March 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


16. El Mundo, 7 April 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 23 June 1938, p. 18; I have not been able to get all the numbers of the bills, but the information that they were approved comes from documents in the Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


19. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 10 March 1938; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 15 March 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 22 March 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 24 March 1938; Santiago Iglesias to


22. Auguste Schwab to Santiago Iglesias, 14 June 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Auguste Schwab, 14 June 1938; San Juan Rotary Club to Santiago Iglesias, 14 June 1938; Santiago Iglesias to San Juan Rotary Club, 14 June 1938; Asociación de Agricultores, Puerto Rico Bakers, Manufacturers Association, and Sugar Producers Association to Santiago Iglesias, 16 June 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

23. Ernest Gruening, Memorandum for Col. McIntyre, 13 June 1938, Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, File 9–0–22, General, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


27. Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Rafael Alonso Torres to Santiago Iglesias, 23 August 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Rafael Alonso Torres, 31 August 1938; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 12 September 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

28. Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 132, 135–136; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 28 September 1938; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Elmer F. Andrews (Administrator, Wage and Hour Division of Federal Department of Labor), 18 November 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


30. Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 19 February 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

31. Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 21 February 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
32. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 21 February 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Blanton Winship, 7 April 1938; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 7 April 1938; Santiago Iglesias Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 7 April 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 13 April 1938; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

33. El Imparcial, 18 April 1938, p. 2; Prudencio Rivera Martínez to Santiago Iglesias, 16 April 1938; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 18 April 1938; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 23 April 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

34. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 13 April 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 9 May 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Francisco Paz Granela, 19 May 1938; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 21 May 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 25 May 1938; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

35. La Prensa, 6 May 1938, p. 2; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 11 May 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 7 June 1938, p. 1; El Mundo, 14 May 1938, pp. 1, 5; Ibid., 16 May 1938, p. 3; Ibid., 17 May 1938, p. 4; Ibid., 18 May 1938, p. 4; Ibid., 19 May 1938, p. 4; Ibid., 20 May 1938, p. 4; Ibid., 21 May 1938, pp. 1, 4, 9; Ibid., 22 May 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 24 May 1938, p. 4; Ibid., 25 May 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 31 May 1938, p. 9; Ibid., 1 June 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 2 June 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 8 July 1938, pp. 8, 10; Nemesio Morales Cruz to Santiago Iglesias, 31 March 1938; Valentín Castillo to Santiago Iglesias, 17 May 1938; Ramón Rosa Sierra to Santiago Iglesias, 18 May 1938; Juan S. Mangular to Santiago Iglesias, 20 May 1938; Félix Acosta to Santiago Iglesias, 20 May 1938; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 24 May 1938; Santiago Carreras to Santiago Iglesias, 8 June 1938; Miguel Angel Vega to Santiago Iglesias, 15 June 1938; Enrique Arrigoitia Moreda to Santiago Iglesias, 23 June 1938; Antonio Mújica Rosario to Santiago Iglesias, 12 July 1938; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 121-123, 181-182.

36. El Mundo, 4 July 1938, p. 1; El Imparcial, 8 July 1938, p. 2; El Mundo, 14 July 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 15 July 1938, pp. 1, 5; Ibid., 16 July 1938, p. 5; Ibid., 2 August 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 8 September 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 20 September 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 8 September 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 20 September 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 21 September 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 22 September 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 24 September 1938, p. 5; Ibid., 4 October 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 2 November 1938, p. 1; Félix V. Acosta to Santiago Iglesias, 2 October 1938; Juan Carreras to Santiago Iglesias, 10 August 1938; Valentín Castillo to Santiago Iglesias, 27 September 1938; Angel Pagán Irizarry to Santiago Iglesias, 14 October 1938; Cayetano Coll y Cuchi to Santiago Iglesias, 17 October 1938; Moisés Echevarría to Rafael Alonso Torres, 19 October 1978; Moisés Echevarría to Rafael Alonso Torres, 19 October 1978; Moisés Echevarría to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 20 October 1938; Moisés Echevarría to Santiago Iglesias, 20 October 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Cayetano Coll y Cuchi, 25 October 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Moisés Echevarría, 26
October 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Angel Pagán Irrizarry, 2 November 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Félix V. Acosta, 19 November 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 1 December 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 21 December 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 122-124.

37. *La Democracia*, 14 March 1938, p. 3; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 15 March 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 24 March 1938; Juan Carreras to Santiago Iglesias, 17 November 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


39. Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 4 May 1938; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 21 May 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 25 May 1938; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 2 June 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 27 June 1938; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 22 July 1938; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 12 November 1938, Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 15 November 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 30 May 1938, p. 10.


42. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 28 September 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Elmer F. Andrews (Administrator, Wages Hour Division, Department of Labor), 2 September 1938; Elmer F. Andrews to Santiago Iglesias, 2 September 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Juan Carreras, 30 November 1938; Memorandum inaugural, 30 December 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 9 December 1938, p. 1.


48. El Mundo, 18 November 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 5 December 1938, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 23 November 1938, p. 12; José M. Vivaldi to Santiago Iglesias, 27 November 1938; Santiago Iglesias to José M. Vivaldi, 9 December 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; René Torres Delgado, El primer legislador puertorriqueño en Nueva York: Oscar Rivera García (San Juan, P. R.: Departamento de Instrucción Pública, 1979), p. 5.


50. La Democracia, 2 December 1938, p. 3; Ibid., 3 December 1938, p. 4.


52. Ibid., 20 December 1938, p. 1.

53. Ibid., 23 December 1938, p. 10; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 23 December 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 28 December 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

54. El Mundo, 27 December 1938, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to José Coll Vidal, 20 December 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

55. Statement by Commissioner Santiago Iglesias, 14 December 1938; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 28 December 1938; Memorandum inaugural, 30 December 1938, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 29 December 1938, p. 1; Ibid., 1 January 1939, p. 1.


57. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 8 December 1938, p. 6.


59. Santiago Iglesias to Harold L. Doughton (Chairman, Ways and Means Committee), 4 January 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 6 January 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 28 January 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

60. Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 6 January 1939; Statement of the Governor of Puerto Rico before the Committee for Reciprocity information on the hearing January 3, 1939, in connection with the negotiation for a supplemental trade agreement with Cuba, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; see Congressional Record, vol. 84, pp. A 107, A 234.


62. Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 6 January 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 12 January 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 21
January 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 28 January 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 4 February 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 11 February 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 18 February 1939; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 24 January 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 29 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 2 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 5 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 22 February 1939, p. 1; see Congressional Record, vol. 84, p. A 298; Ickes, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 42-43.

63. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 5 January 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

64. La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 3 January 1939, p. 6; Ibid., 4 January 1939, p. 6; El Mundo, 4 January 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 8 January 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 19 January 1939, p. 1.


66. El Mundo, 29 January 1939, p. 1; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 28 January 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Frank Murphy (Attorney General), 27 January 1939; Frank Murphy to Santiago Iglesias, 31 January 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

67. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 7 January 1939; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 7 January 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 18 January 1939; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 19 January 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 20 January 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


69. Santiago Iglesias to William D. López, 20 January 1939; William D. López to Santiago Iglesias, 23 January 1939; Santiago Iglesias to William D. López, 27 January 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 1 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 2 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 9 February 1939; Santiago Carreras to Santiago Iglesias, 10 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Santiago Carreras, 15 February 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 29 January 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 30 January 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 31 January 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 1 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 4 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 7 February 1939, p. 1; El Imparcial, 30 January 1939, p. 2; Ibid., 7 February 1939, pp. 2, 3.

70. Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 11 February 1939; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 23 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 24 February 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 25 February 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 24 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 25 February 1939, p. 5.


72. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 24 February 1939; Nicolás Nogueras
Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 25 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 3 March 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 6 March 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Imparcial, 28 February 1939, p. 2.

73. Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 11 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 13 March 1939; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 17 March 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 7 March 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 15 March 1939, p. 1.

74. Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias 17 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 20 March 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


76. Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, pp. 399-412, 418-431; Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 124-125; see Epifanio Fiz Jiménez, El racket del capitolio (San Juan, P. R.: Editorial Esther, 1944); El Mundo, 20 March 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 24 March 1939, pp. 1, 4, 10; Ibid., 25 March 1939, p. 9; La Democracia, 21 March 1939, pp. 1, 4; El Imparcial, 22 March 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 27 March 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 29 March 1939, p. 2; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 22 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 24 March 1939; Santiago Carreras to Santiago Iglesias, 25 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Santiago Carreras, 27 March 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

77. Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 17 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 6 May 1939, p. 1.

78. Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, pp. 437-444; El Mundo, 10 April 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 11 April 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 13 April 1939, pp. 1, 4; Ibid., 14 April 1939, pp. 1, 5, 9; Ibid., 15 April 1939, pp. 1, 5, 9; Ibid., 24 April 1939, p. 1; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 27 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

79. Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 9 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 24 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 29 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 17 April 1939; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 25 April 1939, p. 8.

80. Santiago Iglesias to Cristóbal del Campo, 8 February 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

81. Santiago Iglesias to Juan Carreras, 5 April 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Mateo Pérez Sanjurjo, 6 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

82. Santiago Iglesias to Antonio Reyes Delgado, 6 April 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Enrique Ramírez Moll, 24 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

84. *El Mundo*, 29 March 1939, p. 5; Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 12 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
97. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 12 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
99. *Ibid.*, 1 January 1939, p. 1; Santiago Iglesias to Cordell Hull, 6 March 1939; Benjamin Summer Welles to Santiago Iglesias, 10 March 1939; Ramiro L. Colón to Santiago Iglesias, 20 May 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Ramiro L. Colón, 23 May 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
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102. Henry A. Wallace to Santiago Iglesias, 18 August 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

103. See Congressional Record, vol. 84, pp. 4376, 4990, 5060, 5090, 5471, 7313, 7931, 8799, 11117, A 1577, A 1685, A 1803, A 2179, A 2345, A 2485, A 2704, A 3388; El Mundo, 6 April 1939, p. 4; Ibid., 9 April 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 11 April 1939, p. 6; Ibid., 18 April 1939, p. 10; Ibid., 19 April 1939, p. 10; Ibid., 23 April 1939, p. 9; Ibid., 24 April 1939, p. 7; Ibid. 28 April 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 1 May 1939, p. 14; Ibid., 4 May 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 20 May 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 24 May 1939, p. 10; Ibid., 8 June 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 12 June 1939, p. 6; Ibid., 21 June 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 27 June 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 2 July 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 11 July 1939, p. 1 Ibid., 12 July 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 6 July 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 23 July 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 4 August 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 9 August 1939, p. 1; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 1 April 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 8 April 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 15 April 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 22 April 1939; Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias, 6 May 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


105. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 136.


107. Silvestrini de Pacheco, op. cit., p. 136; El Mundo, 23 February 1936, p. 4; Ibid., 27 February 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 7 March 1939, p. 8; Santiago Iglesias
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108. Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 4 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 8 February 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 11 February 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Prudencio Rivera Martínez, 9 February 1939; Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 25 February 1939, p. 4.


110. Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 11 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 13 March 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 13 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 16 March 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 17 March 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to William Green, 17 March 1939; Nicolás Rivera to Blanton Winship, 17 March 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 26 March 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


112. Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-142; *La Democracia*, 3 May 1939, p. 3; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 13 March 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 15 April 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 18 April 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 22 April 1939; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 30 April 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

113. See *Congressional Record*, vol. 84, pp. 5471, 5476, A 2179; *El Mundo*, 12 May 1939, p. 3; Nicolás Nogueras Rivera to Santiago Iglesias, 13 May 1939, Archive of Igualdad Nogueras de Pagán.


117. Silvestrini de Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.

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150. Ibid., 17 July 1939, pp. 1, 4, 5; Ibid., 18 July 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 1 August 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 5 August 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 19 August 1939, p. 1; La Prensa, 22 July 1939, p. 2; El País, 31 July 1939, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 31 July 1939, p. 1; El Imparcial, 5 August 1939, p. 5; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 20 July 1939; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias, 29 July 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 140, 145.

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154. Ibid., 5 August 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 8 August 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 10 August 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 14 August 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 16 August 1939, p. 1.

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163. R. González Requena (Acting Assistant Commissioner of the Interior) to Santiago Iglesias, 9 September 1939; Santiago Iglesias to R. González Requena, 11 September 1939; Santiago Iglesias to R. González Requena, 29 September 1939; Santiago Iglesias to Gilberto M. Font (Executive Director of San Juan Housing Authority) 8 September 1939; Eloy Ruiz (Acting Executive Director of San Juan Housing Authority), 7 October 1939; William Lemke (Representative of North Dakota) to Santiago Iglesias, 23 September 1939; Santiago Iglesias to William Lemke, 26 September 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 20 September 1939, p. 5; *Ibid.*, 23 September 1939, p. 1.

164. Santiago Iglesias to Nicolás Nogueras Rivera, 13 September 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; *El Mundo*, 20 September 1939, p. 5.

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170. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 25 October 1939; Santiago Iglesias
to Bolívar Pagán, 26 October 1939; William Green to Santiago Iglesias, 6
November 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 26 October
1939, p. 1; Ibid., 27 October 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 10 November 1939, p. 4.
171. La Prensa, 25 October 1939, p. 2; El Imparcial, 26 October 1939, p.
3.
172. Santiago Iglesias to Bolívar Pagán, 26 October 1939, Archive of
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173. El Mundo, 9 November 1939, p. 9; Bolívar Pagán to Santiago Iglesias,
9 November 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.
174. El Mundo, 4 December 1939, p. 5; El Imparcial, 4 December 1939, p.
1; Bothwell, ed., op. cit., vol. I-I, pp. 603-612; Pagán, Historia de los partidos
políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956), vol. II, pp. 145-146; Interview with
Néstor Rigual, 13 May, Carolina, P.R.; Interview with Miguel A. García
Méndez, 8 July 1981, San Juan, P. R.

In the 1940 elections there were 714,960 registered electors and 568,851
(79 per cent) voted (in 1936 the electors were 764,602 and the voters were
549,500, 72 per cent, thus 49,602, 6 per cent, less electors voted). The Coalition
received 222,423 votes (39 per cent) in 1940 as opposed to 297,033 votes (54 per
cent) in 1936. The Republican Union vote was reduced by 28 per cent (from
152,739 in 1936 to 134,582 in 1940) while the Socialists vote decreased from 26
per cent to 15.4 per cent (from 144,249 to 87,841). The Popular Democratic Party
obtained 214,857 votes (37.7 per cent) while Tripartism got 130,299 votes (23
per cent). The resident commissioner elected was a Socialist, the Senate was
Popular (10 Populards and 9 Coalitionists), and the House had 18 each for both
Populards and Coalitionists, and 3 for the Tripartist. During the electoral Cam-
paign Martínez Nadal was unable to be very active due to his declining health and
this was crucial for losing the Mayagüez senatorial district and thus the Senate's
control. He was able, however, to hold most of his voters as his Party was reduced
by only 12 per cent. The Socialist Party lost 39 per cent of its electors. Had
Iglesias been alive, the electoral results would have been different. The Socialists
would have lost fewer voters than the Republican-Unionists and he could have
prevented the split between Martínez Nadal and García Méndez as he had
excellent relations with both leaders. In towns where the forces of the Coalition
were considered equal with the Populards, the Tripartists voted for the Popular and
in this way the Coalition was definitely defeated. It should be noted that the pro-
statehood vote (Coalitionists and Tripartists) added to 62 per cent of the
electorate. Please see Appendix II for a table with the Socialist vote.
175. Sinclair Snow, op. cit., pp. 143-144; Harvey A. Levenstein, Labor
Organizations in the United States and Mexico, A History of Their Relations
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 146-166;
Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias on trip to Mexico, Archive of Igualdad
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176. Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias on trip to Mexico; Santiago iglesias to Laura Iglesias, 6 November 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.


178. Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias on trip to Cuba; Santiago Iglesias to daughters, 22 November 1939, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; Levenstein, op. cit., pp. 165-166; Snow, op. cit., p. 146.

179. Levenstein, op. cit., p. 166.

180. Memorandum by Santiago Iglesias on trip to Cuba, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

181. El Mundo, 5 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 6 December 1939, pp. 1, 8; El País, 6 December 1939, p. 1; La Democracia, 6 December 1939, p. 1; El Imparcial, 6 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 8 December 1939, pp. 1, 2; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 5 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 6 December 1939, p. 1.


183. Plutarco Elías Calles to América Iglesias Thatcher, 13 April 1940, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán.

184. El Mundo, 6 December 1939, p. 8; Ibid., 7 December 1939, pp. 1, 7; Ibid., 8 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 9 December 1939, p. 14; Ibid., 11 December 1939, p. 1; El País, 7 December 1939, p. 1; La Democracia, 7 December 1939, pp. 1, 2; El Imparcial, 9 December 1939, p. 10; Ibid., 11 December 1939, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 11 December 1939, p. 1.

185. Turnos de duelo y guardias de honor, Archive of Igualdad Iglesias de Pagán; El Mundo, 12 December 1939, p. 5; Ibid., 13 December 1939, p. 4; El País, 12 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 13 December 1939, p. 1; El Imparcial, 12 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 13 December 1939, pp. 1, 2; La Democracia, 12 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 13 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 14 December 1939, p. 1; La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 12 December 1939, p. 1; Ibid., 13 December 1939, p. 1; Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, pp. 379-381.


187. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

188. El Mundo, 7 April 1940, p. 1; Ibid., 10 April 1940, p. 1; Ibid., 19 April 1940, p. 1; Ibid., 20 April 1940, p. 1; El País, 10 April 1940, p. 1; Ibid., 13 April 1940, p. 1; El Imparcial, 12 April 1940, p. 2; Rigual, Incidencias parlamentarias en Puerto Rico, vol. II, pp. 453-456.
Conclusion

When Santiago Iglesias arrived in Puerto Rico in 1896, he encountered an enormous mass of workers. The majority of them were illiterate peasants with a mere handful of educated artisans. There were some labor associations in which a very small percentage of workers participated. These associations consisted of a few brotherhoods, guilds, mutualist societies, casinos, and cooperatives. There was, however, no organized labor movement. Iglesias, together with a handful of artisans and following radical European patterns, rapidly began a systematic campaign to organize labor unions. In his labor activism, Iglesias did not follow romantic or purely idealistic tactics as he knew that the workers had no economic strength. Such tactics would have been suicidal. He was a realistic and pragmatic socialist leader, a social democrat, and not an utopian or extremist socialist.

In the beginning, Iglesias adapted his European labor experience to the Puerto Rican reality. With the influence of Samuel Gompers' trade-unionist labor philosophy and the American Federation of Labor tactics, Iglesias began to follow the American form of labor activism rather than the European patterns. This progressive style of labor activism and socialism was still opposed by the Puerto Rican upper classes and the absentee corporations. Iglesias believed that the transformation of the social order had to be achieved by way of labor unions, education, strikes, and political activism through the Socialist Party because the two historical parties were principally interested in the status issue. Santiago Iglesias did not betray any ideology nor did he "sell-out" to "Yankee imperialism." He did what he thought would be best for Puerto Rico.

It was not an easy task to organize labor unions in a country where there existed such poverty, illiteracy, poor communications amidst the opposition of both the upper classes and absentee corporations. Most of the organizing work had to be done person to person and union dues were
difficult to collect. But most obstacles were overcome and the Free Federation became a strong force by which social justice came to the masses as some labor benefits were achieved through better contracts and some social legislation. This, nevertheless, was not enough, so the Socialist Party entered the political arena in 1917. The Party was an authentic proletariat organization which fought for social democratic reforms in accordance with Congressional legislation. Facing an unfair electoral law the Socialists rapidly became a growing force. The Socialists always remained numerically the third party electorally, but in 1936 they won more municipalities than the other parties. From his minority senatorial seat, Iglesias defended the rights of the workers and did his best to achieve social legislation but he was no miracle worker. The Mediation and Conciliation Commission and the Department of Labor, achievements of Iglesias, were two milestones which were of great benefit to the workers.

Regardless of his achievements, Iglesias was, and is, intensely disliked by many. For some he was too radical; for others, he was too conservative and a traitor because he was against independence, made a coalition with the statehooders, and did not make Puerto Rico a socialist republic. The fact that Iglesias was born in Spain and was eminently pro-American was also greatly resented. This resentfulness appears to be in part a result of his success in running a strong labor movement and in leading a party that was an electoral force. Santiago Iglesias was a leader of vibrant labor unions and of a strong political party whereas many of his most vociferous critics have been only successful in forming merely esoteric and weak political and labor organizations. His most strident critics have never been able to be anywhere near as successful in the labor or political fields as he was. There have been cases when Iglesias’ work is condemned without the critic having made even the most elementary research.

When Iglesias took his Congressional seat in 1933, he was not unfamiliar with Capitol Hill. For three decades he had been going to Washington to defend the workers in particular and Puerto Rico in general. Iglesias was a strong supporter of most New Deal legislation as he had been defending social changes all his life. His accomplishments in Congress were a result of his previous experiences, hard work, and the times. More certainly this was accomplished because Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the White House, rather than if, Herbert C. Hoover had been president. Iglesias’ Congressional career will be better evaluated
and seen in a clearer perspective when studies on other important resident commissioners are done. One thing, however, is definite: Santiago Iglesias was the resident commissioner who did the most to unite the American citizens of Puerto Rico with those on the Mainland by way of Congressional legislation.

Throughout his lifetime Santiago Iglesias was a labor crusader with indefatigable enthusiasm and a profound belief in the goodness of mankind. His socialist ideals, extraordinary personal dynamism, and devotion to the workers succeeded in awakening the social conscience of the working masses which gradually accelerated their emancipatory struggle. He was able to transform the workers from their status of quasi-serfs to that of free and active citizens who began to fight for their rights and to raise their educational and living standards.

When Iglesias died, the working classes had benefited by salary increases, shorter working hours, and improved working conditions. Social legislation was a reality which would continue. The economic progress that came after 1940 was due, in no small part, to the seeds Iglesias had planted. The Socialist Party, lamentably, disintegrated and disappeared. The labor movement was in 1939 a strong and unified one that played a daily role in the life of all Puerto Ricans. Shortly thereafter, the labor movement lost its cohesion, began to split, and became Balkanized. At the start of the 1970's, 20 per cent of the workers were unionized; in 1992, less than 10 per cent were union members. The successors of Santiago Iglesias do not appear to have been able to keep the momentum the labor movement had between 1896 and 1939. To deeply study the life of Santiago Iglesias is to admire his deeds.
Appendixes
Appendix I: Salaries earned by sugar workers in the Coast and the Interior (1932-1938)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Coast 1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>Interior 1938</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivo and recolección</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Group A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Aguadores, cuarteros, regadores de abono, raberos, pastores, recogedores de caña, botadores de yerba, regadores de veneno</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Desyerbadores, alineadores, sembradores, regadores de agua, reparación de caminos, cortadores de semilla, bache-ros, boyadores, resiembra</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bombeadores</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Carreteros</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Zanjeros²</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Timoneros</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mecánicos de tractor para arar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The *bombeadores* were classified separately in 1932; in 1934 they were under Group A, number 1, and for 1938 they were under Group A, number 2 of this Appendix.
2 The *zanjeros* and *timoneros* were classified under the same classifications for 1934 and 1938.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>Coast</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>Interior</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Cortadores de caña</em> and <em>grueros</em></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Carreteros en recolección</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <em>Plancheros and llenadores</em></td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Factory</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Obreros-fábrica, bagazo, cachaza, recogedores de caña</em></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Engrasadores, encabadores, romanas de guarapo, defeca-ción, filtros, bombas, cris-talizadoras</em></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <em>Maquinistas</em></td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.42</td>
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<td>4. <em>Centrifugadores</em></td>
<td>1.60</td>
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<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.47</td>
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<td>5. <em>Mecánicos and electricistas</em></td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. <em>Auxiliares mecánicos and auxiliares electricistas</em></td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.47</td>
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<td>7. <em>Personal de artes y oficios al-bañiles, carpinteros y herreros</em></td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.04</td>
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<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1938</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Maquinistas de locomotoras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de vapor mayores de 20 ton.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.78</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fogoneros</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
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Source:
Appendix II

Socialist Party

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>24,468</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>29,140</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>56,103</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928*</td>
<td>67,990</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>97,438</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>144,249</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>87,841</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>68,107</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>64,396</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>21,719</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The votes for 1928 are the votes Iglesias received as senator at-large. The Socialist and Historic Constitutional parties had a fusion for the 1928 elections.
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